Tarun Chitra is co-founder of Gauntlet, a financial modeling platform for crypto. Tarun is a thought leader in the space and is an expert in a variety of topics surrounding DeFi.
This week, we discuss the history of electronic markets, and how we’re in the third wave of this phenomenon.
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Bankless Podcast #74: The History of Electronic Markets Guest: Tarun Chitra
We’re all familiar the image of traders in the pits of the New York Stock Exchange, holding up tickets and shouting out orders to one another. This is the backdrop for Electronic Markets 1.0, when ‘open outcry’ was the norm for the exchange of equities. When internet technology first emerged, it was brought to these markets, such that geographically distinct markets were fused by the instant communication of prices, bids, and offers.
New technologies come quickly to the markets, giving an advantage to those who adopt the fastest. Alongside traders and brokers are the technologists, the quants and computer scientists who leveraged their understanding of networks to revolutionize trading. This first wave of electronic markets lasted until the dawn of personal computers, home internet, and E-trade.
This second wave further revolutionized modern exchanges, distributing public access while consolidating liquidity. Synergistic with the dot-com boom, this explosion of retail investing once again turned exchanges on their heads. Look around now, and observe that we are in a third wave of new technologies applied to markets: Electronic Markets 3.0. Catalyzed first by mobile phones and now DeFi, the markets have once again been uprooted and fundamentally changed.
What does this all mean? Where do we go from here? How do we adjust for scaling complex markets? Well, listening to what Tarun Chitra has to say about it isn’t a bad place to start.
------ Topics Covered:
0:00 Intro 7:00 Tarun Chitra 10:40 A History Lesson on Markets 17:45 Patterns in Electronic Markets 20:55 Electronic Markets 1.0 29:09 Options and Removing Lawyers 1.0 38:08 Experimenting and Crashes 1.0 46:19 New Players & Regulation 1.0 52:19 Electronic Markets 2.0 1:00:08 ETFs and Consolidation 2.0 1:14:26 Before and After 2.0 1:23:00 Removing Lawyers 2.0 1:28:00 Electronic Markets 3.0 1:37:40 Experimenting and Crashes 3.0 1:46:07 Removing Lawyers 3.0 1:52:50 New Risks 3.0 2:00:35 Financial Crisis 3.0 2:09:10 Closing & Disclaimers
------ Resources:
Tarun on Twitter https://twitter.com/tarunchitra?s=20 Gauntlet Network https://gauntlet.network/ Inside Job: The Looting of America's Savings and Loans https://www.amazon.com/Inside-Job-Americas-Forbidden-Bookshelf-ebook/dp/B013S42VF6 More Money Than God: Hedge Funds and the Making of a New Elite https://www.amazon.com/More-Money-Than-God-Relations/dp/0143119419 When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management https://www.amazon.com/When-Genius-Failed-Long-Term-Management/dp/0375758259
----- Not financial or tax advice. This channel is strictly educational and is not investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell any assets or to make any financial decisions. This video is not tax advice. Talk to your accountant. Do your own research.
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Welcome to Bankless, where we explore the frontier of internet money and internet finance. This is how to get started, how to get better, and how to front run the opportunity. I'm Ryan Sean Adams. I'm here with David Hoffman, and we're here to help you become more bankless. David, great episode today. Tarun Chitra on the podcast. He is a polymath. He's got, he spans so many different ideas, such a big brain, but this episode, we really drew his attention to the history of the markets, in particular, the history of the electronic markets. What did we cover today? Yeah, really the concept or story being told here is that the internet, as we all know, changed everything, and it especially changed how markets are structured.
And so as soon as the internet started to invade the world of financial markets, an interesting story is told. And so Tarun has delineated the growth and the story into three phases. Phase one, two, and three of the growth of electronic markets, where we stopped yelling at each other inside of the pits about what trades we wanted to make. And instead, we just started typing our trades into computers. And that has gone from people order routing into various exchanges in the 80s and 90s to consolidation to brokerages like your Charles Schwab and your E-Trades online in the 90s and early 1000s to where we are today with DeFi markets and crypto exchanges.
Each one of these phases has similar story or similar themes throughout each one. There's themes of what happens when a financial crisis happens because we're talking about market infrastructure. The way that the market infrastructure is built impacts the nature of the financial crisis. You have the stories of how regulators came in to each phase and impacted the story of the development of each phase. And the way that the communication and computational abilities of the infrastructure or the hardware of the world impacted the accessibility and centralization or decentralization of the markets.
And so these themes are reoccurring throughout history. This is definitely a podcast about history doesn't repeat, but it definitely does rhyme. And there are lessons to be learned about electronic markets that we are trying to apply to DeFi so that when these events unfold in DeFi, which Tarun thinks that they definitely will, we will be prepared for them. Yeah, absolutely. I think one of the three lines of this episode is just in every phase of the electronic markets eras, there was increased access for individuals, right? And I guess this is the story of markets from the very beginning, the first joint stock companies and the first stock markets.
And that was kind of reserved for sort of the elites and like the uber wealthy and kind of like mercantile class and that sort of thing. Just that the markets are opening up more and more over time. And it's very interesting to see like DeFi as the third phase of this where you've got all of that, but at warp speed. Like anybody, anywhere with an internet connection can open a marketplace, can create an asset, can even if they have the skills, create a new financial product. And that's something like we've never seen before. I mean, I know there are corollaries to what this looked like, Drew, and says in the 1980s with the first era.
But I also feel like this is uncharted water and uncharted territory. Yet, it fits this trajectory of markets are becoming more and more open. And everything is kind of becoming, I don't know if I'd call it hyper capitalism because it has some negative connotations, but hyper marketization. I don't know if that's the word, but that's kind of what we're seeing here. And it's a good thing because it means more financial inclusion for the world and more capital coordination. Absolutely. We often talk about how crypto and DeFi is the Wild West. Well, you can imagine what the world is like before the Internet when trades are being made by people yelling at each other on pit floors and doing hand signals to make their trades.
It reminds me of the movie from Ferris Bueller's Day Off. and but all of a sudden the internet comes and instead of you know yelling at each other and doing hand signals we're inputting you know our trades into a computer and the structure of the entire market absolutely changed that was the absolute wild west back then too this is not the first time financial markets have gone through their wild west moments like the first wild west moment happened in the 80s uh turin tells a story about this one guy that had like 10 of all trading volume going through his server in his garage. It was just some random dude.
And there's a lot of interesting correlates between what we see now in crypto where, you know, just one rogue developer builds this brand new financial product. And all of a sudden, like half the world is using it or whatever, half of DeFi is using it. Similar stories, similar themes, you know, history definitely rhymes. And I love where this ends, where we go through the lens and we sort of apply the lessons learned from previous eras to the current era to try to map out what the future looks like because look man the the future of crypto and d5 is uh is so uncertain in terms of like we know long term this is going to be successful because this is unstoppable but um what might we see in the interim in the in the in the short to medium run and this gives us a framework for starting to project this i especially liked turin's description of risk that we might see in d5 both the you know know, the plus side of this where we have an open financial system so we can maybe see these risks more easily before they emerge.
But also how risk has been kind of not the downfall, but an issue with every single electronic era previous. So exciting episode. Make sure you guys tune in to the end of this episode. Before we begin, we want to thank the sponsors that made this possible. Living a bankless life requires taking control of your own private keys, not your keys, not your crypto. That's why so many in the bankless nation already have their Ledger hardware wallets, which makes proper private key management a breeze. But the Ledger ecosystem is more than just a secure hardware wallet. Ledger is the combination of the Ledger hardware wallet and the Ledger live app.
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There are so many apps coming online to Arbitrum, so you may want to pack your bags in preparation for the great migration to the Arbitrum Layer 2. To keep up to speed with Arbitrum, follow them on Twitter at Arbitrum and join their Discord. All right, Bankless Nation, we are super excited about our next guest. We have Tarun Chitra. He comes from one of the most rich and complex corners of Ethereum. He is a big brain. I don't know. Can't even keep track of all the things Tarun is doing. He's the co-founder of Gauntlet that provides economic simulation to DeFi protocols to help them harden their economics.
Super important stuff. He's also a co-founder of Robot Ventures, where he invests alongside Robert Leshner, who's been on the podcast several times in DeFi. He's also a frequent guest of the Zero Knowledge podcast. so you will appreciate his audio. He's also a leading thinker on MEV, that is maximum extractable value and so many other topics. Today, we're going to talk about his concept for electronic markets and the third era of electronic markets that we find ourselves in today. Tarun, how's it going, man? How are you doing? Great. How are you? Thanks for having me on. Oh, we're doing great.
You know what, man? I love that background. You got to tell us, Is this like an NFT or like, what is this background? It's super colorful. Your glasses seem to kind of match the ambiance of it. What's the story here? So I love kind of weird niche math things that have very pretty pictures. And so this thing behind me is something called Penrose Tiling. Oh, I know this one. Get David to explain it then. If David knows it, explain it, David. David Price- If i'm if i'm right, then I could be wrong, but this is a pen or styling is like the basis of a pattern, if you color it right and the coloring I think it's very important, and I could be wrong.
David Price- But, like the it's a pattern that never ever repeats and so it's an infinitely recursive pattern and you will never find the same tiling pattern ever again. David Price- As the and it's an infinitely recursive patterns, so we can go into infinity, but you will never find the same pattern twice is that right. Yeah, basically, yeah. Basically, it's sort of infinite tiling with no repeated. There's a certain weird way in which the no repeated units is defined, but people make very pretty pictures like this one of them. That is super cool. That's going to be great, this entire podcast.
I'm enjoying looking at that. But let's get to the topic, because today we are here to explore the topic of electronic markets. I think, Tarun, you have this idea that there have been three eras, three stages of electronic markets, the first, the second, and now we are entering the third. And when David and I heard about this concept you have, this mental model you had, we knew we absolutely had to unpack it here on Bankless because I think it's an important mental model for us all to understand. So let's start with some definitions and scope here. When we're looking at electronic markets from a satellite view, what do you mean by the term electronic markets and what does that mean more generally?
Yeah, for sure. I think, you know, if we if we kind of take a step back prior to electronic markets, what what were markets they were? you know you you think kind of from history class like hey it's like in the center of a city there's like a bazaar and there's like a bunch of people who have stalls and and that's like the earliest form of market but every new form of technology uh that has been invented inevitably finds its first usage and adoption in in financial markets so you know when when people uh sort of had the telegraph, the telegraph became sort of this B2B business to business device that was used for different businesses in different towns to kind of like send messages about the weather or whether like a shipment wouldn't make it or sort of commercial details.
