Podcast Episode Summary
The podcast episode features two CEOs, Ariel Cohen of Navan and Todd McKinnon of Okta, discussing their experiences navigating crises and challenges in their respective companies. The main topic is the importance of hiring the right employees, especially during times of crisis, and how CEOs can manage their teams and companies through difficult periods.
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Additional Notes:
The podcast episode is a conversation between Ariel Cohen and Todd McKinnon, moderated by Ben Horowitz and David Ulovich. The episode is part of the Connect Enterprise event, which brings together top executives across the A16Z network. The conversation is informal and conversational, with both CEOs sharing their experiences and insights in a candid and honest way.
Taking a company from idea to household name is always difficult. But the past few years presented challenges that caught even the most-seasoned CEOs off guard.
In this episode, you’ll hear from two CEOs that navigated these waters and somehow, came out on the other side. These recordings come straight from our exclusive Connect/Enterprise event, bringing together top executives across the a16z network.
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Ben Horowitz
So I got good news and I got bad news for y'all. The good news is that you all have a shot to be successful, to grow, to exceed expectations, to create a world-beating company and totally kick ass. That's the good news.
Bad news is I'm not sure it gets any easier. What kind of employees you hire, even when everything works well, is really critical because you will have a crisis. They didn't know how to help. I wasn't sharing enough information. I wasn't giving them the context they needed to help pull us out of this. And I think that was probably the most important step that we took, to actually stay in the market, not leave the market. We got to go faster. We just ran down the runway and jumped over a one-foot bar. We got to jump over the five-foot bar.
He's the only CEO that I've worked with who screwed up his company almost as much as I screwed up mine. I think a lot of the people were way too much trying to keep everyone happy.
Narrator
Taking a company from idea to household name is always difficult. But the past few years presented challenges that caught even the most seasoned CEOs off guard. And we're not talking about challenges like a pixel breaking or a key customer turning. We're talking about when shit really hits the fan. Times like when a virus decimates your revenue going from $100 million to zero after a year of growing a workforce from 200 to 1,200 employees. Or, as Ben likes to say, being a post-revenue CEO.
In this episode, you'll hear from two CEOs that navigated these waters and somehow came out on the other side. Plus, these recordings come straight from our exclusive Connect Enterprise event, bringing together top executives across the A16Z network. Ariel Cohen, in conversation with A16Z co-founder Ben Horowitz. You'll hear how Ariel bounced back from perhaps the worst curveball the world could throw at a travel company, plus how he thought about hiring the right type of employees during a crisis, and how Navan ultimately bounced back, especially into a platform shift that threatened its entire core business.
As a reminder, the content here is for informational purposes only. It should not be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice, or be used to evaluate any investment or security, and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any A16Z fund. Please note that A16Z and its affiliates may also maintain investments in the companies discussed in this podcast. For more details, including a link to our investments, please see A16Z.com slash disclosures.
Ben Horowitz
I always like talking to Ariel because he's the only CEO that I've worked with who screwed up his company almost as much as I screwed up mine. A lot of you may have been like pre-revenue CEOs. We were both post-revenue CEOs as we lost all of our revenue. So let's talk about that. Ariel, maybe take us on your journey from starting the company, pre-revenue, revenue, post-revenue, and what the hell happened?
Ariel Cohen
Yeah, COVID happened. But first of all, I'm happy to be here. Thank you for listening to us. I think it will be interesting. So we started Navan in 2015 as TripActions, with a very simple idea. We saw that nothing makes sense around T&E, around travel and expense. Both Ilan, my co-founder, and I used to work in different organizations. When we needed to travel, you send an email, you call somebody, it's back and forth. And if you need to change something, it's a nightmare. And expensing, you print out a receipt and then you walk it back and you need to make it digital again. So we thought it doesn't make any sense.
We thought there was an opportunity to create something that would be super easy to book, super easy to get support, super easy to expense. And then the company gets everything they need: policy and compliance and safety and saving money and all of those things. So that was the journey. We picked up really quickly. I was talking with CFOs trying to sell the idea to them. We didn't have a product. And every CEO, mainly startups that I met, was telling me, "Okay, yeah, I want to use it." So we really needed to accelerate the product development. Launched in 2016, grew extremely fast, like 500, 600 percent every year, even with big numbers. Got to around a $100 million run rate. And COVID happened. As Ben was saying, it took us two days to lose our entire revenue.
Ben Horowitz
So $100 million in revenue, but your expense line was even higher.
Ariel Cohen
Exactly. And then all of a sudden you had no revenue.
Ben Horowitz
Once you processed that no money was going to be coming in for you didn't know how long, how did you feel? And then what did you do? Take us through the emotional journey and then how you landed on, "Okay, I got to do this."
