Phil Daian is a researcher and software engineer and is leading the charge into mapping MEV with the Flashbots Project. Georgios Konstantopoulos and Charlie Noyes are both partners at Paradigm.
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Bankless Podcast #66: MEV Panel Guests: Charlie Noyes, Phil Daian, & Georgios Konstantopolous
In this State of the Nation, we bring on big-brain experts behind projects like Paradigm and Flashbots to explain the complex but critical topic of MEV - commonly known as Miner Extractable Value, but as discussed in this episode, Maximum Extractable Value is a more appropriate descriptor. MEV is arguably the single most important unsolved problem in the crypto space.
In the context of incentives and network security, MEV generally refers to the ability of miners & validators to take advantage of their position as securers of the network. Blocks are verified by single entities, and these block producers have tremendous power when they are the ones adding a particular block to the blockchain. We refer to this instance as ‘God-Mode,’ in which a node has the power to assemble & order transactions at will. The threat here is the potential gaps between what is best for the network and what is best for the node.
As an internal and unbounded threat to blockchains, solving the problems that MEV presents is critical to maintaining proper consensus and ensuring decentralization and permissionless access. We take a deep dive into potential solutions, and the impact of EIP-1559 and Proof-of-Stake on MEV. Dive in to learn why despite the challenges ahead, Charlie says:
“In the absence of certainty, I’m willing to take the optimistic perspective.”
------ Resources:
Phil on Twitter https://twitter.com/phildaian?s=20 Georgios on Twitter https://twitter.com/gakonst?s=20 Charlie on Twitter https://twitter.com/_charlienoyes?s=20 Exploring Ethereum’s Dark Forest with Dan Robinson https://youtu.be/MtpRDqrCfbc Investing in DeFi Paradigms with Charlie Noyes https://youtu.be/dQOhbb5HmLA
----- Not financial or tax advice. This channel is strictly educational and is not investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell any assets or to make any financial decisions. This video is not tax advice. Talk to your accountant. Do your own research.
Disclosure. From time-to-time I may add links in this newsletter to products I use. I may receive commission if you make a purchase through one of these links. Additionally, the Bankless writers hold crypto assets. See our investment disclosures here: https://newsletter.banklesshq.com/p/bankless-disclosures
No summary for this episode yet.
Welcome to Bankless where we explore the frontier internet money and internet finance. This is how to get started, how to get better and how to front run the opportunity. I'm Ryan Sean Adams, I'm here with David Hoffman and we're here to help you become more bankless. David, this was one of those mind blowing episodes on bankless. I think a canonical episode, who did we have on? What did we talk about today? Yeah, a panel of three MEV experts. We had Phil Diane, Charlie noise and Georgios Constantinopolis, who are really tackling, I think, probably the biggest problem in crypto head on. The problem of MEV or maximally extractable value, also known as minor extractable value, is the one single existential problem that could end this whole entire crypto experiment.
It could just really either just completely just kneecap why we find crypto so valuable, or also make the whole thing just not work at all. Those are some pretty dire characterizations of what the MEV problem is. That's what these MEV experts really illustrate this problem as. The TLDR of what MEV is is that Bitcoin, Ethereum, these are leaderless systems, but the way that they are leaderless systems is that they just allow people to take turns being the one single leader, and that leader is the person that proposes the block. At some point, while there's a bajillion Bitcoin miners, and in the future, in Ethereum, there's a bajillion staking validators.
Only one person at a time proposes a block, and so at that moment in time, that one person or entity is separate from the rest of the network, and that one person has the power to order transactions that people have signed as they see fit, which gives them basically god mode over one single instance of time. That really changes the incentives that the block proposer has in relation to the rest of the system. It could be good in some circumstances. It also could be massively devastating. What these MEV researchers are really trying to do is to try to figure out how do we harness this misaligned incentives opportunity and corral it back into alignment with the rest of the network and the rest of the values of this ecosystem, which is decentralized consensus.
That's the TLDR of this whole entire episode, and it's really the big problem of crypto. I just want to emphasize once again, what David just said. This is the problem that could sink all of crypto. David so often, we hear mainstream media talk about all of these things that they perceive as threats to crypto, and they're really like not threats to crypto at all, like China Fud. China Fud, nation state regulatory Fud, tether, it'll never work. It's too volatile. All of these things are such surface layer attacks. If they were really looking for the problems of crypto that need to be solved, they would be talking about MEV, but mainstream is not knowledgeable enough to talk about it.
These people are. This is the panel that's on the front lines of not just researching it as a hypothetical, but actively trying to solve MEV type problems. I think this is going to be like a canonical episode. It's not going to answer all of the questions about MEV, but I see this David as maybe the first in a series of bankless episodes that we do because we're going to have to talk about this often on bankless. It's not a problem that's going to go away soon. It's a pernicious problem. We use this analogy of it's kind of like squeezing the balloon. You squeeze it a little bit in one place and just bulges out in another place.
One minute, we think we have it cornered, and we really don't. The other interesting thing about this episode, David, is all of the places that MEV actually exists in the traditional world that aren't visible. We talked about the GameStop Fiasco game stop and Robinhood and the hedge fund manager that called Robinhood and essentially was a call to say, hey, reorder our transactions. Hey, sensor some transactions for a period of time. So MEV exists as a problem outside of crypto. It's not a crypto specific problem, but in crypto networks, it's much more visible. And again, the gold standard here of what we're trying to build is a credibly neutral open financial system for the world.
It's never been done before. The existing financial system is not that. It's none of those things, but we are holding ourselves to a higher standard in crypto. So we want to make sure that this problem gets solved. And I think we ended with like you asked the question of like how optimistic are you guys about actually being able to solve this problem? And the panel all had really interesting answers to that question. At the very least. Yeah, stay tuned to the end to listen like to how they answered that question. But like we talked about measurement of MEV where it's most pernicious. Phil talked about his flashbots project, which is just like a really cool attempt to take on the MEV problem head on.
We talked about this transformation to ETH 2. What it means when miners actually turn into validators and maybe there are some incentive changes. Will it really make a material difference to MEV or not the panel answers all of that? And we get into like some philosophy at the end, which is I didn't know we were going there, but super cool. That definitely fits the bank list theme. So fantastic episode guys. You're going to love it. Yeah, the topic of MEV is such a broad one that I really think the best way that you and I, Ryan can really help out this problem is just by talking about it more.
This is actually the first time that Charlie noise, Phil Diane and George yours have all been on the same panel. So they were actually pretty hyped to all be in the same spot to talk about it. And there's a number of other people that are definitely worth getting on to talk about this. Like Hazu comes to mind. I know Hazu pays a lot of attention to to MEV. And also Carl Florsch comes to mind and you talked about how we ended up on conversation on philosophy. These three panelists are very pragmatic and very concrete. But MEV, like you said, it's not just crypto. It's something much more existential.
It goes into just the nature of the universe and how order of operations happens. As soon as you have just like bookkeeping or even grander, just like ordering problems, all of a sudden, like topics of who has the rights or power to determine the ordering of things. And that's a very existential question. And I know that these panelists are very pragmatic and concrete. Carl Florsch, I know, can take the concept of MEV and like talk and connect it all the way to something as like crazy as like human consciousness. And so I want to get Carl Florsch on and also have the same exact MEV conversation in that kind of context.
And just like you said, there's so many things to talk about. And I think the best thing that we can do at Banclis is just host all of the conversations because the best thing that we can do to solve a problem is illuminate it. And I think that's what we are trying to do here on this podcast. Absolutely. Guys, you're going to love this podcast. Of course, David and I have some further thoughts for you in the debrief that is available for premium subscribers. So if you're premium subscriber, you should have access to that pretty soon as well. With that, we're going to talk about the sponsors that made this episode possible.
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We are super excited about this episode. We are going to dive into the topic of M-E-V. That is minor, extractable value and we've assembled a Dream Team panel here. I want to introduce our guests who we are going to have this in-depth conversation with the first is Phil Dianne. He is a researcher and software engineer with a passion for computer security and applied cryptography. You might remember Phil authored the original Flash Boys 2.0 project. He's now working in the Dark Forest on a project called Flash Bots. We also have Giorgio Constantopolis who is a research partner at Paradigm. Before that, he worked as an independent consultant.
Giorgio is a big brain follow this guy on Twitter. Lots of big alpha leak topics. They're deep in the protocol. We also have Charlie Noise who is an investment partner at Paradigm along with Giorgio. He is a Banclis podcast alumni. We've given Charlie's full bio in history in a previous Banclis episode, so I will not repeat it here, but you know Charlie. He is also very informed on this topic and all things. Guys, we've assembled this Dream Team panel. We're going to talk about M-E-V. How's everyone doing today? Pretty amazing. Excited to talk about M-E-V. Very excited to talk about M-E-V. All right, guys, so we're here talking about M-E-V and as part of the catalyst for this conversation, of course, M-E-V has been a topic that has been a long-standing topic.