And that was sort of the original sort of starting point of the telegraph. But then as kind of time evolved and everyone got electricity, you know, we had telephones, and then the masses started using effectively the same communication technology. And that led to a lot of sort of new markets, in the sense that people could buy things over the phone, people could find new customers via telemarketing, which, of course, now is viewed as antiquated and annoying. But I think at the time, you know, sort of post-World War I, was sort of like the heyday of like going into kind of the golden 20s, that there was actually kind of viewed as probably the way we view like Instagram ads today as like much more in culture, kind of in vogue type of advertising versus those ads.
And so, but these were all very markets that were very peer-to-peer. And I mean peer-to-peer more in bad way like you you know you have to do a lot of work to find a buyer or seller um when you're one when you're the opposite you have to go manually kind of like figure out how to put the dots together there's not like a central place or a central kind of source of funds and trading um but what happened once we had the internet was sort of in the very earliest parts of the internet so internet created sort of by defense agencies in the 70s but in the early 80s people in uh finance realized the internet was a really good way to price assets that you know that sort of disintermediated um you know large entities who who uh kind of controlled most trading so if you think about stocks in the 1970s and 80s only institutions could really buy them like you could buy a mutual fund who could buy shares and stocks but you yourself couldn't really realistically do that and you would have to go through an intermediary like a bank now what people really how would you even do that in the in the 1970s 80s like most listeners are kind of detached from that so you have to like schedule an appointment with a banker to go like with a broker Okay.
Yeah. To go buy your mutual fund? Yeah. To go buy shares in a mutual fund. And the mutual fund would go invest in stocks for you. I don't know if you've ever, like, I feel like I've always seen this in sort of smaller towns in the US, but there are like these like physical broker branches. Like there's a Charles Schwab that actually exists as a... I've never walked into them. I don't know what they do there. It's certainly made for like, yeah, it's definitely made for a more geriatric audience, I think, in a lot of ways. But that's the vestige of that time where in order to buy stocks, you would go to a physical venue, you would pay someone 5% to execute the trade, if you're lucky.
And then it would go through a series of middlemen, and then it would go to banks. And banks were the only ones who dealt with the stock exchange for you. So there was this like huge chain of intermediaries what happens once people this was a time where we had markets but we didn't have the electronic part of it right it was just markets yes full of intermediaries not very peer-to-peer from an electronic perspective yes exactly exactly like the the the the phrase electronic markets i think really refers to the idea of replacing a lot of the middlemen with compute and communication um via the internet and also via like being able to use a lot of compute power.
And people in the 80s realized that you, you know, you could actually do that quite efficiently and get rid of a lot of middlemen in banking. And that sort of started this trend that obviously went to today, where you have Robin Hood, and you can go buy stocks on your own, you don't pay anything, you know, you can do your own research, stuff like that. You know, I think the earliest part of the electronic market revolution was getting rid of intermediaries and brick and mortar entities, automating a lot of the execution and settlement and storage of stocks. So stocks, even though you might not know that you still could request this, there is actually a physical certificate sitting at Bank of New York Mellon that represents the the share that you bought, but you know, you're trading when you're trading on Robin hood or, or interactive brokers or Charles Schwab there, everyone is holding IOUs for those shares.
And you're really only trading the IOUs. No one's actually physically usually moving the stock. The, the, the brokers kind of net settle every day of like, Hey, I bought for all my customers, 500 shares of apple and i sold 600 shares of gamestop uh so you know the two counterparts execute that trade but sorry we're getting a little away from the definition of electronic markets but i think the definition is uh any sort of form of uh marketplace interaction where you can aggregate buyers and sellers and they can transact autonomously without needing white listed trusted parties. So just to ground the listener, Tarun is much more of an expert than us on the history and progression of electronic markets.
And so we definitely want to pick his brain about how these things came to be like, how did we go from, you know, the telegraph and the telephone into where we are today, which is, you know, trading on Robinhood. And, you know, while the listener of this podcast and the Bankless Nation are beyond trading on Robinhood, they are trading on DeFi and using DeFi apps. DeFi is really just the next logical continuation of the emergence of electronic markets. And so I think it's really important to understand the history of these things as a concept. And then we can talk about how DeFi is a continuation of electronic markets with new things, with the old things, and a couple of weird kinks here and there as well.
But Tarun, help ground the listener. What would you say are the common themes and through lines and just like reoccurring elements of each wave of each, you know, emerging electronic market? What are we going to continually revisit over and over and over again in this conversation? Yeah, for sure. I think the number one thing is there's always a boom and bust cycle hidden somewhere in each of these waves. Another thing that happens in each wave is that there is a new technology and or regulation introduced that causes sort of a seismic shift in terms of market microstructure and how people interact with these systems.
And then the third thing is I think like there's a kind of gradual disintermediation of third parties at each step. And I guess the final thing is that each new wave of technology makes the market more competitive, which lowers prices usually for an aggregate for people. Okay, so we're going to see these themes, I guess, reflected in each of these eras. But you have a kind of a framework of eras that we want to go through. And maybe high level, I'll kind of say what they are, and we can maybe start with the first one. The first is like electronic markets 1.0. And that was really the genesis of electronic markets.
We had these analog markets, now we're making them electronic. That started in the 1980s, I think lasted into the 90s. Then we had electronic markets 2.0, which started in sort of the 2000s. I kind of think of this as like the e-trade era at the start of it. And that lasts into the present era now. Maybe Robinhood is kind of a transitory thing into partially one foot in era two and one foot in era three. That started in the 2000s and up to this point. And then we have electronic markets 3.0, which is kind of the crypto and Wall Street bets type era. Maybe that started in 2015, 2016 or so. And it overlaps with era two.
So these are the three eras that we're going to talk about. So take us to the first, Tarun. Let's talk about this electronic markets era 1.0, the genesis of electronic markets. Take us all the way back to the early 1980s. What was the technology that really enabled this? And where did it start? And where did electronic markets start arriving on the scene? and take us through the timeline. Yeah, so I know many people have probably seen in movies like these pictures of these guys at like the stock exchange or the commodities trading exchange, like raising their hands and like doing all sorts of types of hand signals to say like, hey, I want to buy like 500 cows or I want to sell, you know, 500 shares of Disney.
That was what was happening in the 70s. So there was, you know, the New York Stock Exchange, the physical location, was filled with people from banks and brokerage and trading firms, and they were the only ones who were officially allowed to trade stock. And what happened in the 80s is actually in this 1970s, something that we don't really see right now. Right now, when you think of stock exchanges as just an individual, you think of the New York stock exchange, you think of NASDAQ, you think of maybe the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, maybe the London Stock Exchange, maybe the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
There's always one or a few in each country, but you don't think of many. But in the 1970s, every city in the US had their own stock exchange. So there was much more regionalized stock trading. So you might be at the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, and Comcast would be listed there instead of in New York. So there wasn't... That's bizarre. Why is that? Is that just because all the companies in that region would sort of aggregate to their local city stock exchange? Yeah. So the idea is that maybe people in Philadelphia, the companies that are IPO-ing there are a little smaller than the ones in New York, but the buyers and sellers had to meet physically to actually buy the stock.
So the buyers in Philadelphia tended to have less, either less money and the sellers have less lower valuations to sell. So they just met geographically in the kind of like their local, they represented their community as finance. This was like pre-globalization, right? Like, it's just like, hey, like I'm going to invest in the company down the street from me rather than I'm going to like send my order to New York. Yes, exactly, exactly. And so what happened, there was a little bit of consolidation, but the consolidation wasn't due to technology. The consolidation was just like the New York Stock Exchange bought the Philadelphia Stock Exchange.
And so they're the same brand, and they would net settle for you. So if I lived in Philadelphia, I wanted to buy a stock in New York, I'd go to the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, and then they would relay it and there'd be fees on relaying. So the problem with that is that's extremely expensive because A, I'm paying locally for the relayer, and then B, I have to pay on the other end, like when the trade actually gets executed. So what happened when the internet came out was people realized they could get rid of this relaying system and this kind of net settlement a few days later. So like, if I was in Philadelphia and I was buying stock in Chicago, I wouldn't even be guaranteed my execution would happen within a day.
It might take like two to three days. They might not be able to actually fulfill it. They might not find sellers. It was very inefficient and like very, it was almost like going to the mall and like going to each store and like looking for like the one share that you're looking for that you want. Right. There was no liquidity. You place your bid and then anytime between one and three days later, it might get filled. Is that kind of the issue? Yeah, exactly. And it, and there's no, there was no way to like find the liquidity. It wasn't easy to figure out like who wanted to sell who, who versus who wanted by and that's why i needed to like cast your line right you would cast your line and just hope that somebody nibbles on the hook right is that why they're all shouting at each other that way they're so loud and like arms waving shouting it's because exactly they're casting their line lines and making a scene so that someone hears their bid yes exactly that that's it's called it's called open outcry that's like the the pit where people would do that and it literally is self-descriptive.
People are in the open crying out. Wow. OK. So open outcry exchanges are kind of these old school ones. And so what happened was when the internet, even just the idea of the internet came out, DARPA late 60s, early 70s, people who were traders were like, hey, I could replace this whole relaying system and communicate information about bids and offers between the different stock exchanges without actually having to do this physical relay thing. And now all of a sudden people were able to compete on price across different stock exchanges. And that was sort of the first glimpse of, hey, this idea of like, hey, really fast communication networks and a lot of compute power can replace the system of like hundreds of people and like very uncertain execution.
Like you don't know when you're going to get filled, stuff like that. So is this kind of like the emergence of the, we use the phrase liquidity begets liquidity. And while that usually is pertaining to specific assets, as in like the US dollar is liquid and attracts a bunch of liquidity. But right now we are seeing like perhaps, you know, running on the example of the Philadelphia stock exchange, perhaps there is like an internet connection, one of the first earliest internet connections between the Philadelphia stock exchange and the New York stock exchange. And now those two liquidity pools, all of the people shouting in Philadelphia, can also technically also be heard in New York.
And so these two liquidity pools are now collapsing to the same. They merge into the same liquidity pool of the stock exchange. And is that kind of what we're talking about? Yeah, in the same way that now VCs and Silicon Valley people love talking about aggregation effects, this was the first aggregation effect due to the internet. It's literally aggregating liquidity across different stock exchanges. And so there was there was still people shouting in the pits, but now the people were connected to more cities. Right. Yes. I mean, so so people shouting in the pits. Let's say I shouted in Philadelphia prior to the Internet.
Let's say I wanted to buy five shares of Disney and I knew there were only like three brokers who had Disney. I would go like, Hey, you broker one. I want five shows at Disney broker two. I want five shows at Disney broker three. I want five shows at Disney. How much can you sell to me for it? And prior to the internet, they were literally like getting on the phone, calling someone in New York saying, Hey, can you shout in New York and tell me who actually has Disney? And that person in New York would go, you know what I mean? Like that part got turned into like query. and so like slowly but surely the internet started replacing but there were job there were physical like people whose jobs are literally to just like sit and pick up the phone and that their jobs are kind of replaced by the by basically the the computers those are the relayers those are kind of like the bridges between blockchains yeah like order routers like there's people look like they're order routing right you know like switchboard routers like right phone ones.