Ariel Cohen
We had this crazy idea that we should buy one of our biggest competitors. That was in February 2020. It was several months of negotiations, so it started a little bit earlier. But it was a really, really big deal. To finance it, it would be a crazy execution, even in 2019. But we were getting the deal in order. In late February, I flew out to Seattle, where this company is, to almost close the deal. Me and my CFO were flying out. I'm landing in Seattle and I get a text that this was the day the first two cases of COVID in the US were discovered in Seattle. Of course they canceled the meeting. I turned around in the airport, flew back to SFO. I remember on the airplane I was texting you. At that point we had a plan to go another 4X in 2020. And I told you, "Hey, I think we need a completely different plan." I still didn't feel anything at that point.
Ben Horowitz
You were suspended. Like Wile E. Coyote ran off the cliff and then you're suspended in the air.
Ariel Cohen
I started to get depressed actually in April, May. It took me like a month. In March, it was just execution. Obviously everybody went to work from home, but we had a pretty big call center. These are travel agents that sit in a location, and there are a lot of requirements around PCI and other things. It's not that easy to take all of these people to work from home. So while we were losing our revenue, we needed to invest a lot of money to put this call center in place. Somebody told us that all of the flights to the U.S. would get canceled. So we needed to have a plan to bring all of our customers back in two days. So while we were collapsing, we kept investing money trying to do the right thing.
Ben Horowitz
Customer satisfaction.
Ariel Cohen
Customer satisfaction and just doing the right thing. People were stuck everywhere. So March was execution. We did pretty massive layoffs, got a lot of negative press around it, needed to manage that, needed to manage employee morale.
Ben Horowitz
Right, I remember you got attacked because you did a layoff over Zoom during COVID, when they would have attacked you for bringing people together.
Ariel Cohen
We were the first ones, so I think that was the issue. We were acting really fast and did layoffs over Zoom. It's a really good headline, and probably if I thought about it, I would have waited for others to be the first ones, but I didn't. So it was a lot of execution without a lot of thinking. Then in April, I started to think about it. I know there are a lot of founders here. I think it's a rollercoaster anyway. We had a lot of other crises in the company. I know that now probably in enterprise, it's really hard to sell. So there's always this rollercoaster. And I think your mood as a founder is really critical. Pretty much through June, I was pretty much in depression. You and I talked a lot about it. Something in late June changed and I started to manage the company. So it took me like three or four months to get there, but it's important. At that point, people were not traveling, but everything started to look good.
Ben Horowitz
One of the things, because you were growing 500% a year and you were going to grow another 400% in 2020. That's kind of funny in retrospect. But when things stopped and you looked at the company, how much of your mind was like, "Well, we were in a race against time. The market was there. We were spending the money like we had to. And nobody could have anticipated COVID." And how much was in your mind like, "I could have spent half the money and I would have been fine. What the hell was I doing? I wasn't getting anything out of all these people I was hiring. I was just destroying my own culture." I only ask that because I had those thoughts in my mind when I was in the same situation.
Ariel Cohen
We grew in 2019 from 200 employees to 1,200 in a year. So you can imagine the mess that we had in the company. But what makes it even worse? We're the right company to join, growing really fast, the right investors. We have you on the board, all the right headlines in the press. So in Silicon Valley, it's really easy to hire employees. But not all of them. Some of these employees would be employees that join saying, "Hey, I'm going to have an exit. I'm going to be able to put on my LinkedIn that I worked at this company." It's really different from the early employees that can handle a lot of ups and downs and don't really care. So I think that was the hardest thing. The hardest thing was to actually manage those employees through that type of change. The reality is that a lot of them left.
I think what kind of employees you hire, even when everything works well, is really critical because you will have a crisis. We had three crises after that, not at the same level as COVID, but three crises. The employees around you will define it, will make the difference if you're going to survive it or not.
Ben Horowitz
In retrospect, we all deal with this. There are employees, God bless them, that you get who are on your mission, believe in the company, want to make it something, really are trying to do something beyond themselves. And then there are, particularly in Silicon Valley, many employees who are like, "Well, what's the best deal for me right now? If this deal isn't good, then I'm going to move on." And we all hire probably more of the latter than we'd like. They went to Stanford, have a PhD in AI, all the reasons your managers tell you they have to hire them. Do those employees, the latter, have actual value? If you could do it again, would you hire any of them? Would you hire some of them? How do you think about that?
Ariel Cohen
I will hire some of them for sure. Some of them are still in the company. If I look at these employee cohorts, we have the employees that started the company, and a lot of them are still there. That's employees that are there for eight years. The next cohort are actually employees that joined us during COVID, because it's the same thing as your initial team. They can get any type of shit. And then you have people that joined us in 2018, 2019, that some of them are still in the company, and these employees are really good. If they've stayed, and they stayed where all of their friends were telling them, "What the fuck are you doing? Nobody will ever travel again," that shows a lot of resiliency. And these are good employees. It took me a very long time to figure it out.