Something very important in depth, but one of the catalysts for us having you guys on Banclis is we've read this article from CoinDesk. It was called Why Ethereum's minor extractual value problem is way worse than you think. Way worse than you think. Of course, kind of a clickbait title a little bit and yet, you know, there are some really interesting points that the author made and I think points that the Banclis nation gets to have to wrap their head around. This topic is incredibly important. Maybe it's the most important unsolved problem in crypto or in Ethereum. Anyway, I'd like to get your take and I want to start with that question.
Is M-E-V way worse than we think? Why don't we start with you Phil? Yes, absolutely. That's kind of why I started working on M-E-V and why I talked about it at DevCon and why I've kind of anyone who knows me in the industry going back a few years knows this is like basically all I've been talking about. I think M-E-V is a very deep rabbit hole. It was kind of intended as a definition to unify all these different problems in the space. Things like what is software security? How do we secure smart contracts? How do we write secure code? As well as things like what does economic arbitrage and financial arbitrage look like in this kind of new domain?
So all these different kind of angles on the problem from software exploitation to arbitrage system design to protocol design can all be studied and unified under this one metric, this one measurable quantity called M-E-V and it was kind of designed to unify all these very lofty goals. So kind of taken in its summon in its hole, the whole problem is super important. It kind of underlies everything we're building in the space and underlies the security and usability properties of every protocol. So no matter how you interact with the cryptocurrency, it's important to understand M-E-V and understand how it can affect you, your protocols and kind of the systems that you're using or designing.
Charlie, when we did our podcast with you, which is one of the earliest bankless podcasts we ever did, you described M-E-V as the single one thing that could end the crypto experiment. Maybe you didn't use such crazy words, but it's something of that nature. Why do you think M-E-V is such a crazy threat to Ethereum and crypto economics at large? Well, I distinctly remember the first time that I learned about M-E-V. It was at MIT, MIT's crypto-economic conference, I think in 2018, and Phil was giving a talk. And I had heard of, I had read the paper, but I had never before heard sort of Phil talk about M-E-V in the broader sense.
And I remember sitting in the audience and like just like a pit of doom formed in my stomach and I was like, holy shit, the sky has fallen. This is absolutely terrifying to answer your question though. Like with crypto economics, in the past, a lot of work has focused on externally motivated attacks, like gold finger attacks and other types of sort of like thought experiments that you can construct as to how, you know, under certain conditions, like the crypto-economic security assumptions of blockchain systems can be violated. So like a simple example would be like, you know, if a Bitcoin miner could access an infinitely liquid put option market on Bitcoin, then like hypothetically, you know, you just destabilize the chain and Bitcoin is worthless because it can't make progress and, you know, you make a lot of money.
And there are actually an infinite number of these such thought experiments. And sort of for a long time, like there are many, I think there are a lot of named ones as well. And people kind of spent time coming up with different scenarios like depending on, you know, financial derivative positions that like miners could take, networks, blitz, whatever, all the stuff. But all of them were essentially externally motivated. And I think the reason that nobody was super concerned about them is because there's no obvious reason that they get worse over time or with scale. So like there's no obvious reason why today, if I wanted to go, if I was a Bitcoin miner, like could not practically take a large enough short position for it to be like profitable for me to destabilize the network.
And there's no obvious reason why if Bitcoin is twice as large as it currently is that that will change, right? Now the thing about MEV that has always scared me and when I heard Phil's talk that terrified me is this idea that it's internal to the system, that it's unbounded, it's internal to the system. And like in the Ethereum context, I think you could expect that it will grow over time. And perhaps even that the growth rate, you know, will outstrip the growth rate of rewards, which is fixed in constant. And I think we have seen that happening, like that trend is sort of seen in practice. So we've joked that, you know, MEV, if it is, like the worst case would be like a crypto-academic cancer, it just takes over the system.
Who would take the contrarian view on this, thank you Charlie, I think that MEV can be seen as a bad thing with all the usual concerns of destabilization kind of description. However, I think that MEV can also be thought of as a security budget source. For example, if you have a blockchain that does not have a block reward, you could fund the security of the system not on transaction fees paid via the usual gas price options, but via MEV. So I think that it's important that we kind of distinguish that there's also this kind of annual, the problem. So before we get too far into this podcast, I think what we want to do is define what MEV is.
And let's try the simplest possible explanation of MEV, knowing that there's some people listening to this. This is their first exposure to the topic. And we're even throwing out an acronym like MEV and they're like what? So Phil, what is the simplest possible explanation of MEV? Maybe I'll give two definitions. I'll give you the historical definition of where MEV came from and then the kind of more modern take the the respawn of the definition. So historically MEV, it stands for minor extractable value. It's the amount of value in cryptocurrencies that miners, especially in proof of war cryptocurrencies, are able to extract a K.
A. increase their own balance or send to themselves by taking actions in the system. So miners have a lot of power in cryptocurrency systems. They are responsible for things like choosing what order transactions were included in in a block in Bitcoin or Ethereum or other such networks. They're responsible for choosing which transaction gets included or not in a block. And their job is to kind of listen on the network and to choose and assemble and act in the system kind of based on what they see in the world. That being said, they have some power given that they have all these choices of like which order do I include?
Do I include Phil's transaction and not Georgia's transaction? Do I include Georgia's transaction before Charlie's transaction? These are all choices. These are all freedoms the miners have in the system. And all these freedoms taken together give them power to influence outcomes and that power is valuable. So the value that they can extract by doing things like reordering transactions or inserting their own transactions with themselves kind of in the transaction or censoring other people's transactions, causing other people's transactions to fail, kind of any combination of all these things that miners can do.
The amount that they can increase their own profit, that's called the MEV and it's a number. Basically the idea behind MEV is that by quantifying this, by measuring this number precisely, which is a very hard problem to do, you can measure the security of blockchain systems and also how different contracts and different systems interact and compose together and affect each other's security properties and affect each other's UXs and all these kind of complex questions that you can't ask without the lens of MEV. You can also look at, and this is why the MEV was originally defined, the effect on the consensus game.
So how does this change and corrupt incentives of miners to actually secure the blockchain, which is what we're trying to pay them to do? So this extra incentive to do things like manipulate the system for profit actually corrupts the miner incentive to participate honestly and to contribute to the security of the system by sometimes causing them to be incentivized to do things like ignore each other's blocks or compete with each other when otherwise they wouldn't and other such games. So in that way, MEV was also designed to quantify the effect on all blockchain users. So even if you're not using a system that has MEV, you're using the same blockchain, the MEV will affect you and the security of your blockchain is getting from its miners.
Just real quick to update the definition. So a lot of people ask natural questions like what about proof of state? What about layer two? So we've kind of rebranded MEV to now be maximum or maximum extractable value. I think maximum is actually the canonical. And what that is is basically the maximum value that any permissionless actor in the system can extract. So for a proof of work chains because the miners are the most powerful permissionless actor and because any attack that any bot or actor on the network can do can be more efficiently done by the miners. All maximal extractable value is minor extractable value.
They're the same definition. Even if the miners choose not to extract it, it's still MEV because it's able to be extracted by the miner. That's what the definition says. Now in proof of work systems in L2s, you have different actors in different permissioned positions and different privileged positions. And their MEV kind of looks at the maximum value that's able to be extracted by these actors or any meaningful kind of collusive subset of these actors. So that was a really long explanation, but hopefully it brings some color to what MEV is. It's great, Phil. And keep us honest during this episode, if we say minor extractable value, maximum extractable value is the better, more canonical definition, more expansive and accurate definition, I think.
One quick question before we introduce some of the other panelists into the definition of this thing and maybe give a recap of it. Does MEV, you phrase it in terms of the blockchain world, right? But it's the category of MEV type problems, transaction, reordering type problems, censorship, some third party, having the ability to with that power, is that exclusive to the blockchain world? Or do we see traditional analogs and what are those? Not at all. I think there's a spectrum. So I think the nice thing about blockchain is this very Cartesian, very deterministic. Like you can measure a number.
There's not risk. There's not uncertainty because within the blockchain world, everything is kind of deterministic and programmatic. So in that way, is there some unique characteristics of specifically Ethereum MEV? That being said, it does generalize all kinds of other different settings. So here are a few examples. One of them is a permissioned blockchain. You can have a fully permissioned blockchain where MEV is still meaningful to reason about. So one of the early myths in kind of permissioned blockchain worlds is like, we're going to spin up this blockchain between like Chase, you know, like Barclays and whatever other five bank consortiums.
And they're all going to validate and we're going to do this round robin protocol. And that's going to disintermediate trust between these entities. And in some ways, the presence of MEV on that chain, like speaks to like a break in that abstraction barrier, we're like, just because you've sharded your validation doesn't mean you've reduced these problems or taken them away. So in that setting, it's absolutely still meaningful. It's also meaningful in kind of the mixed decentralized centralized settings. So some MEV more similar to slow market arbitrage and traditional markets might exist because of, you know, differences on centralized exchanges like Coinbase and Binance that are commonly market leaders and dexes that are trading kind of within the blockchain abstraction and don't have efficient channels for price propagation other than this MEV fuels arbitrage.