It's like basically like that. They were basically doing everything like that prior to the internet. Right. And so we also have like in the crypto world, we have like DEX aggregators, right? They're going and finding offers at all the different DEXs. Are these like the original exchange? Like, I'll find you the best rates by calling up all the different brokerages and all the different exchanges and I'll sell you the best one. Same kind of deal? Yes. Same deal, except extremely slow. Extremely slow. And with huge fees. With huge fees. So this had to be, Tarun, when this came about, electronic markets started showing up in the 1980s.
This had to be hugely transformative for the financial industry. Give us a sense of how quickly this happened. Yeah. So you would think it happened really quickly, but kind of a little bit like DeFi. It took place, it kind of really started with the more esoteric and new assets first, rather than the older assets. So options, so like the right to buy a stock in the future or the right to sell a stock in the future, were sort of done kind of only by legal contract prior to maybe like the late 70s. There are two reasons for that. One is economists only sort of figured out the math for options to some extent in the 1970s for how you should think about how much an option is worth given how much the stock is worth.
But the other thing is that, well, that math is quite computationally intensive. And so you needed a lot of compute power to actually compute what you should think, you know, compute a price to quote for an option. And so options had this double-edged sword where they needed both a lot of compute and a lot of communication about liquidity, where the bids and asks are. And so they were a natural fit to be the first electronically traded asset because, A, you need a computer to even figure out what the price is. And B, you also needed – you have this problem of like open outcry just doesn't work for options very well.
Right. Correct me if I'm wrong, but options, in order to really be a competitive product, they need more participants than the typical bid asks of spot markets. Is that correct? Yeah, to some extent. So one of the reasons is options trade at every price that, theoretically, they trade at every possible price. It's like, I can buy an option to buy Apple stock at one cent. I mean, the option will be worth basically nothing. So you have to actually consider all possible future prices, not just the current. Buying a spot instrument is like, I just bought it, I hold it. With the option, it's actually its value changes quite a bit as a function of how much volatility there is in the price of the asset.
And so you could think of it, you know, in some ways, an option is sort of a form of insurance. And so the more volatile an asset is, the more you're willing to pay for insurance. But the problem is you have to compute, do a bunch of actuarial math to basically say, like, how much insurance do I need to get a certain type of exposure or a certain type of protection? And that's where a lot of the compute comes in. And so kind of in the way DeFi is like, there are these crypto native assets that are kind of computationally annoying. If you were to like turn them into a stock in some weird way, like, you know, we talk a lot in DeFi about synthetic stocks, but you could also imagine the opposite.
What if someone traded synthetic maker at the New York Stock Exchange? There's no reason they can't in some way. There are synthetic stocks in the normal world. Like, for instance, Chinese companies, when they're in the U.S., the stock you're buying is not actually really stock in the Chinese company. It's actually a synthetic sort of implicitly pegged to the real thing called an auditory deposit receipt. But the idea is that kind of esoteric assets that have weird computational needs or weird sort of behavior are always sort of the earliest assets to get adopted by new electronic markets. And so options kind of led the 80s.
Right. And options, just like it was just a rehash what you said, options were specifically enabled by advancements in our humans' ability to compute things thanks to computers, but also importantly, humans' connectivity with other humans, markets connecting to other markets with the internet. And so this is one of the themes that you've been talking about, like growth in our ability to leverage the Internet for communication allowed for more liquidity, more total market participants. And then also our growth in computers allowed for more complex and rich financial products like options. So options perhaps never would have been a thing or really not the thing that we know of today without this new first wave of electronic markets.
Is that correct? Yes. So actually, maybe that's another very good point that you've made, which is that what you're asking about, what's a common thread to each new revolution? And each time, there's always some new set of financial assets that couldn't have existed without the new type of electronic market. That's a really good point. And we're going to come back to that. So I can imagine, did we see like options volume? Because I can imagine that in the old days, you had to get a whole legal crew, like lawyers involved to draft up options contracts, right? It's super, like time intensive process, cost intensive process.
And so I would imagine options markets and products were very limited. But during the 80s, did we see an explosion in options market as a result of these electronic markets? Yeah, yeah, we definitely did. Actually, that's another i guess common common thread uh is is each new electronic market revolution removes a layer of lawyers like because i don't i don't even view defy that much as as like a financial revolution as much as like a legal revolution it's really about just like removing the matt levine's like i i use this as kind of a joke so matt levine is kind of this famous Bloomberg columnist who writes this column called Money Stuff, which a lot of people, both in finance and outside of finance, read.
And he used to be a derivatives lawyer at Goldman. And I view a lot of the products I see in DeFi as basically replacing his job. He would be the derivatives lawyer, looks through the contract, tries to structure how it should be priced. And now that's being done in a smart contract. I mean, they're all called smart contracts for nothing, right? Like contracts, that's a that's a legal domain, not a financial domain. Yeah. So that's another thing to actually keep track of as we go through this is that like, think about all the lawyers that are getting removed, or like how much we how much you need a lawyer, how much that's reducing?
Well, that makes me feel good. But like, more abstractly, I guess, what is the role of a lawyer or contracts to begin with? It's like, this more abstract notion of like establishing trust between parties, right? And so I guess what we're doing is we're enabling that trust to be like pushed into code, pushed outward. And that just unlocks a whole bunch of new use cases, I suppose. So every time we remove a lawyer, we're removing the trust in like the legal system and the contracts and we're putting that trust somewhere else is that a way to think about it yeah for sure i mean this concept of an exchange tradable asset needs some notion of standardization right like if i go to a stock exchange i'm like i want five shares of disney and then tomorrow i'm like i'm gonna sell five shows at disney it needs to have fungibility.
It needs to be able to be standardized and people aren't like, no, no, no, I don't want the Ryan Disney share. I want the David Disney share. It can't have that property. But the problem is these bespoke financial options, for instance, employee stock options are a great example of something that's quite bespoke relative to a normal option on an equity instrument. And obviously those have very low volume, right? It's like employee stock options, you can't trade them. And part of the reason is there's like an enforcement mechanism that has to take place. And so anytime you want to standardize an asset so that it can be traded without people having to, on every trade, inspect the asset carefully, manually, that's kind of when, that's a sweet spot for these types of things.
And over time, we can do more and more complicated enforcement of transfer logic in code instead of with lawyers. Because the lawyers in the legal system enforce property rights, which is the logic for transfer of anything. And so the less you need the legal system to enforce that, the more you can increase volume and liquidity. That's sort of the tradeoff. So, Tarun, what else did we see with the advent of electronic markets in the 1980s? So we've seen some new products. We've seen the removal of some lawyers. We've seen standardization of assets. Were there any downsides as well to this? Or how did it end?
How did this first era end? For sure, yeah. So there were, I think, kind of in the same way. we've we've seen DeFi do in one year what took all of the 1980s to do. There was a lot of experimentation with new asset types, and most of them were just options on X, which doesn't sound like a lot. But remember, options were already like kind of this mind blowing invention then or mind blowing that you could trade them and anyone could use them type of. And so basically people started experimenting And then people started doing riskier and riskier kind of options. And what happened in 1987, which was sort of partially driven, the crash that happened was partially driven by the options market, was basically that there are these types of banking institutions called thrifts, I believe.
So thrifts or savings and loan banks, if you've ever heard of it. But yeah, so basically what happened with these thrifts is they were sort of, they were promising much higher interest rates than your normal savings account but they weren't really fdic insured so they they're not banks that like promise they'll they'll pay back uh if they go under or like the government promises to pay you back if they go under and these banks savings and loan banks work in the following way like people who are depositors earn yield from directly from people who are borrowing to buy houses. So they're only like your money when you put money in to get yield is only used to lend to people who are buying 15 to 30-year mortgages.
But the problem was there was a ton of inflation in the 1980s. And the problem with mortgages is mortgages are fixed interest rate products. right? Like you pay, you, you fix the rate at the beginning of the lifetime. That's it. When you're in a really high inflation environment, you, if you're promising the depositors like 5% yield and you're issued, you've issued all these like 6% mortgages, right? So there's, there's a little bit of spread. If there's a ton of inflation, that 6% is actually worth less and less over time. And it basically means like you have to do riskier and riskier things.
And these savings and loan banks started like trading options and indirectly through weird ways. And that, that exacerbated some of the problems that later happened. But what was learned, which was really good data from 1987 was we learned when the option math breaks down. So people didn't know exactly how the math should work. And that big collapse kind of helped crystallize in people's minds the benefits and the downsides the risks of um these electronic markets if they weren't designed correctly and people weren't like being very careful with them wait um what what collapsed uh sorry like the stock market had this huge huge collapse um i think it was called black thursday i believe or sorry black monday This was a consequence of the speculation that was going on in order to combat interest rates?
So do you remember that when GameStop was kind of in peak GameStop, I guess March or February or whatever? Yeah. There were a lot of memes about something called a gamma squeeze. right so what that means is basically option sellers so like let's say i buy a call option that means the person selling me sold me the call option which means that when i exercise it i have to have a share to deliver to them right an option is the right to buy in the future and so usually people banks will who are selling options you're paying them a premium up front for it like in like insurance, they will cover it.
So they will go buy the share so that their exposure is net zero. People in the 1980s didn't totally understand that you need to do this quite carefully. And electronic markets help you automate this, but they weren't as good as they became in the 90s to like actually automatically hedge your risk when you're selling options. And what happened was all all of these people who bought options started exercising them because the price crashed. And like, I want to buy, I want to like put a floor on my loss or something. And then the underwriters had to go sell in this case, they weren't co-options or outputs, but they had to go sell shares.
And then there's kind of this compounding effect. There's sell shares, push the price down more people to exercise. People would sell more shares. And you had this kind of like this kind of the opposite of sort of like, yeah, this bad feedback loop and like that kind of that was the first time we had a sort of like electronic market in the modern definition sense collapse due to this feedback loop and because it's an electronic market it wasn't easy to stop right in the i'm in the pits raising my hand thing the the the referee i mean like whoever owns a stock exchange who they actually literally had people who would like have whistles and stuff so i i prefer i like to call them the referees And then just like blow the whistle, like no trading.
Guys, can you please stop trading? Yeah, no, it was actually literally that. Like there was like the whistle person to do that. So this was something that was new, right? This didn't exist prior to having electronic markets. We weren't used to this idea that like these things could just like run on their own and kind of have big collapses. So but I think what happened after that was the crazy thing is that options volume crashed after 1987 and then people slowly started to get more and more comfortable with like buying options and then for banks and hedge funds and stuff hedging their risk and options and options volume just grew exponentially since has not decreased um and so you know the 90s especially in the first tech bubble boom um we actually saw kind of the markets even when we had the dot-com crash the market didn't collapse due to like bad risk management um the market collapsed because there's no demand which is much safer than what happened in 1987.
and so that that was kind of you know i i kind of bucket those two boom and bust that boom and bust cycle as like the first era because you know what happened in the 80s was you know a few people realized how to do this and there was kind of a small set of people who really understood like the technology and then of course once the crash happened and a lot of people like hey what is this thing people are doing like regulators started looking into it more but then in the 90s what happened was basically everyone realized hey I could just start a stock exchange or in the same way that you have hey I can just like fork this amm and and deploy it somewhere else.