We have now in Navan this formula that says we hire employees based on four criteria. The first one is drive. It's not any drive. Let's understand what drives them. The second one is smartness, are they smart or not. The third one is qualification. And the fourth one is character. This is very hard to define.
Ben Horowitz
How do you define it? How do you figure it out in an interview?
Ariel Cohen
I write it at the beginning of the interview. That's the only thing I'm actually trying to understand. I put plus or minus, I don't know. And until I figure it out with this question and that question, I'm not leaving that person. If I didn't, I would not hire that person.
Ben Horowitz
What is it when you say character? How do you define it?
Ariel Cohen
It's funny. You deal with engineers. I explained it in a whole lens, and the entire engineering team was asking, because this is not what you do. It's not well defined. What I was telling them was, "You go and have a beer with this person. Do you want to spend some time with them?" But there is another way to think about it. I have this thing, and I think a lot of you have it. You sit with somebody, and is it kind of painful in your gut? It could be a one-on-one with one of your execs. And it's like, "No, I don't want to be there. It's painful." That's when I know I need to fire them. But that's when I realized you can also do it when hiring.
Ben Horowitz
That's a really good point. Even if it's you, not them, if you don't like talking to any of the people on your team, they're never going to be effective and you're never going to be effective with them. That's an important realization. A lot of people try to gloss through that.
Getting back to the crisis, sorry to re-traumatize you. Most companies have what we call WIFIOs, "We're Fucked It's Over" moments, where you're in bad trouble. If you characterize yourself during your depression period and when you came out of it, one of the things a lot of CEOs do is they feel like, "Oh my God, I'm going to die. I can't let the company think it's going to die." They get Pollyannish, optimistic outside and completely depressed inside, as opposed to just being realistic. "This is what it is. We have a narrow window to get through this thing. If you want in, stay in. If you want to leave, go ahead." How would you characterize how you went through that cycle and how it made you feel?
Ariel Cohen
There was a different layer, which was not the business layer. The business layer was easy. I came to my staff and then to other employees, and I was telling them something very simple: "Do you believe that people will travel again?" If the answer is no, the answer is obvious. By the way, there was a whole contingent of people, a lot of VCs, who were basically saying travel is never going to happen again. We raised money, as strange as it may sound, in May 2020, after COVID started. I talked with more than 20 investors, which I've never done in my life. I think 18 out of the 20 were very clear that travel is not coming back. Not 70%, 80%—not coming back at all. That was what Twitter would tell you back then.
But there was another layer, which was not the business layer or the company layer. It was everything going on around COVID. In June, there was Black Lives Matter and everything else. We have a really big call center, which means we have people all over the US. So I also had this cultural war inside the company while trying to figure out how to manage that thing. That added another very complex layer. This is why I always mention June. By the end of June, I was like, "Fuck it. Either you are here or not, and do whatever you want, but this is what we're going to do. This is how we're going to get out of it."
Ben Horowitz
One of the interesting counterintuitive things you did, because you have the travel product, which you built the company on and got to $100 million and then zero revenue. During COVID, before you got travel back, you started building an expense product. You expanded the product line when you had no revenue and a limited amount of cash. Why did you do that? And how did it work out?
Ariel Cohen
It's funny. You talk about all of these things now and everything makes sense because our expense and payment business is really big right now. It's more than doubling every year with pretty big numbers. So now everything makes sense, and maybe I look like a genius.
Ben Horowitz
I think most people here are probably getting the exact opposite advice during this period where revenues are down. The last thing you should do is start a new product line.
Ariel Cohen
I think it goes to intuition, gut feel, but also mission. If you believe that travel will come back, but nobody needs it right now, you need to ask yourself, "What do people need in the area of what you're doing?" Expense management and payments are an integral part of it. We always wanted to do that. So the counterintuitive part was, "Will I accelerate it right now when I'm trying to save money?" But back then I didn't think about it like that. It was almost an obvious move.
Another obvious move that was very expensive, an even bigger bet, was to continue to sell. We kept our marketing teams and told them, "Go to customers right now and tell them, 'We'll sell you now. It's free anyway, but implement it. When travel comes back, you just did change management without any price.'" Our biggest customers, our entire enterprise segment—we didn't have enterprise pre-COVID—was created like that. Companies like Netflix, Adobe, and Unilever, which would not think to do change management with a company like us because we're not mature enough for them, said, "We have nothing else to do anyway. There's a carbon team, right? So maybe we can implement Navan." I think that was probably the most important step we took, to actually stay in the market, not leave the market, and develop other things.
Ben Horowitz
Related to that, we look back on it now. One of the weird things about COVID was when it started, it was like, "Are we going to have to shut down for two weeks?" And then it got longer and longer. How did you know to come out of COVID when it was ending? The New York Times has been writing, "COVID's still going. Go home. Get some more shots." How did you, as CEO, go, "Okay, the pandemic's still here, but it's going to change for our customers and for us"?
