The podcast episode discusses the concept of the "network state" with Balaji Srinivasan, a former CTO of Coinbase and a general partner at Andreessen Horowitz. The network state is a highly aligned online community with a capacity for collective action that crowdfunds territory around the world and eventually gains diplomatic recognition from preexisting states.
The conversation begins with a discussion on the difference between a nation and a state. Srinivasan explains that a nation is a group of people with common birth, culture, and language, while a state is an administrative unit that sits over the nation. He argues that many states today are not nation-states, and that the concept of the nation-state is often misunderstood.
Srinivasan also discusses the idea of a "cloud continent," which refers to the internet as a new continent that has arisen from the middle of the ocean. He argues that the internet has given rise to new forms of power and governance, and that the network state is a new form of governance that is emerging from the internet.
The conversation also touches on the concept of "digital power," which refers to the ability of the network to enforce certain things without the same level of force as the state. Srinivasan argues that digital power is not just a soft power, but a hard power that can be used to compel people to behave in certain ways.
Srinivasan also discusses the idea of a "network union," which is a highly aligned online community that has a capacity for collective action. He argues that network unions can be used to solve problems that are not being addressed by the state, and that they can provide a new form of governance that is more efficient and effective than the state.
The conversation also touches on the concept of "polycentric law," which refers to the idea that there can be multiple regulators and laws in a given jurisdiction. Srinivasan argues that polycentric law is a more efficient and effective way of regulating than the traditional state-based system.
Srinivasan also discusses the idea of a "network state" as a new form of governance that is emerging from the internet. He argues that the network state is a highly aligned online community that has a capacity for collective action, and that it can provide a new form of governance that is more efficient and effective than the state.
The conversation also touches on the concept of "sovereignty" and how it relates to the network state. Srinivasan argues that sovereignty is not just a matter of having a physical territory, but also of having a digital territory that is recognized by other states.
Srinivasan also discusses the idea of "regulatory harmonization" and how it relates to the network state. He argues that regulatory harmonization is a process by which a group of unelected bureaucrats in one country write the regulations for the entire world, and that this can be a problem for innovation and progress.
The conversation also touches on the concept of "challenge trials" and how they relate to the network state. Srinivasan argues that challenge trials are a way of testing new technologies and treatments in a safe and controlled environment, and that they can be used to accelerate innovation and progress.
Overall, the conversation with Balaji Srinivasan provides a comprehensive overview of the concept of the network state and its implications for governance, sovereignty, and innovation.
Key takeaways:
In this episode, we’ll explore the concept of The Network State with Balaji Srinivasan. As the world becomes more digital, it also becomes more distributed. This is obvious on the individual level – how you order goods, the way you chat with friends, and the news you consume… all from a handheld computer. It’s also becoming more obvious at the company level. The pandemic shook the world into remote work and many companies have decided that maybe work can be done in ways they never imagined. But what about the state – whatever that means? Could the network rival the state?
In this episode we’ll explore what a nation state even is and how it may be challenged by a new Leviathan: the network. We also cover the difference between a nation and a state, how constants become variables, the cloud continent, digital power, your identity stack, calibrating risk, polycentric law, cloud regulations, building fast with atoms, founding vs inheriting, the powerful vs the powerless, and just about everything in between.
Timestamps:
0:00 - Introduction
2:41 - Nation vs state
14:38 - Constants becoming variables
16:12 - The cloud continent
20:10 - The three leviathans
30:00 - Digital power
37:20 - The identity stack
53:22 - Cloud first, land last
55:49 - Diplomatic recognition
1:01:47 - Root access to land
1:06:35 - Calibrating risk as society
1:16:13 - Regulatory harmonization
1:28:15 - Polycentric law
1:34:49 - Building fast with atoms
1:38:57 - Looking to history
1:42:00 - Founding vs inheriting
1:50:46 - The one commandment
2:17:33 - The powerful vs powerless
2:28:46 - The competition for people
2:33:45 - Historical lines
2:42:23 - v3 of governance
Resources:
Balaji’s Twitter: https://twitter.com/balajis
Balaji’s website: https://balajis.com/
The Network State: https://thenetworkstate.com/
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Host
Had somebody actually said, "Oh, I'm going to found a currency" in 2007, 2008, almost every VC would have looked at them like they had four eyes.
Today, I had the absolute pleasure of talking to who I think is one of the most fascinating minds on the planet right now. That is Balaji Srinivasan, who you might recognize as the former CTO of Coinbase, former general partner at Andreessen Horowitz. He was also the co-founder of genetic testing company Counsyl and Earn.com, which was acquired by Coinbase, and an angel investor in many successful companies like Deel, Replit, and Superhuman.
Today we brought him in to discuss his best-selling book, *The Network State*. And as you can imagine, when you talk to Balaji for three hours, you can cover a lot of ground. In this episode, we cover the difference between a nation and a state, how constants become variables, the cloud continent, the newest leviathan, digital power, your identity stack, calibrating risk, polycentric law, cloud regulations, building fast with atoms, founding versus inheriting, the powerful versus the powerless, and just about everything in between.
So I hope you enjoy this conversation as much as I did. The content here is for informational purposes only, should not be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice, or be used to evaluate any investment or security, and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. For more details, please see a16z.com slash disclosures.
All right, we've got Balaji on the line. Balaji, thanks so much for being here.
Balaji Srinivasan
Great to be here.
Host
I have to confess, I am a Balaji fan. I've probably consumed an unhealthy amount of Balaji content. So very excited about this. Thank you for invading my brain.
I also read your book recently, which is what we're going to be talking about today, this idea of the network state. And I also have to say that similar to when I learned about cryptocurrency, it kind of forced me down this rabbit hole to reconcile what happened around me in the outside world, how monetary policy worked, as an example. The network state kind of did the same thing, but with other concepts, right? Like nations, states, what are these things? So I'm excited to dive into that.
But I want to introduce the audience to a simple frame that I think was again an "aha" moment for me, which is that technology has been able to reshape our lives at an individual level. I think many people can understand that, they can grasp that. Also at the company level, right? We've been able to start new companies that are digital. It also reshaped our ability to participate in that ecosystem. And then more recently, currencies as well, right? The network has changed that.
And your book discusses how technology can actually potentially create new states. Very interesting concept. And in order for us to dive into that, why don't we start off with what we have today, which are nation states. So how would you define a nation? And how would you define a state? And how do those interplay together?
Balaji Srinivasan
I actually have this at the beginning of chapter five in the book. The thing is, we hear the term "nation state" as a compound phrase, and we don't really give too much thought as to what it means. But it's useful to think about the distinction between those two words because they're actually very different.
The "nation" comes from the same root as "natality," like the Latin "natio." So it's like common birth, common descent. So like the Japanese nation, they have shared ancestry, shared culture going back hundreds of years, and shared language, all that type of stuff. Separate from that is the "state," which is the administrative unit, that thin layer that sits over the nation. The state could be of the Japanese people themselves, or it could be, for example, in 1946 after World War II, the American government was basically the state over the Japanese nation.
Once you think of this distinction between the nation and the state above it, the concept of the nation state was that every ethnic group has the right to have its own government. Now, that's an abstraction, but in terms of reality, many of the ethnic groups on the planet do not have their own government, or they do not have their own territory, which is another part of it.
If you're talking about the Catalonians or the Kurds, these are groups that have long histories and they have a legitimate nature. From the perspective of an 18th or 19th century person who thinks about the nation state, it would be considered a real nation, but they do not have territory in the global game of musical chairs. They didn't get a seat. You have a map of the world and everybody's kind of moving around it, and they just lost out. They're a stateless nation.
The Kurds, for example, their ethnic group overlaps with their historical lands, which overlap with Turkey and other kinds of places. And the Catalonians, for example, overlap modern Spain. The reason for this is that the maps we have are actually very abstract constructs. If you think about a map of Africa, or even in the US, you have these straight lines on a map. Whenever you see straight lines on a map, that's some surveyor saying, "Okay, I'm going to put this here because of the latitude." That's some abstract political decision.
In a sense, a map is like a digital layer above the physical world. You don't see the lines of the map in the physical world. Often those boundaries on a map do not reflect the ancestral, long-running boundaries of language and culture. There is, however, a feedback loop where those borders or boundaries that humans impose then in turn change how humans start living. You will have something where there's now a sharp transition from French to German as you cross the Franco-German border. Signs change, languages change. That human digital thing has caused a digital crease in the physical world, whereas before it might have been more continuous. Before we had modern map making, before the world was mapped, you had a gradual climb, a gradual shift.
Once you think of the difference between the nation and the state—that the nation is this group of people with common birth, the state is this administrative layer—and you think about how that relates to maps, you can start thinking, "Oh, okay, the exact configuration that we have today is not only not how it's always been, but not how it always will be."
Host
Yeah, I think that was another aha moment for me, because in my lifetime, those lines have been constant for the most part. There are exceptions, but you kind of accept that this is the way the world works. These are the countries. And I think another interesting concept that you mentioned in your book is even the United Nations is perhaps named incorrectly. It should really be like "The Chosen States" or something along those lines.
Balaji Srinivasan
The Selected States. That's right.
Host
Elected states.
Balaji Srinivasan
Yeah. There's a guy, the Kazakhstan head, he actually made this remark. He said, "Look, if we allowed every group in the world with a legitimate right to self-determination to get their own territory, there'd be chaos. We'd go from 193 countries to 600." That's what he said. I think it's probably way more than 600, but that just gives you a sense of it.
I used to be against word games for the sake of word games, but then I got more into it. One way of thinking about that, if you know DALL-E 2... Exactly. DALL-E 2 had this tweet about "the age of the phrase." The short phrase—whether it's a tweet on social media, or a 12 or 13 or 14 word phrase to reset your cryptocurrency wallet passphrase, or a short phrase with a single character or word that's different—that changes what the computer generates. You can actually see that changing one word changes what is in somebody's brain.
The concept of Russell conjugation: "I sweat, you perspire, but she glows." The same behavior can be flipped neutrally, negatively, positively, without lying. You're just changing the tone of it. You can flip all of those variables negative if you want to make somebody look bad, or flip all of them positive. "He is in an uncontrollable rage, but she claps back righteously." You just characterize the situation differently. You Russell conjugate it.
The point is that slight choice of word—now with DALL-E 2, we can see a tiny change evokes literally a different visual in the computer brain, and it also evokes a different visual in the human brain. So with that, just to descend onto this concept of the nation: the fact that people have conflated the nation and the state recently—people just say "nation state," they don't realize there's a difference.
Many states today are actually not nation states. Japan is a canonical example of a nation state. Israel is. Others, like India, are more of a civilization state. There are lots of different ethnic groups. India is more like Europe—the South Indian and North Indian are historically as different as a Spaniard or somebody from Finland. India was not a country until recently. It was a civilization. They did have things in common, but a civilization state is different from a nation state.
Or you have something like Singapore or the United States, which is a multinational state where there are many different ethnic groups under one administrative zone. It's not a nation state, it is a multinational state. People could argue that there was an American nation by the mid-1900s. There was a lot of effort to kind of pack down people. Teddy Roosevelt talked about wanting the end of the hyphenated American. He didn't want people to be "Polish American" or "this American." Everybody's just an American.
There's an enormous process where the state was trying to pack in and centralize and remove those points of distinctiveness. Everybody just thinks of themselves as American only. By mid-century, you could argue that was somewhat successful. That was peak centralization. Why is that important? Then people start not thinking about the difference between the nation and the state. The state itself has formed the nation. The state now says the German state is Germany. The French state is France. The Italian state is Italy. The American state is America, and it waves a flag. It's to the state's advantage to identify itself with the nation.
One analogy I have in the book, which I think is a funny way of thinking about it, is labor and management. In a small company, they're actually literally the same. The founder is both the CEO and the person going and taking out the garbage or fixing the computers. Every job is done by one person. There's no division of labor. Then as the company scales, management and labor arguably get more alienated, and people can say management is disaligned with labor. What's interesting is those people who will accept that are often folks who will contest the idea that the state and the nation are disaligned. But it's actually a very useful analogy to see that they can be aligned, but they can also be disaligned. I'm obviously not somebody who's anti-management, but I recognize that you want equity structures and things like that to align folks.
Once you realize that the nation and the state are different, you can re-examine all these words. Example: "multinational." For a multinational corporation, it's actually a misnomer. It really should be called "multi-jurisdictional" or "multi-state," because it's not as if Google has a direct ambassador to the Catalonians and the Basques and the Kurds. It's actually talking to the states that have the administrative units. So it's multi-jurisdictional, multi-state.
The United Nations, as we just discussed, is really best called "The Selected States" because it doesn't have all the nations of the world. Many nations missed out on that game of musical chairs and they don't have a seat at the United Nations. Now you can realize there's a whole queue of peoples—groups really—with long histories and cultures that are boxed out of the United Nations. One that is very prominent is the Kurds, the Catalonians. One that is sort of becoming a nation is the Taiwanese, where there wasn't historically this huge difference from mainland China, or at least there was some difference. A lot of folks in Taiwan came from mainland China because the Kuomintang, when the nationalists lost the civil war, a bunch of them moved out.
Taiwan is a very famous example of something on the boundary between just a group of people and a full-fledged country recognized by everybody, because China leans on people to not recognize Taiwan. That's a famous example, but there are lots of other things in this sort of boundary zone in different ways where some countries recognize them but not all. It's not part of the club fully, but it's also not totally not part of the club. It's in this nether zone. There's a book called *Invisible Countries* on this.
What I'm getting at is once you distinguish nation and state, you re-examine words like "multinational," you re-examine words like "the United Nations," you re-examine words like "national security" or phrases like "national security." Really, that's "federal security." Nation is often used to mean the whole thing, but really it's like federal, like the overall government. You realize there's a base that's being stolen. The nation and the state are different. Once you realize nations are different, you're like, "Oh, well, America actually is not a single nation. At a minimum, it's binational."
Host
As you said, the nation and the state are not always aligned. And there is this gray zone. Many people accept that these lines are very concrete, very binary. I think many of the examples you've given show that they're not necessarily. And I think that relates directly into this idea of a network state, because if you accept that the lines are binary and set, you can't change them, there's no point in even going into this concept of a network state.
But as you dive into these gray zones—and just to bring up one quick example from your book—even just naming countries that many people didn't realize have emerged in the last couple decades. You think back to the largest countries like America, China, etc. They have much longer histories, but there are new countries on the map that have happened within our lifetime. So that was another example of gray becoming part of the existing infrastructure.
Balaji Srinivasan
This whole concept of constants becoming variables is a very important characteristic of our age. 14 years ago, it wasn't fiat currency and cryptocurrency. There wasn't a distinction. It was just currency. If you had walked into a VC office in 2008, 2007, and you said, "I'm going to found a new currency"... Well, actually, Peter Thiel and PayPal kind of tried to do that, but they didn't really say that was the thing. They said it was online payments. They had the idea of founding a currency. But the fundamental issue, which Satoshi later put a finger on, but it wasn't obvious, was decentralization. And then how do you actually make a decentralized backend in the blockchain, all this stuff we know.
Had somebody actually said, "Oh, I'm going to found a currency" in 2007, 2008, almost every VC would have looked at them like they had four eyes. They would have said, "What, are you going to go petition the IMF and the World Bank? Oh, and it's deflationary? You read Econ 101. Paul Krugman proved that deflation is bad and you can never make..." They just quote these priests to you basically to say that it's impossible. It would just be a joke to try and do something like that. Those people were thought of as jokes.
But Satoshi figured out a new way that literally started on a message board. He posted this on the Metzdowd cryptography message board. What Satoshi realized—even if this is implicit—is you can think of the internet as basically giving rise to a new continent. Imagine an Atlantis that just arose out of the middle of the ocean and people were just taking commuter flights there back and forth each day. You'd spend eight hours in Atlantis and 16 hours at home. That's really what the internet is.
How can I prove that? Well, we're in it right now. One way of thinking about it is to ask yourself what percentage of your waking hours you spend looking at a screen of some kind—a laptop, mobile phone, tablet, smartwatch, something like that. What percentage of that time is that for you, Steph?
Host
I unfortunately have to say it's probably like 14 hours a day, but I'm probably an outlier.