And there's kind of this weird effect of like, there was tons of new stock exchanges and then they eventually collapsed and that's what leads us to 2.0. Before we get to phase 2.0, I wanna hammer on some details about the first wave. And my intuition is that this new frontier at the time of electronic markets enabled by the internet computation also probably i'm guessing opened up the or lowered the barrier to entry for more new participants right like like and the the theme that i think is also probably true is same thing with d5 right like i personally probably never would have gotten into the world of finance if it weren't for crypto the invention of crypto opened up the doors to more and more people to be more inclusive and include them into what was previously a more permissioned more siloed industry.
Is that did that same theme happened in the first wave of electronic markets? And and who were the people that were new to finance that and like the emergence of electronic markets really enabled them to come into the fold? Yeah, so that's a great question. So two things. So so my first, you know, my first job was I worked somewhere for this, this billionaire, who was a CS professor at Columbia in the 1980s. He left and went to go work at Morgan Stanley after. And then after a year of like kind of being pushed around by the jocks, jock old school trader people, he left to start this hedge fund, which is, you know, one of the most successful quantitative hedge funds that has been made.
But a lot of the people in the 80s and 90s were really like cs and hardware and technology people who like never would have been exposed and it's sort of similar in defy in a lot of ways um but there there's another another example like so yeah in the beginning the very first wave was actually a lot of academics in math and physics and like uh basically like people who had to do the quant math modeling for things like options because like no one knew how to use them the finance people couldn't figure it out so they needed to get like the the quants and the math math whizzes in there as well exactly and then by the 90s things that people had a better understanding and you got way more of the computer scientists technologists style of people so i think one of the coolest examples of this.
There are two examples. The first example is there's this company, I forget the name of the founder, but there's a company called Automated Trading Desk, which was a guy in West Virginia who was just a developer, just made a exchange in his backyard. He just made, back then there's no data centers, so he just bought a bunch of computers in his garage and at some point had like 20 of at u.s equities volume um running through this like basement in west virginia because he was just undercutting everyone on feet he was just charging like one tenth of what like nasa and nicy were doing um and then city group got you know kind of like fomo and then they they bought automated trading us for like 800 million dollars and so So it's like there was this kind of like, oh, if you have a good idea, you can get rich type of thing, which kind of, I think, also resembles.
I've heard this one before. Definitely some recurring themes. I want to talk about one last one, maybe before we leave the 1.0 era of electronic markets. And that's we had this kind of maybe nasty crisis that was partially as a result of electronic markets in 1987. the Black Monday that you're talking about. Did regulators step in after that? And what happened to the incumbents? Was there some consolidation? So how did regulators react? And how did the market shake out from a consolidation or centralization perspective? Yeah, that's actually a great question. So regulators really focused on the thrifts.
So they focus on these people who were buying the options and less on the stock exchanges. So what happened was there was a ton of bank consolidation. So a lot of the mega banks you see now, the seeds of consolidation happened then. Citigroup at that time in 1987, forget about group. It was just Citibank. And they only had like, they were only like in New York and Boston or something. And there's this guy named Sandy Weil who became the CEO. And he went on this M&A spree and just bought up hundreds of banks. And one of the reasons he was successful was partially because of the savings and loan crisis.
Because government regulators started regulating these savings and loan banks. Became too unprofitable to be like podunk town community bank. That's a savings and loan bank. Thrift. And so they were all like kind of for fire sale for cheap. And so he had the strategy of just like buying up every bank. And then that's kind of how we got to the current state was regulators regulate the banks and not the exchanges and brokers. but that theme will be recurring in 2.0. I think the time when regulators started to realize they had to maybe do something in regulating the exchanges was in 1997, which is toward the end of this first era.
There was what was called the Asian financial crisis and the Asian financial crisis, you know, I think is well detailed in this book called When Genius Failed about these Nobel Prize economists who started this hedge fund that actually caused some of the collapse. Okay. So wrapping up the first era, we've gone from this analog era where we had orders in the pits and manual human order operators to this first inkling of electronic markets. And what that did was there was a massive liquidity boom, right? Made these markets more efficient. It enabled new assets. It removed a layer of lawyers. As you said, there was some asset standardization.
We had lower barriers to entry. So all sorts of new entrants. It kind of ended or got bumpy in a crisis. Regulators stepped in. There was some consolidation. These are some of the lessons we learned from the first era. Now, Tarun, take us to the second era. Pick us up. And I think it's maybe starts in the late 1990s or early 2000s where are we in our timeline yeah i think the asian financial crisis might be the end like 1997 let's let's see that so now we're in era two what happened in electronic markets era two same way that people get FOMOed by crypto and the price to go up people got FOMOed by all these tech IPOs like pets.
com and whatever all these like things that, you know, if you're old enough, you might remember like your parents being like, I got to buy, get E-Trade and Charles Schwab and go like buy this company. Have you ever heard of it? Like, and so that era, part of the reason that like the E-Trades and stuff of the world could work was that electronic markets made it cheap enough for new businesses, new entrants to actually build these kind of front end businesses that faced the retail retail users face consumers and hid the complexity from them but also didn't require extreme like ownership of like a brokerage firm like like extreme you don't have to do as much work as a bank right the idea is like you the electronic markets made it easy to be kind of like a light bank you could view e-trader Charles Schwab as like bank light.
Is this like early fintech, would you say, or not quite? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly. Early fintech. Like at each phase, I think there were sort of like bridge companies that connected the two sides. These hybrids. So like in this side, yeah, and this side, it was like E-Trade, Charles Schwab when they became electronic, Interactive Brokers, which is a public company. And then between phase two and phase three it's robin hood and the real question to me is like if i map this to tech companies robin hood is sort of like myspace in some weird way like that if we if we view d5 as like kind of the the the future um and we're saying that robin hood is transcending phase two and phase three just because it has crypto assets on his platform right yeah and they also like provide provide this like zero fees thing is kind of like right i think like this idea that idea is like very not phase two in a lot of ways in other ways it's not really phase three either but it's it sort of makes it unique and so it's it really sounds like the delineation between these phases is not clear as in there there is no event that clay that delineates between phase one and phase two and there is no event that delineates between two and three is just kind of i think the asian financial crisis plus um the development of e-trade that era in 1997 and people getting home computers was dope it i can't give you like a date like the precision i will give you is one year but 1997 is like a very good point to say because that was the time when kind of retail users were fomoed into buying stocks and they're like why should i pay a broker and like people who were young and had their first computer and dial up internet were like, I can just buy this online.
It's cheaper. Why would I go to this brokerage, pay them 5% when I can pay like $8 fixed? Because that was a big innovation in fees at that time, that you had to pay a fixed price for arbitrary size trade. Before that, you had to pay percentage points. Right. And so would you say that phase two is really a story of financial markets and brokerages making their way into the homes of the everyday people, everyday persons, because of computers, because of the personal computer. And the internet. And the internet. And the internet. Yeah, and home internet. And also the dot-com boom made it a little bit like Ouroboros.
It ate itself because people were investing in all these companies giving internet to people at home. You know what I mean? Of course, people had a bit of exuberance, just like we see in crypto all the time. and maybe went a little crazy. And then, you know, we had this kind of pullback. But after the dot-com bubble crashed, it was a very gentle crash in the sense that none of the financial infrastructure broke. Like in Black Monday, 1987, 1997, Asian financial crisis, the financial infrastructure actually just broke. Like markets behaved in ways they were not supposed to. there weren't correct like risk settings done there wasn't like risk monitoring there weren't people really paying attention because the risks weren't really you know when it's when something's new it's oftentimes really people sort of at the on the edge who are playing with these things but they're not like trying to actually analyze them they're just like i want to like play with cool new gambling toys and uh so those standards get learned over time and and there are people who kind of do that without without trying to trying to stay on the same path but also going down this quick little side quest what does it mean for a market to break as in like do things just not clear is that how you define a market breaking or just kind of go into that a little bit more what does it mean for sure like in 1987 definitely not clearing was certainly one of the problems and not settling like like there just weren't enough shares like brokers promised x amount of shares delivered and those shares didn't materialize.
And like that caused people to have even further lack of confidence because they're like, oh, I thought I bought the share and now I can't like sell everything else. Right. Like maybe markets breaking is like, well, I brought these shares and some some company I have this legal contract where they owe me shares and they don't have them to deliver. Therefore, we're going to court. We go back to the Twitter fail whale. Yes. Going to It was the Twitter fail whale. I don't know if you guys remember when Twitter started. They were just like always down. Like this is like, that's kind of what I mean.
Like you're trying to use the service to like buy or sell things. And like, it just doesn't, it's definitely down. Tarun, would you say 2008 was another example of markets breaking? A little bit different than like the dot-com bust in that, you know, that was a bubble and a bust. But 2008 was a bit more like, oh, we don't really understand these financial, new financial products that are on our balance sheet. Yes. 2008 was things breaking for sure. Again, because it was like, in the same way in 1987, people didn't understand properties of options and when certain risks need to be hedged and when they aren't hedged, like what the worst case scenarios, people just were like, oh, well, that's a low probability event.
It turns out it's not when everyone is trying to sell at the same time. Same thing in 2008. It's just that it was done with way more complicated derivatives that have no transparency. And so there's kind of this theme that whenever there's a big blow up oftentimes you find under the covers that there's this kind of these assets that people don't realize hold risk but actually are holding a ton of risks. I could definitely see the lens that we've been using, which is like the new entrance are these retail people with their computers. We've got increased liquidity, I suppose, coming from retail.
Do we have any new assets in this era? I guess we have some innovations in like trading fees, that sort of thing. But are there, like we saw the birth of options really in the first era. Do we get a new set of assets? in yeah yeah yeah actually i would i would maybe delineate this era uh to be more precise as like 1997 to 2012 um and it has both a boom and a bust the last cycle had a boom and a bust and actually sort of had two busts but here here we have sort of like you know the build-up to the financial crisis and the financial crisis and then kind of the recovery post-financial crisis And the reason I'm stopping in 2012 is I put the Robin Hood era plus crypto.
I'm sort of mixing those two in the kind of the new era with DeFi sort of being kind of the, the where we're living, we're living in that era now. But what happened then was, were a couple of things. So in this era, there were a lot of new financial products, securities of different forms. Mortgage-backed securities always existed, but they didn't become tradable until this era. And one of the reasons they didn't become tradable was people didn't have a math model that they thought worked. Of course, we learned that was not a very good model, but we also learned that with options in 1987. So there is quite a bit of similarity.