Ariel Cohen
At the beginning of COVID, because it impacted my life and my company and everybody's life so much, I almost became a COVID geek. I read every article about pandemics. It's very consistent. It's always two years. It's not if you have a vaccine or not, or if it will vanish. It was obvious that it would stay, but people adapt to this and there is more immunity. So it was very obvious. I remember in interviews in April 2020, I was saying it's two years. I know a lot of people were saying maybe it's two weeks, three weeks, two months. When you say it's two years, then you know what your cash situation is and a lot of other things.
It's funny because it took a year for the vaccine and for COVID to decline. But we already started to scale back up, call centers, hiring employees. Suddenly the Delta variant came. We were way more resilient at that point. We were like, "Okay, we'll figure it out." We raised money again on an up round. I think we also learned how to manage ourselves. Even if there are waves, we learned how to manage our money, how to raise money, how to tell the story. We got better at this. We realized we're managing the company while there are COVID waves.
Ben Horowitz
Switching gears a little bit. One of the things I remember you doing is your CTO built a whole machine learning model, his own COVID model, for how the spread would go. It was accurate, by the way.
Ariel Cohen
Yeah, it was accurate eventually. Like all the COVID models, it was wrong until it was right.
Ben Horowitz
I love how modeling has become science now. Anybody with a model is a scientist. One of the big things coming at your business, to help it or destroy it, is generative AI. When you talk to futurists about what's going to happen with generative AI, one of the first things is the user interfaces we have now, the WIMP—Windows, Icons, Menus—is going to go away and we're going to go to a natural language interface. The first example everybody uses is travel. "Why am I pulling down menus and trying to pick an airline and stop nonstop and first class and business? Can't I just say I want to go to Paris? You know me. Can you put me on the right plane and the right flight in the right way?" How do you think about that with Navan, which has a big user interface and all kinds of code and experience behind it? How are you looking at AI for travel? What's the future of travel look like? How are you going about getting there first?
Ariel Cohen
First of all, I think people are right. Travel is an amazing use case for generative AI. But there's a reason for that. Even when we started Navan, we asked the question, "Why are people calling an agent?" Even back then. People call an agent because the agent knows them. The agent trims down the possibilities. The agent tells you, "When you go to Paris, there are actually three hotels. Not 3,000, but three hotels. Choose out of these three." That's why frequent travelers like agents and don't like OTAs or online. But yes, they're going to call.
We knew it from the beginning. Even in the beginning, we used machine learning to prioritize the search results so that whatever you see in the first three results would be the thing you're going to select. We knew machine learning would be the solution to that agent issue. Generative AI is flip-flopping and allowing you to do something else, which is a discussion. But with the data we have, because we have frequent users, we can create a match. I don't need to do a prompt like, "I'm Ariel, I'm the CEO of Navan." We know we can push it. That thing can tell me, "When you go to Paris, you are likely to want that thing. Let me book it for you."
We went with generative AI on three steps. The first step: we have a bot, Ava, that was always doing part of our support. We took her and connected her to OpenAI and later to other models, mainly to save support time. That was an obvious move and a really fast move. Then we did the same with analytics: "How can I save company money? Show me how I can do that." Again, very obvious steps. We're going to release in two weeks something that will do that match. Basically, "I'm flying to Paris. Can you make this trip happen?" But we don't think people are fully ready to just switch to that. So we'll do a hybrid with the UI. You'll have Ava here, you'll chat. Based on what you do there, it will start to show you what's going on on the web and navigate you through the interface. Eventually, we'll see what people prefer. I don't know what people will prefer, but we'll play a lot between these two.
Ben Horowitz
People do have to get used to the new UI. I remember for a lot of us, if you had parents who had computers, they had a much harder time going to a smartphone than parents who didn't have computers. You get them an iPad and they were like, "Oh my God, I can use a computer now." So it is interesting in that way. But the use case is obvious. What's unique, what maybe people don't appreciate, is how much infrastructure you need to have to actually book a flight.
Ariel Cohen
Yes, yes, yes. Connecting this to that infrastructure is very powerful.
Ben Horowitz
Talk to me a little bit about this. How many people do you have at Navan now?
Ariel Cohen
3,000.
Ben Horowitz
3,000 people. All those people built this last generation interface. Now you're talking about changing the way people travel. How many of them, what percentage in engineering, are going to be relevant to the new architecture? How do you think about that as a CEO and how you evolve, because it's a very different skill set?
Ariel Cohen
I'm old. That means I was around in '99. It happens all the time. Web happened, cloud happened, SaaS, mobile happened, now this happens. This one is probably faster. If you are a developer or anybody, you can be a salesperson that knows to sell on-prem and doesn't know what the fuck SaaS is. You always need to adjust, definitely if you are in tech. You need to learn. I really didn't know what generative AI was in November last year. I never heard of it in my life. My co-founder knew, but even he didn't really know it. But now I really know. So that's it. You have to learn. You have to adjust. If you're not, you'll have a problem finding a job. That's reality.