So that might be kind of a more probabilistic and more hybrid kind of style of MEV. And if you kind of take that to its most probabilistic and like most amorphous kind of form, you can also view traditional financial systems that way and like quantify for various actors what is their benefit for being in their position. And I think like had the world been looking at the financial system through a more MEV lens, things like the robin hood, drama that happened with GameStop, it would have been a lot more obvious. That was MEV. Yeah, it was MEV and like it's something we've been saying ad Cornell and like to people I've been talking about in the space even long before that happened that like look at how these people make their money.
But why was that MEV? It was because hedge fund managers didn't like what was going on in the market and made a phone call to robin hood to reorder things. Yeah, robin hood was the M basically right they controlled the infrastructure of like whose trades get processed and things like that and they did several things. A, they were reordering and inserting their own transactions. It wasn't their own it was Citadel's right. And like sandwiching people basically, which is exactly what we see on flashbots and on like Ethereum today. So they were doing that like actively the entire time. And that wasn't bad.
That was just their business model and that was like all open and public. And then yes, they engage in some more active censorship attacks when kind of the black swan happened of GameStop and of hedge funds losing money. And that also speaks to how MEV will play out I think in in in permissionless systems. When you see these system shocks, when you see these black swans, these systems of trust that we built are very fragile. And they fail users at those moments at those really key moments when they need to be working. And that's where a lot of the work in flashbots is going how to kind of shore that up and how to think about that and prepare for that that future.
As maybe Matt Levine would say everything is minor excited value in the system. Something on this I think that MEV is kind of as fields blogs have written in the past. It's fundamental to having a permissionless system. If you don't have MEV and you have many users trying to touch kind of the same piece of state, whether that's a trade or a liquidation or anything else. But if there is this kind of race condition where many people are trying to touch the same thing which has value. If your system is permissionless, it will have a MEV. If not, well, your system has permissions and actors and well, the hierarchy is not as flat as you'd want.
Yeah, I guess just to I think we're going to get into this with the transaction fee section later. But I think that there is an argument that like in the permissionless context, like transaction fees as a necessary DOS prevention vector, like are the original sin of MEV and unavoidable in the sense that if you don't give folks the ability to express preference on transaction inclusion, that's a DOS factor. If you do give them the ability to express that preference, that's MEV. I mean, not even a DOS vector. If you want to design a quote-unquote fair system or equit or you know, I don't know whatever you want to call it, ideally you want people to be able to bid and express their preferences, right?
I would argue it's a necessary quality. Yeah, right. And by the way, guys, for those listening in DOS, you guys mean denial of service attacks, which is essentially without transaction fees. Right. Without the ability to express preference, then you can't differentiate spam from normal transactions and there's like a fixed cost of spam, although you can't have bit. So I want to back up and Phil gave a nice illustration of MEV and I want to do the same, but with different words. The way I've heard this is that, you know, Bitcoin, Ethereum, Cryptoing, Economics, these are supposed to be leaderless systems, right?
There's a supposed to be decentralized and what that means is that instead of having one leader that bestows the right to order transactions upon either themselves or they pick out their party, Ethereum and Bitcoin, it's kind of ideally chosen by randomness, right? Like random hashes, the beacon chain randomness for proof of stake. And so while these are leaderless systems in the macro, in the micro, whoever proposes the next block has literal God mode over that one specific instance, right? God mode over that one block. And the way that Ethereum and Bitcoin achieve fairness is they just shuffle all around who gets God mode, right?
And like, oh, you get God mode. Now you get God mode. But the difference is when you have been bestowed the position of God mode, you all of a sudden have very different incentives than the rest of the system. And depending on the characteristic and nature of the MEV, the MEV could actually keep your incentives generally kind of aligned or different types of MEV and different kinds of strategies could actually make you very misaligned with the rest of the ecosystem. So, Joe, I want to turn to you. Maybe you can shine some more light and get some more clarity on MEV for us. What would you ascribe to be like perhaps good MEV that actually adds to the alignment between the transaction order and what would you also call bad MEV where the transaction order is fundamentally misaligned with the rest of the participants in the system?
Yeah, of course. So a good MEV extraction opportunity would be an arbitrage because when there's two markets, ideally of the trading the same asset, ideally would want these two markets to be trading more or less at the same price. So what arbitrageers do which exposes MEV is that they try to make a trade on one place and trade on another place in a network to make spreads tighter. And generally in markets, we like it when spreads are tighter. So that's one case of good MEV. Another case of good MEV would be that let's say that David has a loan on maker now or on Ave and suddenly, Ether price starts to move against his loan and he's about to be liquidated.
A good MEV example here could be a miner or a liquidator, however, saving your loan from getting liquidated and saving you from the penalty, the liquidation penalty that you get. So there's ways basically to use a MEV kind of to our benefit on that end. On the opposite side of the spectrum, a bad MEV would be somebody censoring a liquidation transaction or rather a debt repayment transaction such that your system gets your loan gets liquidated. Many people in the black Thursday, days, they call that maker down when the maker down loans all got liquidated at zero. Many people were calling that there was miners censorship for example around this.
This was not, this was most definitely not true, but that would be one example where basically miners start to censor transactions like crazy. Another example would be that let's say that you are on a layer two system that uses fraud proofs and the miner just decides to censor a transaction forever. You could say that all the funds in the system could be under MEV because the miner in a way would have control of them. And Georgios, how would you also reclassify different kinds of MEV as it relates to security for the overarching system, right? Some MEV actually adds to security, some MEV detracts from security.
How do you draw these lines? This is a hard thing and I think that if you ask three different people you would get a different answer. Probably the ways that a MEV contributes to the security of the system is, as I said earlier, around how do you align the incentives of the miners to keep extending the longest chain? Whereas a case for where MEV can be seen as bad for the security of the system would be when the miners are trying to they see an MEV opportunity five blocks in the past and they would execute the infamous time bandit attack where they would go in the past and they would rewrite the history so that they grab this past MEV opportunity.
So I think it's a bit hard for us to kind of say this kind of MEV would be good for security and bad for security because it kind of depends on how the consensus participant the block producer decides to utilize it. Phil, George, you said if you get three different people you get three different answers, do you have a different answer? Yeah, I think George has hit some great points. I think there's a little bit I would add of like one extra dimension that I think is relevant here which is like just the regularity. So if you have like constant MEV that's like available every block. For example, transaction fees approximately the same amount every block rewards being the most regular.
I think that's very different to analyze from a security game standpoint just because it's much more predictable. Whereas if you have something like Black Friday, Black Thursday style, MEV where it's like you know blocks that just have millions and millions and millions of dollars in MEV in like a very very short time period because of how quickly things are happening in the real world. That introduces much more variance to like all of your security calculations, much more unpredictability and in that way kind of just like erodes here at conclusions whether or not the outcomes are expressed. I think in general this is very much an open research question so like no one has a definite answer of what MEV is good or bad for security.
I think what's clear is that it affects the game and like it's clear that some types affect the game more or less or in different ways but it's not clear what to do about it or or or if it's fundamentally good or bad in like a stability sense in the long term yet. I think that MEV shares an interesting property with a long time ago Goon had written the post called Ethereum is inherently secure against censorship which essentially makes the argument that because smart contracts can do anything you can't constrain any specific type of behavior on Ethereum. If we want to implement you know swap there there are a literally theoretically infinite number of ways to do that and so there's no way at the level the protocol to preclude that kind of behavior and like the same is true in the case of MEV and different behaviors that generate it so I think that like there are certain there are certain base cases like Phil referred to like transaction fees that are baked into the protocol and like are able to be reasoned about in a general way in a general way but like sort of as you start getting into the application layer it becomes difficult to reason about and and sometimes it's like you you just can't know what's happening because anything can't happen and no behave no specific behavior can be precluded or even handled you know differently than any other so the generality is quite difficult the reason about I agree and for what it's worth I have a follow-up to Goon's post that you're talking about on my blog it's called on-soft fork security that I wrote like several years ago I think maybe two people in the world ever read it so I'm mostly trying to chill it to Charlie who likes reading my blog posts it's like way back in the archives and it kind of talks about this and I agree that almost speaks to like a fundamental time MEV kind of trade-off that we've noticed where MEV clearly relates to like fuzziness around time and global time synchronization and subjectivity around time and and its relationship to kind of deep computer science problems and I think that fundamental connection is still being explored since you mentioned Goon I also do want to say one other thing which relates to our previous kind of line which is about god mode and kind of leaders in the MEV protocol it's worth noting that that's how a lot of cryptos work today but like on a metal level zooming out like all we're really doing with like electing a leader electing a specific minor is trying to come to a group consensus and Goon himself has a has a project called avalanche which works differently in which it's much more probabilistic and you kind of get an approximate consensus by sampling people in the group rather than a strongly consistent log from one leader it doesn't matter actually so you might instinctually say like look at that that solved MEV there's no more leader there's no more god mode there's not this privileged actor anymore but at the end of the day like the there's still a power structure in that network and the people inside that power structure and that stake distribution and that validator set they still have influence over the outcomes just by like biasing which transactions they announce first or which they prefer versus others or which orders they go with and even though they're not the god mode leader for that period they can still influence the outcome probabilistically so all you're doing even when you remove leadership as the natural solution to these kinds of problems is like making it more probabilistic which is still kind of MEV it's still a payment it still has all the same economic properties and implications on your consensus game so just something I wanted to mention that kind of slip bias that there's no like silver bullet like oh let's just get rid of this one god mode guy and suddenly we're not going to have MEV it crops up in all sorts of places you wouldn't expect thankless listeners that's exactly why we're talking about MEV it is such a pernicious problem something that is one of the remaining unsolved problems I think with with scaling this credibly neutral open financial systems for the world and I want to turn this next question back to Phil again because Phil you've been talking about MEV for years and I think a lot of people were like unconvinced like yeah okay thanks for thinking deep into the future it's a interesting hypothetical but like if if it's coming Phil where is it right and then there were some posts people like Georgios and Dan Robinson wrote this fantastic post about the dark forest I think there's a backless podcast somewhere about that will include that in the show that's sort of illustrated a real world example of MEV but now we're like starting to measure it and I think flashbots is doing some incredible work measuring it but let's talk about the measurement of MEV how much MEV is out there right now and let's let's maybe take Ethereum as our example here Phil tell us how to measure it and how much of it is there yeah that's a great set of questions so totally agree with you you know I have been kind of going blue in the face about MEV for a while it's actually been an interesting kind of process it's the I think I would say it's the first like really major kind of research meme that I stumbled on a little bit earlier than the rest of the community so like I spent a while just working on it measuring it building bots and it was like I was going a little bit crazy because I like wasn't sure if it was real or not and I know everyone who went through early MEV also had the same journey because I I would like show them what I was doing and explain it and like show them code and like numbers and things like that and they'd like wow this is a really big thing let me go like drop my job and go work on this and then they'd come back and be like well there's only two protocols and there's like not that much here where is it feel like you're lying to us but I think you know research is about predicting the long term and there's still so many facets of this that we haven't uncovered yet so maybe I can start by pumping to flashbots measurement products which is explore.
