Main Topic: The podcast episode discusses the history of the internet, specifically the evolution from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0, and the lessons learned from the past that can be applied to the future of the internet.
Key Participants:
Key Points:
Takeaways:
In his book (and podcast), Brian McCullough chronicles the history and evolution of the internet -- from college kids in a basement and the dot-com boom, to the applications built on top of it and the entrepreneurs behind them.
General partner Chris Dixon chats with McCullough about How the Internet Happened -- and more broadly, about how tech adoption and innovation happens. They discuss lessons learned, how innovation doesn’t happen in a straight line, and what the past can tell us about the next phase of the internet and technology.
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Chris Dixon
Hi, this is Chris Dixon. This is the a16z Podcast. And today we have Brian McCullough, the author of the recent awesome book, which I just read, called *How the Internet Happened: From Netscape to the iPhone*. Thanks for being here, Brian.
Brian McCullough
Thanks for having me, Chris.
Chris Dixon
So I thought it was a really fun book. I guess I had lived through some of it and knew some firsthand and had heard a lot of the stories from some of the principals or sort of secondhand. I'll say first, I really liked the book because as far as everything I knew, which I'd say maybe more than half of it or something from first to secondhand, it was very accurate. And so I just appreciate that.
Brian McCullough
I appreciate you saying that.
Chris Dixon
And then number two is really entertaining. It was a great read. I highly recommend reading it. But then the third thing is, I think it's a great resource, especially for younger people who are interested in technology. I guess in some ways everyone might be interested in the internet these days. Even if they're not in the technology industry, they probably should be interested in the internet. I just think it's a great resource to have what may become the canonical history of the internet for that period.
Brian McCullough
The thesis was two-part. I'm thinking of non-tech people. What has been more influential, disruptive? Technology has infiltrated every facet of our life. More clear than ever in the last few years. I feel like anybody would want to know, who did this? Why did they do it? How did they do it? So I was thinking, number one, of my parents, and here's how you got a supercomputer in your pocket, all that stuff. But number two, as we were talking about off air, about 10 years ago, I'm 40 now, so when I meet with young entrepreneurs and things like that, they'd start to say things like, "Oh wow, you were around for the dot-com stuff, what was that like?" So now 10 years on, if you're 26, the internet has just always been in the ether all around. So if you're a young entrepreneur entering tech today, I wanted, here is your industry. And not going all the way back to even the PC era. No, the modern era of web-based startups, especially modern startups. So the book covers sort of Netscape, so 93-ish to I think 2007 or so. I end with the announcement of the first iPhone, yeah.
Chris Dixon
And that's important, I think, even if you aren't someone who's interested in history per se or whatever. Like if you want to understand – I mean I think I would argue and I assume you would agree that if you want to sort of try to predict the future of your industry, you should know where it came from, right? And that gives you a good – gives you pattern recognition.
Brian McCullough
Pattern recognition but also why forget the lessons of the mistakes? Yeah.
Chris Dixon
Learn from the mistakes, yeah.
Brian McCullough
Why forget the things that failed? When you go into the dot-com era stuff in those chapters, you're seeing all the things like grocery delivery, like cloud computing, cloud storage and things like that, that were always good ideas but seemed like the most boneheaded wrong ideas at the time because it was just too soon. So there's so many lessons all throughout the book of not just why did this thing work and that thing didn't, but why did that thing not work then and does it work in other contexts? And learning those patterns I think are the most valuable.
Chris Dixon
I have this, I always forget the name of it. It's on eBay, but it's a card game from like 2005. I think it was like Dot Bomb or something. But it was a joke because at the time, it was of course the internet had sort of become a joke. And the cards were each all the, it was bad idea cards. And it was like internet grocery delivery, internet money. It was funny because I actually wrote a blog post about this somewhere where it's almost like all of the companies that are sort of the hot companies today in technology were these quote unquote bad ideas.
Brian McCullough
Which I think the lesson is I think Mark Andreessen said this there are no bad ideas, just ideas that are too early and you saw it all happen in that kind of primordial soup of the 90s and so that's also, there's a built in fun narrative there which is you have the web going mainstream and so you have this sort of Cambrian explosion of technology and companies and then the asteroid hits and the dinosaurs are dead and then the rebirth so maybe that is the more important lesson than individual ideas that don't work But being in an industry that is prone to occasionally on a cycle, everything's going to blow up. And so how do you and your company and your idea survive that sort of a cycle?
Chris Dixon
It's hard to describe to people who didn't live through it how the internet looked 2001 to, let's say, pre-Google IPO, I guess. And you talk about that in the book. Before people realized. And it was clear people, like it was an important thing. People would use it. Although nothing like today. You didn't have smartphones and everything. It would be more like this thing. You go home. You check your email. It's this nice way to send pictures to your family. So it's clearly a useful thing to have a money for, but the assumption was it's one of these things like the airline industry or something that will just never make money.