And once people had a model, they could write algorithms to quote prices. And then things became exchange tradable. You need fewer lawyers. You have way more compute power. We're in this Moore's Law era at that time where compute power is doubling every 18 months on average. Your home computer was getting doubly as fast every one and a half years. And mobile phones were starting to take off around then. Although, yeah, I think apps were really sort of the end of this era. But the new instruments were like, kind of volatility futures, like the VIX, ETFs. So this was the era when people started really, for lack of a better phrase, aping into passive investments.
And this completely changed market structure of the financial markets so an etf right is a share of something you buy that exchange tradable fund which thanks to electronic markets improving in their efficiency let you get a lot an exposure to some type of sector let's say i want to buy the metals metal miners sector but i don't want to go buy each individual stock i just want to own metal miners that's went on the cycle percentage yeah but it needs to rebalance maybe i just want 10 percent miners 10 percent um like i don't know i don't know 50 miners 50 percent like distributors in that industry um and i want a 50 50 weighted portfolio just like a uniswap what could be share i want 50 50 pool but that means i have to go trade to try to like keep it rebalanced and that sucks and so what people were doing before then is you pay these active mutual fund managers and you pay a really big fee to them uh to keep it rebalanced and so etfs were once people were able to write algorithms that were much better at holding option risk programmatically um etfs became possible because you could basically say hey we're going to uh Here's what the portfolio is going to look like.
Here's how we're going to rebalance it. And it's going to be done electronically. There's not going to be a human in the loop actively saying what to buy and sell. And there's going to be this arbitrage game that's created to keep the portfolio roughly balanced. So where does the role of communication and computation come in with these ETFs? How does improvements in these two things really enable that product? Yeah. So the The improvement in communication is that somewhere in the middle of this era, so 2003 to 2006, the US government decided that they really wanted to make sort of arguably at that time, what they said the intention was, was not what the outcome was.
But what the stated goal was, was to make markets more sort of equitable. Every stock exchange had to offer the national best bid and offer. And what that means is, let's say, let's go back to my example of like the New York Stock Exchange and the Chicago Stock Exchange. Let's say they're owned by two different companies. One is NASDAQ, one is NYSE. And let's say that there's a company that's listed on both. So there's GM shares at NYSE and there's GM shares at NASDAQ. Well, before, the prices were allowed to be different. So NYSE could tell you GM's share price is $30. NASDAQ could tell you it's $25.
But that was just because the people trading on NASDAQ think it's $25 and the people trading on NYSE think it's $30. The US made this regulation called Regulation Neutral Market Service, Reg NMS. And it basically said every market had to actually go look at every other exchange and quote you the best price. So basically, this meant that NYSE actually had to go to NASDAQ and say like, hey, NASDAQ, what price you offering? And hey, we have to offer it at the same price because there's this idea that this would be like more fair and transparent. This caused insane consolidation. This is the reason we have like so few exchanges in general.
This also just seems completely antithetical to the concept of markets in the first place. So the SEC is the agency that put in the regulation NMS in place. And they're just dictating that the market must price certain assets at a specific price as dictated by the lowest or the best, most optimized market participant that's giving the best price. And they're saying like everyone else must offer that same price. That seems a little bit crazy. Right. And I think it was like that. I still like so I wasn't working in the industry at that time. So I don't have at that. I don't understand what the intention was.
Cause like you read the law, it doesn't really make any sense in modern terms. Cause basically it led to this consolidation we have where you have an oligopoly of like Citadel jump, few other people who are the main market makers. So it turned everything into this computer science, distributed systems problem of how do I synchronize many nodes? Each think of each exchange as a node. How do I synchronize prices across all nodes in the minimum amount of time? because there's an arbitrage profit. So the government basically created this weird arbitrage profit. And the exchanges don't want to take risk.
They don't want to be traders. They just want to collect fees on volume. So what they did is they invented market maker, maker-taker rebates, which you may be familiar from just on centralized exchanges, or even yield farming in some ways as sort of a maker-taker rebate. But they basically offered you incentives for making sure they met the Reg NMS rules. So if you did a bunch of volume and you also did a bunch of trades that made sure that the NASDAQ price and the NYSE price were synchronized, then you basically got a discount on your fees. And that kind of led to this heavy consolidation, both in exchanges and also in trading firms that were market makers.
So you remember how in era one, there was this kind of Wild West of like, hey, this guy in West Virginia just made an exchange that had 20% of the daily volume. There were tons of exchanges like that in the 90s. Dotcom crash killed a bunch of them. And then this regulation really killed all of them. And now we're back to kind of this oligopoly. We have CME, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Nasdaq, NYSE. That's it. just rehash why the emergence of ETFs were so important in helping accelerate this story. Ah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So sorry. So ETFs are kind of guaranteed trading volume. So one thing that all of the kind of like, smart, I put in air quotes money at that time was saying was like, oh, ETFs are dumb.
There's tons of adverse selection, everyone's picking them off. It's exactly the same as SBS saying Uniswap will fail. Because like everyone, there's a ton of adverse selection. There's a ton of adverse selection, but all these people don't care. They're fine. What's adverse selection? Yeah. What do you mean by adverse selection? Yeah. So adverse selection basically means like, you know, you're when I'm an ETF and the ETF is like, hey, I have to buy 500 shares every day to keep my 50 percent, 50 50 ratio of my two assets. You're telling the market you're going to be a big buyer. And so everyone will front run you and just buy in front of you and then you they'll sell to you at a higher price right so let's say the current price is ten dollars everyone knows the etf has to buy new shares at 3 59 pm everyone goes at 3 58 pm buys up all the shares pushes the price to two dollars then the etf has to buy at two dollars and they all sell into that so they're so like all the mev stuff you see is the same as So it's it, but the idea is that like, Hey, the ETF is telling you what it's doing.
So you're going to get front run. So then anyone who holds the ETF is going to lose money. That's sort of true, but it's also, there are a lot of people who like, they'd rather just own any exposure, even if it's losing money in the, like, it's not the optimal exposure, it's still better than sitting on cash for them. Right. Like, and they, they, they don't have to think they literally just buy the thing thing and they it's sitting in the robin hood account like yeah it's lazy lp right like and passive investing always wins like if there's anything that this era has taught us is that passive investing used to be 10 of the market in the early 2000s it's like 80 of volume in stock in the stock market right now just because of etfs because of etfs and then there's all these other types of like like all the active managers and mutual funds now rebranded themselves it's like hey we're like active light we don't do much trading but but that's all boomer finance that's like targeted to boomers like mutual funds are truly like i don't i don't think anyone under i don't think as single gen z person knows what mutual funds like wait so just just to find uh finalize the this train of thought the the etfs and the consolidation of um consolidation in the industry.
We actually haven't finished that topic. How did the emergence of ETFs lead to the consolidation that we know today? Ah, right, right, right. So ETFs had a bunch of guaranteed volume, right? They're telling you when they're buying and selling. Right. And people in the same way that Robinhood sells their order flows, Citadel, the ETF underwriters, the banks, who just want to collect some small fee, they collect a very small fee on creating and redeeming. So creating is, let's say there's an ETF called the car ETF, the Detroit ETF. And it's made up of a portfolio of one third Ford, one third GM and one third Chrysler.
So to create an ETF share, like an LP share, right? When I create a Uniswap LP share, I have to give them ETH and I have to give USDC. Here, I would take maybe two shares of GM, one share of Chrysler, and half a share of Ford, and I would give it to the ETF underwriter, and then give me one unit of ETF share. Same thing as making a Uniswap LP share. and then there's a redemption process which is i can redeem one share for for the fair value and so that's this arbitrage game just like with lp shares that etfs created to kind of like keep themselves synchronized to the market prices so if someone observed a deviation in the price they could buy the basket uh for cheap sell create the share and then sell the share for more and then that way the prices would track exactly like uniswap um and uh basically that arbitrage game became extremely profitable if you bought order flow from the etf so you you were you were going the etf underwriters the people who are minting and creating the shares like blackrock uh you basically like hey blackrock sell me your order flow and i'll execute it and make sure make sure it stays synchronized.
And so there's a lot of that, that the passive order flow aggregated a ton of volume, but then all the volume got sold to a small number of people executing it in the exact same way Robinhood is. Now, it provided better execution. It also lowered fees for people, but it did consolidate the industry into a very small number of players. so a very small number of players were responsible and had control over the order flow and that that starts to my mind lead us into like kind of how the whole robin hood game stop debacle how the foundations for that were set right it would you say that that's correct like what you are talking about right now is the the tremors before the actual event of the whole game stop debacle would that would you say that's correct yeah yeah this was the same thing happening at the like institutional level like with order flow like basically banks used to be market makers they used to be quoting prices on markets electronic markets made it possible for small firms who were not banks and didn't have a banking license to quote much faster if they had better technology and so all these technologists like my old boss in the 80s 90s they basically front run banks into being market makers.
But then once we had this kind of flip of the passive investing world, banks were like, hey, we're not even going to try to market. We're just going to sell our order flow and it's easier income for us. And then that led to further consolidation. That's why like new trading firms are actually very hard to start right now, I would say, in TradFi. In In crypto, of course, it's green pastures. Totally. So in order to keep on defining this wave two, phase two of electronic markets, can you kind of compare and contrast the start of phase two and the end of phase two? What were the state of things while phase two was getting started?
And then once phase two was kind of coming towards maturity and kind of finishing up, where did it end up as? Yeah, so it started with the dot-com crash and kind of like a lot more like people kind of a little bit like the crypto bear market. Like people basically, there wasn't much retail. There was only kind of like institutions and institutions were trying to figure out new products like ETFs. By the end, we had these products really growing massively and increasing retail uptake. But we also had very few players who were able to be the market participants who are market makers. And so in a lot of ways, market making became just a very small set of people who could actually do it, which unlike in DeFi, where anyone can be a liquidity provider if you want to be.
I think that sort of is, you know, we started, there were more maybe like a lot of market participants, not many retail products. By the end, new retail products, not many market participants. Right. So we, in phase two, and I think also perhaps phase one as well, we are increasing the accessibility of markets to more and more participants. yet the service providers, the people actually routing trades and making sure things execute has consolidated to a fewer and fewer set of people. You say that's correct? Yep. And what's the role of the stock exchanges in phase two? Where's the NASDAQ? Where's the New York Stock Exchange?
How did those grow and develop during phase two? Yeah. So those grew kind of the way in the, you know, after the savings and loan crisis i said the governments like regulated these drifts and then like you got these conglomerate mega banks uh you had the same thing happen um where basically like after reg nms came up basically it was impossible to be a small upstart exchange and everyone just sold to cme or or nasdaq or nisey so like the big exchange conglomerates you see now are they just basically bought up everyone. So when I say fewer market participants, I also mean fewer venues. Right, right, right.
