Vitalik Buterin returns to the Podcast to discuss his recent article 'Moving Beyond Coin Voting Governance.' As always, Vitalik comes with a birds-eye view of high level challenges facing the crypto space with a moral & philosophical slant.
Building sufficiently decentralized governance mechanisms is a hugely challenging endeavor. Tackling elegant solutions to coin voting, we also cover the benefits of running your own node, the metaverse, and an update on the Ethereum narrative.
When Vitalik comes on Bankless, it's time to listen closely.
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Topics Covered:
0:00 Intro 4:00 Vitalik Returns! 7:26 Decentralized Governance 14:38 Who is Governance For? 19:44 Coordinating Public Goods 26:07 Public Goods & Upgrades 34:52 New Mechanisms 38:28 What is Blockchain Governance? 47:53 Ungovernance for Layer 1 54:00 Why Coin Voting Sucks 1:02:20 Whales 1:12:15 Running Your Own Node 1:22:14 Culture & Technology 1:26:51 Scalability Tradeoffs 1:31:05 The Metaverse & Loot 1:36:55 Update on Ethereum 1:43:15 Closing & Disclaimers
------ Resources:
Vitalik on Twitter https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin?s=20
Moving beyond coin voting governance https://vitalik.ca/general/2021/08/16/voting3.html
----- Not financial or tax advice. This channel is strictly educational and is not investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell any assets or to make any financial decisions. This video is not tax advice. Talk to your accountant. Do your own research.
Disclosure. From time-to-time I may add links in this newsletter to products I use. I may receive commission if you make a purchase through one of these links. Additionally, the Bankless writers hold crypto assets. See our investment disclosures here: https://newsletter.banklesshq.com/p/bankless-disclosures
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Welcome to Bankless, where we explore the frontier of internet money and internet finance. This is how to get started, how to get better, and how to front-run the opportunity. This is Ryan Sean Adams. I'm here with David Hoffman, and we're here to help you become more bankless. David, Vitalik on the podcast, got to listen to every Vitalik episode sometimes two or three times. This was a fantastic one. Would we cover? Yeah. We covered a bunch of different subjects, every time for our quarterly check-in with Vitalik. He put up two articles that we wanted to go through. One was Vitalik talking about how we could graduate or evolve from coin voting or token voting in DeFi, and also just token voting in general, kind of the issues that token voting presents and how we can circumvent around them with new governance mechanisms for DeFi apps.
And as Ethereum becomes more and more valuable, as these DeFi apps become more and more valuable, the conversation has to see how to govern these things in ways that aren't just centralizing control into token holders is going to become even more important. Then we also turn to the conversation, which is resurfaced lately, regarding the infrastructure required to run a node for a blockchain. All of the different bottlenecks and requirements that you need in order to run a node and how these different choices that are made about hardware requirements impact how scalable a blockchain is both in terms of its actual throughput, but also in terms of its decentralization.
Decentralization is also a scale that you can optimize for different ends of the spectrum. So we revisit that conversation as well. And then we finished off with some really fun stuff. We asked Vitalik about the metaverse and whether or not Ethereum with this whole loot phenomenon has gone full circle. Vitalik, you know, always made the joke that he made Ethereum because he wanted to not ever get nerfed by his like special spell or item. And now that we have 60 Warlock or something. Exactly. Right. And so now that we have the metaverse, we have this final, this gaming structure that you can't actually get your assets or your spells rug pulled from you.
So that conversation happens towards the end. And then of course, we just check in with Ethereum about where he considers Ethereum to be in its current state and history, both at the protocol level, but also in just the mass adoption society level. So a bunch of different things here in this episode with Vitalik. Yeah, really relevant things to like, you know, number one is relevant because everything is a coin vote, right? We talk about decentralized governance, but are we actually moving towards decentralized governance? The second thing is relevant because we have all of these high performance blockchains.
David, you and I just did a panel say kind of a debate ish, but not really, it was a panel about Solana and comparing contrasting a high performance blockchain like Solana to Ethereum. And it really centered around this question of how important is it for a user to have the ability to run a node? It turns out Vitalik and the Ethereum set of values think that it's very important for users to run a node, have the ability to opt out so that the elites don't control the system, right? This is the trade off you're often making with a high performance, you know, high transactional throughput blockchain and doesn't get a lot of press because it's easier during a bull market when price is rising and, you know, people want unlimited block space to just make these kinds of trade off.