It was a cool thing, cool tool, we're using it, but man, was that a bad idea from a business perspective. That was the sentiment. And then Google, I remember Google's IPO, and then Ubuntu or other sort of... Do you remember the first time you heard how much money Google was making? Because I remember so many people's reaction to that because that was the thing, is that everyone had been conditioned to think that while the internet was fun, it was probably a niche and you were never going to be able to build a truly great company on top of it. And then all of a sudden, because I kept it secret for so long, I remember people's reactions to just their jaws dropping.
Brian McCullough
And I think, as I recall, I joined the industry and there were sort of all these other kind of green shoes. You saw, you know, you were in the industry, you start to say, wait, that person, you know, they're supposed to be a terrible thing and they're making two couple hundred million. Yeah. So absolutely like Flickr and Delicious and there were all these cool products, but also there were Zappos and PayPal and a bunch of other companies were actually still and they weren't Google, but they were real businesses.
Chris Dixon
So anyways, let's go through some of the chapters of the book. So I think what particularly interesting thing is in the early stage of the Internet, there was this kind of, I think one thing people don't realize today is the kind of bottom-up decentralized architecture of the web. There was an alternative to it known as the information superhighway being pushed by companies like, I believe you know better, Comcast, Disney, Microsoft.
Brian McCullough
Well, they were all planning to get together and make, you know, So there was a million plans, a million meetings, and I say in the book, you know, Bill Gates took meetings with all and sundry from Barry Dillard to whoever. So the point being, though, that there were plenty of people who just didn't believe in the internet. And then among the people that did – I don't think that's it. I don't think that's it. I don't think anybody, even the people that eventually became internet true believers, thought that it was good enough. That's, I think, the lesson.
Chris Dixon
Okay, okay, sorry. So I guess – let me rephrase it. I think there was some camp of people that just weren't excited by the idea of networking computers. Right, sure. Then of the people that wanted to network computers globally, there were people that thought the best way to do it would be in this kind of centralized way with putting a big box by your TV with a big fat pipe and sort of a TV kind of top-down experience controlled by Comcast, Disney, Microsoft. and then there was sort of this really kind of unlikely alternative, which was this, at the time, pretty crappy experience in Mosaic and homebrew websites and Yahoo, and you talk about this in the book. And I think that was sort of at least, let's say, in 1993 or 1994, probably still the underdog, that approach versus AOL and all these other companies. And the fact that that ended up winning, what's the lesson there?
Brian McCullough
It's a very interesting story. We're almost saying it. It's obvious. The lesson is sometimes just good enough technology is good enough. So like, again, Bill Gates and Barry Diller, all of them, they weren't wrong. They believed that broadband was going to become. So they were trying for perfect too early and just good enough was better. They knew it was going to come 2002. They weren't wrong. That's the date that broadband started to penetrate and things like that. So they thought they had time was the key essence. And they thought that, OK, we'll all play nicely together. We'll all take our piece of the pie or whatever.
So it's classically out of nowhere from the bottom up, like you're saying. It was almost like the PC too because it's hobbyists that want to do this thing. So people see the early web and pictures are enough. Little postage-sized videos are enough to do cool things at the beginning. Now then you have the crazy people that come on top of that and say, can I do commerce on top of this? Can I build an actual business on top of this? But what you need first is you need the technology to be good enough to excite enough people to accept the limitations of the good enough technology. And then if you reach a critical mass there, then you can at least build businesses off those early adopters.
Maybe I'm promoting my own view of the world here too much, but I would also argue it's very important that the people that are excited in the beginning are also people who are able to build websites or build code or do whatever. The fact that a lot of them were software developers or computer enthusiasts, the same with the early PC. You didn't just want people to use it, you wanted people to write spreadsheets and word processors and do all that stuff. And so for that we have to credit Berners-Lee, of course, because not only does the web bring sexiness to the internet, the internet had been around by 25, 30 years at that point, but the pictures and the things and the cat videos, that gets normal people involved.
But Berners-Lee and HTML is so dead simple that you have to only be minimally sophisticated to be able to develop for it, right? So we have to give them credit. Him and then also the academics and other people who made DNS, for example, like the fact that it was permissionless, the fact that a hobbyist in a university could be on sort of level playing field with Disney on the web, right? And like put up a website and... So it's that sort of chicken and egg thing where people see the web for the first time in the Mosaic browser because it's easy to use because you can get it on Windows. And they say, I want to create a cool thing like what I just saw.
And so it's easier for them to go off and create that cool thing. You need both sides of it.
Chris Dixon
Yeah, I see. So you need sort of the one side that kind of inspires people and gets them fired up, and the other side that lets them then go. The obvious analogy to think of today is like VR is still, it's not only can you not get mainstream people to adopt it, but it's still relatively difficult, and you have to be super sophisticated to create decent VR experiences.
Brian McCullough
Yeah, makes sense.
Chris Dixon
Okay, so there's that. So to me, that beginning part was really interesting, the sort of top-down, bottom-up battle. And in fact, I think you had in the book, I'd seen this before, but Bill Gates' first version of his *The Road Ahead*, which came out in what, 95 or something?
Brian McCullough
94-ish.