Balaji Srinivasan
I'd say probably the average person, though, it's a third of their day, maybe eight hours.
Host
That's right.
Balaji Srinivasan
That's up from basically zero in 1991. This Atlantis, this cloud continent—just to extend the metaphor—we're taking these commuter planes up to the cloud continent 14 hours a day and coming back. You're only spending two hours of your waking lives on the land and 14 hours in the cloud. For other people, it might only be three or four hours, but that's amazing. Billions of people have migrated huge chunks of their lives to this cloud continent. When I say billions, I mean three-something billion just on Facebook. Add all the people with smartphones. Let's say there are three to four billion people in the world. Half the people on earth are now spending half their lives in this cloud continent, half their waking hours. Up from nothing in 1990-something.
When we think about that, it's a different way of visualizing the whole thing. You realize the internet is actually on par with the discovery of the Americas for the Europeans. Of course, there were people in the Americas before the Europeans got there. I talk about this in the book. If you look at the Bantu expansion or the Mongols sweeping across the world, there's essentially no ethnic group that has ever had some location since time immemorial. They just killed the previous folks and took over their territory. Leaving that aside, from the perspective of the Europeans, the discovery of the new world was this huge thing. Similarly, the folks who went over the Bering Strait, their discovery of the Americas was this huge thing, this new frontier, which is obviously thousands of years earlier.
This internet frontier where we've migrated to will, over time, give rise to new countries just like the Americas did. People came there and didn't think of themselves as American or Brazilian or Mexican or Canadian. Nowadays, North and South America are slotted into the same grid as the old world. But initially, they thought of themselves as English or French. They were colonists, settlers. They didn't identify with the new land as primary and the old world as secondary. They didn't think of themselves as Polish American or English American. That's just English.
That's similar to folks who spend all of this time in this cloud continent but have not made the flip. You're spending the majority of your time in the cloud continent, but you're not thinking of yourself as a cloud person first yet.
Host
Yet is the key word.
Balaji Srinivasan
Yet.
Host
I think one interesting thing for you to share would be that for many people, the individual you might have just described, they in reality spend a lot of time in the cloud, but they don't actually see the cloud or the network as a true challenger to something like the state, or prior to that, religion. You talk about this as this idea of a new Leviathan. I think what would actually help people wrap their head around this is what are some examples of where the network did challenge the state, where there was almost like a head-to-head or strong sway that the network had in our wider world? One thing I've heard you talk about is Wall Street Bets, which people might think is a silly example, but there are larger ones. So what are some of those examples?
Balaji Srinivasan
The concept of a Leviathan generalizes. This is the least common word in Silicon Valley: God. In technology, it's God. So I'm going to talk about God for a second. The concept of Leviathan generalizes God. In this context, it's like Hobbes' Leviathan, and I'm just taking that concept a little bit further. The Leviathan is that all-powerful force that stands above all men and makes antisocial people behave in pro-social ways.
I have introduced three Leviathans: God, state, and network. It was actually gratifying. I have this passage in one of the footnotes by a guy named Jacob Burckhardt from *Force and Freedom*. Did you see that passage? It's like footnote N or whatever. There are a lot of footnotes, a lot of links, but it's great.
Host
Why don't you share what that footnote is?
Balaji Srinivasan
Here is this pretty cool footnote. I think it's cool, at least it's the kind of thing I think is cool. This is from a book that was written almost 200 years ago: *Force and Freedom*. I found this after I had written much of the book, just flipping through old stuff, and I was like, "Ha!" He identifies essentially three forces in the world. He calls them state, church, and then the third force he calls culture. This is way before the internet or anything like that. State and church are kind of what you'd guess. Culture he defines as all the peer-to-peer interactions between people. He didn't say "peer-to-peer" quite. Let me give the exact quote:
"Our theme is the state, religion, and culture in their mutual bearings. We are fully aware of the arbitrariness of this division into three powers. The division, however, is a mere device to enable us to cover the ground. Indeed, any historical subject must proceed in this way. The three powers are supremely heterogeneous to each other and cannot be coordinated. And even if we were to coordinate the two constants, state and religion, culture would be still something essentially different. The state and religion, the expressions of political and metaphysical need, may claim authority at least over their particular peoples and indeed over the world. For our special purpose, however, culture, which means material and spiritual need in a narrow sense, is the sum of all that has spontaneously arisen for the advancement of material life as an expression of spiritual and moral life. All social intercourse, technologies, arts, literature, and sciences is a realm of the variable, free, not necessarily universal, of all that cannot lay claim to compulsive authority."
That's like 200 years ago. What he's talking about in modern language would be that culture is the network of peer-to-peer volitional interactions between people, as opposed to the top-down impositions of the church and the state respectively. This relates to the Council of Leviathans. The three Leviathans I describe are God, state, and network.
How do you think about this? In the 1800s, what's the most powerful force in the world? God. Why? You do something wrong, you steal, God will punish you. That's why you don't steal. By the 1900s, enough people didn't believe in God. You had Nietzsche writing about how God was dead, and essentially the basis for a lot of civilization. You went from this decentralized law enforcer who would hit you with lightning bolts if you did something bad—people actually believed in that as the super cop—to people not believing in that anymore. Instead, you had the rise to a greater extent of the state filling that void. The uniformed police forces, the boys in blue. In the extremists, it's the Soviet Union of a totally godless state. In fact, that was a huge collision in the 20th century between the Soviet Union, which is a pure state, and America, which is a god-state combination. The Marine Corps of mid-century would say, "Forgotten country."
In the 1900s, why didn't you steal? Because the state would punish you. Even if you didn't believe in God, the boys in blue would get you. That's why there are so many police procedurals on TV. The state is portrayed as omnipotent domestically. Even a small little boy knows what a cop and a robber is. They can see the uniforms. They are also taught that the US military abroad can go and invade any country, blow anything up. It's big, bad, all-powerful.
Until about 2019, those kinds of things, while rickety, people kind of believed in them. Now what we're getting into is the third Leviathan, which is a network. That's the cryptocurrency network. That's the social network. Now you have a third thing. You don't steal because the network won't let you. Either you'll get canceled by the social network, or you will not be able to take it because the encryption prevents you. It is a third way of thinking about it.
God would smite you, 1800s. State will punish you, 1900s. Network won't let you, 2000s. These are three different theories of the prime mover. What is the most powerful force in the world? Is it God? Is it the U.S. military? Or is it encryption? All kinds of political arguments, moral arguments, cultural arguments, social arguments—a lot of them reduce down to "Who is my Leviathan?" What is the final thing that I'm invoking that says, "My dad can beat up your dad"? "My God is stronger than your God." What do I think of as that thing?
Of course, there can be conflicts within people of God. There can be conflicts between people of God and people of the state—Christians and the state, like the Soviet Union persecuted people of God. There can be conflicts between people of the state and people of the network, like the antitrust cases against tech companies or the State Department versus Tornado Cash. Once you see this, it's actually a vocabulary for parsing the world.
Just to generalize—this is a part that's not in V1 of the book, but it's coming in V2. With God, we're familiar with the concepts of atheist, monotheist, polytheist. Atheist doesn't believe in God. There's also agnostic, but just for our purposes. A monotheist, like a Christian or Muslim, believes in one God. A polytheist, like a Hindu, believes in many gods. Zero, one, many. We can now generalize this to the a-statist, the mono-statist, and the poly-statist. And let's say the a-coinist, mono-coinist, poly-coinist—or you might say "a-numist," as "numis" is the study of coins.
What's the a-statist? The a-statist is an anarchist. They don't believe in the state at all. It could be a crypto anarchist, it could be an anarcho-something. They just don't believe in the state at all. Zero states. Mono-statist is somebody who believes that their empire should run the world. Like a national greatness neocon, or somebody who thinks China should dominate the whole world.
Host
Or back in the day, like someone, the Roman empire, the Soviet, right? Soviet imperialist. That's like a monostatist. Our state should run everything. And then the polystatist is like somebody who's into competitive government, digital nomads, okay? Switching between countries, passports, okay?
Now, you can also apply the same framework to coins, to the network. A coinist is the no-coiner. They don't believe in coins at all. They hate coins, right? You know, Web3 critics, blah, blah, blah. Okay. Monocoinist is like the Bitcoin maximalist or maximalist of anyone. They think their digital currency or their network is just the number one, everybody, right? The polycoinist, I mean, there's actually, there's Polychain, right? There's multi-coin. Those are literally funds that were set up on the premise that multiple coins will exist, which was controversial at the time that they set it up, right? Like in, you know, I think Polychain was set up in 2015-ish, or thereabouts, multi-coin, I don't know the exact time frame, but around that time. I'm just naming those as two funds, which are Polychain and multi-coin. So the Polycoinist, okay, or the Polynumist is another term. Numist is like, numism is the study of coins, like numismatic, right? They believe in multiple coins.
Now, here's what's interesting. Once you have this cleavage of the world, you can realize, so that's like a three times three times three, many ideologies can be further slotted into combinations of these. For example, you have somebody who's the atheist, monostatist, acoinist. That is somebody who is like your secular East Coast establishment person who doesn't believe in God, believes in the US government, and especially the regulatory state, and hates coins.
You know, crypto anarchist, Bitcoin maximalist. They're an atheist often. Sometimes they're a monotheist or a polytheist, right? Let's say often an atheist. They are an astatist. They don't believe the state should exist, but they're a mononumist, okay? So that's a real conflict that's going to happen between the atheist monostatist anumist and the atheist astatist mononumist, right? That's a collision because they have different gods, right? That's going to be like the U.S. government and the U.S. dollar versus Bitcoin is as big a clash as like, you know, I don't know, Christian Muslim was during the Crusades or something like that. That's a clash of, you know, or like the Soviet Union versus the US. Those are two fundamentally different classes of ideologies.
I think to many people that would seem a little outlandish. Being the devil's advocate, what comes to mind is these are all collective terms or structures or things that we all believe in or don't believe in, right? Some level of belief, depending on where you fit in that matrix. And for many people, let's say we use God as the Leviathan, the repercussions, as you're saying, of like not behaving in certain ways for them, the people who believe in that, they're like, I'm going to hell. That's like a lot of force or at least imagined force. The same thing is true with the state, right? So if I do something wrong, I'm going to jail. A lot of force again.
What's interesting about the new Leviathan that you're describing as the network, there's force, but it's not approached the same way, if that makes sense. Like it's actually a lack of force in some ways. It's cryptography and it's using the network to enforce certain things, but without the same force that you imagine through God or the state. And I think that's maybe why it's hard for some people to imagine this being a Leviathan, because a lot of people view the network as what is just a bunch of semiconductors and servers and bytes running back and forth. But I think that's why it's important to think through, or to give these examples of where the network has actually been incredibly strong relative to other leviathans.
Balaji Srinivasan
Well, so here's the thing. Basically, one of the things I touched on there and I talk about more in the book is fusions of leviathans. So you introduce these pure forms of God, state, and network, and you can have fusions. So I mentioned God plus state is the American state, right? And there's different versions of network plus state. One is the titular version of the book, the eponymous network state, which is a fusion of network and state that you can think of as the network is the state, like it's the government, right? The network is the nation that underpins the state because you have a social network online that is actually giving legitimacy as opposed to a physically based nation where everybody lives together. It's a digitally based nation where everybody thinks the same and they're aligned that way rather than the same language. They have the same culture, but this culture is online.
There's different ways of parsing that. But to your point in terms of force, well, one fusion of a kind of network state is sort of what China is building, right? And actually what the U.S. establishment is building. And so you connect the network to drones, right? You connect the network to robots. You connect the physical actuators. And that's like one way of thinking about it. So now that absolutely is force in the physical world. And in fact, that's already being deployed and so on, right? Another way of thinking about it is, which is already there.
So this thread that I just pasted into chat. So this was a while back, but basically, I was thinking about digital power and how to articulate it. Digital power is not really soft power, okay? If you're deplatformed and seeing all your money frozen, that's much more than just influence. But it's also not what we traditionally think of as hard power because it's invisible, it's intangible. You can use it on 100 million people. There's no optics. There's no fireworks, nothing blows up. There's no nuclear explosion. The human brain is not trained to react to the use of digital power. It's not dramatic in that way. It's like a bit flipping on a server, right?
So I was trying to think about how to classify it. And then I eventually was like, oh, you know, here's a four-part classification: analog soft power, analog hard power, digital soft power, digital hard power, right? You could also say physical soft power, physical hard power, digital soft power, digital hard power. And what is that? Analog soft power, that's culture and influence, okay? Analog hard power, that's bombs and bullets. This is the classic soft, hard power. Digital soft power is ranking and recommendation. Digital hard power is deplatforming, freezing, and seizing. And so the key differentiation is soft power is probabilistic and hard power is deterministic. Soft power, you're persuading. Hard power, you're compelling.
So now you start to actually see, okay, that's another way, besides the obvious thing of drones and so on, or that's like compelling in a very gun pointed at you kind of way. You can compel in a different way with the network where you lock people out, either of their accounts online or they can't access a building, their key card is disabled, right? Their funds are frozen, their account has permissions reduced, they're suspended, et cetera. That's actually a very significant punishment. In China, for example, people, their COVID codes are used, the red and green zones are often marked as like COVID red, and then they can't travel. Their WeChat doesn't work. And yeah, in theory, it doesn't actually affect their physical body. They're not hurt, okay? But they're basically unpersoned. They are disconnected from huge chunks of the Chinese network. They have to rely on a friend to do things and so on. They are just much less independent than they were. It's similar though not quite there to exile, like when you're exiled from the community in Greece or whatever. So it's like digital exile.
I think digital power should not be underestimated. Even if it's like flips on bits on servers, it's growing in power. Drones are the most obvious example, but locking you out of an account or digital soft power, like downranking you. These are big things that can totally crash somebody's company. They can make or break you socially, et cetera, et cetera.
Host
Yeah. And I think it's directly correlated to our dependency on the network. So as more people go online, as more people spend more time online, as we talked about before, if people are spending eight hours of their day online, that's a third of their living hours, half of their awake hours in which that is important to them to some degree. And as it gets more integrated with work, let's say, that is a meaningful sense of power to your point.
One interesting aspect to consider as well is that with all of these forms of powers, there's tiers, right? So you could think of the most extreme tier of hard analog power or force is the death penalty, right? But you can actually dissuade someone from doing something by saying, applying a night in jail, or maybe it's a month in jail, right? So there's tiers to it. And I think there's going to be tiers as well to digital power, right? Where it's not just the extreme version at all times, but also it can be where you lose all access to your digital life. And that's quite significant. And the thing is your digital life just becomes your life, you know, in the sense of it's your login to all kinds of things, right?
Balaji Srinivasan
Yeah. Why don't we return to this idea that, you know, it sounds like this digital power concept may not resonate with everyone, but I want to give a couple of these examples because they really resonated with me that you've shared in your book and otherwise. So I mean, I mentioned WallStreetBets. It's maybe a silly example. Another example of a network utilizing some degree of force is Amazon HQ2. That's an example that you gave where actually like some concept.
Host
Yes. Persuasion though. That's not force.
Balaji Srinivasan
Yes, exactly. Yes. So there's convincing and there's compelling. Yeah. I mean, something else that you've said is your immigration policy is your firewall. You've also shown how networks can be utilized in unison with humans, of course. So another example that you've given is the power of 12 Instagram engineers to beat 12,000 from Kodak, right? So Kodak.
Host
Yeah, not an example that's original to me but yes, it's an important example.
Balaji Srinivasan
Right. And so I think it's important to recognize how the network does change the game. It changes people's ability to participate within these systems, to challenge the state, to challenge previous leviathans. And I think with that understanding, let's return back to the idea of the network state and actually building these new lines that many people assume are very much set.
Yeah. So I actually start off the book with this because people skim nowadays. And so network state in one informal sentence is a highly aligned online community with a capacity for collective action that crowdfunds territory around the world and eventually gains diplomatic recognition from preexisting states. That's like an informal sentence, but just to kind of describe that. Highly aligned online community, okay? So it's not just a Game of Thrones Facebook group, okay? Such as people who are there to pop popcorn. They are highly aligned. They all think of themselves literally part of the same community. Okay. And they've got leadership and they've got an org chart of some kind, and they've got probably membership dues and a cryptocurrency. And like, this is at the top of their identity stack.