flashbots.net and dashboard.flashbots.net as you're speaking I'm actually going to bring that on screen for our YouTube watchers here amazing so the first one explore.flashbots.net is designed to measure MEV activity on Ethereum that's kind of outside the flashbots ecosystem so this is already pre-existing MEV activity that was going on things like bots on the network placing bids with miners over the mempool that's what flashboys 2.0 was about the research paper that kind of started the whole MEV meme things like liquidations which Charlie and George just talked about things that were kind of going on before flashbots and then dashboard.
flashbots.net is kind of what is going on on flashbots so that's like very flashbots specific kind of MEV measurements and metrics and like what's the state of the network or the miners who are the searching bots what's the distribution what is the total profit and things like that so I encourage you guys to dive deep we're super into transparency to give you some ballpark numbers you know I would like like on this explore page you can see 12 million dollars of extracted MEV in the last 24 hours there's a few important caveats here number one we have to manually add coverage for different types of MEV to the dashboard right so because there's so many different types of MEV to quantify kind of what these bots are doing and things like that is a little bit of an active effort so we may be lacking in coverage on certain contracts or certain activities which make this number kind of a lower estimate for the minimum amount of MEV that's present in the network but I'm sorry any any estimate is the lower bound exactly yeah yeah that's the other thing that like MEV in theory is like almost unbounded just because of how the problem is defined and like probably increases over time as like you have more time to like look back at the blockchain and things like that so like even what's being extracted is not what's being what's out there so like 12 million is not the amount of MEV in the last 24 hours not even close like if the bots were playing perfectly if the miners were playing perfectly they probably could have gotten a lot more so we're kind of bounding it and we encourage people to contribute and improve this by contributing code that improves these estimates it's all open source we're kind of revamping also the code base right now because you know it's a little bit too rust focused thanks to someone who's on this call who's a nice rust developer over here judges but for de-rusting it so that all you find folks in the community can more easily contribute context being that when we were populating the initial database we had Scott Bigelow from the flashboard team shout out he wrote the initial like prototype of the MEV inspector and then basically what I did was that I took this and then kind of rewrote the whole thing in rust which is a great memory safe like very high performance programming language I'm a big fan of the programmers in the show should use it and basically what we did was that we used that in order to be able to index like the last two years of history like in a very short amount of time because when we were like developing new inspectors all the time because we started with just one we started with uniswap and sushi swap but then we started adding more and more and more so while we were prototyping we also needed high performance because each time we added a new inspector we had to go back to the start of time and re-index everything to make sure we did not miss any MEV opportunity then and but it turns out that the language is not as kind of widespread as I would have hoped yeah maybe um Ryan if you want to pull up the MEV explore dashboard again maybe Georgias you could walk us through some of the evolution that's happened over time um yeah happy to so basically we see that until the DeFi Summer July 1st um you don't see much or well you don't see much comparatively what we have now and the reason for that is that that's when DeFi Summer started and all the yield farming madness also started and when all the yield farming gas fee started kicking exactly exactly and also when all the exactly when gas prices start to go up um MEV like the MEV that goes to miners also went up and basically what happened over time is that more and more and more protocol started to launch and we now have seen this kind of evolution of things what we're missing in this dashboard is maker so a large source of MEV in March 2020 was maker and the reason why we do not have maker is because simply the auctions or other liquidations in maker they play out more like kind of options instead of the kind of atomic liquidation where you provide the liquid the instantly you get an asset in return and so these are harder to classify because they may play out on a multi-block time scale so this thing it classifies everything that can happen in a single transaction in a single block but the reality is that the actual MEV that's out there it may happen across multiple blocks and so I want to zoom out again and kind of talk about measuring MEV kind of at a high level you guys talk about how you guys are constantly finding new ways to classify MEV and then going back and then adding that to the historical data and if we we zoom all the way out we if and try and measure MEV more accurately it actually kind of turns into this like subjective qualitative analysis as to what actually MEV is and I'm reminded of the like the metaphor of like measuring a coastline right where if you measure a coastline with very low resolution from very very far away you'll get one relatively low number but then if you increase your resolution and if you increase your granularity the coastline of a country or whatever can actually become like three times as long and so what is the actual measure of the coastline it really depends on the tools that you have available and also what the subjective analysis is for how you measure these things and so maybe one of you guys could could walk us through why is it actually not so incredibly like objective about what MEV actually is and and and the process for actually measuring these things well Charlie let's start with you uh sure so I think um you know maybe one way to think about it would be it's less a question of like what is and is not MEV and more just a question of like what is feasible to like heristically kind of classify or rather identify um so the the hindsight looking change would not be um you know like that we uh decided that some activity you know was in fact MEV it's that we recognize it was happening we add the heuristic and then we look back at how much MEV has been collected over time and so part of the you know lower bound estimate today element of it is you know as we add more and more sort of heuristic as we can identify more and more types of these behaviors heuristically then we can also go back and hindsight and see how much we how much we missed so three years from now we might look back and be like oh man we're off five factor of 100 today correct and what Charlie said was extremely accurate so building the software there is no kind of arbitrary rule that said um this is MEV this is not like some very generic thing what the software does is it literally goes like step by step in the transaction and it sees does this match one of the things that I discussed in my call with Phil last night about the heuristics that would want to classify for there is no like automatic thing which you know you point it to and it tells you this is MEV and has a million dollars in it it's literally like very very manual so I want to stress basically that the thing that we found right now it may be like so big more bigger than we ever imagined so what might not be obvious to those listening on the podcast is we were showing a flash bots UI and explorer which shows one of these hockey stick like growth curves that we are so familiar with in crypto but this is a depiction of MEV growth over time right and george was saying it started in defy summer at that point in time about you know three and a half million or so total MEV was able to be measured now flashware to today we're at over half a million sorry half a billion dollars in MEV I want to ask this question to to Phil maybe is this sort of what you predicted kind of a hockey stick like growth of MEV and what accounts for this growth like where is it all coming from is it the case that because the ethereum economy is booming and defy is booming we get all of these new MEV opportunities characterize that for us Phil so in terms of what I was predicting I'm actually terrible at making predictions and like my track records of the like you know investments and like being crypto for a long time is like very much proof of that so I didn't really have any put any intuition on the trajectory I didn't know whether it would take like one year two years five years ten years it all happened kind of a lot quicker than I expected it seemed a lot slower at first but like in retrospect in the last like two or three years it's been all a lot quicker than I expected I think the only thing I predicted was that kind of the incentives were set up that like ultimately this would be extracted and there was no kind of way around that that was prediction A prediction B was that there was a big chance that it would be centralizing on the network if you had certain specialized actors people who used information asymmetry actors like hedge funds and traditional finance or other kind of silos of knowledge I thought those are all very possible and that those would become the most competitive miners if nothing was done to kind of distribute rewards or otherwise redesign the system because those miners would be more profitable than other miners and it would be in their interest if Ethereum especially stayed on proof of work long-term to kind of centralize power to themselves and use that competitive edge to drive others out of the the miner and mining pool game and we have seen that to an extent we've seen mining pools like ether mine kind of picking up projects that would indicate that they're working towards that direction so I think those were kind of my main predictions and also that all these things would kind of harm user fairness and cause financial loss and that people would continue carelessly designing systems without thinking about MEV so I think all those have kind of somewhat come true I hope that in the future as as the problem is accelerating and I think the mean is taking off much more than I ever thought it would that people think a lot more carefully when they're developing gaps on kind of the ground floor about what MEV we're exposing and what this means for our users other than that I think things things are going relatively on track and there's still a big possibility for MEV to be a really terrible centralizing thing for cryptocurrency which we definitely want to avoid yeah I would maybe just add on kind of the question around like will it get worse or like you know did we expect this to happen so quickly I mean it's always hard to predict the future but like one mental model that I kind of have for MEV generally is that it kind of acts like pressure on the incentives of the system like we've kind of designed this nice little box and there are certain valves on it like transaction fees and others that the pressure created by like all the economic incentives can escape out of and so like as MEV started to take off this summer something that we saw happen was back running started which is a normal ethereum transaction or get priority gas auctions you can bid for priority get your transaction in front of another what you what those auctions don't allow you to do is bid to get behind someone else however the default geth config at that point in time this summer basically said that when these transactions have the same gas fee like its random which one ends up getting