Chris Dixon
94-ish. It barely had the web in it, and then they actually revised a version. Suddenly had 150 seconds. But it did have information superhighway. It did talk about networking. And so that's the only thing. I'm not calling Bill Gates stupid at all in the book. He had the vision. He just bet on the wrong horse because he thought that it was too nerdy for normal people to adopt.
Brian McCullough
Interesting.
Chris Dixon
And then you talk about a bunch of interesting companies, obviously sort of the iconic companies, I guess, Netscape, Yahoo, Google, eBay, Amazon. eBay is an interesting one because I think of the, you know, well, they're all interesting, but obviously Google and Amazon are wildly powerful companies today. You know, Yahoo, of course, had its sort of fall and was kind of replaced by Google. I think eBay is interesting because, you know, they're still an important company. They're a big company, but we don't think of them as, they're not sort of GAFA. They're not the four big ones. But from a product point of view, I think you argue they in some ways could be the most influential internet company and in some ways the truest internet company.
Brian McCullough
And I was surprised that I discovered that in writing the chapter. I knew I was going to write about eBay. So there three things that they do that I argue are super influential and they deserve more credit for laying the groundwork for this. Number one, they teach normal people to trust faceless strangers from across the country online, right? When I was doing the library research for this, as late as like the Christmas of 98 and 99, people are wondering if e-commerce is ever going to take off because they can't convince enough people to put their credit cards online. Like we're going to completely through the looking at the last world now in terms of that sort of stuff. But so the fact that eBay trained normal people that you can trust faceless masses. We should not underestimate the people that were the training wheels for the modern digital era. And so just doing something like that is key.
The second thing that is key is that, like I said, these are masses that are self-organizing. And so like we live in the tyranny of the five-star rating system. How would Uber, Airbnb, go down the list? They created or they proved that a non-hierarchical sort of self-organized reputation system could function online maybe not perfectly, but well enough to achieve scale to be good enough most of the time.
Chris Dixon
Did eBay invent that or popularize it? There must have been a concept in life.
Brian McCullough
I'm sure, of course, they did not invent it. But the story is that they certainly popularized it. They certainly made it mainstream. Pierre Omidyar did not want to have to settle the disputes between users. So he just created a system out of laziness that was like, alright, you can accrue reputation and if you don't defend that reputation, it's going to harm you. And so that was actually one of the key reasons that they, because Amazon came after them, Yahoo auctions came, you know. People, once they invested in that reputation system enough, they're not going to go to the other platform, right? So trust people on the internet. The rating system.
And then the third one is just the fact that, and I do argue this, maybe around the edges there are others, but they were the first company to succeed at our business model is just whatever our users are doing on our platform. And I tell the story in the book that like Jeff Skoll is – the newspapers were not dumb no matter what anyone says. They were kicking the tires. They knew that this was a threat to their classified ads business. But one of the guys says to Jeff, my C-suite is not going to sign off on buying you because you don't own anything. You don't own trucks. You don't own factories. And that's common throughout the digital era. But also they couldn't wrap their minds around the fact that like you're not even taking possession of the goods. All you're doing is letting people interact. Right? And so again, where would social media be? some of the most powerful, valuable companies in the world don't own anything. That's precisely why they're so valuable, because it turns out that's a very profitable thing. You don't have to deal with all of the inventory and everything else.
Chris Dixon
It's funny, you still see that on Twitter. People are like, how could Uber be more valuable than, I don't know, what Hertz or something? They don't own things. And it's like, well, that's actually a feature, not a bug, from a P&L perspective.
Brian McCullough
That's interesting.
Chris Dixon
So I guess some other interesting ones, so Napster. That was one I learned a little bit more. I mean, I knew this public story, but I never really knew the startup story.
Brian McCullough
I discovered what that was about while doing it because we all think Napster is about piracy. It's about disruption of a media industry that can't get with the times quick enough and was dug their heels in stubbornly. But no. And I got this by interviewing some of the Napster guys where they're making their case. And then when you do the research, you see their quotes from 1998, 99. They're screaming this from the rooftops. The story of Napster is today we live in a world for media of unlimited selection and instant gratification. If I tell you about a TV show, movie, book, whatever, we just did that with our phones, right?
You know, you expect to be able to pull it up in five seconds and at least sample it or probably consume it, right? That's what they had. And had they been able to convince anyone of that in 1999, it would be a completely different media landscape. And the only problem that they had is, you know, don't pick a fight with an industry that has literal mob ties going back to its very founding days. That's the interesting thing is it's sort of a three-act – to me, it's a three-act play, right? So the first act is Napster does this and everyone says they're instigating piracy. And the second act is, OK, we shut them down.
We got rid of the pirates. And the third act is it turns out in a way they were right all along. It wasn't about getting things for free. It was about the convenience.
Chris Dixon
And Steve Jobs said the same thing. But like right in the end, it turns out like today that there's like very little, you know, I mean, there's music piracy and there's movie piracy and there's video game piracy. But for the most part, if you make it simple enough and have a reasonable price.
Brian McCullough
That's right.
Chris Dixon
That's right. So it turns out we now know that their value proposition actually was, as they claimed, a great deal of it was about convenience and not about stealing.