Ben Horowitz
How do you go about figuring out who's who in that equation? Who's come up to speed and who hasn't?
Ariel Cohen
I think you see it. It's exactly like we talked about with these transitions in COVID. We are handling something right now. We had a board meeting yesterday. We talked about it in the board meeting in June, and that was a low point of this thing. Yesterday, you saw the team completely adjusted to the problem, to fixing it. Now you can actually see that. If you have a team that can adjust, they can adjust to a lot of different things. One of them is, the day after ChatGPT was released, we did an emergency meeting. I said it's the thing that can make us bigger or the thing that can kill us really fast. Because of everything you said earlier. The team already adjusted, and you can see how many things we're doing around it. We took a team that was doing one thing and told them, "Hey, it's not relevant. Let's do something else."
Still, the hardest thing is with travel agents. Not the AI agents, the human agents. The ones who answer the phone. If somebody in the company is building a model to replace them, what does it mean? You know what that means. You need to find them a certain mission.
Ben Horowitz
Great. I'd like to thank Ariel. Thank you for listening to us.
Ariel Cohen
Thank you.
Narrator
Next up is Okta co-founder and CEO Todd McKinnon. Like Ariel, Todd faced a whirlwind of challenges since he chose to bet on the cloud in 2009. Today, he shares his war stories with A16Z general partner David Ulevitch. Todd does not hold back here as he discusses the difficulty of being measured as a public company, including missing many quarters in a row, and the tension that can exist between keeping the board and employees happy.
David Ulevitch
So I've known Todd McKinnon for a long time, co-founder and CEO of Okta. I'm not going to read his whole bio. I will tell you two quick facts about Todd. One is when I was at Cisco, I tried to buy Okta. That turned out to be really stupid. I called up Todd and I was like, "Hey, we want to do some things in identity. Can we buy your company?" He's like, "Are you fucking smoking crack? Do you not know how good we are?"
He made a smart decision to not take another phone call. And then the second thing about Todd is I realized at some point, I think just before COVID or during COVID, you became a world champion, a CrossFit champion, like one of the top 15 in the world at CrossFit.
Todd McKinnon
It was 14.
David Ulevitch
14. You're the number 14 in the world. Don't shirk me, Todd.
Todd McKinnon
Yeah. 14, which I am not a CrossFit person, which you may have already known by looking at me. But I think that's quite a hard feat while being CEO of a publicly traded company.
David Ulevitch
So those are my two intros for Todd. I'm proud of those things.
Todd McKinnon
But my father, all he ever cares about is my kids. So that's all he calls me up for. I go talk about Okta business, he goes, "How are the kids, Todd?" That's good. That's what a grandpa should do.
David Ulevitch
Well, we're going to talk about Okta because I'm not your father. And so you are the only founder and CEO of a public company that we have here on stage. So I'm going to start there. How have you managed the whiplash effect of the last few years? You've had massive financial changes, cultural changes, the way you work changes, personnel changes. Talk about how you've managed that as a CEO.
Todd McKinnon
Well, I was thinking about this group in this room, and it wasn't very long ago I was much earlier stage in the journey as a CEO and a founder and the company lifecycle. I remember coming to meetings like this and watching CEOs of companies that were further ahead of me in the journey and thinking to myself, "Man, that person, I'm never going to be like that person. That person's made it. They must be happy and calm and not have to deal with a lot of problems." So I got good news and I got bad news for y'all. The good news is that you all have a shot to be successful, to grow, to exceed expectations, to create a world-beating company and totally kick ass.
That's the good news. Bad news is I'm not sure it gets any easier. The problems are different, they have different flavors, but it's a challenge. And it's kind of what I love about it: proving that we can build something, we can keep going forward, and we can do something that we think is very unique to what we're trying to do. So yeah, there is adversity and we're dealing with all this stuff like you all are. But I think one thing about me is that I'm very challenge-driven. So if there's a challenge and I have to fight for something and I have to go through some adversity, I kind of seek that out.
So when it gets stressful and hard and tired, I just go back to the fact that everything in my life when I've had a lot of happiness or a lot of satisfaction has always been going through some hard times.
David Ulevitch
Excellent. Type two fun, as they call it.
Todd McKinnon
Exactly.
David Ulevitch
Have you changed the way that you lead your own teams as a CEO from remote work to in-person to all hands, those kinds of things? Like how have you even just tactically changed the way that you operate and lead?
Todd McKinnon
Yeah, recently. I think a big change I've noticed in myself over the last two years or three years particularly. I think three years ago, myself, Okta, and I think a lot of other people were way too much trying to keep everyone happy. Employees, partners, and customers. Although I think it's always good to try to keep customers happy and be really oriented on that. Particularly on employees, there was this vibe and this mindset of, "If we do anything wrong, if we do something that's going to make people upset, people will quit. We can't keep talent. Oh my God, their stock options might be underwater.