included behind the other so we started seeing people sandwiching trades not just front running them meaning getting a transaction in front and spamming a ton of them spamming a ton of transactions to hopefully probabilistically get one in behind as well then the because this is not a consensus level kind of constraints it's based on like the configuration of gas miners and how they handle transactions with the same gas price they decided to change it away from random to stop the spam after that happened a lot more miners started adopting a lot more proprietary solutions and I think that like the you know expectation that things kind of continue down this route for me there is a lot of pressure and every time we've tried to like close off valves that allowed it to escape we've it seems like we've just pushed the system for push miners further and further towards just like leaving the sort of default state and so like I would say that in hindsight like the decision to change the gaff config to prevent backgrounding almost certainly accelerated the adoption of you know like custom mining software and so to the extent that's true it's sort of like I think you know indicative of like that trend likely continuing we really are squeezing the balloon with this MEV problem just like they are just seeps into another pocket of the balloon and guys if you're wondering why gas fees were so crazy this summer users defy users this is part of the reason why this sort of activity goes on David I think you've got next yeah the metaphor of the balloon is a really apt one it actually does like a very good job explaining why we all care about MEV is it seems to be this thing that is intrinsically difficult to capture and harness yet if we can capture and harness it a lot of potential comes out of this and so I think this is actually a great place to turn to the topic of that the flash box project that fail is working on which in my mind is an attempt to harness and capture MEV and make sure that it behaves in the way that we want it to and so Phil maybe you could walk us down like the project of flash bots like first off what is the goal of flash bots and how and why are our miners incentivized to participate in flashbots in the first place yeah so the goal of flashbots is to democratize MEV basically so to make sure that if possible and maybe it's not possible there's still an open question that as Charlie said MEV could be totally unfair and torpedo all of cryptocurrency but if that's not the case and it is possible then what we want to do is we want to drive miners to a state where MEV is well distributed where the ecosystem of MEV extraction is efficient because that's important for network security if it's not efficient that becomes an attack vector where the profits are democratized to all the miners in the system in a way that's not centralizing where the system stability is insured and where the UX of everyone else in the ecosystem from client devs to layer one devs to layer two devs to DAP users to DAP devs everyone else in the ecosystem is not trashed by MEV to the point where the systems become unusable expensive on fair uncertain or otherwise risky so the goal of flashbots is to kind of form an open source research and development collective where we create products we create research we create other artifacts and other ventures and structures that are intended to shift the incentives of the MEV game towards a more decentralized future that's more aligned with cryptocurrency and with the open source free software movement that backs cryptocurrency itself rather than purely fueling information asymmetry so as part of that mission one of the products that we release so far is called MEV geth or mevgeth and it's a patch to the go ethereum reference implementation client implementation that basically allows miners to create a channel by which people on the network can submit bids to them for private bundles of transactions to be mined those bundles containing other people's transactions or their own private transactions this allows arbitrageers and other bots who are running economic strategies on the ethereum network to have a more efficient channel to communicate with miners and the mempool why did we build this because we saw mev kind of taking off and we saw miners building these channels independently and individually as a centralizing force so we thought that having one single community channel across all miners that maximized also bot activity on that channel would be the most beneficial equilibrium from which we can then build a more decentralized more robust kind of long-term looking ecosystem we thought we had a better chance in that kind of decentralized protocol model that we were striving for rather than allowing the fragmentation to kind of naturally take shape which possibly could lead to the fulfillment of the predictions I made about mev being centralizing and centralizing to actors like hedge funds so that's why we built mev geth why do miners run it because it's strictly it increases your profit over running geth if any part of mev geth breaks if flashbots fails if whatever happens there's a strict security property in mev geth and it is out the software so run it at your own risk it's not fully audited but it is coded in a way such that at any point in time if you mine on top of a block provided by mev geth you will make at least as much money as mining on top of geth so in basically all aspects it gracefully degrades to the status quo which we think is the optimum for network resilience and which we think is the optimum for also miners to make it a very easy decision to switch you don't have to do complex reasoning you just need to kind of run this software and let the decentralized community compete to kind of maximize your share of the mev game and a lot of the work of developing the software and staying at the bleeding edge of actually understanding and processing mev which is a constant arms race is outsourced to the decentralized marketplace rather than needing to be performed in house by each miner and needing to be duplicated and becoming kind of a centralized information silo source so that's why we built it and that's kind of what it does it's not the only thing flashbots is going to build we have a long agenda of kind of projects and products we want to do in the mev space with the broader goal of really aligning the incentives of mev and cryptocurrency as a whole and that's really the through line that I see with flashbots and and overall crypto economics at large is that it's really crypto economics is a sandbox for tinkering with human incentives and with clever people like like you're the three panelists that we have here if we can figure out a way to incentivize people to stay with the group then then we will figure that out and implement that that's like the optimistic case the the model for flashbots to me is getting people to coordinate together for commonly shared good and it only actually works if there's financial incentive to participate in the network and so Phil where where does this how do you expand upon this model what are the like the next steps for for flashbots to increasing its overall usage and adoption and making sure that the it reminds me of the the model the theory of like the like the the Leviathan right where we have this this powerful person with the with a sword that controls the body and it controls the body via force but like flashbots controls the could try to keep the body composed via rational economic incentives how does how does the quote of quote metaphorical Leviathan that is the flashbots grow to compose everyone and stay and keeps the body composed as a whole like what are the next steps for for growing the the the the Leviathan for if you will yeah I think there's a million different things we're doing just in parallel and I think anyone in the community can come be involved one of the next steps is building a community so come join our discord and be part of this question of organizational design and how we build anti-fragile organizations and how we align these incentives I think there's a lot of question mark question mark question marks there maybe I'll give you some like immediate random samplings of things we're doing at flashbots but but it's far from exhaustive one of them is decentralizing ourselves so right now flashbots mainly isn't in a kind of alpha testing mode with our software where we're very much reliant on some centralized infrastructure that we operate not fully reliant in that like people have forked this and you can use flashbots without using this infrastructure but we're not comfortable giving the software to miners and saying like just remove this because then it opens up attacks that we can't control so removing our need to police things like spam on the network and police things like privacy this privacy property that we're kind of enforcing as this incentive cartel that you basically mentioned that's how we're doing it removing ourselves from those equations are kind of the immediate next technical steps for our current product line both through crypto economic and through cryptographic means we want to provide full privacy of anything going through the flashbots network without relying on centralized parties and without relying on trust assumptions we want to also provide spam resistance so that we're not needed on the network whatsoever once we've done that we're also doing a lot of work on integrations so looking at things like e2 layer 2's that are coming up all these other block chains the universe of cosmos parachains and polka dot chains and then sorry I might be mixing my terminology but like basically integrating all these other systems into flashbots and creating basically the ultimate preference expression engine for financial bots in the cryptocurrency ecosystem across any chain across multiple chains this is kind of work we're doing and then also just a lot of ethical work a lot of work on governance on how to ensure we build an organization that does good research that doesn't lead to run away information asymmetry how we contribute back to the open source commons and the standards that we use for doing that that's a lot of organizational design work we're doing right now and we do have regular community calls about all of these subjects so those are as I see it the kind of immediate challenges is just making sure all incentives are aligned in a robust organizational way and that no trust is required anywhere in the system those are kind of the near term goals and the longer term goals are to create the platform for the robot financial revolution basically and you know give people this ability to in a decentralized and completely permissionless way express their preferences and express them securely in these auction systems i mean in these cryptocurrency networks so feel a lot of what you've been talking about with the the success of flashbots happens at a level i think the typical defi user might not be aware even exists or even sort of notice but i think a lot of that activity that flashbots is is harnessing was was happening on ethereum mainchain inside of the mempool and ever since the flashbots project has launched some of that activity has actually shifted to the flashbots network which is super interesting which i think defi users might have experienced in the form of of lower gas fees maybe can you confirm whether that's true because that's sort of a the rumor that's going around like some of this mev activity instead of it happening on ethereum mainchain is now happening in this private network and that has contributed to reduction of of gas fees and and costs for transactions on the ethereum mainnet to what extent is flashbots responsible for that and can we thank you for that i think it's really too soon to tell i think people really like that meme and like as much as i wish i could say like yes it's all us i think we want to make