Brian McCullough
100%. Yeah. And so the direct analogy is Spotify, right? You could have had a Spotify in 1999 or 2000 at the very least. This is, again, classic disruption stuff. You can't convince an industry at the height. 1999, I think, is the height, and they're doing $20 billion because of the CD format and all that classic stuff. But at the same time, there's other reasons why Napster didn't work out. They couldn't attract the best talent, and the legal stuff happened from day one.
Chris Dixon
Didn't they also get displaced by Nutella and all these other things? Or what was it, Kazaa?
Brian McCullough
Yeah, but let's say that the record companies had been willing to at least play ball a little bit and do tests with them as a platform. Think of the counterfactual there. Where would, if Apple launches the iPod, how does that eventually gain traction other than being something that then, if Napster is popularized, is just an accessory to Napster. And then if that model had been proven, who's to say that they wouldn't have been the ones to go, because it's the next obvious thing, to video streaming and things like that. So Netflix had the road open to them because there was no one else doing it, but there could have been a player already there that had proven success through this model and would obviously have gone into video.
Chris Dixon
And that then, when YouTube and Netflix came along, the movie and TV folks industries had seen what happened to the music industry and were savvier this time, right? Instead of just sort of saying, let's just fight it tooth and nail, maybe we can make it work for us. Number one, they trust Google to have the math to at least take down the piracy enough. Number two, Google had already proven AdWords and was making billions of dollars a year at these little contextual ads. And so Google can come to the table with them from day one once they own YouTube and say, hey, there's money here. Do you want a piece of this? So as opposed to Napster, which didn't have that built out. So they're begging the record companies to come to their platform that they're going to build. They haven't done it yet, but they don't have in place any monetization. So from day one, once YouTube is under Google's wing, Google has at least something. It wasn't what they wanted. It wasn't going to replace their existing business models, but something was better than nothing.
So let's talk about Google a little bit. So I think, to me, there's many remarkable things about Google. But perhaps what's most remarkable is the business model, which kind of, in the most serendipitous confluence events in history, you create the most popular, I mean, they're brilliant, of course, and invented all this amazing stuff. But they build this incredibly valuable search engine, incredibly effective and useful. The web, of course, explodes in use and value and broadband and smartphones and all that. But then this company called Overture, GoTo originally, and then Overture, for sort of completely, a little bit orthogonal reasons, invents the greatest business model of all time, which happens to tuck perfectly into Google's model.
Brian McCullough
I just gave a talk a couple weeks ago at Google. It posted recently. And I said to them, I was like, I don't know how to say this here, but obviously you guys, your first miracle was you solved search. God bless. How can we function today without that? Your number two miracle is that you created the greatest advertising machine ever devised by humanity. but actually you kind of stole it. They didn't steal it. Somebody else invented it because they actually made it functionally better. That's the Google story. There's no problem that they don't think that they can do better. The quality score stuff.
GoTo never had great organic results. They just had results. GoTo was a pure pay-for-play thing. It was like for people today, it's just the SEM without the SEO. It's just the right rail without the left. And then that original model, because again, I built one of my first companies purely on AdWords. So imagine this perfect three-sided market where as an advertiser, I'm paying less per click if my ad is more relevant. Because I remember I used to be paying $2 or whatever over on GoTo, and all of a sudden I'm paying 30 cents a click because my ad is better. And as it gets better, it goes down.
Google's making more money because they know that someone might be bidding a dollar but only be clicked on a certain amount of times. If you bid five cents but get clicked on 30 times, we make more money. And they did that actual A-B testing where it's like the users actually preferred the ads because if the organic results are good, yeah, maybe these paid results also might have some benefit for certain use cases. So people actually searched more once they put the ads up. So it's the perfect three-sided market where it's win, win, win.
Chris Dixon
Well, the other fascinating thing, right, is all of the pressure at the time was around so that everyone thought the only possible business model for search was sort of the portal model, which was to have banner ads and surrounded by celebrity news and all that kind of stuff. It's the classic eyeballs attention.
Brian McCullough
Yeah, yeah.
Chris Dixon
And so there was all these famous stories. I think it was – was it Excite with George Bell or something where they were – and I'm not taking – I'm not criticizing these executives at all because that was the business model at the time. But the whole thing was I don't want a search engine that's too good that gets them off my site because that destroys my business model. So the other brilliant thing that Larry and Sergey did, beyond everything else, was stick to their principles kind of crazily, with no business model at all in sight. And we're going to go against the entire industry, and we're going to just bet that a business model will come along that's going to work, even though everyone says it's not going to.
Brian McCullough
Their investors have said publicly that we were starting to get a little itchy. Are you guys ever going to – Well, they had this whole real – this sounds crazy today, but they had a real effort to do – they were going to sell Google boxes, which were this enterprise surge. because everyone knew consumer had no business model. And I remember there's a great business we got from 2000. Awesome search engine, how will they ever make money? One of these pipe dream Silicon Valley things. And they literally, it was like a little sell box, it's $100,000. You put it in your data center, it collects your corporate documents.