We have to give them more stock. If we make some comment internally to the company that they don't like politically, they're not going to like working here." I was very, very cautious and wanted to just keep everyone happy. Part of that was the war for talent, and part of that was just the macro environment. There were jobs everywhere, companies were competing, and money was free. Right now, I'm much more in the middle of the spectrum. You don't want to be totally careless and cavalier about employee satisfaction, but I think we were too far on the spectrum. Now I think we're more in the middle, where it's having more confidence.
If you have conviction as a leader and as a leadership team that it's the right thing for the business and the right thing for the market, you've got to do it. You've got to be clear about it, because it's going to be clear for the employees what you stand for, what's important in the company, what your strategy is and what your priorities are. It's going to be less confusing, and it also has the effect of galvanizing people that are aligned with that. So it's a win-win. Speaking at a very high level, that's one example I would give.
David Ulevitch
Can I give a concrete example?
Todd McKinnon
Please. Because I hate when CEOs talk about this stuff and they're super high level. This is what we're here for.
David Ulevitch
Yeah.
Todd McKinnon
So I'll give you a really concrete example. We did this acquisition a couple of years ago. We were 3,000 people and this company Auth0 was 1,000 people. We integrated the G&A functions first, then the go-to-market teams 18 months ago. We were really, really slow to integrate the security teams. Auth0 security, Okta security. There were some reasons — the security team was kind of embedded in the development team. So there were all these excuses about why upset the apple cart and why make a change. "People won't like it, people will leave." But given what was going on in the industry and stuff that happened to Okta regarding security issues, it was very clear to me that getting our shit together for security internally was really, really critical.
Being the most secure company in the world, locking everything down, and having two separate security organizations for these companies was not the way to do it. So I just made the hard call. "They're being combined tomorrow. The debate's over. I don't want to hear any excuses. Figure out how to do it. They're being combined tomorrow." Turns out some people did leave, and it was controversial, but I think it was just a very concrete example of this shift I've been on. Much clearer for the people that stay.
David Ulevitch
Yeah, exactly. "This is what we're about. We're going to make the hard call to do what's right for the company." Awesome. How, as a public company, you get measured every single quarter in a different way than a private company. How do you think being measured on a quarterly basis by the public markets has changed you as a CEO? And would you have taken anything you've learned there and applied it when you were a private company?
Todd McKinnon
Well, I think this is a big topic. Recently, one of the more interesting things is that I have a challenge because when you're public, you want to set really realistic external expectations. Then hopefully you execute and overachieve them and beat and raise — you've all heard the term. In the last year or so, a lot of companies have really been conservative on their external expectations, as we should be, because of what's going on in the macro economy. So internally, you have your internal plan, and you're maybe missing it or just meeting it, and you think you can do more. You're trying to fire your team up to really get aggressive and not take excuses about macro.
"We got to go faster and do more. We missed this number, do this." Then externally, you do these earnings reports, and you blow out your numbers. Wall Street loves you, the stock price goes up, and everyone's celebrating, high-fiving. Then you're walking around the office and you're going, "I know that you got to suspend belief for a second because we got to go faster. We just ran down the runway and jumped over a one-foot bar. We got to jump over the five-foot bar." So it's a little bit of a different twist on that. In terms of being measured quarterly, a couple other things I'll add. There are a lot of things about being public that are great.
Access to capital markets — you can raise money if you need money much, much faster than raising it privately and at much better terms. Although with interest rates, it's changing a little bit. The other thing is that we're paying all our people in stock. It's a fair thing for the employees. People forget this. The most obvious reason to go public is that you've paid your people in stock and you've got to give them a fair deal. You've got to let them sell it. It's not fair to stay private for many, many years and then have these weird secondary markets, which are not as liquid as a real stock market.
So that's a good reason. One more thing: table stakes for going public is having a somewhat predictable business. The investor relations is very simple. You might think you've got to communicate a vision and be compelling for the long term, but they're going to look at the numbers. Deviations from plan speak loudly and get punished or rewarded more than anything else. So you've got to make sure you have a somewhat predictable business. I don't know how folks went public with the traditional revenue model in software without recurring revenue. Having that recurring base of business and stable retention makes it much more manageable because once you get out there, you are exposed.
But if you have that solid business and that stable business, there are a lot of benefits that make it very worth it.
David Ulevitch
Nice. I'm going to shift more to the founder journey and building a company. You started the company in 2009, the height of the financial crisis. There were pros and cons, but people perceived it to be a more difficult time to fundraise. Let's start with capital raising. You raised money from Andreessen Horowitz as your first check. Talk about the fundraising journey and the company formation in those early years.
Todd McKinnon
I was running engineering at Salesforce. I say that just to make myself sound cool? In this room, that is very cool. This room and maybe zero other rooms in the whole world. I say that because being at that company for six years at the time, late 2008, it was pretty clear that cloud computing as a service was going to be huge. Being at that company, it was pretty obvious to see. You had us at the app layer doing well. They called it Google Apps for Domains at the time — the collaboration layer and email was going to go in the cloud. Then AWS was out, Simple Storage was out, and Compute was out, EC2.