You know, what you do is not what you are. You may not think of yourself as a left-hander, even if you are left-handed. It used to be, I'm Jim, I'm 32. I like the Steelers, live in Philly, whatever, something like that. Those are less and less common as bios, right? Instead, what people do is they put pound X, like pound BTC or pound this movement, pound that movement in their bios. They'll basically put their tribal flags there, both their attack and their defense. You kind of instantly know where somebody's coming from when you know their tribe, right? There's various shibboleths, various words and things people put in there that identify what gang they're informally a part of, what social network they are self-identifying with, and that probably also accepts them to some extent. They are also ready to sort of defend that identity. They're putting it out there on their sleeve. And often the attacks on somebody will attack them, ha ha, lol, another Bitcoin nutter or something like that. People will say that, right? Or, oh, how is meth? Some people will call it Ethereum meth, right? And of course, there's a zillion other things like this.
Then the next step is it has a capacity for collective action. It's aligned and it has common beliefs. Capacity for collective action, that's the part I was talking about with respect to the org chart and the leadership. Again, this is an extremely selective filter. The vast majority of online communities do not have a capacity for collective action. Why? Because I can, you know, if you look at a Twitter following, right? Let's say somebody has a million followers on Twitter, okay? How many likes does a typical tweet get? Actually, a pretty good thing would be if you have a million followers to have a thousand or two thousand likes.
That's actually pretty good. On the order of 0.1% to 0.2% are actually engaging with it. That is not what I'm calling a capacity for collective action. That is a capacity for popcorn action. Okay. Yeah, it's a cool treat food like this, right? Okay. A capacity for collective action would mean that when you put something out to a thousand people, you get a thousand likes. You don't get one, right? You put something out to a million people, you get a million people hitting the button, basically. That's what a capacity for collective action is. It's something where the group moves as one.
If you go and look at the web to intranet, okay, you look at Hacker News, and you look at Reddit, and you look at Twitter, there's an aspect of it, you can't unsee once you see it, which is its entropy. It's just 30 random links. Every time you refresh the page, 30 random links, okay? And what that means is intellectually, you're like, oh, hey, you know, a shiny object. Oh, there's another one that direction. Oh, that's cool. Book, right? And so what happens if you randomly move like, you know, a meter in this direction and randomly in this direction and then randomly in this direction, right? Do you make any progress? Probably not, right? That's actually what's like the so-called spherical random walk. You just kind of drift away from the origin or what have you. And by contrast, if you have a focused direction and you're like, I'm learning AI and I'm learning this today and that tomorrow and that and that and that, then you're moving in a direction.
Now there's ways of combining these, by the way, I'm not saying serendipity is always bad. The flagella of E. coli famously have the tumble mode, you know, where it like randomly seeks it out and then it finds the nearest food supply and then it runs along that thing. It's like tumble and run. Okay. So you can combine the random search with the directed search and you get a good combination. Okay. Similar in some to stochastic gradient descent or something like that. And so the point being, though, that if you just do lots of entropic stuff, you're not making progress on an axis. And if you have lots of people who are just online to hit random buttons, to doom scroll, to whatever, to just click this and that and popcorn, there's no compulsion. That's why they're wasting time, right? They're turning an hour of just looking at the screen into like a few clicks. It's a very low efficiency conversion of their intellectual energy into output. The capacity of collective action changes that. So now you have this meta-organism.
What's the third part of the definition? A network state is a highly aligned online community with a capacity for collective action that crowdfunds territory around the world. Once you've gotten people, you know, a thousand people in a discord or something like that, it might turn out to be, by the way, another kind of app because for example, discord doesn't like enforce tasking. Once you've done that, once you've shown a capacity for digital collective action, once you can get a thousand people to like something, which is hard, by the way. It's very hard to do that. Okay. And you might need new kinds of apps. Once you can do that, well, you can get to a very high bar of collective action, which is not just getting a thousand people to like something, but a thousand people to buy something. And in fact, not just to buy any old thing, but to crowdfund territory and move in together.
Host
I'm going to pause you there because I want to get to the rest of the definition, but that is something that is quite the leap. Of course, yes, I agree with you getting a thousand people to do anything, even if it's liking a tweet, that is hard. But get me from there to crowdfunding land.
Balaji Srinivasan
Sure, totally. So I had this article called "Software is Reorganizing the World" almost 10 years ago and I had a little table in there which I will let me see if I can find it. Classification of cloud formations taking physical shape, right? It's a very picturesque term. A cloud formation I define as a group of people who meet on the internet. Okay. And taking physical shape means they materialize out of the cloud and actually all come and aggregate in person. And even in 2013, almost 10 years ago, I was tracking these cloud formations taking physical shape. And here's a table, right? There's scale and duration, right? Scale is the number of people and duration.
So the simplest is two people. Scale is two. Duration is one day. So coffee with a LinkedIn contact, okay? You meet someone on LinkedIn, get coffee with them, whatever. That was I don't know if anybody's using LinkedIn today, no offense to LinkedIn people listening to this, but that was happening back in the day. All right. So coffee LinkedIn contact. Then two people for a month is you meet a remote engineer, you interview them online, okay, and you bring them in for an onsite, okay? Come in for a month. Okay. Two people for a year, that like match even in 1995. I mean, obviously, now there's Tinder or whatever, but the point is like match.com was like the beginning of that, let's say, 1995. Two people for 10 years, that's like eHarmony.com, like, oh, they come together. You know, it's like very high intention, form a matrimonial bond with somebody, right? Okay.
10 people for a day, that's like a hackathon. Obviously, it's been going on for a while, right? 10 people for a month, that's like a data science type program or one of these sort of immersive courses where people come and meet up. They take a course for a month and come somewhere. 10 people for a year, those are like hacker houses, which have started in the late 2000s. You're probably aware of some people who have kind of moved in and just got a big house. And the downside is communal living, but the upside is communal living. So the downside is there's other people around, so you don't have total privacy or whatever. But the upside is you get a much nicer house than you would otherwise. Like economies of scale get really good quickly with houses.
Host
There's also the digital nomad version of that too, right? Where you don't actually have communal living, but kind of as you talk about cloud first, land last, the digital nomad hubs like Canggu or Lisbon or Chiang Mai are equivalents of this, right? Like I would put them probably on the like 10,000 people for a couple of years.
Balaji Srinivasan
Well, it's funny because people flip through them, but they don't stay. It's interesting. It's one of those things where it's like maybe the 10,000 people in the cloud, there's like 100 people who are in that location at any one given time or something like that, right? That community is kind of there and then it's gone. It's like a cloud drifting through an area versus them all actually being present.
Host
Right. Well, I think so. That's an interesting perspective. I would say that's true for some of them. I would also say that some of them are actually quite stable. And there are many nomads that spend many years in a given place, if not their intention is for quite some.
Balaji Srinivasan
But 10,000 digital nomads in one location, while it's good and it's on the kind of track towards us, is not what I would call a cloud formation unless all of those 10,000 people are basically friends with each other.
Host
I see. Okay.
Balaji Srinivasan
And this is actually, this is an important concept I have in the book. One of the things I developed, and this will be more in the V2, I've got a lot of graphics and stuff. Quantitative definitions of terms that we've been using sort of verbally for a long time, right? So for example, what is a nation? There's like a dozen definitions that I've got in the book or something on that order. Somebody like it got a common language. Oh no, it the folks who lived in a territory or no, it a common ancestry. Or you have like Renan definition which I really like. It like a group of people who have done great things and wish to do great things together.
My definition is it's a densely connected subgraph in a social network. What exactly does that mean? A graph in the math sense, it's like nodes and edges, right? Densely connected means all nodes are connected to all other nodes. For example, if you have four nodes as a subset of a giant graph that has a hundred nodes, and those four nodes form a complete graph, they're densely connected if each of those four is connected to the other three. It doesn't have to be a fully complete graph, but it's just a densely connected graph that's much closer to a complete graph than a random group of 10,000 digital nomads might have no connections between themselves. So that's not what I define as a cloud formation.
This gets to our original thing about people are used to using the internet individually and informally collectively, and this is now formally and collective. If you have a densely connected subgraph amidst a bunch of loosely connected nodes, that's a natural unit of association where these folks should be capable of self-government, right? Because they all kind of know each other.
My friend Jan Talin, who's like early Skype engineer, very prominent investor and so on. He had a really amazing take on this, which I'm going to quote. This is Jan's phrase. He's like, "Balaji, I've been early to three things in life, AI, crypto, and dance." I'm like, "Dance?" No, so he's like the investor in DeepMind. And we've both been early on a bunch of this type of stuff. So yeah, I'm like, "Dance, what do you mean?" And so what he meant was basically that when you see, you've probably seen this in movies, but maybe you've seen in real life, you know, let's say there's a couple who's really good at dancing, right? What happens is they're like locked on, you know, like a very choreographed kind of thing. The entire dance floor kind of clears back in admiration and looking at the coordination of these two people. People like seeing other people moving in formation.
Or put it in another way, when you can get a group that is very highly aligned, as demonstrated by the fact that they've, even if you're not consciously thinking of, oh, they must've practiced a lot for that, right? Their motion is pleasing to the eye, but they have, they're obviously self-sacrificing. Like one person's elbow is not where the other person's face is at that time. You know, they have coordinated the whole thing. Okay. That is now something that garners respect from the outside because that's a unit. It's a coordinated unit. You can visually see it's a coordinated unit. These people are all acting together. And so as such, because they respect each other, they gain respect from the outside world. So to a non-obvious extent, this community, if it's highly aligned, if it can do a dance digitally, right, where it's moving in formation, that group, now you start thinking of it as a unit and you both respect them and you don't want to mess with them.
Host
If I have to rephrase it another way, it's AI, crypto, and social.
Balaji Srinivasan
Yes.
Host
Walk me through that.
Balaji Srinivasan
Because social technologies allow people to coordinate.
Host
Yes.
Balaji Srinivasan
Right? Messaging apps, discords. You're allowing people to do this digital dance. One way of kind of putting it all together. Have you seen the movie Transcendence?
Host
I haven't.
Balaji Srinivasan
With Johnny Depp?
Host
No.
Balaji Srinivasan
Okay. So I'm going to spoil it for the viewers. Spoilers. Okay. Go watch it. All right, fine. Transcendence is an awesome movie. It's underrated, I think. I think it's a pretty good movie. There's a lot of stuff that I like like this, like surrogates or whatever. They're just good sci-fi explorations of the potential future. Even if they're dystopian, which we can correct, by the way, on that note, digression on digression, many Hollywood movies are dystopian because they steal the base. They implicitly assume the present is okay. And then some tech guy came in and ruined it with their autonomous robots or something. They messed it up. Oh my God, we had this good Eden going and they came to the Garden of Eden and spoiled it, right? And the alternative framing is that the present is dystopian. And there's like a few founders that just might be able to get us out of the situation if only they could get past the bureaucracy, et cetera, et cetera. Right. And that's a different framing of like implicitly is it a present bad or future bad.
OK, point is Transcendence is I don't think it's dystopian. It hints at being dystopian early on, but then it actually gets more positive. One of the things in it is you have Johnny Depp is this AI that coordinates all these human beings. And I thought it thought provoking because it extends the concept of like what you can do with smartphones in terms of coordinating humans to another level, right? Where it's not just, you know, let's say you're an alien looking down at the earth and you saw like somebody walking in New York. Right. And then they suddenly take a right angle turn and you know they just going in a totally different direction. Why? Because somebody in Hong Kong hit some keys to send them a text message saying, "Oh no, actually the office is down the street the other way." Okay. That logic, like if you were some alien observing this, I mean, there's an obvious logic from our perspective. But like, it seems like it's a very subtle signal that moved from this person over here. Like backing that out is like really difficult to figure that out. Okay. But in the network, it's very visible. It's like, oh, this person coordinated this other person. They did a dance.
Okay. And if you take that up and it's not just like I send a text message every day or hour or something like that, we're sending packets. Now you can have a bunch of robots dancing in unison like this, right? Or a bunch of people dancing in unison or some combination of people and robots, people and servers, okay? And you can coordinate. And so Transcendence shows like essentially many becoming one, right? This is actually something else that's going in V2 of the book. There's at least three different ways of thinking about many becoming one. There is, let's call it, there's democracy, right? Which is an aggregation, an election. Many become one because you all vote and then there's decision and it goes up. There's markets where many become one where you have an order book, you have supply and demand, let the market decide, right? And you get a price. And there's actually a third version, which is harmony, right? Many become one because many actually become a single organism.
Host
In the case of network states though, you go from, yes, I understand this collective unison online. What would be the reason that someone would want to go from that online digital collective unison to doing that in the physical world?
Balaji Srinivasan
One point I make in the book is, look, obviously I love digital space and so on and so forth. This is something, by the way, which I found the V3 is hard to communicate because people will hear something and they'll immediately bucket it into V1 or V2, but not V3. Okay. So cloud first, land last, but not land never. Okay? Why do I say this? Whenever I talked about the network state or something like that, people would hear one of two things. They'd either hear, "Oh, it's totally digital. Yeah, that's great. The physical world doesn't matter. We all online, cryptocurrency, internet, blah, blah, blah." Or they hear, "It's purely digital, you moron. Humans are still physical beings. We still have guns. There's still buildings. You're going to eat online? What are you, you idiot, like another tech guy, stupid tech bro, whatever," right?
Host
In the case of network states though, you go from, yes, I understand this collective unison online. What would be the reason that someone would want to go from that online digital collective unison to doing that in the physical world?
Balaji Srinivasan
One point I make in the book is, look, obviously I love digital space and so on and so forth. This is something, by the way, which I found the V3 is hard to communicate because people will hear something and they'll immediately bucket it into V1 or V2, but not V3. Okay. So cloud first, land last, but not land never. Okay? Why do I say this? Whenever I talked about the network state or something like that, people would hear one of two things. They'd either hear, "Oh, it's totally digital. Yeah, that's great. The physical world doesn't matter. We all online, cryptocurrency, internet, blah, blah, blah." Or they hear, "It's purely digital, you moron. Humans are still physical beings. We still have guns. There's still buildings. You're going to eat online? What are you, you idiot, like another tech guy, stupid tech bro, whatever," right?
Okay. So they'll basically hear that it's purely digital, but it's not purely digital. It is a cloud formation that has the ambition of projecting into the physical world. Just like Google has offices all around the world and your login gets you into any Google office, right? Why do they have physical offices? Well, they do have meetup points and so on. You might argue there's less need for physical offices than there was, but there's still a need for it. You still want to have meetups. You still want to have data centers. Cloud first, land last, but not land never.
Another version of this are the embassies of a country around the world. Another version of this are Starbucks chains around the world. A chain that has restaurants or storefronts around the world. The examples I've just given are those that are basically commercial real estate, companies, or states like embassies. But you could have it where it's not a Starbucks or a Google office, but residential real estate. You could have essentially a network of communities where it's not a Google login to enter and you see a Google logo. It's not your workplace, it's your residence. You have essentially an ethnic diaspora around the world and you walk in and it's a little piece of home everywhere you go.
Host
Right. So I understand that. So why would you want something like that? Well, even more so than that. I can imagine why a digital community would want to have these physical locations around the world. Google is a great example for offices. I can also imagine an example where it's a bunch of people who want these co-living houses and they just operate around them. But one very important aspect of the network state is the need to be diplomatically recognized. So why that step? Why not just operate within the states that already exist, where you have these communities that are digital with a physical element? Why that extra step to be diplomatically recognized in your own state?
Balaji Srinivasan
Not every business needs to have the ambition of becoming a public company, let alone becoming Google or Facebook. It's totally fine to have a sandwich store or a hardware store. In the same way, think of there being a funnel. In the book, I define V2 as network society, network union, network archipelago, network state. Network society starts as one person with a dream, and they assemble a small group. Stage two is a network union where they're now able to take collective action, which is a huge step above 99.9% of online groups. Messaging apps and Discords are not built for tracking collective action. This is the unification of cryptocurrency and Discord. You will get something that actually tracks that and has leaderboards for people, and everybody can see who did what collective action and who participated. There's a karma board, all that type of stuff.