Chris Dixon
I think they were still manufacturing those as recently as two years ago, by the way. I think they only recently shut that business down. They probably felt bad because someone bought them and you felt like you had to support it. I don't know. So that's an amazing story. I mean, there's a whole bunch of great stories in there.
Brian McCullough
Yeah, I mean, I fought hard, as we said, to preserve the stories of the dot-com bubble because I think for our industry, it's key to remember.
Chris Dixon
So you mean the bad side of the bubble?
Brian McCullough
The bad side.
Chris Dixon
Let's talk about that. So you're talking about just the froth and the bad companies and the whole kind of hysteria.
Brian McCullough
Yeah, and so part of it is excusable by the fact that any new technology is a lot of entrepreneurs just feeling around in the dark to see what actually works. But this was more so than most because no one knows anything. No one knows if you can successfully do commerce on the internet at the beginning. No one knows. I think of it as you're searching on more degrees of freedom than normally. Normally you're looking for what's a good product. Here you're just trying to figure out what's a good product, what's a good business model. Just so much was unknown.
Chris Dixon
When you invent the internal combustion engine, you have a pretty good idea you're eventually going to move people and go on it.
Brian McCullough
That's right. But no one even knows. It's like that analogy of the elephant. You're looking at the elephant, somebody sees a tail, somebody sees a toe. No one really knows what they're looking at. A lot of the fun excess and things like that, I don't blame the people involved at all because no one knew. And anybody that tells you from that time, oh, well, we were successful because we, no, come on. It was just random chance in a lot of cases. Proven out by the fact that the vast majority of them were e-commerce plays. I think the way you describe it in your book is, I don remember the years exactly but like 95 you have some high companies 96 it more of that At some point maybe 99 you get cynical At some point you do get the hucksters and the cynicism and just pure business plans IPO So there's the great companies that survived.
There's the really well-intentioned good ideas that just didn't happen to make it. And then at some point there is this cynical huckster layer on top. Because there's the quotes from the VCs in there, number one, where they're like, we don't have to back a successful company because all we got to do is get it out the door and get it public, right? And the way capitalism works is like maybe their VC, I assume there were VCs who were really trying hard to find companies that would really work long term. But eventually if their neighbor is doing the cynical strategy and winning, the system will reward that.
It's the classic bubble, the greater fool, like can I get out while the getting's good before those guys get out while the getting's good.
But also then it's not just the VCs because Wall Street had so much and not just Wall Street itself, But like as I point out in the book, like this is – historically, these are the baby boomers reaching their peak earning years and they're going to – that money had to go somewhere. So almost independent of the internet, you would have had some.
Chris Dixon
Right.
Brian McCullough
You would have had some. It was a ripe era for some. Maggie Mayhar, the journalist from Barron's in the book, I quote her. She said something like, yeah, someone would have had to invent this. It was the froth and the cappuccino of the longest bull market in history.
Chris Dixon
Yeah. Going back to 82.
Brian McCullough
So yeah, let's talk more about that kind of the frothy sort of craziness there, right? So many times in this book, so many of the ideas that seemed dumb at the time prove out later because they were just too soon. There was a startup, I think they might have been public in the late 90s called MySpace. But it wasn't the social network MySpace. It was literally you would put a widget on your desk. It was Dropbox. Right. Store your files in the cloud, right? But, you know, this is in the era of dial-up. Wi-Fi doesn't have – there were so many things. One of the most notorious .com era flameouts is Webvan, which is grocery delivery, right?
Chris Dixon
The story of Pets.com and all of – there were four to five major pets e-commerce plays, and they couldn't find ways to economically ship dog food. Now, that's a classic story, but obviously that's a problem that's been solved now.
Brian McCullough
So in a way, this is always true again in tech. Any technology, there are ideas that will always be bad ideas, and then there are ideas that are only bad ideas because the technology's not there yet, the market's not there yet, the public's not there yet. So there's a lot of those stories in the book, and I wanted to preserve that. I wanted to also show even ideas or people that swing and miss in certain eras, why do they come back, what are the lessons?
Chris Dixon
What are some good examples there? Frankly, things like the on-demand delivery stuff. Because there was Cosmo here in New York City.
Brian McCullough
I thought you meant the very same people. You're saying just trying the same ideas.
Chris Dixon
I'd have to think about it a bit, but there are people. Mark being a perfect example. But the idea that you wouldn't hunker down and wait on your idea. No one knew at the time you needed smartphones to get the on-demand delivery piece of the puzzle to work. But it's not like people hunkered down and waited. A lot of the people went in different directions. The people that were successful, like a lot of the people that founded PayPal, came from other dot-com stuff that they either flipped and sold or IPO'd or whatever. But then they didn't keep going with those original e-commerce players. Like what was Zip2? It was like a directory or something like that. They went in a different direction.