You could tell the infrastructure was going to go there. So this cloud thing was going to be big. It was pretty obvious. Not everyone saw it, but I did. I had a great job running engineering and had to convince my wife that it wasn't totally insane to quit, because from the outside perspective, the financial world was going to shit. Lehman Brothers was failing, banks were going away, the financial system was freezing up, the government had to bail everyone out — it was a shit show. But the technology arc was very clear. For me, it felt like a great time. Then I got out into VC world and started to fundraise.
You could tell that when you talked to these venture funds, they were nodding and listening, but you could tell they were scared. They were thinking, "Do my LPs have money at Lehman Brothers? When I do that capital call to the LPs, is it going to come in?" They were really unsure. My co-founder and I first got introduced to this really exciting new firm called Andreessen Horowitz. It was even before they had A16Z — Andreessen Horowitz. We went into a conference room at the Rosewood offices, and it had a laser-printed sign that said "Andreessen Horowitz." Laser printed and taped to the wall. We walked into the conference room, and it was Mark, Ben, and Scott Cooper.
We sat down at the folding table that was folded out and stood up in the conference room. My co-founder and I were nervous. I was like, "Are these guys going to give us money? Are they scared? Do they even have money?" We're sitting there looking at Mark and Ben and Scott, and my co-founder looks at them and goes, "Did you get this table at Costco?" Mark said, "Yeah." And Freddie goes, "Oh yeah, I have one too, in my backyard." So the ice was broken. Mark and Ben wrote a check. I joke that we had a little bit of an interesting idea, some credibility, because besides this room, they're probably the only two people that think the VP of engineering at Salesforce is cool — someone that might be able to do it.
If we had walked in there three years later, they'd probably be like, "Yeah, all right, go talk to someone else." They were willing to take a shot, and it worked out great. But it was a scary time. Those were some of the early memories.
David Ulevitch
I actually forgot your question.
Todd McKinnon
Did you have a question?
David Ulevitch
No, that was pretty good. The stories are the thing that we're all here for.
Todd McKinnon
Yeah. I just make up a prompt that will generate a story. It's like ChatGPT.
David Ulevitch
So continuing that thread, you've had tremendous success, but I have heard from Ben that there might have been a period of like one or two or like five, six, or like eight quarters where you missed your numbers in a row.
Todd McKinnon
That happened.
David Ulevitch
Yeah. It was not all up and to the right.
Todd McKinnon
We've had the last couple years for Okta — we've had some bumps.
David Ulevitch
Well, I mean in the early days.
Todd McKinnon
Oh, I'm getting there. I'm a stateful chatbot — I can bring it back to the question you asked. It's been rough. When we were going through these rough times, we had this issue with a security issue where some hacker claimed they had access to the system and it wasn't true, and we didn't handle it great. It was a pretty stressful time for the company. We had an acquisition we were integrating that we could have done better. So it was some stressful times. I used to tell people at the company, "Listen, this may not even be in the top five of hardest times in the company." If I were to stack rank that for you, number one would be: we raised money in the beginning of 2009.
In 2011, some of you may remember this phase of your company, or maybe you're in it right now. You've been doing it long enough where the early hype and excitement has kind of waned. You were able to raise money, it energized people, there was a story, people were excited. They gave you money, you're on a roll. The hype had waned, and there were expectations. It's been a couple years now — you should have revenue and customers, and you had a financial plan, and you've got to hit it. But two years probably wasn't enough. Cloud adoption maybe wasn't where it needed to be. The product wasn't quite good enough.
So you're in this valley of death or tough times. That was a tough period. How did we get through that? First thing is we had a board. One thing I did differently during that time period: I shifted from early in the company with the board. My mindset and my mode of operating was kind of collaborative — "There's a bunch of ideas we have, a bunch of ways this could go. What do you guys all think?" That was a huge mistake.
David Ulevitch
It's not a democracy?
Todd McKinnon
Well, when I did that, my perception was, "I have a really strong instinct on what we should do, but I'm not totally sure it would be right. So if I come out and bang my fist on the table and say, 'This is where we're going,' they may not agree with me and they may think I'm not a good leader." But when you flip that around, what was really happening was, when I was saying, "These are different options, what do you guys think we should do?" what they were hearing was, "He doesn't know what to do. And why are his people going to follow him if he doesn't even know what to do?" So I switched my approach. I still remember the board meeting where I said to myself, "All right, I'm going to change my approach."
David Ulevitch
You got vibes from your board members? You guys get vibes from your board members? Vibes? Like, "Todd, this is a mess. You've got to do a better job. Todd, maybe some people on the board don't have confidence in you." Those kind of vibes?