cryptocurrencies more efficient and we've done a lot of work on that front like we've definitely reduced congestion on chain we've reduced pga's there's less estimator inaccuracy as a result of all these things and there's just more headroom as well as more minor revenue which leads to things like decreases in gas token and cheap minting and other sorts of pathological activity so i think flashbots' mission is to reduce impact on these commons and bots were we're we're trashing these commons before they were like trashing the network and trashing the gas space and like we've brought a lot of that down that being said i think a lot of other things also contributed to low gas prices like an increase in supply of gas and a general stability in price for a while in cryptocurrency so i think flashbots has helped a lot put downward pressure but there's also a lot of other downward pressure and without like really sophisticated economic modeling it's hard to take credit the only thing i'll say there is like you know we're we're definitely working in that direction and and we one of our goals is to make things more efficient and i think that's definitely happened and good side effects of that are like part of what we want to do here because we don't want a situation where there's a few meb bots kind of pissing all over the commons and like ruining the network bandwidth and things like that just so they can make their arbitrage profit before we leave this topic and talk about sort of futures and some other things curious charlie d and georgio's do you have any insights charlie first uh yeah i think i'm beyond everything that Phil said uh i'm accidentally successful version of flashbots uh is a future in which the theory never experiences a time band at attack end of the day well we're going to have to go into to what that is i know we talked about it briefly but can you just go ahead and give us a recap on a time-bathed band at attack and why that's so critical to not have that yeah the the time-banded attack uh if we didn't cover it earlier it's kind of like um i don't know i'm trying to think of a proper analogy but i don't know it's it's just it's the doomsday scenario of meb it's it's the idea that um uh you know when blockchains are reorged uh which happen for the small reworks happen fairly frequently um everybody knows sometimes you know it seems like your transaction has one confirmation and it turns out that it doesn't um meb uh can be extracted from back in time so if i uh let's say for example there's you know five blocks with like a ton of meb in them lots of competition uh tons of tons of trades whatever uh and 50 blocks later uh it turns out that georgios on the side here has been shadow mining uh side chain and reorges the whole thing capturing all of the meb available in those 50 blocks not only the me and importantly not only whatever meb uh you know was captured by actors on the previously canonical version of the chain but he can arbitrarily reorder transactions in every one of those blocks meaning uh that it gives you uh not just like the sort of god power uh mode as a leader uh within a single block but the ability to do that over multiple blocks so another example this would be i take out uh let's say i'm a miner i take out a trillion dollars uh you know in die debts and then i just wait to see what happens to the price of ether and if i don't like it never it's like it never happened it's gone from the canonical chain um so time time bandits are like like the the the you know they're kind of terrifying uh it's like the worst possible form of meb right it's like if uh bankless listeners will be familiar with the concept of mohawk right like it is literally the instantiation of mohawk in a single instance of being reword coordination failure absolute coordination failure yeah quite quite literally right because it's getting reorded hey bankless nation i hope you're enjoying the mev panel thus far in the second half of this conversation we go into proof of stake in eip 1559 and how they do or do not impact mev we also talk about l2s and and the relationship between l2s in mev and how there's both mev on the l2 and there's mev on the l1 and those things actually interact uh and then we also get into a conversation with fill about the inherently centralizing force that is mev especially as it relates to both l2s and l1s and then we also get into a more philosophical broader conversation which frankly i only understood like chunks of it and so i'm going to have to go back and re-listen to this after i do some google searching and homework this is one of those episodes where it's not just for you guys but it's also for me and ryan to get our learning in as well so i really hope you guys are enjoying this panel but first before we get into the second half of this conversation we have to pause and talk a moment about these fantastic sponsors that make this show possible balancer is defi's most powerful automated market maker typical amms just have two tokens inside of one liquidity pool which can lead to fractured liquidity across the many pairs in the defi with balancer you can access the full power of multiple tokens inside of one single amm which unlocks an entirely new playing field of possibility this makes balancer an awesome building block for so many different use cases balancer pools can make asset indexes when instead of paying fees to portfolio 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coinbase you know or block.coinbase from inside the the kind of system there's an opcode that lets you pay the miner in a bespoke way in any kind of transaction you want so even if there was zero tip and 1559 was the only pricing mechanism you could still just make a direct transfer in a smart contract to the miner and that would constitute basically an implicit tip. the reason the tip was was added was to kind of stop people from doing this so so the tip is one place but there's like that's not the only place flashbots operates we also take into account kind of these other more bespoke payments yes it's kind of also like you know if it weren't included right then like an off chain market would like certainly be created there's you know half a billion dollars or whatever that's right I think the like pretty much anything that you do to try to prevent miners from accessing MEV because you can't actually get rid of the MEV itself is liable to incentivize the creation of like off chain or off protocol mechanisms to access it so okay well let's talk about another upcoming predical level change to Ethereum which has got to affect something you guys tell us so that is staking proof of stake so basically the way I think about this high level is that all of the miners they lose their responsibilities and those responsibilities turn over to the validators those with stake inside of the Ethereum network so you've got a new set of stakeholders and what staking does is it's essentially merges the holders of eth the asset with the obligations of validation so this doesn't eliminate MEV I think anyone who's listened up to this point and understood up to this point can understand that but it's got to direct it to a new set of stakeholders what are the implications of that all right Georgias let's start with you there is some impact this time but I but to kind of stress it MEV is again an ordering problem it is about borders and how so proof of stake changes one thing how or how how validators are elected in proof of work validators rather block producers are elected randomly you can never know who the next miner is with absolute certainty in proof of stake specifically Ethereum to proof of stake not any kind of proof of stake because the protocol details may change things in Ethereum's proof of stake once you are a validator you can always know the validators for the next 12 minutes which is in if two lingo two epochs what this implies is that if I know that I will be the next validator and then I know that my friend Charlie is going to be the next validator and then I know that Phil is going to be the next validator I can call them and I can call I can tell him hey guys like we will have it guaranteed three block opportunity to do whatever we want with Ethereum so what this allows is for miners to or rather block producers to execute multi-block MEV extraction tactics reliably while these before were only probabilistic and because they were probabilistic they were probably not something we would see and the very trivial example of that would be manipulating uniswap oracles uniswap we choose oracles for example require that they require that rather they snapshot the value from the last transaction in the block and they use that to kind of determine the price in that block however if I am a trader rather if I am a validator I can manipulate the price to wherever I in the last transaction of the block and the next block I can then push it back to wherever wherever it was without realizing any loss net of fees so the implication is basically that miners will be validators will be able to execute these kinds of attacks reliably so you think it makes the problem worse George yes I think so well let's talk about another implication of this which is you have completely changed the the miners out you swap them out for ETH holders so if you are a holder of Ether as an asset right you are a potential recipient if you choose to stake and validate you are our potential recipient of this MEV versus miners that has some effect so I guess miners receiving sort of the MEV payment you know the bribe this something might call it validators are the new recipients of this MEV payment maybe bullish the price of ETH but not bullish the credible neutrality of the network I don't know about bullish or not what I do know is that right now validators only two are earning a fixed percentage on their stake assets once if two they two merge happens validators will also start earning transaction fees and MEV and of course what this means is that the APR for staking would be higher because as a validator you now also earn MEV so that's kind of a positive byproduct of the merge to contrast the maybe negative out their attack that I mentioned earlier I think politically it changes a lot of things too in that it changes the power distribution which fuels how MEV expresses itself in the real world so zooming out like it's always important to also consider the social angle of these systems we're building and how they'll interact with society miners kind of have an incentive structure which because there's a high barrier to entry and a lot of capital required has kind of taken a particular structure in the real world so like often you have very scoped business entities that exist to extract a certain amount of profit in the scoped way and have like investors and and operations and things like that in the validator world you have very different politics so in the large validator community you have things like exchanges which are competing for users and trying to maximize user yields there you might see things like MEV farming you might see things like centralization through proprietary MEV strategies or partnership with the information asymmetry driving entities that I mentioned like hedge funds you also have large holders in that picture who maybe have less technical resource access and sophistication but a lot of system and incentive alignment and you also have a long tail of small holders who are trying to get access to APR and trying to get yields basically without without kind of meeting this full control and without having as big of a piece of the pie as these other actors so that political landscape is really different than miners on Ethereum today where like it's much more than even pie chart a few things I think that says is that number one it's really important for these small guys to be able to access their percentage of the MEV that they're owed if they if you have 0.