Brian McCullough
So I wanted to track that sort of development on the specific personal story level too. Where do you think... you must have thought a lot about this, I assume, when you wrote the book. So you wrote about that era, and then you can imagine a follow-up book from 2007 to today, which I kind of call a smartphone era. Where do you think we are now? Do you think this is the internet, and now obviously it will get better and improve, but that was sort of it? In the same way that, well, you wrote a book about the automobile industry, right? The equivalent of your book would be covering, I don't know, 1901 to 1915 or something. And then after that, okay, you get more makes and models and they get faster and this and that. But fundamentally... or I don't know, maybe not. Maybe in the automobile industry you could argue that stage two was about building suburbs and trucking companies. So that would be sort of the history of... where are we? I just always think about this. I don't know the answer, obviously. Where are we in the 100-year story?
Chris Dixon
If I'm being honest, where we are right now today, my original answer was going to be almost what you're saying, is that we're sort of in a lull. So I said the original dot-com era is this Cambrian explosion that tended to have a flavor towards commerce. And then in the Web 2.0 era, you have this more "here comes everybody" sort of thing where the web and technology itself becomes more bidirectional, where people aren't just passively consuming. I think that's Clay Shirky's phrase, this idea of Wikipedia and Facebook, just this bi-directional. By just turning the knob a little bit, that shades into social. And then when mobile is essentially a rise at the same time that social goes mainstream, and it is serendipitously the perfect consumption and crucially creation device for social. Would social have gotten as far as it had had the iPhone not arrived at the exact same moment? It's within the same 18-month period that Facebook opens open registration and the iPhone is released. I think that's a crucial thing to remember: it's not just the perfect consumption device, it's the key device for actually creating all that social stuff.
Back to your original question. I actually think we're in a lull right now, if I'm being honest. Remember what it was like as late as even 2012, where it was like every couple of days you'd be like, "What's this new thing now? Do I have to be on this? Do I have to try this? Do I need this gadget?" And aside from all of the other things about tech right now and people maybe feeling bad about the tech industry generally, I also think that what's not helped is that there hasn't been that new wow factor.
Brian McCullough
And I don't know what that is. Are we in a lull, or is the internet like TV and now we have CBS, NBC, and ABC? Is that a symptom of maturity?
Chris Dixon
I agree we're in a lull now, and I personally, I'll just say my own bias would be it's a lull and it will un-lull or whatever.
Brian McCullough
But another argument, I think if you've read Tim Wu's book, I think it's called *The Master Switch*. It's a really good book, but he basically argues this is just sort of all forms of media. You get mature, you have four big incumbents, and then the government either breaks them up or doesn't. Is that where we are?
Chris Dixon
I think so for at least the existing players. But I think the other thing where we are right now is... Or does software technology have a different dynamic? I guess that's what I'm sort of hinting at my view, which is I think software is a little different than hardware in that way.
Brian McCullough
Because this is more what I've been talking about on my daily podcast a lot lately: another symptom of what we have right now is that there was a lot of low-hanging fruit picked. When mobile takes off, you can be a 16-person team, code up a new, better, slightly different chat app and have a billion users. So we were in this great period of a decade, the better part of a decade, where everybody can chase a billion users. Well, most of those categories have been filled. I mean, arguably anyone could come around tomorrow and do something slightly differently and take over anybody's place in any of these things.
But because all anyone was chasing was scale, all that mattered was getting to that scale. I think that what we're waiting for now is that it is sort of like the market where it was just the Model T and you could only get it in black. What we need to see this next generation develop is that it's about not just the quantity or the scale, it's about the quality. The way that you'll differentiate and become the new Instagram is to provide a qualitatively better experience. I actually think that will create more interesting startups because it's not just you show up here, plant your flag in this market and reach a billion users.
If you're going to reach a billion users now, you have to offer something qualitatively different than what other people are doing.
Chris Dixon
Yeah, I guess the question I have is... I think the historical pattern in tech has been this interaction between what's called infrastructures and platforms, but let's say infrastructure and applications. Infrastructure in my mind is computers, the internet, broadband, smartphones. Applications are the word processor, Mosaic, eBay, websites, Instagram, things like that. I think you mentioned low-hanging fruit. What happened right there was the iPhone was this major new unlock for a new wave of infrastructure. People suddenly have this thing in your hand, you've got a camera, you've got this awesome screen.
What am I going to do with it? You're sitting there looking for apps. You don't have that many on your screen. Now it's saturated. I think the history has been that the lull is due to the fact that now, the iPhone is 2007, the App Store 2008, so we're 10 years into this cycle. Entrepreneurs have picked off all the low-hanging applications. But then either we're at the end of history or something new comes along. I don't know. We have all these candidates. Maybe it's a new kind of device. Maybe it's cars. Maybe it's VR. Maybe it's blockchain. Maybe it's machine learning stuff. Maybe it's whatever.
That thing then creates a new piece of infrastructure that unlocks 10 years of innovation, or we're at the end of history.
Brian McCullough
We're not at the end of history because what I think another thing, and I'm not blaming entrepreneurs for this, but people are still doing the same playbook that people have been doing since 2004. Since the first time that you could achieve a billion users with a product. What maybe we're also waiting on is for that next generation to come up behind and be like, "Well, we're doing it this way because this is the way it makes sense to us," as opposed to people still trying to hit from the same playbook.