So we discuss that. And then, of course, the metaverse is always a really interesting conversation, the state of Ethereum. So guys, we think you are going to enjoy this episode with Vitalik. Before we get into the details, before we get into the conversation, we want to thank the sponsors that made this episode possible. Making a bankless life requires taking control of your own private keys, not your keys, not your crypto. That's why so many in the bankless nation already have their ledger hardware wallets, which makes proper private key management a breeze. But the ledger ecosystem is more than just a secure hardware wallet.
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Arbitrum is a layer two to Ethereum, which means Arbitrum can increase Ethereum's throughput by orders of magnitude at a fraction of the cost of what we are used to paying. When interacting with Arbitrum, you can get the performance of a centralized exchange while tapping into Ethereum's level of security and decentralization. This is why people are calling this Ethereum's broadband moment where we get to add performance onto decentralization and security. If you're a developer and you want to save on gas costs and make an overall better experience for your users, go to developer.offchainlabs.
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Guy who will never give you free ETH on Twitter. I can guarantee you that Vitalik. Welcome back to Bankless. Thank you very much. It's going to be here. It's awesome to have you again. I feel like this is an opportunity to have a conversation with you and just pick your brain, almost like an ongoing conversation. The last time we chatted, we talked about the topic of legitimacy. That was now three months ago. That was in May. Three months is a long time in crypto. It's probably like three years in the regular world. We've hit new milestones. There have been new issues, new insights. You've written a slew of blog posts.
We want to cover those as much as possible. This time, I think we want to lead with a topic that is top of mind in the crypto community. I think it's part of your mind share as well because you wrote about it. This is the topic of governance. So, read your article about moving beyond coin voting. If I could maybe summarize and give the headline here, it feels like after reading that, you think coin voting sucks, that the community shouldn't settle on it as the only solution, but that instead, we should explore better decentralized governance protocols. We want to start there and pick your brain on that subject.
I guess my first question is this. When we talk about decentralized governance, do you think that's even possible? Or is this somewhat of an aspirational goal that will never quite achieve? I mean, I think you can definitely have governance that's much more decentralized than, you know, the average thing that people call a centralized work. Obviously, the question of how much decentralization can you achieve in a complicated and fascinating one? And I mean, there's the question of what kind of benefits do you can get from that decentralization? I do think that it is a worthwhile experiment. I think in particular, because blockchain based in decentralized platforms, they get derived their entire value and legitimacy from a credible neutrality as we've talked about before, right?
And it's very difficult for a platform to be incredibly usual. If there is a very small team that's controlling everything at all of the decision-making behind it. So coming up with the forms of governance that do not depend on a small team making all the decisions, it's definitely something that's very important for a bunch of reasons. But at the same time, have a coinholder's voting is definitely far from the only way to do it. So when we talk about governance, baked into that conversation implies that there's some sort of objective or direction that governance actually points towards. And in your article, we juxtapose to the difference between, or at least imply the difference between public goods and private goods, right?
And when we have these DeFi apps, these financial infrastructure, and also Ethereum at large, I think there is a question outstanding as to who governance is actually governing over these systems for. And so one possible interpretation is that the governors of the MakerDow system are governing in order to prioritize and uphold the value of the MKR token above all other things. Or an alternative interpretation might be that MKR is a token that is used to direct the MakerDow application to become the best financial services product on Ethereum for the betterment of the users. And so when you think of governance, how would you answer who is governance for when we talk about all of these things that we are governing over?
Yeah, I think that distinction between, like, is it for the benefit of the users or the benefit of the users is really important, right? Because especially in the case of these platforms that contain a lot of what I call internal capital, right? In this case, it's like the East that's locked up in the MakerDow contracts. Like, potentially, you could imagine a world where for like, let's say, for example, that like, Rye does so really well and it ends up taking over and there ends up being this public consensus that Rye is better than Dye and Dye is spending on the way out. But at the same time, there's like a couple of legacy organizations that still hold a whole bunch of Dye.