And also, correct me if I'm wrong, but we're also kind of seeing like the very early days of what the crypto knows as MEV also crop up during phase two, where like there's everyone wants their orders prioritized first, and then the people routing the orders have the advantage. Can you talk about the early days of MEV, but in electronic markets phase two, which we wouldn't even have called it MEV. Did you even have a name? Just high-frequency trading. Talk about the aversion to that. Yeah, high-frequency trading really refers to when exchanges started selling co-location. So exchanges were like, hey, you know what?
We should actually sell... I wouldn't say it's like selling priority, but they kind of were like, hey, we'll sell priority in some weird way where if you pay to rent a server at our data center you get slightly faster execution speed and then it became this kind of like hardware war of like who could build the best hardware and high frequency trading boiled down to like who could build the best hardware so that your order got the the moment you got a new signal you could process the signal as fast as possible and like output in order as fast as possible. And so people started making custom hardware for that.
And that, that kind of was like, I'd say like the peak peak HFT was actually post financial crisis. Pre financial crisis, the technology wasn't that good. Post financial crisis. I think I think the financial crisis in general kind of caused the exchanges to be like, hey, we need a diverse fire business model. And then there was also this new wave of, of HFT people who are way more hardware and CS and way less quant, and they were sort of the wave of people who were, who were doing that. So some, I guess I like, I worked in HFT before I came to crypto. So, but like it, it's definitely like a industry that's like focused on, uh, like speed and execution and less on like, did I have the right math model?
Is there still a huge arms race in HFT, Tarun? Yeah. I mean, it's kind of the arms race in HFT has also led to like super consolidation because like just the cost of like hardware, microwave towers, everything has gone up exponentially and the profits have decayed. So like, yeah, basically it's, the profits have totally decayed. They're kind of flatlined. But if the cost of hardware is going up every year, then it's like only the biggest ones are going to survive. Would you say the whole high-frequency trading phenomenon, is that more of an afterthought of the phase two of electronic markets?
Or is that like a core component of it? It's definitely enabled by… That's a core component at the end. Yeah, at the end. Why at the end? So I think the financial crisis caused people to be very cost-conscious, which will lead into phase three. And so when people are cost-conscious, they want really fast execution because there's a sense in which the faster your execution, the lower the information difference between market participants because markets are synchronized faster and that means the prices are the closest to the true price in some sense. The MEV part of this was just like, hey, if there's a ton of people competing to be first, then they're all competing and keeping the prices synchronized, right?
There's sort of sense in which competition does drive prices down. The MEV case is a little weird though, because the order flow is public. So it took Citadel a while and Virtue and others to realize they should be buying order flow by writing contracts. So you do high frequency trading, but you sign multi-year deals with Robinhood or whatever to buy all their order flow. So in MEV land, it's actually quite different. The order flow is just public, right? Like it's sent to the mempool. Of course, like with some nuance, I mean, some miners let you send order flow directly and stuff like that. So before we finish out the second era and go to the third era that we are in right now, I got to ask a question.
Did we remove any lawyers in this 2.0 era? Yeah, I think we like added a bunch of lawyers in the beginning, because like people want to make these crazy volatility products and mortgage backed securities and weird derivatives. Like the Matt Levine's of the world, that's, that's when their careers took off. Financial crisis killed all those lawyers, I would say. You know, I think there's a reason he's a journalist now. I'm not doing that. I mean, that, I mean, there's probably many reasons, but I wouldn't, I wouldn't, I would say that's probably one of them. what about the second phase really killed the lawyers uh i think basically the advent of high frequency trading and the advent of passive investing vehicles meant you didn't have to do all sorts of weird structuring because the passive investing vehicles made this arbitrage game a little bit like uniswap that kind of replaced the lawyers having to do the pricing the market was able to do the pricing without them.
Oh, go ahead David. When it comes to the financial crisis, how did the state of the market structure as a result of the changes that we saw in phase two, did that, did the way that the markets were set up and, and, you know, um, architected, did that change or, or impact the financial crisis at all? Um, I think it did for these kinds of like esoteric securities, like mortgage backed securities. Partially because like those were all traded on weird venues or over the counter between banks. So there's no transparency into how the contracts, what the terms of the contract are and how they get executed and what triggers payments.
And I think, you know, when we go to phase three, we'll talk about how like that DeFi is kind of like made you makes, lets you do that without lawyers. And also while making it transparent as to what the payoffs are. Hey, guys, I hope you're enjoying the conversation thus far. In the second half of the show, we get into electronic markets 3.0 or DeFi and talk about some of these companies that are transcending the barriers or transcending the gap between 2.0 and 3.0. Robinhood, Coinbase, centralized exchanges, these come to mind. But also we talked about the different ways that electronic markets 3.
0, Ethereum and DeFi are fundamentally constructed differently and where electronic markets 3.0 really rhyme better with 1.0 rather than 2.0. I thought that was a fantastic conversation. And then we also get into the new risks of DeFi. Now that DeFi has come and solved a lot of the problems that we find in the legacy world, what new risks have we introduced and what is Tarun doing at Gauntlet to help deal with some of these risks? Hope you're enjoying the conversation. There's so much more to get into. Before we go any further, however, we have to talk a moment about these fantastic sponsors that make this show possible.
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Thank you, Uniswap, for sponsoring Bankless. So I think it's time that we actually move on to phase three. But first, I'd like to summarize phase two. How would you characterize, like, if you could do it in just like a sentence or two, how would you characterize the legacy of phase two? What did it leave behind as we go into phase three? Passive investing is the main way the market wants to invest. if you want to increase the number of market participants. Two, HFT completely annihilates the banks from market making. And then the order flow business is created, but for institutions, not for retail.
But phase three will move to that. And what's the themes, the incoming themes for phase three? And also, was there some sort of, you know, event or year that really marked the leaving of phase two and the entrance into phase three? Yeah, so I think, you know, if I go by industry profits, the peak profit year for high frequency trading was 2012. So that sort of like signals to me one of the ends, like that was like the pinnacle of that era. And what happened from 2012 on was this new entrance of retail via apps like Robinhood and also via crypto retail into markets in general. and I think like centralized crypto and Robinhood are sort of the stepping stone and DeFi is sort of like the expression of like that taken to kind of its logical extreme of how can how can we sort of remove middlemen so the thing about HFT is it's often reviled like oh people front-running us but the weird thing is the prices for everyone the reason Robinhood can exist and offer you free trading is because like, HFT is so competitive that the prices just like fell through the floor.
And basically, you know, these like traditional brokers can't take like percentage points at all anymore. Right? So there's high frequency traders brought prices to the floor. Do you mean like the arbitrage opportunity as in like margins? tighter and tighter and tighter? Exactly. And so like a lot of these like old school brokers who like that's where they made their money. Couldn't do it without a ton of technology and a ton of resources. And so like, obviously the technologists kind of killed the fat cats in that case. So would you say phase three is not, phase three isn't DeFi, it's more about access to markets.
And so I think perhaps the reason why you're including Robinhood in phase three, even though it has nothing really to do with crypto other than the fact that it allows crypto assets on this platform, Robin Hood is the weed of DeFi. It's the gateway drug. It's like, it's like, right. Coinbase too, perhaps like these are, these are these apps that are like phase 2.5 maybe. Yeah. They're kind of these transition things. Yeah, exactly. Okay. So, so how would you characterize phase three then? What's the theme of phase three? Why does phase three exist? I think the theme of phase three is internet culture and memes.
will beat suits in some sense. And I think a lot of people who are doing quant trading probably have had better decades than they did since kind of this era. But what is the underlying technology of phase three that really unlocked phase three? Yeah, so there are two aspects to it. One is new backends. So new backend technologies that replace intermediaries. So that's crypto. And the other is the mobile phone. So, you know, yes, the iPhone came out in 2007. But if you remember for like two or three years, Apple not only didn't have an app store, but you could jailbreak your phone and like install these kind of like renegade third-party app stores.
And we kind of had a little bit of like the like hacker culture in mobile phones that completely got eviscerated by the app store. And so like by 2011 ish, I think, I feel like that was, that was sort of the, you know, the, the era of like centralization in, in, in mobile phone land. And why is that as such a thematic component of phase three? Why does that matter so much? Because it changed the user experience for finance like basically people got super comfortable once they got comfortable with mobile phones and apps they also got comfortable with mobile finance like doing finance on your phone and the idea that you can do this without going to a branch remember we started in the 80s where like you had to go to like the weird brokerage firm in your town and like go stand in line, whatever.
And now it's just like, I can just use this whenever 24 or feels like 24 seven. That was like a huge tectonic shift. And that was something I think that brought new users and new people, new entrance into the marketplace. And I think the other thing that's interesting that kind of really took place is that crypto crypto over time became kind of the prediction market for what would happen in stocks. So I feel like the boom of retail investing started in crypto and then kind of got copied by, you know, we saw the same trend of like memetic investing over sort of like fundamentals based investing, uh, kind of seep through.
We also saw calls for disintermediation from crypto starting to be seen in the equities market, especially after the GameStop stuff. And people actually realizing that, hey, the back end of the financial system is actually still whatever stuff was made in the 90s. And then we sort of see this idea that retail users want to buy exotic products. I think DeFi portended this thing where options volume on Robinhood has never been... There was more retail volume in options than institutional volume for the first time ever this year. and this idea that financial access to even complicated products is made easier by a sort of mobile phones b um everyone has computer with a ton of power around them all the time like and they can be crunching numbers and doing kind of like basically doing all the financial modeling themselves without any infrastructure costs and then see this idea that uh you can use financial products and apps almost as easily as it is to use facebook or to use social media or twitter and i think that is really what portends to defy where once you have composability It's just like using apps on your phone, like using integrating apps on your phone and being able to play with a much larger universe of products.
So I think the last phase is really brought up by the deinstitutionalization, first of all. That's clear that that is the number one trend. But the second thing is that compute has become so cheap and easy. and communication is so cheap and easy for everyone, not just for companies, not just for exchanges, not just for market makers, that these markets can kind of scale to all humans and also at the same time be awake 24-7 and people can create and destroy products as they need them, which I think in normal finance is extremely slow to make a new financial product. And it takes a lot of time to get liquidity and get people to understand what it is.
And DeFi and crypto really have made it so that the inventors of the products can be their own marketplace. They can be their own media, go market on Twitter and TikTok. And then they can also just kind of do this with relatively low capital costs. Sure. And I'm interested when we talk about the first era and the second era, right? And we talked about these kind of companies and products that are sort of these bridge type products. And maybe Robinhood is one such bridge product, right? But what strikes me is the way era three is different than era one and era two is the previous electronic market eras existed within the existing financial system, right?