The short answer to your question is there are things that are useful just as network unions and just as network archipelagos that don't need to become full network states, just like there are things that are useful as hardware stores or small businesses that don't need to become Google. What's an example of a useful network union that can do digital collective action? An example I give in the book is a professional guild. A guild of designers. Those thousand designers, let's say they're in a network union. 99% of the time they're just chatting and exchanging info on their latest designs. Maybe each day somebody says, "Here's my work, I'd love a boost."
With a thousand people, if you have three people a day, each person gets like one boost a year. They can ask for it. They're actually asking for something from the community. In return, they're expected to give to the community and then RT or Fave or whatever. This is disclosed on their thing. They're like, "Look, I'm part of this community. I'm part of this network union. We're all signal boosting each other." Some folks may not be able to put in time or they may not have an account, they can put in capital instead. They'd be like, "I couldn't make it today, but I'm paying my union dues in capital rather than time."
That exchange rate is determined by the union leader.
99% of the time, this guild is boosting its members, helping to find those members a job. Somebody needs a job, they're out of work. Then everybody else, the other 999 people, someone can find them a job right away. It starts to be a very powerful support network, a professional guild. That's why these things existed for many years, we're kind of rebuilding them online. That's useful in its own right.
Then 1% of the time, that person is under attack online. The union leader looks at their bylaws. It's not an unqualified defense of them, but most of the time, online attacks are distortionary. They basically say, "Okay, this guy's being canceled or something unfairly. Here's their version of the story. We're going to signal boost that to get them out there." Because it is actually in somebody's time of need when their status is lowest that they need the boost the most. If everybody in the community acts together, the other 999 people cannot be attacked for supporting this person. You essentially join the union 99% of the time for upside. 1% of the time, it's cancellation insurance protection against downside. That's an example of a structure that should exist, that will exist, that we're going to see lots of. That's a purely digital structure. You can do that for designers, for electrical engineers. You'll see all kinds of guilds like this.
Host
That's digital only though. You don't have to have any physical for that.
Balaji Srinivasan
The next step is a network archipelago, which takes that capacity for collective action that the network union has demonstrated and now applies it to crowdfunding territory in the physical world and having people live together. When even two people from an online community start living together, let alone 10 people, it completely changes everything. One concept I mentioned is that companies have logos, but communities have flags. An important thing is if you go to the networkstate.com, if you see the logo in the upper left, it is what we call the plus flag. The plus flag stands for new country. Get it? That's kind of clever, I thought.
Host
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
Balaji Srinivasan
Because the plus, every day you're hitting that in the upper right of Chrome. What do you see? The plus, new tab. Every single app, the plus is new this, new that. It stands for the principle that one can create a new country. It also stands for win and help win, positive sum. You could imagine each of these people, they're part of this network union, and they want to become part of a network archipelago. They're hanging the flag of their community in their room. They're seeing it every day. They've got it on their profile. Eventually, they save up the money or the time. They're able to get a remote work job or something like that.
They're able to find one of the other 999 people in the community and be like, "Hey, why don't we go and get a group house together?" Now let's say there are six people who are associated with this in Boston. They start doing meetups and stuff. They don't live together right away, but they do meetups and other kinds of things. They build trust. You might like three of the people there, but only want to live with two of them. This concept of group houses, hacker houses, all that stuff is a big thing among the younger generation, as you know. As your scale increases, you buy an entire apartment building with 300 people, or you buy a small town.
Now you've got a self-driving car town because you have unanimity. You're the self-driving car community. You put 400 people into the middle of nowhere in Nebraska. A thousand people, whatever. Now the roads are all zoned for self-driving cars. You can rip up the roads. You have root access to the physical world because you have alignment.
If you're building a network archipelago, you want to build it on Burning Man style territory, or at least territory that nobody else wants. There's a website called landandfarm.com. You can see properties which on a per square meter basis are 1000x cheaper than Palo Alto. Why does Ithaca have higher property values than other things nearby? It's because lots of smart people move there and thereby increase property values by moving there. These thousand people can make something out of nothing into something in the same way you can take a domain name that doesn't have any value and turn it into something because all these pointers and backlinks are looking at it. The capacity for collective action, you have these thousand people, they take a territory in the middle of nowhere that doesn't mean anything and they make it into something. Now suddenly it's valuable. That collective action turns something that any one person could not have done into something that a thousand people can do together when they're moving as a multicellular organism.
Host
Just one example of that is Chengu, which I mentioned earlier. Back in 2013 or so, Chengu was very empty. There's pictures of it back in the day where there's like Deus and one other building and then a bunch of rice fields. It took one person who ran a co-working space, he worked with the locals, he built a fiber line there. Now if you look at Chengu, it's completely full, thousands of nomads. To your point about property values, I saw a tweet the other day of a friend of mine who lives there who basically said that his rent there was more expensive than his rent in Singapore where he used to live. So that's a perfect example of where property that no one cares about can be turned into property that people care about. But do a lot of people want to do this? How many people do you need to do this?
Balaji Srinivasan
What percentage of the world moved to the United States? A tiny percentage. That completely changed the world.
Host
It strikes me that there are people who will want to do this, but will they want to move to rural Utah or some land that no one cares about? I guess you just need a few is what you're saying.
Balaji Srinivasan
A tiny percentage of the world moved to the US. The example of the United States has been because there was new land, so to speak, from the perspective of the Europeans. There were social experiments in democracy and capitalism in particular that then propagated back to Europe and to the rest of the world. The French Revolution, while it was bad, was influenced by the American Revolution. Lots of the democratization, lots of the market stuff, all kinds of things happened in the new world and came back to the old world. To an extent that I don't think people fully appreciate. It's the Margaret Mead thing: "Never doubt that a small group of highly motivated people can change the world. Indeed, it's the only thing that ever has."
One thing I think that's kind of interesting is, just to hover on that point for a second, mass appeal comes last. That's after something is completely proved out. Nothing ever goes from 0% to mass movement overnight. And even if it does seem to do that, it is because lots of prerequisites were installed. Billions of people with smartphones, experience with Instagram, 5G LTE, the App Store. That's why TikTok could ride behind all those prerequisites because people knew what social networks were, what smartphones were, what App Stores were, what a feed was. TikTok is a well-executed company, but they were not an overnight success 10 years in the making. There were like 10 companies in the making.
Host
It's very easy to dismiss this idea of startup societies and then eventually a network state because there are going to be many failures, just like there are many failures with startups. Then we look at the successes today, but there are almost infinite numbers of people who tried to build the next Google somewhere in the last 30 years. Of course, we see the eventual success. I wonder how you think about that in terms of the number of experiments that need to happen in order to see this network state.
Balaji Srinivasan
How valuable do you think plane flight is?
Host
I don't know. Very valuable.
Balaji Srinivasan
Very valuable, right? Okay. So click this link and this is a century of aircraft accidents. You can literally see in this graph, as of August 2022, 28,896 accidents with 159,859 fatalities in basically the last hundred something years of aviation. 28,000 fatal accidents, and a lot of non-fatal accidents. The point is, no plane crashes, no planes. No train crashes, no trains. No explosions, no internal combustion engines. No risk, no reward.
In a big way, we have virtualized all risk and that's progress. A lot of risk has been virtualized where it's just financial risk. I kind of think people are foolhardy about physical risk. People will do bungee jumping or skydiving. They'll take risks with no reward beyond just the thrill of it. But they'll be averse to, "Let me try an experimental drug that could save your life." Euthanasia is legal. It's the sixth leading cause of death in Canada. You can kill yourself, but you can't take an experimental drug. That's actually a misallocation of risk in the physical world. An alternate society would lionize those people who took one for the team and took a risk on an experimental drug.
This is actually at the beginning of the pandemic. We could have had a vaccine in a week. Why? Because mRNA vaccines could be printed out. All that time over those nine months was not spent manufacturing, but a lot of it was spent information gathering on whether the thing worked. There's a way to fast forward all of that. That would have been with challenge trials. What's a challenge trial? You have a bunch of healthy, brave volunteers at the beginning of the pandemic. They get the vaccine and they volunteer to expose themselves to it. You could have drafted the military for this. Groups of people who said, "I will risk my life for the country."
Soldiers. You could have asked for military volunteers. You would have gotten soldiers who would have volunteered. You could have gotten it from different demographics. You could have done this. You could have gotten extremely good data very quickly and iterated on it if you had people who were willing to risk their lives for the greater good, for the health of the population. Of course you'd pay them, just like you pay soldiers in a battle and you reward them for taking this risk for the whole team. They're not doing it to kill other people, they're doing it to save lives. I'm not saying that you don't need a military at times, but this is actually the kind of thing which is a brave thing to do.
That kind of society, which is clear-eyed about physical risk-taking, considers the pros and cons. It basically says, again, no plane crashes, no planes. There's a book called the CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics.
Host
I have not read that yet.
Balaji Srinivasan
The CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics is the kind of thing that I would flip through in high school. It was basically like printed out MathWorld or printed out the math portion of Wikipedia before that existed. All the compounds, especially the older compounds, you'd see "smell and taste like cyanide." How did we know that cyanide smells like almonds? There's some guy who took a hit for the team. He's like, "Almonds," and then croaks after that. The old school chemists were crazy enough to smell and taste the compounds. That's why we know how to do flavors in foods. It is because somebody is taking the hit to take that test. At some point, it needs to contact the physical world. Someone must take a risk at some point. No risk, no reward.
Now, the thing is, this is being pathologized to be like, "Oh, you're encouraging them to take a risk, so you're exploiting them." The issue with this is it assumes that there's no informed consent that's possible. If you're not paying somebody to do something, you're exploiting them. If you are paying them to do something, because you're paying them, you're convincing them to do it when they wouldn't have ever done it. So you're also exploiting them. Everything is exploiting other than letting people go bungee jump and take purposeless risks and self-destructive risks and military risks. That's all fine. But you can't have calculated risk. I disagree with that philosophy. I understand why people have that philosophy that all other people's physical risk is exploitation. But I think it can be done in a proper way.
I think the way to do it is you start with this online community. You start with a network union. You develop lots of movies. It's basically a content unit. You develop movies, you develop books, you develop little short films. All this stuff is open source. Have you heard the term devotional content?
Host
No.
Balaji Srinivasan
Bitcoin maximalists in a sense are devotional content. Lots of folks on Twitter are cranking out what I consider devotional content for their hashtag. They're cranking out devotional content: "Here's why my cause is good. Here's why you are bad. Here's why I want to abolish the police. Here's why I want to social security or something like that." That's possibly more like the kind of thing that gets you to a zealous level. Bitcoin gets you to a zealous level, devotional content.
So what you'd have is lots of movies like Dallas Buyers Club. Not exactly in that register, in that tone, but some Dallas Buyers Club and some Limitless.
Host
I've heard of it. I haven't seen it. I'll let you describe these two movies.
Balaji Srinivasan
Why don't you describe Dallas Buyers Club?
Host
The movie is about a man who happens to get HIV. At the time, I think there are drugs that potentially could cure him, but he cannot get access to them. Am I remembering this correctly?
Balaji Srinivasan
That's right.
Host
It's his fight to basically get that access and also get that access for other people. I think he basically ends up breaking the law, getting in trouble because he's getting these drugs to himself and other people. He ends up dying, I think, but sorry, another spoiler. But am I remembering that correctly?
Balaji Srinivasan
That's right. But basically the primary agency preventing him from getting the drugs is the FDA. This is based on the true story of Act Up, where people would do die-ins because the FDA was preventing them from getting access to these drugs. These people had this life-threatening condition. Fundamentally, they're miscalibrated on terms of risk. They want to minimize PR risk for themselves, the agency, as opposed to allowing people to take a risk on their own. Why is that? It's because media only covers it when a drug doesn't work and doesn't cover it when a drug does work but it's been delayed. Calculations of so-called drug lag, Alex Tabarrok and others have pulled things together on this. Daniel Hedinger has written about this. Depending on how you calculate it, the number of lives that has been cost by the FDA, if you have a drug and it was held up by 10 years, and then once it was approved, it reduced morbidity and mortality by X percentage. That means FDA's delay of 10 years multiplied by that is how many lives it cost relative to just taking the risk at the beginning and shipping it. There is risk.
But once you start having the ability to take calculated risks, you can move at the speed of software. Do you know, for example, who Banting and Best were?
Host
They're familiar, but why don't you share?
Balaji Srinivasan
We need to get Banting and Best zones. Banting and Best won the Nobel Prize in the 1920s. Why? Because they came up with the concept for insulin supplementation to treat diabetes. They had the hypothesis. They tested it on dogs. Then they tested it on themselves. Then they tested on patient volunteers. It's a miracle drug, people jumping out of bed type stuff. Eli Lilly had scale production for the entire North American continent in like two years. They won the Nobel Prize in like two years after they started. That is when pharma moved at the speed of software. That is what is possible in the physical world. Once we can get a zone outside the FDA, once we can exit the FDA, people don't understand how bad the FDA is. Your entire life, it's tens of trillions of dollars of value being held back by the FDA. It's incalculable how bad they are as an agency.
We saw this during COVID where they were holding back. The FDA is why we were flying blind in February 2020 because they were holding back the tests. That's why the journos were reporting that, "Oh, there's no problem. It's not in the US yet." Actually, it was in the US. Why was it in the US? Because it had actually come in via China and people were not able to run tests to confirm it because they had to get a so-called emergency use authorization from the FDA, which was delayed. What happened was some labs actually did civil disobedience, just like Dallas Buyers Club, and they defied the FDA. They just went and ran the test. Later, they got a blessing from the journos, who characterized it as civil disobedience versus running an illegal test. They basically blessed it retroactively. The FDA did not go and crack down on those labs that actually managed to get the testing data out there.
The vaccine could have been had in a week. The tests could have been there immediately. Fundamentally, the problem with the FDA is it's got control over the entire world. The single most important technological problem to solve in the world is a problem of regulatory harmonization. Regulatory harmonization is a process by which a group of unelected bureaucrats in the US write the regulations for the entire world. Just like a small website will outsource its login to Facebook login. Because, hey, Facebook's big. But in so doing, it's beholden to Facebook. I respect Zuck, but I also don't necessarily want the login system to be completely at the discretion of some engineer there.
In the same way, a small country like Czechoslovakia will outsource their regulation to the FDA, the SEC, the FAA. They'll say, "America's regulators should be good enough for us. We're a small country of a few million people. This is a big country. It's got a big market. Therefore, if a company can get through FDA regulation, then we'll approve the product for sale in our country. If the plane can get through FAA, we'll approve for sale. If it can get through SEC, then it seems like a decent financial product. We might list it on our stock exchange."
This is actually something that is sought by the FAA, SEC, and FDA respectively. If you go to their website and look for harmonization, they intentionally convene working groups with all the rest of the regulators in the world to say, "Use US regulations. Harmonize. Have everybody singing in unison." That thing is both big business and big government. Obviously the regulators like it because when you become a federal regulator, you're not doing it for profit. You're doing it for ambit. Ambit, same root as ambition. It's the scope, extent, or bounds of something. If a CEO wants maximum profit for their company, a regulator wants maximum ambit for their regulatory agency. They just want scope. "I'm the baddest, biggest regulator around." The FDA brags that they regulate something like 30 cents out of every dollar. They brag about this, how big their regulatory ambit is. The most powerful regulatory agency in the world. It's a Food and Drugs Administration. Literally everything you put in your body, every bite you take every single day is regulated by the FDA in the US and around the world. Its power is absolutely immense.
We have bionic eyes. They exist. We have super soldier serum. It's already real. Did you see that poster of mine?
Host
No, I didn't.
Balaji Srinivasan
There's a little mouse on the left-hand side and there's a myostatin null mouse on the right-hand side. Then the second row, that's the chest of the mouse on the left and the mouse on the right. That's literally like Captain America before and after. That paper came out like 15 years ago. People have known about myostatin null. If you just inhibit myostatin, there's different ways of doing it. You can do knockdown, other stuff. There's other things, follistatin. You could make somebody basically naturally jacked. The side effect would be, because muscle is metabolically expensive, they'd be able to eat whatever they want.