Chris Dixon
So you're saying less a new piece of infrastructure and more just a new kind of cultural shift.
Brian McCullough
And I'll tell you why. Think about it. When the dot-com bubble burst, people thought it's a fad and this is over, but the people that still believed it, people were still using it. They were still using it to do cool stuff. They weren't going to do that playbook because they had the example of the whole dot-com thing blowing up. That playbook was dead and over. So they were freed to go off and do crazy ideas. So it's almost like we're being held back by the fact that we have been so successful in tech and tech has taken over the world. People are trying to follow that model that has been so successful for everybody else. It would almost be useful if we had a couple blow-ups so that people would be freed up to think differently and also, crucially, be brave enough. Because again, when Flickr gets started, this is cool. "I want to find all photos of the Grand Canyon and users will do this for us with taxonomies and tagging. And then we'll find the business model later." Whereas everybody is still trying to play from that Instagram and get to a billion users and get to scale playbook.
Chris Dixon
I think what probably will happen is you sort of have these archetype companies come up who show a new playbook. You mentioned Flickr and Delicious and those things in the Web 2.0 era. And we were talking earlier about eBay. They kind of paved the way for a lot of that stuff. I think there's been a lot of stuff happening in enterprise software. So if you think about it, one way to interpret the current era of the internet is it's actually a corporate slash enterprise era. And I'll admit my bias is towards consumers.
Brian McCullough
No, and I'll say mine is too, but I work at a firm that does both and I see this stuff happening.
Chris Dixon
If you just think about your typical experience of a corporate worker in 2018, you go to the office and maybe you're using Windows 95 and some archaic ERP software and a bunch of other stuff. And then you go home and you're using this Retina iPad and Gmail and Facebook. It's a little like a time travel experience. The software, the work feels like 10 years ago. One interpretation is that what's happening right now is we're just upgrading all that stuff, and that's "SaaS" and all these other kinds of things going on, and there's a lot of successful companies there.
Brian McCullough
Can I pose a question that literally I'm posing to you because I wonder if structurally this is another thing? When Web 2.0 flowered, Microsoft had already had the antitrust thing, so they're not going to buy anybody. The dot-com bubble had happened, so it had cleared the slate. So there was this decade-long period for the Facebooks and everybody to surface, and no one's going to take them out. I'm almost asking you... I mean, there was Yahoo who was trying a little bit.
Chris Dixon
A little bit, but not in the way that Microsoft could have. Microsoft could still have bought Amazon when it was a $5 stock.
Brian McCullough
So maybe are we structurally in a situation where the danger is that because the big players at the top are so big, and all they do is every time there's a new crop coming through, they just pick them up, incorporate them, and turn them into a feature of their existing products?
Chris Dixon
Yeah, well, Instagram Story, Snapchat would be the most. Exactly. They didn't even have to buy them in that case. That's the counter argument: the distribution on the consumer side is so strong that even if you have that great idea... But there are limits to this. There's only so many times Facebook can keep adding features to Instagram without the thing becoming...
Brian McCullough
But what I'm saying is that if Flickr comes around today, that would just be... it's the most obvious example, tagging photos. That would just be something that would be immediately scooped up and incorporated into someone's existing product. So are we in a lull because we almost got lucky 15 years ago that we had this period where everyone could rise up and no one kneecaps them?
Chris Dixon
I think it definitely had... I mean, look at Snapchat. It's a great example. They really invented a new media type. That type of vertical short video with stuff. It's a brand new idea. The ephemeral messaging and all of it is probably on par with things like Flickr and their novelty. And they're still a very successful company and they're publicly traded. But I think their growth, most people would agree, was severely limited by the fact that all of the ideas propagated so quickly. Particularly companies like Facebook have gotten very good at execution and leveraging their massive distribution. And look, Amazon too. You have some great new thing, Etsy comes along and then Amazon launches Amazon Homemade or whatever. Instagram comes along and they launch it. They just take advantage of their scale and Amazon Prime and all these other things.
I'm also almost saying it at the level of: if you're a company that has the luxury of staying independent, then you have to find... if you have one good feature idea or one good product idea, but it's not actually a good business, you have to bust your butt to make that happen. Versus if you're in an environment where you have one good feature and someone's going to acquire you just to add that feature to their set, then you don't have to do the work of actually evolving that feature before it can become a good business. My partner, Alex Rampel, I'm going to butcher the phrase, but it's something like: "Startups try to find distribution for their innovation faster than the incumbents attach innovation to their distribution."
He always uses TiVo as an example. Great idea, but you're competing against Comcast. Of course, it'll take Comcast five years to add this feature because they're just not very good at adding new features, but they're Comcast. They've got tens of millions of households, and eventually they add the TiVo feature. Or can TiVo leverage that? Netflix is probably one of the most interesting ones today because a lot of people would have bet against that. A lot of people did bet against it. The idea that they would be able to get to 200 million people before the people with 200 million people would figure out that people want always-on streaming.