001% of the network and you can't get 0.001% of the MEV you'll go to Coinbase instead you'll go somewhere else and that'll be a centralizing force to access these profits so democratizing this and creating this network where each validator in each miner doesn't have to be doing the work themselves to get most of these profits I think is critical to the decentralization of proof of stake and it's like a big part of how we view this transition at flashbots in shining that and also being aware of these change power dynamics we don't know how this will play out yet I think these are all big question marks so as much as I wish I can predict the future I can just say like these things are going to change and these actors will be relevant increasingly in the future and there will be kind of politics and drama there that we can't predict yet I think the through line that listeners should really be cognizant of is we just talked about EIP1559 we just talked about proof of stake and then neither of these situations did the MEV situation really improve all that much and perhaps even gets worse and that kind of just illustrates the perniciousness of this problem and what Phil is really talking about is that if we do not figure this out then the whole argument of that proof of stake makes the wealthier wealthy there are plenty of arguments as to why that's not true but one of the biggest perhaps manifestations of a future version of the world is that we cannot solve MEV and the wealth distribution of proof of stake just becomes so incredibly centralized because of the natural incentives that proof of stake just really just the the power asymmetry is just a crew faster and faster and faster to the large stakeholders I want to maybe bring up two other implications that I'm seeing and ask the panelists about this one is and bankless listeners will be familiar with all of our episodes we did the Justin Drake about Eath being sort of an ultrasound money and even like modeling that out with like what does the world look like when validators are receiving issuance validators are also receiving transaction fees he did not model out what it looks like when validators receive MEV which could be an absolute massive portion of revenue flows and to the point David just meant that has and the point of this entire podcast is that has some negative effects negative externalities to the credible neutrality of Ethereum potentially and also yet I'm linking this to a comment that Georgios made in the introduction which is that could also be fuel to pay for network security at the same time because it means Eath issuance can be effectively lower why because it's being paid by not just transaction fees by large amounts of MEV as well those those are two implications like in my mind and also like just the implication I guess in the short run wow like all of this revenue flowing to ETH holders like wow okay but I want to get the panelists' reaction to you to maybe that is there some flip side that is actually good from an economic security perspective and since Georgios you brought this up they've alternative to you first candidly not much to Adrian I think you explained it very well I think that MEV like transaction fees can be a source of security budget in the future and I think there remains to be seen whether it will be enough of a security budget yeah I think I was a little bit to that I guess there's like small things we can do that change things a lot right like for example just designing systems in an MEV aware way like if to expose MEV you need to be mined on top of a particular block if you add that as a condition to your transaction it stops how deep you can rework and it affects things like time banded attacks a lot without being a substantial UX penalty so there's a lot of like low hanging fruit mitigations uh like this that could probably change these equilibrium a lot and like make MEV a better security budget I think there are worlds in which MEV is a good security budget and worlds in which it's a horrible security budget and it depends how we design our mechanisms and it depends how things play out socially and on all these other factors which are really hard to predict or even model but I believe both of these futures exist and we should try to like work towards the one where it's maximally not bad as we can we can sort of build that's kind of what we're trying to do well said there's also a good very obscure but good post back from like May 2020 by Vitalik um uh on medium that I can say the link to afterwards um where he talks about um uh basically central you know MEV has like a centralization prone uh kind of revenue stream and that in a role of centric ethereum uh although I guess it's probably written before a role of centric ethereum roadmap is written but uh anyway uh that we might want to centralize MEV extraction into role-up sequencers um given that like it's very high fixed cost um probably more so than mining itself indefinitely for the stake um and that if we're not able to harness the MEV revenue stream as a security budget we could potentially at least quarantine it off um essentially um you know more bifurcated from like the core consensus engine and and um make in the worst case um you know uh kind of uh like if we needed the hard for to fix something it might be easier if the revenue stream is quarantined off the basically the the the action of uh centralizing MEV on layer 2 sequencer networks it does not remove the MEV but it moves it somewhere else where it can be contained and basically not leak into the security of the rest of the system right that actually that's exactly where we want to go next and so sequencers on layer 2s uh entities that are responsible for ordering transaction is a totally different design scape of MEV that's separate from the ethereum mainnet but it is MEV all the same and there's you know the whoever gets to aggregate transactions on l2s gets to do extract that value and then and then the transactions go to the l1s and then there's l1 MEV uh miners or validators as well so let let's talk about some of the uh structural differences or similarities between MEV on l1 versus MEV on l2s probably under the context of optimism and and uh arbitrum because i know these two these are the two l2s that are really going head on after this georgio so i'll turn that to you how is MEV the same and how is MEV different on l2 i mean in the end a layer 2 when we call rather when we talk about layer 2 today i think that we really refer to a roll up and optimistic or a zikki roll up that's what the layer 2 typically refers to great yeah and this may also be relevant given discussions in the rest and uh days around what exciting and what the layer 2 is um however i want to stress that if they roll up has programmability the MEV it exposes is the same as if that thing would have been a layer 1 so in a way MEV is not a property of whether it is layer 1 and layer 2 it is a property of how much ordering uh is allowed in the system and how much programmability is in the system had tip to um to tryly for his blog post uh clearly laying out that uh that aspect so specifically i think that um again it matters on the election process for um the person who will order transactions optimisms design specifies the so-called MEV auctions where the MEV auction basically says that if there is um some amount of MEV in the layer 2 then the sequencer that wants to extract it should be able to pay up to that amount um to be elected to become the next blog producer and that's what the design uh what rather that's what the implementation will be eventually it's not there today and there's no kind of commitment to the dates on when that would be live for arbitrum i think that right now there's similarly kind of like a fixed or the a fixed scheme for how validators how how sequencers are elected if it's one it's one if it's many i think it would be something like around robin based on stake um which means that if you own more stake in the system you get uh elected more often but what uh arbitrum also has been working on which field maybe has some thoughts on is uh the so-called fair ordering algorithms where they say that instead of having one person decide on the ordering you have let's say all the consensus participants to agree on the ordering and this is basically the same thing as uh running a tenderman uh or a bft kind of a blockchain where two thirds of the stake first need to agree on the ordering and then only does execution happen yeah and you can in fact add like a threshold signal i mean if you're using like BLS signatures then as like part of uh you know a bft style protocol then you can just have the uh threshold signatures unblind after uh final after finale um but obviously that restricts the uh set of possible bar disciplines given that you have like a quadratic communication constraint on the um uh consensus process so i mean guys is the story here that we've just uh squeezed the balloon once again and now move the mev problem back to layer 2s and back to rollups do you think Phil?
I think this is where the coastline analogy you mentioned before is most accurate so i think layer 2 is like a fractal instance of layer 1 like there is no layer 2 and layer 1 there are just blockchains and how they connect each other uh layer 2 is like another chain of blocks with its own process for designing ordering so depending on how you design it it might have the same exact mev problems as a similar layer one would have um you could on each say like oh we're just going to give all the mev to the talent and like hard code out in the protocol and that would work right and that's basically what optimism is the charity though Phil?