People say, "Oh my God, there'll have to be side effects. It's like Icarus, we flew too close to the sun." Actually, no, they don't have to be side effects. Yes, it might be plane crashes, but we eventually figured out how to get aviation basically without plane crashes. In the same way, you could figure out dosage and with enough volunteers and enough people, you could probably get very effective, either natural or artificial steroids or equivalents that would make somebody naturally muscular and fit. Just like we take caffeine every day. It's a known drug with known pluses and minuses. You have something that's like that.
This is just one example. I can give 50 more. The point is the FDA is holding back so, so, so much. That is why you want the network state.
So the progression: network union just does things digitally and collectively. It's like a guild working together.
Host
A network archipelago, now you're getting offline territory. But some things do, yes, require changes in law. So that's the highest level. A network state is something that has that collective action capacity and the content, which aligns people, has the physical footprint, and it has the square meters of physical space. And then the last step is it gets big enough and strong enough and morally aligned enough it can do the dance, right, that a city or state or country recognizes it and does a deal with it.
Balaji Srinivasan
Okay.
Host
And what are the precedents for this? So like Wyoming has its DAO law. It's literally built an interface effectively to the Ethereum network, right? Or El Salvador, Bitcoin's a national currency there. So it's built an interface to the Bitcoin network. Or a Nevada has done a deal with a lawn for the Geiger factory. Right? So that's like there. Okay. Or Amazon with HQ2. Google tried something like this with Sidewalk Labs. It got pushed back, but the concept was there. Okay. Point is that lots of these sovereign entities cities states countries or let say not lots enough of them Okay have been doing deals with companies and digital currencies that there is feasibility there.
And so what you want is you want a group of people, which is large enough, motivated enough, maybe it's 1000 people, maybe it's 10,000, maybe it's 100,000, maybe you need a million people, I don't know the scale of it. That's an empirical question, that they can go to all of the different mayors and governors and maybe presidents of the world. Because it's a parallel process. That's the awesome thing. You're no longer just negotiating with just the US government, et cetera. Forget them. The US federal government will be the last mover on everything. Everybody's over-indexed on, we need to reform the US government.
No, you need to exit the US government. I shouldn't say ignore, but just assume they can do nothing good. Assume they can do nothing good and basically just focus on the other 96% of the world who are not American and the enormous part of the US, which is breaking away from the US government. Meaning you want to try to get a sanctuary city for biomedicine, a sanctuary city for cryptocurrency, a sanctuary city for self-driving cars, where federal law is not enforced, right? Officially.
Balaji Srinivasan
And is it not enforced only along that plane, or is it you are creating completely new sets of laws?
Host
Well, it's both. So basically the thing is you can do this both within and outside the U.S., right? Outside the U.S., harmonization is rejected. So basically the unelected bureaucrats of Silver Spring, Maryland no longer have power. But why do I say that? Because those bureaucrats, I mean, for example, when Facebook is criticized, you know who runs Facebook, it's Zuck, right? You know he's in control of it. He is like attacked by name constantly. People personalize it. It's Zuck's company, blah, blah. Can you name a single person who works at FDA? No. Right. Despite the fact that every single bite you take every day is regulated by them.
There's zero personal accountability, okay? If they're ever criticized, it's this abstract thing of the agency, which has billions of dollars in annual budget and essentially infinite hit points, can't go bankrupt, right? It has appropriations from the government. So no individual is ever accountable there. They're not accountable to the electorate. There's no elections. And they're not accountable to the market because they have career tenure and can't be fired. And they're anonymous. They not even accountable in terms of public criticism. So it this totally unaccountable agency that determines everything you eat and drink your vaccines your drugs your this and that and has delegitimated itself in its performance over COVID where it held back the vaccines.
And also, you know, the Johnson Johnson vaccine got held back by like a few weeks over some stupid scare. Like, you know, the problem by the way, with the COVID conversation around like vaccines is either being like, yay, everybody is forced to take the vaccine or, you know, oh my God, vaccines are a world economic forum, conspiracy, Klaus Schwab, et cetera. And what there hasn't been is option three, which is we needed this in a week and we could have like essentially gotten them to the vulnerable first, even if manufacturing needed some time to scale, which it would have, you get them to like the elderly rapidly, right?
And you could have avoided like a million dead. That million dead is on the FDA's head, like because challenge trials could have been done, you know? And so that's like a different interpretation of the problem with this, right? Now, the thing is that no country around the world has this formulated in quite this way. That is to say, despite the fact that these are, you know, ostensibly sovereign countries, they don't have the narrative that A, FDA is illegitimate or delegitimated. And B, also, and this is important, I want to make this important point. I'm not saying zero regulations and a total free-for-all of all kinds.
I'm actually saying a V3, right? So I'm not saying just end the FDA. I'm saying exit the FDA. Just like you didn't just end the Fed and replace it with nothing. You're ending the Fed or exiting the Fed and replacing it with Bitcoin. The reason being, just to talk about this point for a second, because I think it's important. I've just spent all this time tearing the thing down. Now let me give something to it to build it back up again. People want a regulated marketplace in the sense of they want a regulator that will do star ratings, like quality ratings of, you know, most actors and bans of bad actors, right?
So you get a star rating one to five stars on something, you know, that's a product in the market and the zero star bad actors, the scammers are just like kicked out of the market entirely. One way of doing that is a national state-based regulator like FDA, FAA, SEC, et cetera. Another way of doing it, which is actually not thought of as such, but it's really important, is a cloud-based international regulator like Amazon, eBay, actually even Gmail, Apple, et cetera.
Balaji Srinivasan
How are those regulators? What do you mean?
Host
Well obviously Amazon has star ratings eBay has star ratings And they also kick bad actors right And they kick bad actors on the merchant side. Uber and Airbnb are also regulators. They're international regulators. They're better than the taxi medallions or the hotel regulators because Uber is tracking every trip, right? They're giving star ratings on both the driver and the passenger. They're checking that payment can go through and that the passenger is good for it and so on. And then they are decommissioning people who have low ratings on either side or are abusive. This is just, in a sense, a much more intrusive regulator.
No taxi medallion could possibly do anything like that. They do a very cursory inspection every six months that the windshield wiper still works. They're not getting reviews from every rider, certainly not collecting them in real time. It has to be like an accident for them to actually ride up that taxi driver. It has to be a right tail kind of thing. So the state-based, paper-based regulator is fundamentally less efficient than the cloud-based international regulator, which also has data from around the world. Moreover, it's inefficient in a different way where typically we think of the state-based regulator as adversarial to the industry, right?
Oh, the taxi regulator is supposed to be adversarial to the taxi companies, keep them in check. What actually happens is they form a duopoly against the customer. There's a cozy relationship between the taxi regulator and the taxi drivers, since the taxi drivers sort of, they get to know the regulator, but the taxi riders just flip in and out. Like taxi riders have nothing in common besides driving a taxi, but the drivers keep meeting with the regulators, eventually form social bonds. In the same way, the FDA is in many ways adversarial to pharma companies, but it's also cooperative with them against startups and against patients who want novel treatments.
So Uber and Lyft actually changed this. Airbnb changed this because now you have a regulator-customer-provider complex. It's Uber, the regulator, the Uber driver, and the Uber passenger versus Lyft, the regulator, and the Lyft driver for the passenger, right? So the star rating and the provider are linked together and the efficiency comes from competition between regulators. It's what's called polycentric law, okay? So it is within the same jurisdiction, you have choice of law, okay? I pick the Uber app or the Lyft app or in another country, Gojek or Grab, right? You have choice of regulator, right?
Now, even two choices is better than one.
Balaji Srinivasan
Yeah, I get that it's duopolistic in some ways, but there's other like ride sharing apps and so on, right? That's a model where you're not saying no regulation whatsoever. You're saying a choice of regulator. Regulators are actually incredible. in some ways, but there's other like ride sharing apps and so on, right? That's a model where you're in some ways, but there's other like ride sharing apps and so on, right? That's a model where you're not saying no regulation whatsoever. You're saying a choice of regulator. Regulators are actually incredibly valuable. Like these are multi-billion, multi, because the reason being, because people want to pay one price to enter a market.
They diligence a regular, say that's a legit regular, that one isn't. And then they don't want to go and test every product in the market. They want to know it's at a basal level of quality and look through it. Otherwise you have a situation where every coffee you get at Starbucks, you need to put a dipstick in it to see, you know, is this poisonous or not? So the point is, the V3 combines aspects of the V1 and the V2 to get like a third version. For example, with Bitcoin, right? It has aspects of gold, which people talk about, but it also has aspects of fiat. Why? You can send it across borders, you can represent it digitally, you can program with it, and so on and so forth.
You can't do any of those things with an inert block of gold. So it's digital gold, right? It is not just a dumb, you know, throwback to V1. It's not competitive as V1. V2 beat V1 for a reason. V3 takes the good aspects of V1 and the good aspects of V2 to make something that's better than both, right? This would be a V3 where, yeah, you don't want the totally unregulated market for patent medicines and scams and so on and so forth. They had great upside and they had great downside. We also don't want this, you know, harmonized environment where unelected bureaucrats just impose uniformity on everything and no one can take any risks.
And it's so risk intolerant that it's the riskiest of all, right? Because if you don't take small risks, you end up taking the biggest risk, which is not taking risks. And then you just, you never explore anything new and you can't adapt, right? So the V3 says no regulation is bad, but this regulation is also bad and we can do better with cloud regulators, right? international regulators. And what would that look like? Again, just to go into the FDA example, because the reason I go into this in great detail is this is one of the most motivating things as to why we need new states, right? There's a certain level of innovation you can get to that's sub-sovereign, and there's a level that you actually need sovereignty for of some kind, at a minimum, a sanctuary city for biomedicine.
Some governor, right, could put their state on the map by saying, this is a zone where, let's say it's Texas, right? They say, guess what? approvals will now go through UT Austin. Because the thing is, the reason is you need some name brand right That the people respect locally to be the regulars Okay we got some scientists there We got some physicians there and so on So you have some reputable brand in this jurisdiction which is taking over review So you really not changing that much What you are doing now is you introducing the crucial thing of competition between regulators, right? And you might say, oh, this is in biomedicine.
I don't know, man, like, you know, bio is like really important. And the thing is, people just don't know about this market. Okay. But basically routes outside the FDA, like right to try laws, like CLIA labs and the LDT pathway, like compounding pharmacies, off-label prescription by MDs and countries that aren't fully harmonized with FDA. For example, you can go to Germany for stem cells. Each of these things has been attacked by FDA. So off-label, people think it's bad, right? But there's a good article called like assessing the FDA by the anomaly of off-label prescription, right? I think this is by Tabarrok, which is worth reading.
This almost 20 years ago. And essentially his point is that while off-label sounds bad, oh, right, it actually means that a doctor can prescribe a drug for some purpose other than what the FDA approves it for. And that's actually the way that like all kinds of things seem to work. Once you understand the degree to which FDA holds things back, once you understand that they have harmonized the whole world, once you understand democracy doesn't work in this case because they're not up for election. You've never run an election on the FDA, okay? Markets don't work because they can't be fired. They're not like a company.
They don't go bankrupt. So whether you believe in an electoral or market theory of accountability, they are completely unaccountable and anonymous, right? The press isn't holding them accountable either, right? So you can only exit them and you need a new technique to exit them. That can be outside the US. You get places like Germany and so on to allow for stem cells. You get places that allow for biomedical treatments that the US is holding back, right? Or it's inside the US and you're having sanctuary cities. Just like sanctuary city, they won't enforce federal immigration law, right? So precedent has been set.
In fact, actually states are diverging from the federal government on education, on gun laws, on abortion laws, on marijuana laws. Like if medical marijuana can be legal, why can't, you know, like every other kind of experimental drug that you might want to take be potentially legal, right? And obviously you have some framework around it. It's not no framework, but finally you have choice. You have something that's outside this monopoly of the state regulator, right? Again, unelected and unfireable. I mean, there's so many other reasons I think that we need innovation on sovereignty but that alone is how we get to life extension.
That alone is how we get to transhumanism. We get to brain machine interface. We get to limb regeneration and super soldier serum and all this stuff. There so much stuff that's being held back. Okay. Like by, I mean, that's why you see articles constantly, like scientists have discovered X, right? And you're like, wow, that's amazing. You're like reversing this guy's aging by like 10 years. Their hair is repigmenting from gray to black, right? Here's an example of that. Because people have to see this stuff because they don't believe it otherwise, right? They don't have the same exposure. If you don't see the examples outside of your reality of FDA or non-self-driving cars or whatever society that you live in, it's impossible to even imagine that there are these other realities.
Exactly. It's Bastiat's point, seen and unseen. Are you familiar with that?
Host
I think so. I didn't realize that was from him, but yes, exactly. It's impossible to imagine those realities until you see it. And then it's like this spiral of, wait a minute.
Balaji Srinivasan
That's right. It's basically something where it's like, I show people... So for example, take a look at this thing that I just sent you. One, it says patient image pre-treatment and patient image post-treatment. And yes, exactly like you said, it's like gray hair. The man looks like he's in his eighties to a full head of brown, black hair. People don't understand that we're not like within 10% of optimal or something like that. In many areas, we are 1,000x, 10,000x, 100,000x off from what is possible, right? You know, people said the pandemic was not going to be something and it's like, you know, millions of people were affected by it.
Like it takes years to build a train station in the Bay Area and it takes less than a day in China. That is not a, oh, they're 10% faster. They are literally 100x faster, maybe 1000x. If you're talking one day, or like, let's say nine hours, right? Versus a year. Okay, that is about 1000x faster. It's just a totally different thing. You know, your cost, by the way, the cost for everything comes way down, because it's now a subroutine, you can just invoke that boom, boom, okay, train station, train station, clone stamp like this, right? Versus the completely antiquated kind of thing in the physical world in the US.
Host
And all of that is the state. All of that is the state holding this back.
Balaji Srinivasan
Right.
Host
And so ways to exit the state and gain sovereignty are how we re-innovate the physical. And in a sense, by the way, we talked about the V3, you know, Teal has talked about how we can innovate in bits but not in atoms right. And what the network state is is among other things it many other things but it is a recipe for using bits to reopen innovation in atoms.
Balaji Srinivasan
Well yeah I think that's a really important point because it's easy for people to see the exponential difference between physical and digital. A simple example is physical mail can take days, weeks, months, digital mail take seconds, right? So they can see the delta there, but I do think it's hard for people to imagine that exponential delta within the physical world because it feels slower inherently. But I think the train station example is showcasing that, yeah, it's not going to happen in seconds, but there is a massive delta between what we have in certain arenas and what we could have.
Host
Yes. So, you know, a friend of mine, when I showed him those videos, he's like, okay, you reset my belief in what is possible, right? This is senior executive at a trillion dollar company didn't know, you know, he's like, this is why we're doing bids and so on and so forth. I'm like, atoms are actually possible in other places and times, right? So other places, so I'm showing China here where there's a thousand X. There's another link that's worth looking at, which is Patrick Coulson fast, patrickcoulson.com front slash fast. That's also worth putting up on screen where he goes to other times and shows that the U S used to be much faster in building things. And by the way, people will say, oh, China's authoritarian. That's why I can build fast. We're a democracy. They're basically making a virtue out of incompetence, right? That's actually not the case because, quote unquote, the US was a democracy. I mean, if you think the US was a democracy in mid-century, it was able to build fast then.
Balaji Srinivasan
I actually do argue that's part of the nature of the political system, but it's not necessarily democracy versus authoritarian. And in fact, actually, the democracy of the mid-20th century America was quite authoritarian, right? Democracy, like capitalism or Christianity or communism, is so capacious a term that can mean both X and its opposite. Communism, for example, meant kill all the capitalists, and then it means capitalists can be in the Communist Party, right? Christianity meant tear down the Roman Empire, and it also eventually meant have Christian kings and build a holy Roman Empire. Democracy means tons of different things over time periods. The ancient Greeks thought democracy, there's a great book called Against Elections, It's the case for democracy. It's a hilarious title. Okay. And it basically says that the ancient Greeks, they use a mechanism called sortition rather than election. Do you know what that is?