Whereas era three is creating this brand new, almost from the bottom up financial system where all of the themes that we saw in the first and second era of like increasing liquidity, enabling new assets, removing a layer of lawyers, standardization of assets, ERC-20s, right? Lower barriers to entry. All of these things seem to be like almost on steroids in this third era, in this new parallel financial system that we've invented. So it feels like Robinhood is just this bridge thing to get us to this weird, bizarre new world in this new financial system that we've built from the ground up, where it's like era one and era two, except amplified to the 10th degree.
What's your take on that? Yeah, I mean, I think that's a good way of thinking about it. It has this like exploratory playful nature, though, that sort of feels like a little bit reminiscent of the early part of the 80s prior to the crash. you know like people were just like making all sorts of crazy stuff doing all sorts of sort of wild experimentation um and you know i think that that's sort of inevitable that we're going to run into some issues right we've already seen some issues with with defied stuff but i think the the cool thing is the democratization of these assets basically means people will try to use them in weird ways that are not expected.
And you know, that, that's going to be kind of both good and also bad, but we're going to get new data points from it. And I think the idea is like really about kind of like over time building risk. You know, I think one of the big things institutions have that retail users still don't really have, and they do now for stocks and options, I'd say, but not for DeFi, is really tools about understanding risk and stuff. And that's because it feels like the 1980s and options, where people didn't really know. And it's like getting the math right is the hard part. Right. And we've kind of over time we started with getting the math right, then adding technology, then getting the math right, then adding technology and there's kind of this like back and forth.
And usually the crashes punctuate the times when we transition between new technology causes new behavior versus like new math causes new behavior, new product. When I say new math, I'm also mixing new product because there's a sense in which if you're making a financial product, you do have to sort of define the math of how the asset gets traded. So, Tarun, we've got this era of experimentation, this new playground, as you said. Do you think that this might also precipitate, as in the 1980s, all this experimentation precipitates some sort of crisis? and could that crisis even cause regulators to step in and do some things?
I'm wondering about the themes that we can learn from era one and era two so that we can project forward and see what we might anticipate in this crypto DeFi era. Yeah, I think we're certainly going to see some forms of crashes again. you know we we already we already had cryptos had had a few uh but the cool thing is they happen faster in crypto but i think the second thing is that as we get into a world where there's a lot of d5 protocols there's a lot of dows and uh you know these protocols kind of like learn best standards and the things people kind of figure out how to model this stuff um we will eventually have tools that people can use to measure this risk themselves in a manner that's understandable and interpretable when they're building new products.
It's sort of like, if you could understand how to get composable risk models in the way of composable money Legos, then you could make it just as easy as using Robinhood. Trun, I want to run this by you because I'm not sure if it's completely true or not. But the story of this podcast is that, you know, history doesn't repeat, but it rhymes. Phase one and phase two are similar, but not completely the same. Phase two and phase three are similar, but not completely the same. But I think I can make the case that phase three is meaningfully different from phase one and phase two, in the sense that are the, you talked about how backends are different now.
And you talked about how that's crypto, You know, Ethereum and Bitcoin are these new settlement networks that are replacing the bottom of a financial system, whereas phase two was an evolution on phase one, right? It was an evolution of financial markets as they currently existed into something new, whereas phase three is something completely brand new. Now, we're not reinventing finance. We're just reinventing the substrate that it exists upon. And so while these are the same themes throughout history, it is phase three is radically different from previous phases in the sense that the guts of the system are completely brand new.
Would you agree with that? I think phase one also is like that. Yeah, I think phase one. Yeah, phase one coming from phase zero, right? Yeah, coming from like pit traders, like replacing. That was also a similar tectonic shift. Okay. But, and the overarching, another overarching through line is that phase three and DeFi, it's just way more accessible than what came before it. And you talked about how like, you know, we can easily spin up new financial instruments and, you know, market that on Twitter. And like, I think we have seen- Also not legal advice. Sorry, sorry. Very much not legal advice.
Never, ever. And I think we can take a lesson from Andre Cronje's book when he releases Yearn and it has this accidental success that he didn't even intend to market. And he actually got frustrated at the level of success that it saw because of just the nature of the industry. And so we are now seeing a complete democratization of what it means to make a financial product just because of the nature of this new substrate. Yeah, for sure. and it's completely different it's completely wild but there are still lessons to be learned uh for sure and i think a lot of the lessons boil down to like how do you think about risk at each new stage there was a new mental model a new mental framework that needed to be invented new tools to to kind of think about risk because like a lot of the point of different final financial products like new ones is to do risk transference at some level transferring risk from some part of the market to another part of the market and in defi land it's even wilder because the risks are sort of when you have a composable network of apps uh you know the the figuring exactly kind of like how to hedge that under any different possible user behavior is quite different than, oh, I'm just hedging the exposure to the stock price.
And it's like a static object in some sense. There are a couple of themes that I want to revisit here. One of the themes is the removal of lawyers out of the system. Can you talk about how phase three has removed lawyers? yeah so i mean d5 definitely is removable so i i view uniswap liquidity shares and and and all of the generalizations of them as basically etfs where you don't need barclays to be the manager like the smart contract is the underwriter um and a lot for liquidity from the perspective of a liquidity provider right because the liquid liquidity provider is like hey i want a 50 50 portfolio and sure you could use it to facilitate trades right from there in sort of an abstract sense um and i i think there's like that the the there's sort of disintermediation both at the consumer level like the retail user can go do it themselves and at the issuer level like why do i need to go to BlackRock to issue the ETF.
And I think that's kind of the crazy, wild improvement that we've seen. Again, not without pitfalls. If history rhymes, we're going to kind of learn that there are hidden risks. But there's a combination of both modeling and thinking about things and also just like breaking things and so right you kind of need both lenses and that the cool thing is this industry definitely feels like it's in this phase right now i think for normal finance and stocks and stuff i think people just are yeah it's like too regulated like to do anything creative and yeah speaking of the regulation i think one of the the big ways that these this third wave has really broken away from the previous two is that not only have we reduced the need for lawyers, but like to some degree, if you keep your construction of whatever you're building inside of DeFi, inside of smart contracts, instead of needing lawyers, the EVM is the lawyer, right?
The EVM is the law. And so not only have we broken away from lawyers, but we've also broken away from regulations, right? Because like I said, the EVM is the regulations. And so I kind of think that regulators, it's going to take them a lot longer for them to come to terms with phase three than it was for phase one and phase two, just because Ethereum doesn't use the US legal system to settle. And so if markets, quote unquote, break down, it's up to the EVM, not to the US court system to make the markets clear. And so what's your opinion on the fact that we now have this new court system, which is the EVM rather than the US legal system, and how regulators are going to approach this world of crypto using lessons from phase one and two?
Yeah. I mean, I think the initial regulator strategy was, of course, block the on-ramps. so I will say regulators took a long time for electronic market for phase one they didn't know it was happening it's closer to this right now I think that they didn't have the tools they weren't really sure because it was so easy to start a stock exchange and you didn't have any regulation on this national best bid and offer thing you shut down one someone else will come up it wasn't as structured as it is in crypto where it's like built around that being the modality but that was what was happening in the like late 80s early 90s for sure um but i would say yeah it's going to be hard for them to grapple with um but i think that's the beauty of of kind of being in this space right now is that you know for now i think it will be kind of uh you can actually try out all of these new things um without you know with some level of impunity uh i think in the long run governance will somehow end up being part of like regulators will somehow try to like you know like the block the fiat on ramps will be block the governance on ramp type of thing like i think that's the route they would go yeah with the themes that we've been following so far in in the show how would you um uh account for just the fact that there's a massive number of centralized exchanges that have cropped up right um in in 10 20 years we haven't really seen exchanges outside of the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ.
But as soon as crypto shows up, you got Coinbase, Kraken, Gemini, Binance, OKEx, BitThumb. And that's not even to talk about the decentralized exchanges that exist on Ethereum. Why was that enabled? What part of this story enabled so many exchanges to just crop up? Yeah. I mean, it's a little bit like the early 90s when in stock exchanges, anyone could just go start a stock exchange randomly, right? And the difference is, if you remember in phase two, we had this regulation that completely killed a lot of the stock exchanges and forced consolidation. In crypto, it's much harder because A, your fiat exchange, centralized exchanges are the fiat on ramps for most people.
And they need to have local banks. And I think it's just way harder because it's like a global phenomenon to like imagine a world where there's like one centralized exchange um i think the other thing is just uh there's so many assets and so many like different like standards at different exchanges like which assets they have how much the kundi they have and it's actually really hard to do a lot of the arbitrage like people like oh there's so much easy arbitrage between like the thailand bitcoin exchange and the us one well the problem is you need a ton of thai bot and a thai bank account to get money into that exchange right like so there's all sorts of weird like pseudo regulatory reasons for like the the kind of like explosion and centralized exchanges i think um but yeah i think the fiat on on-ramp thing is certainly the the main thing governments know how to do and that's like the only thing they'll probably continue to do uh so turin you've mentioned a few times as we've been talking about um you know phase three that uh each of these other phases have presented new risks and um you know define this crypto phase presents new risks as well i'm curious from your vantage point and like you've got i mean you're working on this with gauntlet uh you're an investor in the space all sorts of things um you know mev in and out what are the big risks that you see on the horizon for defy and in crypto at this point?
Yeah, I mean, I think we, composability is a two-sided sword as well. You know, there's the boons, it's much more capital efficient in some sense. But obviously the risks are that you could compound your risk as you move through different protocols. But I think one of the bigger risks over time is going to be more from users not understanding what they're buying. And I think that's in general kind of fine. I think it's much harder when people are taking a ton of leverage and they don't understand when their leverage might, like when they get liquidated or when something like an adverse event happens.
and i think a lot of reducing that is figuring out how to convey in simple terms sort of likelihoods and probabilities of risk to users in a way that they can understand and in a way that they can say like when i do action x this is what how much it will change my risk now a little bit like options in the 80s, like, you know, the math isn't there yet. The way of reasoning about things isn't totally there. But I mean, that's sort of what we work on at Gamma. But it's like, there's still this sense in which there's a lot of like fly by night kind of behavior. And I think if we don't have good risk, we're not going to risk models, risk assessments, risk kind of understanding, we're not going to actually be able to get to this kind of dream of like, closer to under collateralized loans, and closer to being more capital efficient than centralized exchanges, because capital efficiency comes at a cost of security, like how much capital you put comes at cost of like, oh, how easy is it to take advantage of the system and being able to walk that tightrope um carefully is going to be the key to success of defy kind of take for my yeah i will say just from like a practical perspective it is really hard to understand the risks like i so you take something like um you know a die versus c die right so like die wrapped in compound versus die wrapped in ave i like i have no way to tell the you know like the risk difference between those two assets and if one is riskier than the other.