The zero yeah exactly or whatever you want to do um uh so with a with a centralized solution that's basically um what you're doing um in terms of kind of fairness protocols i think there are a lot of um that's kind of what we're describing with these kind of bft style protocols and and what arbitrum is trying to do where they say like here's some process that we consider more fair for some reason um and they state why this process is more fair um usually it's because it makes some claim like if three out of the five nodes we have here's your transaction before mine your transaction will definitely get in and it'll definitely be before mine and so therefore that's a fairness property that takes away from ordering that being said the way they express this fairness is in like computer science terms not an economics terms or or really like fundamentally speaking to mev um so it doesn't talk about things like what if your assumptions fail and those three nodes collude against you um what is the incentive for these nodes to honestly follow the protocol and like is it detectable if they don't how do network assumptions play into this um how do which assumptions do we have to accept as users of the protocol um to kind of engage in this protocol and believe that it's going to give us the so these are all kind of very deep parameterization questions that themselves introduce mev and kind of represent blockchain assumptions um so in all these cases in layer two's and layer ones and fairness protocols these are all basically just blockchains they all kind of have their own mev that you can think about that you can calculate and they also have mev across them so layer two is going to have mev that's practically larger almost like the coastline right like when you combine it with the layer one to which it's anchored because if you're in a privileged position on both layer one and layer two you can amplify your own attacks on each one you can make your layer one attacks more powerful with the economic degrees of freedom you have been controlling value flow on layer two and therefore how that flows back into layer one and you can make your your layer two attacks more valuable using things like layer one censorship um and reordering and other messing with the kind of core security anchoring of that system um so so let me ask you the the panel is kind of a follow-up to that right so we we just chased mev to a roll-up right we've squeezed the balloon now molok lives on a roll-up but we still have the same mev problem except for the fact layer two's can harness a thousand different experiments at once right so the ethereum settlement layer other chains like other layer ones like it they have to ossify over time uh they can't experiment with new fairness protocols to try to solve the mev problem as rapidly they certainly can't iterate as fast maybe I'll turn this question to to Charlie so we've we've chased the mev problem to layer two's do you think that there is some magic protocol out there some magic mechanism we will be able to uncover to actually like slay molok and solve mev or at least drastically mitigate it on layer two are you optimistic or are you pessimistic about that Charlie so i i have a couple of thoughts and first it is a fantastic question um i think that there will that there is a wide space experimentation that's possible on layer two um and i think that um it is going to give us the opportunity um to kind of try designing more um potentially application specific um uh kind of controls i think that for roll-ups where you know it's kind of for roll-ups which basically just emulate like the evm um like the problem is essentially identical modulo the sequencer selection just i mean like given the nature of their design um i think it's possible though that we're going to start seeing more um like application specific uh altos um that start to incorporate like um well application specific transaction fee orderings uh or which may get easier to add stuff like vdf receipts or do threshold signing um for ordering um i would say that like i don't think that there is any silver bullet um i would guess that there are probably like most applications probably have um certain protocol layer um like levers that they can pull to help mitigate the problem and find like more stable equilibria and for a lot of those applications it'll probably like they'll probably need to be on l2 to do that um uh and and this is related to um you know like paradigm has invested in cosmos and is someone interested and you know it's obviously interested in that ecosystem for like largely similar reasons it's it's just the idea of like um mev with generality is a very hard problem and i think a lot of the experimentation that we're gonna see happen is uh you know sort of like more conforming um uh to the specifics of each application guys one burning question in my mind that i have to ask because you know as even i say a lot of this this podcast is also for us like we're on the journey we're trying to understand learn this stuff as well so one thing i'm unclear about is if this is a an ethereum specific problem or say a general smart contract platform problem or to what extent it exists in a network like bitcoin say on bitcoin's layer two which is like crypto banks let's call it inside of a coin base or a finance exchange like think of visa side chains versus to what extent it it uh exists in traditional finance it just seems to be the case that maybe in kind of crypto banks or in traditional finance you just can't see the mev but maybe it still exists is that the case or is this really specific a specific problem to uh ethereum smart contract and it's designed and i think it's philosophical i think it's a philosophical question honestly um i mean yeah like we like philosophy why is it philosophical Charlie um well because you know my bank uh like or or broker whatever elects not to front run me because the sec is gonna come after them which you know you could call a you know crypto economic incentive i don't know where the cryptography comes in in that part but whatever you know we could call it that philosophically um uh and you know mev like uh like most things uh yeah it has like fractal you know sort of analogous uh uh fractal analogies in other contexts but i think that when we talk about mev in in crypto and like with respect to permissionless blockchains in particular um like it is actually a pretty narrowly scoped uh concern in the sense that like um it's it's like not a thought experiment it is real uh it's like fair it's like fairly easy to define you know what is and is not uh i mean vm and i think that there is like a pretty clear difference to a conversation about for example the incentives up like uh you know an optimistic role of sequencer on aetherium uh versus like why Wells Fargo may or may not decide to front run me you know in in their position um so yeah i guess i would just say it's it seems to me more of like a practical concern within the context of permissionless systems in the same in in the same way that like um you know custodial systems permissionless systems just have different tradeoff to custodial traditional systems and like mev practically is one of them yeah i would agree with that and that's kind of uh you know segues into like a new perspective i've taken recently on mev after like a long time thinking about it um and that's basically that mev kind of measures what happens in like sort of the raw economic security case only where the only thing that matters are economic incentives um and so yes mev exists in traditional finance but it's not as meaningful because the incentive structure that's built there is not only these raw economic incentives it includes all sorts of social and technical and political and like uh legal and paperwork based and human based infrastructure processes that are outside the scope and that can't be modeled as easily um uh like Charlie said uh which make this so yes you can measure what happens in like this technical system we built on Wall Street if all laws break down and everyone's acting maximally maliciously it's just that that's less meaningful than in the cryptocurrency case where where the goal is to build a system where we're like encouraging people to pursue their rationality and that's almost like enshrined as like you know acceptable no matter what you're you're you're getting dangerously close to rationality itself defeating right now my friend yeah i mean it relates to rationality is self-defeating in many ways but i think it cuts through rationality is self-defeating so because rationality is like self-defeating this like simpler metric is like the only means of analysis that like matters and kind of uh you know like there's obviously a difference between bitcoin and algalrand or other honest bft protocols inside an economic model in that like bitcoin is more robust in a wider range of rational after rational incentive models where there fewer honesty and more economic assumptions that being said rationality is self-defeating you can't perfectly model the world and in many models bitcoin breaks down for example if you have two equally size bitcoin like blockchains the analysis says nothing about that and that's like a perfectly valid future so yes it is self-defeating but that being said even though it is self-defeating you know somehow the systems we're building we're trying to build things that are robust in more self-defeating worlds than not and towards that end kind of looking at it through the lens of MEV is a useful tool to see like in which universes does it clearly break down versus not and because we're building these kind of economically secured systems that's a very immediately meaningful and and like we just said practical question oh my god this panel did not disappoint yeah on on everything we've covered in particular that last question thank you guys super insightful david i think you've got the last yeah it's it's very i hope it's obvious to listeners as to why this is such a critical conversation and i thank you guys for coming on and giving us your time and also simply just being public servants or yeah public servants for public goods somebody has to fight this fight and so i'm just honored that you guys are fighting this fight on behalf of my opinion the whole entire globe and so i kind of want to finish off with this question when you hear the term MEV do you feel optimistic or pessimistic and why and feel let's start with you oh that's a hard one i don't know i feel cautiously optimistic the same way i imagine i would if i was like observing like the early days of the internet you know i think we have an opportunity i think it's easily squandered so it's very cautious and i feel still a lot of existential anxiety about the way things will go in this space and if everyone who's looking back on this podcast in 10 years is like this guy screwed up and he's the new blive masters designing like terrible credit-backed instruments like f that guy i'm sorry you know i don't know i hope people oh go ahead i was gonna say hopefully like they come back and listen to this podcast they're like guys they weren't such bad guys they gave it their best go i feel very optimistic i think that the better world of tomorrow firstly this is like very philosophical the better world of tomorrow is built on optimism and we need people to kind of risk working on hard problems like this because without these kinds of risk takers we wouldn't be where we are as a species and secondly i think that mv right now like what i care about most fundamental is engineer researcher investor is working with the smartest people in the industry and i know that the hardest people the hardest problems in the industry attract the smartest people in the industry Charlie mv optimistic or pessimistic optimistic um for this reason um the rationality is self-defeating argument or like the you know girdles incompleteness theorem for blockchains uh argument to me is incredibly uh intellectually attractive um it's something that i i've spent like an inordinate amount of time thinking about um and you know this this this is the argument again that that for any set of quote-unquote uh rational cryptoeconomic assumptions uh you know we can come up with that there is a way to violate and defeat them yet in practice uh if you go to coin market cap.
com how many blockchains currently uh like exist and work and how many have been broken um based there's a ton that work in practice very few have been broken i guess like ether classic had like a reorg attack but like i don't know be kind of hard for me to think of another um and so i think that like uh i think of mv somewhat similarly which is um there is like i think a really deep uh philosophical concern that's worth taking seriously um and like obviously you know is being more realized in practice today like this is something we actually have to confront um and we sort of have like the counter factual that if we don't do something um the default state might not be um successful and optimistic but that being said um broadly crypto has done pretty fantastically at uh succeeding even when uh we have an incompleteness theorem as to why um so i don't know in the absence of in the absence of certainty i'm willing to to take the optimistic perspective.
In completeness theories themselves are rational claims that are self-defeating is what i would say and uh yes yes you can you can technically design a mechanism that breaks any rationality assumption but like i think it's much more useful to look at the whole and the big picture and like approximately what you're getting and like the leverage you're buying in various universes and that's really more where yes mv can divide i'm also optimistic because it feels more articulate than i am so i just i just heard him. guys we're gonna have the same panel back and it's just gonna be blockchain crypto philosophy because i think heads would explode as mine did toward the end of this i hope you've enjoyed this episode bankless listener i want to thank the panel for making this happen thanks a lot guys thanks so much for having me.
guys what did you learn from today here's one thing i learned mv is a pernicious problem it's probably one of the biggest last unsolved problems in the space and the stakes are extremely high this is like the difference between do we create a better financial system for the world or do we fall flat on our face and just create a different financial system with a different set of actors super important here this is not the last time we will be talking about mv on bankless i guarantee you but there's reason to be optimistic and i'm leaving this conversation more optimistic having spoken to these panelists today of course guys got to close with risks and disclaimers eth is risky crypto is risky defi is risky you could lose what you put in but we are headed west this is the frontier it's not for everyone but thanks for joining us on the bankless hey we hope you enjoyed the video if you did head over to bankless hq right now to develop your crypto investing skills and learn how to free yourself from banks and gain your financial independence we recommend joining our daily newsletter podcast and community as a bankless premium subscriber to get the most out of your bankless experience you'll get access to our market analysis our alpha leaks and exclusive content and even the bankless token for airdrops raffles and unlocks if you're interested in crypto the bankless community is where you want to be click the link in the description to become a bankless premium subscriber today also don't forget to subscribe to the channel for in-depth interviews with industry leaders ask me anything and weekly roll-ups where we summarize the week in crypto and other fantastic content thanks everyone for watching and being on the journey as we build out the bankless nation