Host
It's like random selection from the population and any that the ancient Greeks, they use a mechanism called sortition rather than election. Do you that the ancient Greeks, they use a mechanism called sortition rather than election. Do you know what that is? It's like random selection from the population and they drew lots. And so your president could be anybody from the community.
Balaji Srinivasan
What did that do? It eliminated the whole process of running for office. And what it also did is it kind of ensured that you had to maintain a high level of virtue in your community and actually a high level of equality because anybody could be the leader. And at first it seems like a crazy system, but the awesome thing about history is people estimate there's a hundred billion people who've ever lived, right? You have one life. And so just like we look at other places in the galaxy and we know what our star system looks like, but there's like dual star systems and black holes, all these crazy things in the huge expanse in space.
There's this enormous expanse in time with this other configurations of humans that are totally counterintuitive to our current orientation. We think, we know this current state, well, it doesn't work anymore, but let's say this current state of affairs kind of works, or at least the ones that we've always known over our tiny window of 20 or 30 or 40 years on the world. But when you take the 100 billion human lifetimes and look at all these other configurations like other star systems, you're like, oh, that's how elections used to work. That's how regulation used to work. That's how it worked here.
And you can pick little subroutines from there and say, this was compatible with human nature back then. And maybe we can update it and make it work in the present day.
Host
One thing that you brought up, which is important, is this idea that there has to be the potential for a challenger. So if you take the taxi example before, it's like, yeah, I could choose person A's taxi or person B's taxi, but I didn't have an alternative outside of the taxi system. And something that's coming to mind is as we talked about the lines drawn around the world, or at least within our lifetime, or let's say my lifetime, they've been mostly fixed, obviously outliers, but mostly fixed. And to me, that reminds me of this idea that there are many people around the world who just assume that there is no challenger. And we've seen that competition drives innovation in many domains. And so it's almost fascinating to just imagine that we can get to potentially exponentially better societies if we do have challengers. But there's almost like this underlying assumption that there aren't. There are challengers within the societies that we have, but not challengers to the societies.
Balaji Srinivasan
I mean just to talk about this for a second like the US establishment is currently fighting has been fighting simultaneous conflicts with tech with half its population, with Russia, with China, with, to a lesser extent, with Israel, India, Hungary, France, Brazil, with the Brexiteers in Britain, with Web3 now and with crypto. Like it's just fighting on so many different fronts at the same time. At the same point, it is printing tons of money. And in many ways, its state capacity has fallen through the floor where SF takes 20 years to reopen a bathroom. Or, you know, I had this thread where it's like a trillion dollar disaster for the F-35.
And like the Zumwalt is, you know, like this Navy ship, and that's a disaster. And the Ford class carrier, another multi-billion, like incredibly expensive things that we just sort of were numb to it. Because you see another $100 billion here, $100 billion there, a trillion dollars here, a stimulus here. It's just money being thrown down a raffle. It's like a kid who, I mean, one of my points, you know, there's an article I wrote called Founding versus Inheriting. One really good way of thinking about the current US government and the US establishment really, because it's more than just the US government, the reason that it can't execute, partly because it hasn't had competition, but partly because it's essentially inherited a monopoly from better men.
If you think about the difference, think about a founder who sets up a factory. They pass it down to their heir who passes it down, and it's just cranking out widgets and churning out money, and it's a great-grandson or whatever of the founders and heir of the factory. One day, and so it seems like the thing is working. It's DuPont brand widgets or something like that, right? And the great-grandson has the famous name and he's got the money and everybody looks at him legally as a legitimate heir of that founder because, hey, look, here's all the documents, the chain of custody or whatever, right?
Then one fine day, that factory has to switch from making widgets to making masks or like servers or something new. It has to do something new. This great-grandson does not have the skill of the founder. They cannot change the assembly line. They don't know what they're doing. Neither do the career managers who have been hired over the time. Like the ability to do something from scratch, do something new. That was the domain of the founder. So all these people are just running systems that meant better than themselves set up years and years ago. Right. They not the founders of the heirs. And so we understand this within the context of a factory that the like great great grandson of Rockefeller or DuPont or whatever is not Rockefeller or DuPont.
I mean, in one sense, like, you know, half your genes go to your child and then half again and have more generations you go down. It's not like the same person anymore. It's like one, one half to the end power and generations down, right? So not the same person but they are legally they're legitimate they're just not competent they were selected for legitimacy but not competence right. Conversely if you select for competence but not legitimacy that's like someone taking over the factory blam blam blam hostile takeover or not even a hostile taker that's at least a legal thing like seizing the factory maybe they're actually good at operating it but they're considered illegitimate the society's like you just stole it from them blah blah okay that's like for example nationalization of oil fields and stuff like that, you know, with various independence movements, this kind of thing.
So you want is both legitimate and competent and simply just identifying that as an axis, right? Legitimate and competent. Well, that's why you need to have refoundings because nobody would have elected a lawn to run Tesla or elected Mark Zuckerberg to go in at 30 something years old to run a 3.6 billion communication network. He could only have proved it by doing it, by founding it, right, from scratch. So the from scratch aspect is so ridiculously important. And that relates to all of our current institutions because they're decades, in some cases, hundreds of years old, and they're just built for a different time and by better men.
The people today, you know, like George Washington organized like the armies of the United States from scratch, right? The NYPD was at one point organized from scratch, right? Even FDA or whatever was organized from scratch at one point, right? These organizations are now so many generations down that they're just inherited by heirs. Okay. And sometimes they're literal heirs in the sense, and I talk about this in the book in the founding versus inheriting chapter that is pasted in here, but sometimes they're literal heirs in the sense of like a DuPont or a Rockefeller or, you know, like Sulzberger who's inherited the New York Times from his father's father's father's father's father, right?
Like five generations. And by the way, just on that, I do talk about that in the book. It's like, there's this great website that you should check out. It's called tech journalism is less diverse than tech.com. And the point being that actually the journos who endlessly talk about tech diversity. And so it far less diverse than tech itself right. A lot of these tech journalists are basically employees of some East coast nepotist who has inherited millions of dollars and or a newspaper and is funding their whole operation. So they meritless nepotists and or employees thereof who are attacking the self.
Host
Right.
Balaji Srinivasan
And once you see that, you're like, oh. These these journals are basically like dogs on a leash. They're hit men for old money. Right. Assassins for the establishment. They have no legitimacy whatsoever. It's literally old money attacking new money. The meritless attacking the merit, you know, the meritocracy or the more meritocratic as privileged. It's like actually this amazing inversion when you, when you apply that lens to it. The thing is this entire establishment has, you know, it's declining legitimacy, but it has legitimacy. It doesn't have competence. And so it can't innovate because it's not selected for founders. Like if you were a founder, but you go to the U S government or the U S establishment. No, that's the whole point is you can't found anything. You get like Your career ambition is to try to paste some language into an 1,100-page bill the night before it gets approved in a vote where nobody reads it, right?
And it's deployed to the entire country. Imagine if that's how Google was coded. Some giant political meeting, blah, blah, and someone pastes in some JavaScript. Obviously, that could be malware. Obviously, it could be self-interested. Obviously, that's not the way to test something, to roll it out, to deploy it.
Future historians will look at our current time and these institutions as so insane in many ways. Like just one example is the thing I just mentioned where you're deploying code to 300 million people that you haven't read, you haven't tested in the sandbox, you haven't got any room for iteration. The people who are responsible for writing it aren't responsible for implementing it. It's totally broken on that level.
On another level, you're voting for somebody and the contract isn't binding. They give some campaign promise and say they're going to do something. They're not going to do it. It's literally like buying something that's labeled milk and getting orange juice. That's fraud in the commercial setting. So electoral fraud is when—I mean, the most routinized version of it is when a politician says they're going to do X, gets your vote on that basis, and does Y. Then people say, "Oh, that's representative democracy." I'm like, well, your vote literally didn't count. And you have no recourse. They've got some form of immunity. Basically, you cannot sue them for not voting your way. So it's all completely symbolic.
Those are just two ridiculous examples of how bad the current system is. And so you cannot fix that system. You have to figure out a way to get outside it. Why do you want to get outside it? Well, I mentioned the FDA is a huge motivation, but there's lots of others. You want self-driving, you're going to need sovereignty. Do you want drone delivery? You're going to need some form of sovereignty. Do you want to be able to have nuclear power? You're probably going to need some form of sovereignty. Wyoming is pushing some of this. There are good things happening in some places accelerating it. You want to innovate in the physical world, you're going to need some form of sovereignty.
One of the big recipes of the network state is not just to say the correct observation that you can innovate in bits but you can't innovate in atoms. You can build a billion dollar business online, you need a billion permits to build a shed in San Francisco. That is true. We've reconciled that tension by using bits to innovate in atoms, by building this aligned community online. And the alignment is ridiculously important. They need to do the dance, they need to coordinate and choreograph together. If they can't all hit "like" on something, they literally can't do anything else. But if they can do that, then they might be able to do a lot of other things. You've turned them into a multicellular organism.
The content is also really important. It's not just the code, it's the community and the content as well as the code. All the messaging they're putting out—the Declaration of Independence actually had that thing at the beginning which says, "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation." That's a really critical thing. Something that tech people underestimate and undervalue is that something like 10 or 20 or 30% of your actions, you need to allocate space for the moral justification for what you're doing. It's almost like, "I'm doing this because..." and then you do it.
For example, if you're fighting back on Twitter, you might think that everybody has seen the full context of the tweets and attacks back and forth. You basically have to assume that most people are coming in with absolutely zero context. In your limited space, you need to include the reason this person attacked you in the first place, that you're defending yourself, and then the attack. In the same way for every product, that moral justification—"We are doing this because X is good and Y is bad"—is there. It's baked in, whether it's a logo, a slogan, a mission statement, a catechism, or whatever you want to call it. I call it the one commandment. It's your moral differentiation from society at large. It tells you that society at large has gotten something wrong, and we're going to get it right.
To get it right, we're going to need to shape the physical world. So you use bits to come to consensus. You say, "This group is now aligned. We need self-driving." Why? Because the current NHTSA is an abomination. Tens of thousands of automobile deaths a year is an abomination. We have the technology to fix it. We can't just retrofit the roads necessarily. Why? Because it's like trying to send electrical power over a water line. The current roads were not built for self-driving. If you built a town for self-driving, it would look totally different. The roads would have sensors instrumented there. They might be segregated farther away from human traffic. You wouldn't have human crossings of the roads. You can engineer your way out of the problem where you just assume the road is completely self-driving. Everything changes.
That's one of the reasons self-driving is so hard—you have to assume all of this legacy baggage. If you could take that away, it could be easy. We know this to be the case because guys like Rio Tinto, this huge mining conglomerate, as far back as 2013, on closed roads, on private mines, they were running the miners and trucks remotely from Perth in Australia. They can run the mine remotely and move things around because there's no one else on the road, or because it's a private road where they know all the cars.
This is a great example of a self-driving car zone. You have this moral commandment. You align people with their bits. You get that alignment. And then they go and take physical territory and they relentlessly negotiate with enough governments until they get a sanctuary city or a deharmonized zone. And they don't just replace it with nothing. They replace it with a new regulatory paradigm.
Host
One clarifying question. When you say that they develop their own regulatory framework, is that just using the example of self-driving? Is that just around self-driving, or is the intention that they regulate or re-regulate everything from education to taxes, et cetera? Or is it embedded?
Balaji Srinivasan
Right. The one commandment concept is a useful thing in the book. It's actually one of the more important things. I'll give the short version and the long version. The short version is you cannot change everything in society at once, but you can also not give up completely on societal change. So just like a startup sets out to fix one thing in the market, a startup society sets out to fix one moral failing of society. You're not saying profitable versus unprofitable. You're saying good versus bad, starting with a moral premise. It's not a market premise. This is really important.
A lot of DAOs, for example, will start with a market premise and be like, "Hey, you can all make money. Come here." It reminds me of that scene from *Meteor*—the guy's like, "You like sex and money too? Wow. Me too." Those are human universals where there's absolutely no community. People are just there for the money. They're there for the airdrop. When the token comes, it's like dogs waiting for scraps. They grab the scrap and run off. That's not a real community. That's just a bunch of people there for an airdrop.
Starting with money first is wrong. Money comes as a superstructure on top of a community. It's a way for the community to represent its debits and credits between each other. That's why you see a bunch of these coins just drop to zero—because there's no true community. There's speculation on whether they'll build a community, and then it drops to zero because they don't build one.
One way of thinking about it is the one commandment. What are examples? I mentioned the digital Sabbath example. You're saying technology is good, but you can have too much of a good thing. Just like highways—I think the internal combustion engine is good, cars are good generally, but you could overdo it. San Francisco had a highway that blocked access to the waterfront. So you say, "I'm not against cars. I want a V3 that takes away that highway so we have a walkable waterfront." In the same way, you're like, "I'm pro-internet, but I'm not pro-internet all the time with all the notifications." So we have community support and we say we're offline 12 hours a day. Internet is cut 12 hours a day. Everybody's now synchronized, like the weekend synchronizes people. We have Saturday and Sunday off.
The Soviet Union actually tried making it so that they could work seven days a week. You had Mondays and Tuesdays off for some people, Tuesdays and Wednesdays for others. They tried these kinds of experiments. The problem is there's a utility to everybody knowing that Saturday and Sunday are off. Imagine having to schedule your weekend like that and never overlapping with somebody else. Coordination and everybody picking the same defaults totally changes things.
Once everybody accepts in this community that I'm offline 9 p.m. to 9 a.m., that changes the community. "Hey guys, let's go for a run. We'll have an outdoors dinner." You can figure out the exact timing. Maybe on the weekends, you're offline an entire day. That's an offline day and we're all going to do things. Once you have that coordination, just like the weekend, new things arise out of that when you can assume everybody is doing the same thing. Literally new societal adaptations arise.
The thing about this is money runs out, but a moral premise doesn't. Being part of that community—if digital Sabbath is important to you, being offline some of the day is important to you—everybody knows I'm offline and it's okay. As this community expands, more societal conventions develop. People know not to email you then. If you're offline 9 p.m. to 9 a.m., 95% of jobs will be fine. Most jobs don't expect you to be on at that time. People expect you to be asleep for eight hours. So 9 p.m. to 9 a.m., you should be pretty much okay even outside your society. But as it grows to a million people, it's a totally different world. All kinds of things get scheduled for offline time versus online time. This is a resource that doesn't run out. Money runs out. A moral premise doesn't. This is differentiated from the outside world in a permanent, persistent, and interesting way. It's like a wellspring that doesn't run out.
Another example: keto kosher. You've got a network archipelago by my definition. You don't just have an online community. You've crowdfunded territory and you're treating sugar like cocaine. You're interdicting it at the border. You're literally not allowing it. Every store and every restaurant is not filled with high fructose corn syrup and chocolates. Sophisticated corporations have set it up so that when you're at the checkout line, you're hit in the face for five minutes with some chewy, sugary thing. They want to wear down your resistance. You just want to be on a diet and avoid sugar, but experts from Madison Avenue have set up something maximally tempting in the checkout line. Against that giant corporation, your community collectively can provide some resistance by setting the defaults in a different way.
What I'm describing is outside the normal left-right spectrum. It's a community acting in the interest of the community. It's neither left nor right. It's just for what the community's values are. They'd say, "No sugar at the border. Just not there. You have healthy food—lettuce, fruits, tomatoes, other stuff. Every meal is healthy." You don't have to ask what your dietary restrictions are. Everybody is now snap to grid. It's not "I'm offline 9 p.m. to 9 a.m." It's "I am snap to grid on a different thing." I'm either full keto or just very low sugar. You can imagine variants. There's keto kosher, the paleo people, the carnivory community. You could also have the vegan village, which is as different from the carnivory community as both are from mainstream society. I would bet that both the vegan village and the carnivory community would be far healthier than McDonald's-eating mainstream America. They're quite different from each other, but both are self-conditioned. The bacon village is eating real meat and stuff, not this processed horrible stuff. They're probably 20 or 30 pounds lighter.