Todd McKinnon
Yes. Yeah. I was getting those vibes. So I changed my approach. I said, "I'm just going to be super strong about what I think we should do. This is what I think we should do. We've got to change this go-to-market strategy. We've got to be clear about this. This is the direction we're going." It was a dramatic difference. They gave me input, and it wasn't like all of a sudden they thought it was flawless analysis and perfect direction. But the tone totally changed. It was like, "This guy is going to be in charge. This guy is going to take us forward." They had more confidence in me. At the same time, one thing I did that was really a step forward was internally in the company.
We probably had 50 people. Maybe 40. So like 15, 20 engineering and a few people in sales, G&A. Our new ARR bookings target for the quarters was like 200 grand. The whole year was going to be like a million in ARR bookings. Pretty small, which ironically at the time felt like a huge number. Internally in the company, I had this mindset that was almost opposite. It was, "I got this. I can do it all. I'm the CEO. I was the CEO two years before, but it was really a tiny company with only a few people. Now I'm a CEO. I got this. I can do everything. I know all the answers. I'm going to make no mistakes."
Internally, that was having bad effects. People didn't feel bought in. They didn't feel like they could help. They didn't know how to help. I wasn't sharing enough information. I wasn't giving them the context they needed to help pull us out of this. So I flipped my whole persona. With the board, I was like, "This is what we're doing. Stop checking your BlackBerry during the board meeting. Pay attention to me. I'm the leader." There wasn't really someone with a BlackBerry. It was 2011. No more BlackBerrys. But internally, I totally opened up and said, "You guys, these are our problems. We have a lot of problems.
I made some decisions. They weren't the greatest. But together we can open up, recognize the problems, share the data, and we can get through this together." It really galvanized the team and got them focused on the problems. They were part of the solution. Even in the culture at Okta today, I can see the reverberations of that switch. It's pretty open, pretty transparent, pretty team oriented — bring people in and solve the problem, collaborate. Those were some of the things I remember from the formative years.
David Ulevitch
So being a leader with a plan in the boardroom, but having the right team around you. You've had a lot of people with a long tenure at Okta, but you've also gone through executives in different phases of the company. I think that's something that founders in the room have either gone through — and after a while they start to think they're the ones who are the problem — or they have not yet gone through it, and they probably should. Talk a little bit about how your executive teams evolved over the course of Okta, especially in the early days.
Todd McKinnon
I remember I was surprised by this, but when I became a founder and a CEO, my decision making actually slowed down. It sounds weird, but as a leader in engineering at Salesforce, I was pretty decisive. "This person needs to go, this person's coming in, we're doing this, we're doing this." But I noticed myself being slower and more circumspect at Okta. As I analyzed why, it was pretty obvious. At Salesforce, my boss could overrule me or tell me I was doing the wrong thing. I had someone above me to help me. Being a CEO, as you all know, is different. The buck stops with you, and the mistakes seem more consequential and difficult to unwind.
So I had to really try to get back to faster decision making, even though I didn't have that boss guiding me. Another thing that changed was related to this, particularly on people. When you go through a year like 2011 and you start to get some traction and come out of that place where you really thought the company was going to die, you build this loyalty to people. Five years on from that, when the company started to outgrow a lot of those people and their capabilities and what they wanted to do, it was pretty hard for me. I was pretty slow to make some tough decisions that, in my mind, I was perceiving as breaking that loyalty.
I basically had to outgrow it. I had to outgrow this feeling that this core group of people that got us through those tough days are going to get us forever. It took some time. If I had to do it over again, I'd probably make that shift faster. I've made the mistake in both ways. We've had new leaders come in, and I've counseled them to go too slow in making changes in their team. Right before the IPO, we hired a new go-to-market leader. He was great. He wanted to make a bunch of changes. I said, "Listen, man, slow down. Just don't mess anything up before the IPO. Let us get through this." It ended up really hurting us a couple of years later.
We hadn't made changes fast enough. We weren't scaling fast enough. Now we're three, four quarters as a public company, and it almost really hurt us. We had so much slack in our external guidance, we were okay, but it almost ended up hurting us. I've made the opposite mistake too. I've had leaders come in and I was too permissive in what they could do and let them do everything, and they basically screwed a lot of stuff up. So finding that balance between loyalty and going slow and trusting what got you there, but not being too aggressive and not overchanging anything — it's kind of an art to find that balance.
David Ulevitch
That is the name of the game as CEO. I think that's an excellent note for us to end on. Todd, I really appreciate you making time out of your schedule. I know you're actually flying up for a board meeting with Ben tomorrow.
Todd McKinnon
Yeah, my whole perspective on all this stuff might change based on how tomorrow goes.
David Ulevitch
Yeah, yeah. We don't want confident Todd. We want Todd who collaborates better. Thank you for taking the time here. You've built an amazing company. You've been a great friend of the firm. It's always great to see you.
Todd McKinnon
Yeah, thanks, David.
Narrator
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