I sort of think of it as the enterprise consumer thing. That said, there's always new interesting stuff popping up. And I think there's always this kind of search on the periphery. Personally, where I enjoy spending my time is on the periphery, on the virtual reality and crypto and all these other kinds of things. There's always these periphery things, and I think sometimes, especially if you get a lot of developers fired up, can surprise you in the rate at which they improve. I think at some point, I don't know when it'll be, but I think at some point there will be a new set of infrastructure that unlocks new capabilities. And then we go back to that kind of low-hanging fruit mode you described.
One of the key things to look for: go back to the PC era, the Homebrew Computer Club. Go back to when the internet gets started and people are just doing it because they want to make cool websites. Go back to the dot-com era. Always look for the people that are doing this even though they don't think there's a reasonable expectation they'll get paid for it. But they're so passionate about it. The PC industry was literally created by hobbyists. So you should be looking in those spaces today, even as weird as those spaces might look right now. Even think of things like esports and things like that that obviously are becoming very successful spaces right now. But that's where you need to look: where on the developer side, but even literally on the hobbyist side, where are the people doing these things so passionately that it doesn't even occur to them it could be a business or an industry? That's where the next thing is.
Brian McCullough
Yeah, I like to think of it as... I was thinking about this one time: why is it that so many interesting tech things come from hobbies? And this is one model I'd propose. Think about the things in life that operate on a two- to three-year time horizon versus the things that operate on a 10-year time horizon. Most businesses, you go to your work nine to five, and almost every normal business manages to a quarterly or yearly cycle. Maybe they'll invest in two- to three-year things. Who in the world invests at a 10-year cycle? I would say it's maybe academics, maybe things like DARPA, government, and then hobbyists, frankly, because the hobbyists don't care.
If they're doing it for love, they're doing it because it's just cool. People in the Homebrew Computer Club weren't thinking, "What's the ROI on this for the next two years?" They just wanted to program a machine of their own. That's it. So I would argue there's a deeper truth to the hobbyist thing. It's not just the passion, the smart people. It's also that there are people that are investing on a longer time horizon. And that's a very important, rare thing. I think most corporations today simply aren't designed to operate at that time scale.
Chris Dixon
That gets back to my theory of why we're in a lull: people are doing the same playbook. You need that generation to come.
Brian McCullough
It could just be a generational thing.
Chris Dixon
It could be a generational thing, yeah.
Brian McCullough
People who see things in a different way.
Chris Dixon
Exactly. Maybe they have to sometimes forget recent history and not be acculturated into a certain way of thinking of how you build a new product.
Brian McCullough
That almost makes me think that it's so beneficial to have a cleansing, a culling of the herd sometimes, to blow up the old models and blow up literally the old incumbents, because then that's the only way that people... What we're talking about is people that are crazy enough to be like, "Well, we're going to do it this way." But that turns out to be the way that works in this new era. And so it's harder now because it has been so successful that you have a framework where it almost looks dumb to do things any other way right now. And there's no incentive to do it.
So last question, I guess. What were a couple things that you... you obviously know a lot about the history of technology, or I assume already before writing the book. What were some of the most surprising things you learned writing the book, or most interesting things?
Chris Dixon
How much it always is people feeling around in the dark, faking it until they make it. And again, the... If you're an entrepreneur, you know that that's the truth always. And so even though the book becomes the story of "these were the guys that were successful," I was always looking for the thing, like...
Brian McCullough
I see. What's the secret? What did they do?
Chris Dixon
My theory is that because we know Bezos is so analytical, he just had it all mapped out. No, no, no. We know the reason that he started with books. He did all the... But he was proving it to himself. He did not necessarily believe himself that commerce was better in a virtual environment. But once he proved it... Starting with books and running Amazon was almost like this test that he was running to himself. And then because we see as soon as books proves it, then that's when pedal to the metal, get big fast. So even in the case of arguably the most successful entrepreneur of this generation, I think he did not quit Wall Street, get in the car...
no matter what he says. There's the hagiography on that. And he knew from day one "I'm going to have an everything store." I think he thought there could be an everything store, but he was running the test. And then once he proved it to himself, then he went whole hog. And then other things, like again with social media and things like this: how long did all of us think, "Okay, this is a great thing, but is there a great business here behind this?" So it's almost the feeling around in the dark even when you got a provably great idea, fitting that to a provably great business model.
I think maybe it didn't surprise me that, but I want people to see that in the book. It's not just a story of "these are the geniuses that won." Why did they win? And guess what? In almost every single case, the whole Facebook chapter is about Zuckerberg almost requiring people to tell him, "No, you've got the great idea here. Run with this." He was doing Wirehog. Even when Facebook was sort of taking off, he had Wirehog, which was totally separate. They're already out in California, and Sean Parker, at least this is Parker's telling, so granted that, but he's got to convince Mark, "You have this great idea here. Believe in this." So being an entrepreneur myself, I wanted to not bust the myths on that, but show that we'll always come behind 20 years later and say that we were geniuses and we saw it all along. But that's not the reality on the ground.
Brian McCullough
All right, awesome. Well, thank you for being here. And everyone listening should read the book. It's a great book.
Chris Dixon
Thanks.
Brian McCullough
Thank you so much.