Again, this is a resource that doesn't run out. When you join that community, that moral premise where you've inverted something society said was good—you're saying it's bad. Society said sugar is acceptable. You're saying it's morally bad. Everybody in your community agrees. You get social support. The defaults are set for that. You literally need to travel outside the town to go and pick it up. It's like getting drugs. You now have several levels of defense. And again, it's morality-focused.
By the way, to relate this to something else: Mike Moritz, a famous investor at Sequoia, has this saying that all of Sequoia's best startups satisfy one of the seven deadly sins—sloth, gluttony, pride, lust, et cetera. What he means is it's really hard to build a company, so you need to satisfy some visceral drive. The more intellectual, academic, idealistic one's view of human nature—"we will all gather to deliberate on X"—the less likely it's going to be a thing. Not impossible, but less likely. You can map a lot of startups: Tinder is lust, Twitter is wrath, Instagram is pride, Uber Eats is gluttony. Productivity apps are arguably sloth. It is hard to build a company, and you do want to align it to a visceral drive.
The problem is that the seven deadly sins are sins for a reason—because you can overdo it. They all relate to lack of self-control. When you have lack of self-control, that's bad in various ways. You're fat, you spend too much money, you get mad when you shouldn't. Not being in control of yourself often means other control is imposed on you. If you don't control yourself, others will control you.
The other issue is that once these companies get really big, they're no longer simply fighting for survival with this visceral drive. Instead, they're actually creating the deadly sin. Netflix—this is an offhand comment, I'm not holding it against them—but they did say something like, "Netflix is competing with having wine with your wife." They're competing for your attention. It's a famous quote: "competing for all of your time, including wine with your spouse." It's meant to be tongue-in-cheek, but it's also true. People would rather have that than Netflix most of the time. The issue is that these companies, once they get to a certain level, are exacerbating genuine sins. In many ways, America—not just America, the West, but lots of the world—has become a sinful society in that sense. People are being pushed out of their desired self-control by these companies pulling them in these directions for private profit.
Host
[laughs] Wow, this is a really different tone from you. I thought you were like a super capitalist, pro-profit VC kind of person.
Balaji Srinivasan
I am, but I'm also fundamentally a community person. Both capitalism and democracy are tools—conflict resolution tools. Democracy is elections, capitalism is markets. But within a family, or even within a company or a community, not everything is an election or an auction. Many things are just a decision arrived at organically where people are aligned. They're harmonious. It doesn't have to be conflict. If you have multiple competing options, you need an election or an auction because people really want to bid on it. But lots of things can be allocated by community if you have a real community.
What's the opposite of the seven deadly sins? Keto kosher is the opposite of gluttony—it's satiety. Digital Sabbath is the opposite of several things, but probably the opposite of wrath. You're not getting mad on Twitter. It's the opposite of sloth—you're getting out of the house rather than being online all the time. The startup company says, "It's hard to build a startup, so we satisfy this visceral drive." Here, what we do is flip it. You could take the seven cardinal virtues and build a startup society on each of them. You invert the Moritz thing.
Again, I'm not critiquing Mike. His framework is good for satisfying those visceral desires, but any good thing can be overdone. I think we've overdone it in some ways. How do you bring it back? These startup societies, as opposed to startup companies, have a moral innovation that may start with the seven cardinal virtues. There are other things like this in other religions. You take one of those and you're like, "Keto kosher is attacking the gluttony problem. How are we doing this? The community is giving you support. Our one commandment is sugar is bad."
That one commandment leads to other things. If sugar is bad, continuous glucose monitoring might be good. So everybody gets CGM meters. Now you're snapped to grid in a different way. You can assume everybody in the society—1,000 people, 10,000 people, 100,000 people—has continuous glucose monitors. Maybe they all opt in with some privacy data to say, "Here is my glucose response when I eat lettuce." Then you go further down the tech tree. You're not just monitoring glucose, you're monitoring vitamin D levels and other levels. You get a quantified self-community out of that.
Once you have that moral innovation, the moral innovation actually enables the technological innovation. This is something we've sort of forgotten because what's happened in modern society is the technological progressives and the political progressives have separated. The moral innovators coming up with new slogans online are different from the people making new technologies. In the past, that was actually one movement. For example, public health in the early 1900s. The moral innovation was "cleanliness is next to godliness. Let's not all be filthy." The technical innovations were sewers, handwashing, all that type of stuff. Those two things went hand in hand.
That moral innovation doesn't cost you anything, but it does mean you have to be concrete about what you believe in that is different from society at large. I'm not saying come up with your own 10 commandments and a whole new religion. I am saying one commandment, just like a focused startup has one thing. You have one commandment like "sugar is bad." You build a community out of that. Then you'll get your second, third, and fourth derivations from that—like the CGM stuff. That's just one example.
In this fashion, everybody has one thing they think is the problem with US society. They might say people are gambling too much on coins and assets. They might say people are eating too much, or people are too mad online canceling each other, or they're too lazy and not fit. A lot of these things line up with the cardinal virtues thing. Tinder encourages bad personal relationships, and we need something with much higher commitment and much more courting beforehand. Everybody has some critique of society like this.
Now you can be president of your own startup society. You can start solving that problem. You set up your shingle—your one commandment. You have your whole set of graphs and charts, all your historical arguments that say why you think this is bad. You're willing to put this at the top of your Twitter profile and defend it in public. People will argue—the thing is, you're arguing society is wrong. You're arguing you are right and society is wrong. You've recruited a community of like-minded people who believe in this. Either it's online or offline or some combination. You start getting territory. Maybe you eventually need sovereign recognition to become a full network state. But even a network union or network archipelago can get very far.
You are solving the problem for yourself. Remember the thing we were talking about—Bastiat, the seen and unseen, which you mentioned. You are now making the unseen seen. You are showing in the sugar-free zone what the impact of sugar is on the sugar-full zone. Everybody's 30 pounds lighter here. Diabetes has dropped X percent. Everybody's much better looking. All these other conditions maybe go away when they're not overdosing on sugar all the time. That thousand people reforms a million people, 10 million people, because they make movies about what they're doing.
Host
I like the analogy or almost the framing of evidence over confidence. In the societies that we have today, they tell us what should be done. Perhaps the best way to actually show an alternative is through evidence, through these small societies that show, not say, what is better.
Balaji Srinivasan
That's exactly right. The key thing is—I mentioned the term "president of a startup society," "president of a network society." The number of people in the world who could feasibly become president of the United States—you have to be 35 years old, a natural born American citizen, some other requirements. Only 4% of the world is American. Apply those requirements and it probably chops it in half again. Maybe under 2% of people could become president. We're told in school that anybody can become president, but it actually means 98% of the world cannot become president of the United States. Even the president of the United States cannot actually fire these regulators who have career tenure. There's a whole to-do over that—Schedule F. Practically speaking, 98% of the world cannot become president, and that president doesn't even have power in these regulatory agencies.
The current pathway cannot fix those regulatory agencies. There is no path to reform within the system. It's literally like making Blockbuster into Netflix, making Barnes & Noble into Amazon, making Blackberry into Apple. You couldn't do it. You had to disrupt. You had to build the alternative system. You could not have turned England into America or the UK into America. You had to build America.
So now, you declare yourself president of a startup society. Guess what? The vast majority of the world will laugh at you. They'll look at this idiot like, "Oh, you're president of a startup? Your imaginary president." You want that. You know why you want them to do that? Because they won't stop you. Exactly. If you do have enough power, if you do have enough attention, then you are actually putting friction between you and your goal for a period of time. The whole Gandhi line—which is overused but also true—"First they laugh." You want them to laugh at you. They're not taking you seriously. Here's the thing: you don't need to win an election. You do not need to get 51% support. That thing you were mentioning at the beginning of, "Will the majority go with this?"
Host
Everything doesn't have to be calibrated to whether the low attention voter can be convinced of this premise. And actually the way they're convinced, here's another deficit of the current system. It's all acting. You're increasingly seeing people who are selected just for being influencers or actors in a literal sense, whether it's Al Franken or Trump or Reagan. You have folks who are literally actors and are selected for their acting ability to be politicians, but actors are liars.
Balaji Srinivasan
We don't think of it that way because actors are prestigious. A liar is not prestigious, but an actor is a very skilled liar. They're incredibly convincing on camera. You believe they have that emotion. They blend into the character. Then cut, and they stop crying, get a tissue, like "All right, what's my next scene?" You're selecting for politicians that are liars. There's a saying like "actions speak louder than words." They actually don't. Online, words speak louder than actions.
You know why? You see the Twitter feed of AOC or any other politician. What most people are not looking at constantly is not just their voting record, but their actual actions. Their actions are not legible in the same way. One of the things that crypto does is we're going to be turning the LinkedIn resume of self-declared things into a feed of crypto credentials that is awarded to people by you. You close a sale, you get a crypto credential. It's an on-chain proof from your CEO at the time that you closed a sale for this amount at this time. You solve a math problem, you get a crypto credential from your professor.
You now have a machine-readable on-chain resume that's provable. It's not simply assertions. It's timestamped. It happened at the time. It's digitally signed by that person. Now actions start speaking on the same scale as words. You can start a feed of them. It's visible in the same way as the words online, except it's on chain. Now you can actually start filtering your society by those people who actually are doing actions and not just words, or actions plus words. Actions plus words is valuable. Actions alone is valuable. Words alone is usually not as valuable.
You put this together and you get something where your concept of evidence over confidence is really good. Confidence is the confidence of the actor. It's also the confidence of the confidence man. Evidence is the evidence of one's own eyes. Here's the thing: you don't have to go and move to the society. You can tour the society. You can tour it in VR. You can tour it online. A good startup society, as I mentioned, 20% or 30% of your case is making the moral case for what you're doing. They're constantly preaching their case from scratch over and over again, just like you're constantly pitching your startup.
Host
That tagline that you've heard 10,000 times, that person on their side is hearing once, the first time.
Balaji Srinivasan
Yep. So you're constantly making their moral case. You're making videos. You're making content because you're recruiting people to your community. But even more than that, you're trying to set an example for the rest of the world. They may not adopt the entire thing. They may not say, "Digital Sabbath, we can't be offline 12 hours a day," but maybe they'll do eight or some silly iteration thereof. That's good. It's just like Google's example of using Linux eventually forced reform on Microsoft. Now they own GitHub or whatever. That would never have been done within the organization. The reform had to come from without. But it was practical reform. It wasn't saying, "Let's rely on this thing to change." You have the thousand X, you have the people exiting to that jurisdiction, you have the loss of faith in the old, but you also have the building up of faith in the new, and that forces reform.
Host
Yeah. I think the parallel to startups is really illuminating. Every startup, as you said, has some sort of tagline, some sort of minor thing at the time that they're founding that can extend. It has inertia in some cases all the way to Google. In some cases, it ends up just being a bootstrap startup. In some cases, it's somewhere in between. They, similar to the idea of these startup societies, are often ignored. Then as they get bigger and bigger, they become too big to be ignored. Then there are other routes at that juncture too. Some of them are absorbed and bought. Some of them continue to ascend and actually overthrow the existing company in that space. I think it's really interesting to consider that many of these startup society ideas will sound silly to many people at first, but they do become something or they evolve over time.
Balaji Srinivasan
Startup societies are like startup companies in this way. As I mentioned in the book, if you think about Twitter or SpaceX, Twitter sounded insanely trivial. SpaceX sounded insanely ambitious. "Oh, 140 characters, breakfast tweet. What is this?" And SpaceX sounded like, "Yeah, sure. You're going to beat NASA. Good luck." They were at opposite ends of the spectrum, but they're both now multi-billion dollar companies that have changed the world. One of them was considered too trivial, the other infeasible. Lots of startup things are like that, where they're just outside the original window, and all of it is in the execution.
This guy Idan Levine had this great tweet where he's like, "What is the craziest thing that would work as a one commandment?" That's a really good question. What is your answer to that?
Host
Oh, I mean, there's going to be things I couldn't even predict. The obvious stuff is like language communities, religious communities. For example, Rod Dreher has this book called *The Benedict Option*. If you want to be a religious Christian, now you can actually do that. You don't have to impose your values on the rest of society. It's that V3. You're not imposing Christianity on people who don't agree with it, nor are you seeing your Christian culture eroded. You go and gather with others and you actually craft and practice and live that holy life. That's always harder to do in practice than in theory. People will LARP being trad. They'll pretend they're super traditional online because they inhabit a fantasy world. But the actuality of how the trad stuff interacts with modernity...
In Judaism, there's something called Modern Orthodox. It tries to synthesize traditional Orthodox Judaism with the modern world. It has to make interesting trade-offs for that. When you actually build that society, maybe it'll be pleasing, maybe it won't. The way you can test it is whether it attracts immigrants from the rest of the world. Here's something going in V2 of the book, this is new content. Ready for new content?
Balaji Srinivasan
Take a look at this pretty cool video. Here's a visual version of it so you can see it in a graph. The population rank of every US state over a hundred years. There's a better version that goes all the way back to 1770. This is only over 10 years. You can watch that YouTube link which has an animation of this. The US has had something where, especially over 200 years, different states have been number one, pulling in all the internal immigrants from other places.
People talk about the US as a nation of immigrants, and that is talked about as coming from other countries. There are two wrinkles on that. First, it's not just a nation of immigrants, it's a nation of emigrants. Every immigrant emigrated from somewhere. Why did they leave Poland or India or Iran or China? Sometimes it's leaving communism, like China, or Nazism, Germany, or an economic basket case like India was, or just in search of a better life. Fundamentally, the people who leave are not the wealthy necessarily. What they are is the politically powerless.
This is really important. People say, "Oh, your exit stuff is all about rich guys leaving and leaving us holding the bag." I'm like, "Have you looked at the profile of immigrants globally?" They are not on balance the wealthy. The wealthy and powerful have big houses and political power in places like San Francisco. They control the government. The new money, the immigrants, are the ones who do not control the government and thus had to leave San Francisco because they could not get YIMBY through, because they could not fix the streets, because they got priced out.
Those who leave are not those who are financially wealthy. Those who leave are those who are politically powerless. They are often those who are, in a sense, fleeing. One way of putting it, and this is kind of reductio ad absurdum, entertain me: was Stalin rich? It depends on what part of society. It wasn't money. There's a Quora quote that's very plausible. Stalin didn't even have change in his pocket, but he could walk around like Grand Theft Auto and just carjack a car. Stalin and the nomenklatura walked around the Soviet Union. They had root access to everything. They could commandeer your house, sometimes your wife, your farm. That's what collectivization meant. The Communist Party and the nomenklatura controlled everything.
Was he rich? No, he was powerful. A wealthy person must still persuade. They're giving you money for something and you can reject that offer. The powerful can compel. Persuasion versus compulsion. Convincing versus coercing. Those are different things. Was Stalin rich? No, he wasn't rich. He was powerful. Once we acknowledge that as a limit case, you can pull it back and realize that power is a different axis from wealth. There can be people who are powerful but not wealthy. People who can compel but cannot convince, and vice versa. Those who control territory are those who are powerful. Those who set the laws are powerful. If you could set the laws, why would you leave? There's no incentive. You're setting the laws. This is all bespoke, made to you. Why would you leave? You've carved out some stupid bailout. The folks who own housing in SF and have been blocking housing are not the ones leaving. It's the new people who are leaving. The politically powerless are leaving.
The reason this is important is that things are often framed as masses versus elites, or these rich elite are leaving. It's actually at least three groups. There's masses, there's elite, and what Peter Turchin calls the counter-elite. That term is glorious because it clarifies so much. You don't get into this silly situation of saying someone who is a VC millionaire or a tech founder or a biomedical researcher, are they elite or are they masses? Instead, they're the counter-elite. The tech folks are a global meritocratic group relative to the white nepotists of the American establishment. I'm not the kind of person who thinks "white" is an insult, but the US establishment does.
Once you apply that lens, you see how many of their businesses, how many of their media corporations, how many of their East Coast things are either literally inherited, like the New York Times company passed from Sulzberger to Sulzberger for five generations, or informally inherited like the Kennedy name, the Pelosi name. A very large fraction are famous family dynasties. If you go to that article "Founding Versus Inheriting," there's a paragraph that says, "Of course, someone who attends political office isn't always a familial heir, though it's more common than you might think." If you click those seven links, you'll see articles on widow succession, hereditary politicians, history of wives replacing their dead husbands in Congress, the Kennedy family, the Bush family, the Clinton family, the Roosevelt family, and the list of US political families. There's quite a lot of them. There's this movie *The Distinguished Gentleman* about name recognition. America has a nobility. It has de facto hereditary titles. That's a huge advantage in running for office, that hereditary name of being a Kennedy.