It's very difficult. Is this the sort of transparency you're talking about? And what do you do at Gauntlet to help with this? Because it seems like a lot of these things are hidden and the risk is really difficult to quantify. So how do you start to quantify the risk of these types of things? Yeah, I think, yeah. So something like the difference between A-die and C-die, that is not static. It's not like I can tell you forever at all times that the ADAI is safer than CDAI or CDAI is safer than ADAI. It's always changing based on the user behavior in these systems. So it's dependent on the types of loans that are outstanding.
It's dependent on the types of liquidity providers, how often they're adding and removing liquidity. It's dependent on the liquidators, like can liquidators, are there enough liquidators? Do they have enough DAI? And so this complex mesh here is different than normal finance in another cool way, which is you have multiple agents and participants who each have to sort of, if they're rational and the market conditions make sense, each of them working as expected somehow keeps the system safe. But if any one of them is sort of removed, the system can collapse. And that's just the nature of decentralized version of this versus sort of like a bank.
If a bank collapses, well, government bails out or, you know, like the legal system somehow resolves that, right? That's not going to happen here, right? So the key here is to make sure there's sufficient incentives for all of the participants and that all of the participants can earn a profit given their sort of utility, their measure of happiness in these systems. And so, you know, what Gauntlet, you know, how we started and kind of how we got to where we are now is when I was working in high frequency trading, a lot of the ways that we were, we would optimize and measure risk in our trading strategies that we'd put in production is we would take our strategy and we would take what we thought other people's strategies are in the market.
And we would run a simulation where they sort of play the game against each other. And we'd run millions of different universes of the same simulation and like hey what percentage of time does our strategy win and which strategies does it win against crypto markets are kind of similar there's in in the case of a lender there is a borrower there's a lender and there's the liquidators the liquidators are keepers and they each have different incentives the liquidators have very low time preference and they just want to optimize profit instantly. The borrowers just want to pay the lowest rate. And the lenders just want to earn the most yield.
And even though those three are sometimes opposing, you can find these equilibria where they're very stable. But you need to be able to say, hey, what do I think this user does? What do I think this other user does? And what do I think this other user does? Based on the data that you've seen historically, and also things that you haven't seen, but could be kind of irrational, crazy behavior from them. And crypto systems are also analyzed this way. When we analyze consensus protocols or we analyze zero knowledge proofs, we try to model a world where we assume that these adversaries or users can be Byzantine and maybe not rational and maybe sort of doing something erratic.
And so what we do is we model all the users in the system and then run simulations of them kind of competing using historical data and then say what percentage of the time does this particular type of adverse event like a liquidation happen and so it's slightly different than the way people quantify things in you know the way people think about risk models in uh sort of like an insurance company or uh sort of like more like an asset manager but it's much closer to how people in high frequency trading and sort of AI in a lot of ways, think about modeling risk. Because here, the transparency actually means you can model it in a way closer to HFT or AI.
And so from doing that, you can start to say things like, hey, if the parameter, the interest rate curve in the system was slightly different, then this event happens 50% less. And so that's sort of the outputs of kind of this type of modeling, if that makes sense. True. And I want to present, I want to put on my like blind bull hat and send, I want, then I want you to see, uh, see if I'm being naive or, or smart or not. And a lot of the, with these phases, phase one, phase two, there was some sort of like market event, market crisis that perhaps ended the phase and then moved on to the new one.
Also regulators came in and started acting because of the crisis and started to, you know, shake things up a little bit. And I want to see if the, you know, I want to know if that's going to come true for DeFi and crypto, right? So far, this industry has been relatively blessed to be protected from some heavy-handed regulation. And there's definitely been conversations and some light regulation coming. But overall, as an industry, we haven't really been too regulated. We also really haven't had too much of a financial crisis because this, A, this industry isn't big enough to really have a financial crisis.
But B, like, we go through booms and busts, and we have our market events that are negative, but they just don't really impact the greater globe. You know, the crypto has gone through, like, multiple major drawdowns of 90% in asset prices, and it survived that. The markets survived that. DeFi was born in 2017, 2018, and then we saw Ether lose 95% of its value. DeFi kept on going. Worked just fine. Then we had Black Thursday with COVID or Black Tuesday or whatever it was, where asset prices got cut by 60% in under a day. So we've had both long-term drawdowns with asset prices that caused liquidations and things were fine.
Then we had extremely fast volatility drawdowns in very short amounts of time. Things kind of broke up a little bit, but ultimately markets cleared. The Ethereum blockchain kept on going. Nothing really bad happened. And what you are talking about with this financial modeling that's going on that you guys do at Gauntlet to talk about risk parameterization for Aave and Compound, we are able to do that by the very nature of what DeFi is. We have the data to do that, and we can make more informed simulations to make more informed economic platforms. And so my bull case for DeFi and Ethereum and this industry at large is that we have so much data permissionlessly available to everyone.
And we have this new financial substrate, which is, you know, Ethereum and the EVM that will continue to clear markets no matter what, as they have done, that perhaps we never actually have our big financial crisis moment that previous phases have had that have brought in the regulators. And so perhaps the EVM and the Ethereum blockchain just keep on chugging. People like you and companies like Gauntlet keep on doing great financial modeling because of the richness of data that we have. And we are actually protected from any sort of massive financial crisis by the very nature of the industry.
Am I being naive here? well you could argue that bsc was a financial crisis in some ways just in the sense of like in the sense of like all of the kind of like rug pulling and like i think that the key thing to a financial crisis is there's a lot of naive or uneducated participants who lose a lot of money and right now the thing is if we're being real everyone in this space is like a little bit like you know paying their there's their risk tolerance is certainly not low right it's not like you know like the sec only really goes after people when like grandma loses her her pension money right and like that's the that's kind of the type of thing i think that would be more like institutions losing money like some let's say like some college endowment like puts money into iron finance and because mark cuban told them to i don't know like like that's the type of stuff i think that like people would call a crisis a sort of crisis in some ways it's like when moms and pops sure you know lose lose money who are not kind of like risk seeking to some extent And I'm not trying to say, I'm not trying to call everyone on this call super risky, but I'm just saying, compared to like the people who like, yeah, like pension funds, kind of, that's kind of when people start getting a little antsy.
Okay, well, my question still stands, though. So like, is there a fundamental difference in these phase three of electronic markets that protects us from systemic risk that we've seen happen in previous markets yeah transparency so one one really cool uh thing i think that is uh that exists in crypto is that we've already we have like tons of cdos mortgage-backed securities at d5 they're just under different names like you could you could view maker as mkr as sort of like security for a CDO. You could view staking derivatives like Lido, which basically has sort of something like a little bit like a mortgage-backed security backed by your stake that's locked up.
And the cool thing about them, and this is the difference between 2008 and DeFi, is not necessarily just that, that, you know, hey, it's electronic, the data is is super transparent it's also that the information is propagated through all the entities using things because of composability so in the mortgage crisis well here's what kind of how things would happen you would go get a mortgage your mortgage issuer would then go securitize it the securitizer would make shares like they make a company that bought your mortgage that company would have shares, those shares would get sold. Now, let's say you default on your house.
So the company owns a bunch of mortgages that owns the securities. The default process takes like three to six months. I mean, very locality to locality sensitive, right? Like, oh, like, you know, maybe certain places like you can't foreclose on a house in one month, other places you can foreclose instantly. And there's a whole legal procedure. And there's also all these middlemen. There's the person who made the company that securitizing, there's the mortgage issuer. There's like this whole like cruft of that industry, which is mainly due to regulatory capture, to be honest. And so the security has a price, last traded price, but the information of like which houses are foreclosed, what's the true value of like the mortgages inside this black box that's the company has it could take six months to reach the security like the securities holders will only learn about it six months later and they'll be they'll only learn about it via some weird disclosure form that's regulatorily required not because like the issuer wants to tell them in defy you're issuing these crazy securities but the information is priced basically instantly like within a couple blocks right like something happens smart contract executes all of the price change, there's a decision tree of like, hey, how should we mark all the different components?
And like, here's the new price of the security. That fact that the information in a complicated financial product can be propagated through it and executed atomically and sort of instantly, basically instantly, is a hallmark of how this is much more different than kind of what we saw in 2008 and why all the lawyers were necessary there because the lawyers were the ones who were like propagating the information between the different entities right right and ensuring that these transactions lawyers order lawyers are order outing and the lawyers in case anyone listening doesn't know take much higher fees than like robin hood uh so yeah you could basically think about that and so i view the lawyers in that whole industry as like like the open pit you know to get back to phase one like the open outcry people they're the ones who are like doing the hand signals and shit and they got replaced and this feels a lot like like defy really feels like it's these complicated financial products that were gate kept are now kind of being unleashed.
So Tarun, this has been an incredible, I guess, walk through the three phases of electronic markets here. And I'm wondering if you could just like leave us with a few final thoughts for this phase three era. It feels like we're maybe still in the front half of phase three, but I'm not sure. So how do you see this playing out and how can we prepare ourselves for the rest of phase three? Yeah, I think the sort of main things to think about are, you know, one, what primitives will be invented that might be even further out on the risk scale that get lots of capital in because i think those are the places where you're most likely to have kind of these kind of potential crashes like super highly leveraged things that like you know get stuck in in certain ways like there's no liquidation mechanism there's no way for things to to exit correctly um but on the more positive side um being able to actually see like c-fi entities become front ends for DeFi because they just don't think their businesses are regulatorily not viable.
And so it's just easier to be a DeFi front end than to actually be a centralized exchange. I think that is the sign of the transition into the new phase. We have a word for this. Yes, we have a phrase. We call this the DeFi mullet, Tarun, which is like fintech in the front, DeFi in the back. Yeah, exactly. it's really cool to see that with uh with exchanges and crypto banks uh moving forward uh man it's been great to have you you are a wealth of knowledge sir thanks so much for joining us on bankless thank you for having me action items guys we have uh some books to read turin was kind enough to leave a book reading list with uh some of the themes from the episode we will include that in the show notes when it's called inside job looting america's savings more money than god When Genius Failed, a few of the books there.
So make sure you check those out. David, we could also use some more five-star reviews, I think, because you know how I know that? It's because we could always use more five-star reviews. If you're on YouTube, by the way, like and subscribe. But if you are listening to this on the Apple podcast, what should people do, David? They should absolutely go and give us those five-star reviews to get the Bankless podcast up to the front of the Markets and Investing podcast, Business Markets Investing. The wave three is upon us and more people need to hear about it and they are hearing about it on the bankless podcast so go ahead and give us those five star reviews absolutely guys of course risks and disclaimers none of what we said was financial advice not even a bit eth is risky bitcoin is risky crypto is risky so is d5 we talked about some of the risks near the end the key thing is you could lose what you put in but we are headed west this is the frontier it's not for everyone but we're glad you're with us on the Bankless journey.
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