Against that elite, that hereditary elite, sometimes in the literal sense of inheriting a media corporation, what I call the meritless nepotists. Just calling them that, scales fall from the eyes. So much becomes clear. Old money against new is an eternal story. It's literally the old money calling the new money rich. Once you see that, you realize it's elite versus counter-elite. What that will probably mean is the US establishment wins within the territories of the US that they control, but they lose outside. There are parts of the US that become more sanctuary city-like, diverging in different ways to the left and to the right of the federal government. There are countries outside that diverge away from the federal government. The US establishment will have more power over fewer people.
Host
Something that comes to mind is, I think I heard you say something along the lines of Google News basically made every magazine compete with every other magazine, or every blog compete with every other blog. I want to hear your take on how certain technological shifts like remote work change the game in terms of every state or every city competing with every other city out there for talent.
Balaji Srinivasan
The US is a nation of immigrants, but it's also a nation of emigrants, where the people who left were those who are politically powerless from other countries. But it's also a nation of internal immigrants. Less appreciated is the degree to which the number one, two, three, and four states in the US have been in flux over time. They have attracted people and repelled people. Looking at that over time tells a really interesting story. We live 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 years. If you're very old, you've seen some of these ups and downs. But once you take a window longer than a human life, because we've got data going back, remember my thing about a billion, 100 billion people have lived. If you go back, you get more data. You only have one life. Let's get some leverage out of that. That's what history is. It's leverage. It's financial leverage in a sense. It's alpha. Other configurations of humans worked.
You look at these charts and you see, in the 1800s, Ohio was a really big deal. It was one of the top states, attracting lots of people. Pennsylvania was like, "Oh, yeah." That was when it wasn't the Rust Belt. It was making stuff. The higher river, all that stuff was really important. Then you come forward and you see New York. At the very beginning of the US, Virginia was big. If you've read any early American history, you'll hear people talk about "as a Virginian." State identity was actually a big deal then. In the 1700s, individual US states were as different as tech companies were in the year 2008. You have Larry Page and Google, Zuckerberg and Facebook, Steve Jobs and Apple, Bill Gates and Microsoft, Jeff Bezos and Amazon. These are founder-run companies with different cultures and personalities.
Now that four out of those five companies have had their founders leave, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Apple are much more similar than they were 10 years ago. A lot of people have the resume of "I did three years here and two years here and three years here," but big tech is its own thing. Facebook is the outlier because Zuck is still a founder, so he can actually do big things like rebranding to Meta and take risks.
Point being that putting those states together, Virginia was an identity of its own. After the Civil War, it went from "the United States are" to "the United States is." These states lost more of their individual identity and became administrative subdivisions of a federal government union. Even more of that was knocked down over the early 20th century and the great centralization. FDR did another big step with the 10th Amendment basically being repealed. Everything that was supposed to be left to the states was now something where you could set up these regulatory agencies like the FDA. They just said, "Everything is interstate commerce, therefore the federal government regulates anything." All this centralization happened.
But even during this period of high centralization, you still have people moving between states. Now you have something like Florida that's been coming up over the last 20 years. With the Miami thing, it's really giving California competition. That's not something that came out of nowhere. If you look at the Visual Capitalist graph, Florida has been gaining traction for decades. It's an overnight success 50 years in the making. This internal competition between administrative subunits is very important for keeping things healthy. This is the polystatus model as opposed to the monostatus model. There's always a tension between these.
There's this whole Chinese saying: "The empire long united must divide, long divided must unite." Why? Because when it's long united, you have stultifying bureaucracy, harmonizing, as I was talking about. It's not responsive. Then you decentralize, you divide. Then what happens? You have a period of "Oh, it's all chaotic. I wish we had common standards." So then you reunify. There's a honeymoon period. Each time there's a honeymoon period of "Wow, we've got our independence." Then "Oh my God, it's chaotic." Then "Let's reunify." Then "Oh my God, it's sclerotic." Then "Let's divide." It goes in cycles like this.
That's not to say you come back in the same place. One of the points I make in the book is the helical theory of history. From one axis, it looks like progress. From another axis, another projection, it looks like going in a circle. But if you look at it from outside, X of T equals cos T, Y of T equals sin T, Z of T equals T is the parametric equation for a helix in three-space. It's cyclical on some axes and linear on others. You are still making progress sometimes even if it seems like you're going in a circle.
Bring that to the present day. What we are going through and what we are going to see is much more polystatism. The network state is a way of not just using the existing administrative units like Florida, but setting up new ones. Imagine a United States where you couldn't just found a company, but you could found the next California. To first order, the 34 million Californians own California. That huge territory. Take a smaller state, Wyoming, about 500,000 Wyomingans. I actually don't know what the term is. 580,000. It's the smallest state in the union. The 580,000 Wyomingans basically own Wyoming. They could, in a sense, crowdfund Wyoming. Let's say on the order of 80 or 90% of Wyoming territory belongs to Wyoming residents. Some out-of-state holdings, some Chinese holdings, but let's just say that for short.
That's interesting because what that suggests is 500,000 people that you unify in an online network society, network union, network archipelago, could have a territory that amounts to the territory of Wyoming just spread out. I could actually found an administrative unit that competes with these other administrative units. The key thing is that because I'm able to buy pieces of territory that aren't connected to each other, I don't have to expand it in one place. This is a key insight.
I talked about this in the book: there are city states, nation states, and network states. This is the V3. The city state was an independent unit. It was innovative, but it got beaten by the nation state. Why? Because the nation state had scale. What we now think of as Italy and the language Italian, most people in the Italian peninsula didn't speak Italian at the time Garibaldi was unifying Italy. Eric Hobsbawm argues that at the time of the French Revolution, most people in France didn't speak what we now know as French. They spoke other dialects. Germany, Bismarck unified Germany. There was a whole thing in the 1800s called the German question about whether Hanover and Austria would interact. Garibaldi unified Italy. After the French Revolution, France got unified and homogenized. The state actually shaped the nation. Now all those people have no memory of a time when their ancestors spoke a language other than French.
The nation and state have an interplay where the state has all this power. It can reshape the nation and rewrite people's brains like Men in Black. Flash, now the children are educated by the state. The state shapes the nation. There is a feedback effect. It's similar to the whole currency argument: what comes first, barter or debt? I do think barter comes first, but it is true that you can have a feedback effect.
Why did I bring this up? The city state lost to the nation state because the nation state had scale. It rolled up all of these smaller units into this big thing and had the scale to beat others. Once one group had that scale, nearby neighbors needed to also get together. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars helped lead to German unification. All these guys were like, "We got to gang up together because France is going to beat us." There's a relic of the past, like a duck-billed platypus, a missing link that lives into the present. Do you know what San Marino is?
Host
I recognize it, but I actually don't know. Why don't you explain what it is?
Balaji Srinivasan
San Marino is this tiny little patch in what we think of as Italy. It's a sovereign thing in the UN. It's got a flag. It's like 30,000 people. It's an enclave in the middle of Italy. Before the unification of Italy, there's a whole complicated story. Garibaldi was able to seek refuge in San Marino at one point. In gratitude, he said, "We'll just do a contract with you guys. We won't fold you into the full Italy." San Marino, by hook and by crook, managed to preserve its sovereignty to the present day. They're a relic of the past when the whole thing looked like that. Lots of little San Marinos all over the map. If you look at a map of Germany before Bismarck, that's what it looked like.
Here's another one: a map of the princely states. When India got independence, it wasn't just independence from the British. That wasn't the only problem they had to solve. They also had to solve the problem of the princely states. Take a look at that. There were 562 princely states that constituted what we now know of as the Indian Union. Look at how complicated that looks.
Host
Wildly complicated.
Balaji Srinivasan
Wildly complicated. The physical world used to be complicated like this, but it meant it was very simple within those communities because people basically spoke the same language, had things in common. You're trading off one kind of complexity for another. Clean lines on a map in Africa have put people who don't speak the same language, don't share the same culture together, and have led to a lot of African civil wars. These are artificial nations that didn't reflect actual ethnic groups. The Sykes-Picot lines in the Middle East, something that ISIS and others also hate. Whenever you see these straight lines in the Middle East, these are artificial countries that don't reflect ethnic boundaries. It gives rise to endless conflict because people need to share culture before they can agree on law. If your religion says this must be done and this guy's religion says this must not be done, you're just going to slug it out endlessly. You can't just agree. It might be something really stupid, some dietary thing that doesn't really matter in the grand scheme of things, but they'll slug it out endlessly if the boundaries aren't set in the right way.
This is how the world used to work. If you look at San Marino, you get a piece of it. You look at the map of Germany before Bismarck. You look at Indian princely states. This is how the world also kind of works today. You know why?
Host
Because a lot of countries are small countries.
Balaji Srinivasan
Yes. So you know that part. The other thing is, if you've seen the county map of the US and who's Democrat and who's Republican, that also looks fractal in this same way.
Host
It's complicated.
Balaji Srinivasan
Right.
Host
Right? Yeah. The lines aren't representative necessarily of the nation behind those lines.
Balaji Srinivasan
That's right. And so, in fact, you know, they're saying like "one nation under God, indivisible," right? So there's this really important—the unfortunate one-liner is it's now two nations that don't believe in God, highly divisible, right?
Host
Why?
Balaji Srinivasan
Because you can take a look at this graph. That's at the level of Congress. But you can literally see it going from people basically voting together on things to essentially all Republicans voting with all Republicans, all Democrats voting with all Democrats.
Host
Right.
Balaji Srinivasan
And there's the rare bipartisan things where there are like gray lines that connect them, like 9/11 and the financial crisis. So for the bombings or bailouts type stuff, that's the bipartisan stuff, but otherwise they just never vote together on anything. Then you look at that, that's at the level of Congress. And then you look at this graphic that I just pasted in, this is at the level of Twitter or Facebook. There's an article, CGR study 2017. Basically, both Twitter and Facebook look the same, where it looks like this blue and red separated thing. So this is literally two nations.
Going back to the very first thing in our chat, it is not one nation. It is two nations with different values. One way of thinking about it is something like 96% of Democrats marry other Democrats. Only 4% marry Republicans. So Democrats will not marry Republicans. And what that means is ideology becomes biology in one generation. This is becoming, or already is in some ways, like Sunni versus Shiite. It is not a political conflict in the traditional sense. It is a tribal conflict between groups that do not marry each other.
If you look at this graph over here, marriages between Democrats and Republicans are rare. So when you have something like that, they are becoming different ethnic groups, as different as racial groups. Ethnic groups like Sunni and Shiite, or Protestant and Catholic—for a long time, that was a huge thing in Europe. Or Hutu and Tutsi, whatever.
Host
And this relates to your idea of primary identity, right? Because these people are Democrats or Republicans. They're also American. There are also many other things, left and right as you said, but there is one identity that people are now trending towards as their primary in certain cases.
Balaji Srinivasan
And that's why you're saying basically the nation which previously would have been primary identity—American, or in the past primary identity Catholic—that's right. It's like Yugoslavia where that primary identity was national, but now it's a sub-national identity.
There's this book by, I think it's by Barbara Walter. It's called *How Civil Wars Start*. She talks about how in Iraq, she interviewed a girl there and she's like, "What was different about after the US occupation?" She's like, "Well, people started asking me a question they'd never asked me before, which is, are you Sunni or Shiite?" So Saddam, for all of his many faults, basically kept the lid on Iraq. If you were in Iraq before Saddam, there are bad things about it, but it was not in civil war and ISIS and the insanity that followed and the sectarian violence. Because in the absence of the state, once the state was knocked out and the Americans were considered illegitimate, you had God. People fell back on that Leviathan. And so you had these sectarian disputes, which of course were fueled by Iran, all these terrorist groups. But it became Sunni-Shiite. The national identity went away.
And so what you're mentioning here is exactly like the American flag is not actually—that's the state, right? But people don't identify with it. You'll see all these articles, NYT, other places, they'll criticize, "Oh my God, I don't like the American flag." Instead, the way of thinking about it, it's not just Republicans that are nationalists. It's Democrats that are also nationalists. They're for Democrats and Republicans are for Republicans. Both are for their own tribe. Their nation is not the American nation. It is Republicans for the Republican nation, Democrats for the Democrat nation.
And both of them actually have their own flags. They're not called the Democrat flag and the Republican flag, but you can immediately think of them—the Blue Lives Matter flag or the thin blue line flag, the Don't Tread on Me flag for the Republicans, or the Progress flag for the Democrats. They have actually their own flags that are the flags of their nations. We don't recognize them as such today, but that's why I was saying if in the 2010s the question is "what is the currency," the 2020s the question is "what is a nation." Once there is no longer an American nation, there is a Democrat nation and a Republican nation. You have these fractals that look just like the princely states of India in 1947 or Bismarck before Germany. We already have the fractal Democrat, Republican America, that complicated thing that I showed you that seemed like it's part of the distant past is actually our present.
Host
How does this relate?
Balaji Srinivasan
The internet has actually made this possible to deal with. I'm not saying it's all going to be roses, but one of the things the internet has done, as you progress and connect to the previous thing from city-state to nation-state to network-state: those city-states like San Marino that were little tiny things that couldn't survive on their own versus a big nation-state can now, with the internet, group together around the world and have a collective scale that is bigger than any local nation-state. A nation-state can no longer expand because the boundaries there are fixed. The network-state can expand at the speed of a TikTok or a Facebook.
Host
It can grab all these people globally.
Balaji Srinivasan
It's constantly competing for people. And so it can get greater scale than any nation state—or not any, let's say many nation states.
Host
And I mean, it'll be hard to be bigger than China or India, but Facebook is, right?
Balaji Srinivasan
Now, Facebook is not a network state because it was not set up as such. The Facebook employees report to Zuck. They are in the leadership hierarchy. The Facebook users are just using a tool and they're not taking orders from Mark on this or that. But you could imagine a network that did have that kind of social contract, where when you came in, you were like, "Look, here's the thing. This is the president. Here's the folks. Here's what we're doing. Here's the one commandment. Here would be your slot in the hierarchy if we have to break up tasks and so on," just like when joining a company. "Here's your title and your position." It doesn't have to be quite that hierarchical, but it could be. Different network societies will have different varieties.
And then you are signing that social smart contract upon entering it. And now you've got something that has aspects of the city state where everybody agrees on something, it's innovative, it's agile, it's nimble, it's founder-led. It has aspects of the nation state which beat the city state because it got scale, it has uniformity. It is useful to have people in a large group all speak Italian or French. It allows laws and all the types of—there's a reason the V2 happened. And this V3 combines aspects of both, just like Bitcoin combined aspects of both digital gold and fiat currency.
And that is maybe what we're going to need as we move into this fractalized America, where you do have two nations not under God, because people don't believe in God anymore—that's dropped off the cliff as well. Divisible. You're going to need some new thesis of how to govern. And I think network states may be a piece of that.
But even if you take America aside for now, the rest of the world, all of these other countries, all of these other groups within those places—the 96% of the world is not American. They can also now have new ways of doing self-government that don't require winning a war or an election. Anybody can declare themselves president of a startup society, set up a one commandment, fix the problems they see in the world, and be an example for others.
Host
Well, I think that's a good place to end it. This was really, really informative. I think I'm glad we covered certain topics like, is this just for the wealthy? Or can this actually scale to the point that we consider states to be today? So Balaji, thank you for going through all this. If people are interested, they can go to what?
Balaji Srinivasan
The networkstate.com and also twitter.com. It's free online and you can also get it on Kindle.
Host
Awesome. And if people are curious, the networkstate.com slash dashboard looks like you have 26 startup societies that you're starting to track. So also a very interesting place to see who's building, what they're building, and there's a lot of diversity there too.
Balaji Srinivasan
That's right. So this space is—things are happening here.
Host
Awesome. Thanks, Balaji.
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