But like, you just know that over the next few years, they're going to stop using Dye and the platforms going to kind of slowly would only have nothing, right? Like in that situation, if you were an MKR holder, it's like, if you feel like you don't have the long-term prospects anymore, it's absolutely in your long-term interest to just make a vote that just says, okay, guys, we're just going to snap up all the East that's locked up in the collateral for ourselves, distributed among the MKR holders, and like, screw the Dye holders because, well, we don't really have a long-term reputation, name, part, right?
And like, to me, that sounds like an outcome that's pretty fair to describe as being like that, right? So there's like, I think, in a lot of cases, there is alignment between the token holders and the users, but also, in a lot of cases, there really isn't, right? And a lot of cases, like, for example, sometimes, you know, the thing that the platform is trying to provide and just ends up requiring trust, and so you want governance that can actually satisfy the user's trust, even if it's not in token holders' interests. Sometimes the participants in the community or even the creators of the project, like they have particular values that they care about that go beyond the interest of token holders.
So like, for example, I might care about economic equality, and I might want to build, if, like, if I could create a new token, build in a gadget that distributes, say, one unit of that token to every human per year, like, just because, like, I want this a lot to be more egalitarian. You know, the existing token holders might not want that, and so, and they might want, you know, if the individual governments say governance, they might end up like shutting it off or, like, basically, kind of stopping, you know, registration of new humans completely. So that's another example of where, like, there is some other goal that it seems reasonable to try to, like, have a governance mechanism to achieve, but that will just not end up being well aligned with the interest of any particular token holder.
Another thing, I think, is also that, like, token holders, they often end up holding tokens of a lot of different projects, right? Like, it often ends up being the case that, like, if you just try to use your token holders as a representative of your community, then those, like, the set of token holders that you get ends up being the same, right? Like, you know, there's these big investment funds and they have a big chunk of, you know, they just want, they have a big chunk of a whole bunch of these other projects. And, um, basically, yet, like, you end up losing the ability to have kind of unique ness and to have different communities that actually have, like, different values that are making kind of artistly different attempts at pursuing whatever their goals are.
So, you know, there's also just this kind of, like, this sort of risk of just, you know, homogenization in terms of, like, strategy, um, before if, uh, token holders end up controlling things, right? So, I think, like, there's some examples of, uh, reasons why, um, governance that, uh, it's, like, explicitly tries to do something other than satisfying the desires of token holders for their token to make more money is, uh, something that's important. Um, and it's, uh, something, um, like, basically, the reasons why it's, uh, importance to empower other, other kinds of constituencies or at least create structures where even if token holders are part of those structures, token holders have some kind of, like, incentive to actually participate in the, in the system in a way that serves those goals.
So, Vitalik, when you were writing your article, uh, are presenting an argument about why token vote sucks and we need better and, and better and stronger and more aligned mechanisms. Who are you trying to, first off, I, I think I can claim that there is a value judgment baked into even writing the article in the first place, implying that, you know, you actually think that governance should be different and more inclusive. Uh, and so when you were writing this article, who were you trying to get more included into governance or what was the, the goal of even bringing up this conversation? I think it's, uh, first of all, it's a conversation that definitely did not start with that post, right?
Like, yeah, like, I have been writing these posts on, like, you know, uh, the one on collusion and on coordination problems, uh, the post back in 2017 and 2018 on, uh, governance where I, yeah, I was criticizing what was going on in, in, uh, the EOC ecosystem with all of the bribing that was happening. Um, so it's definitely something that, like, I have been trying to express for a long time. And I, yes, I, I definitely felt the need to express it just much more cleanly and plainly. And one of these I know blog posts were just the, the whole point of the post is the title. Um, but the, the, the reason why I felt that way is just because, uh, you know, we have been seeing over the last year and a half this big emergence of these new edify up verticals and, and thousands of all kinds, right?
Um, and we've been in a, seeing people do all these different experiments, um, some of these projects that are launching from zero. So, you know, they, they just start off being doused right from the beginning. Uh, and the thing that I've been seeing, right, is that people feel the need to add decentralized governance. And I think there's good reasons why they feel that need, um, but at the same time, like, there just aren't any ideas available for how to implement that decentralized governance beyond, like, just, uh, token voting. Um, and, like, someone needed to sort of just express that alternative and it would just express the idea that there is an alternative to so good voting and that alternative to so good voting or not, like automatically centralized or whatever.
Um, in the absence, in the absence of these alternatives, you think people just, you know, settle on token vote as almost like a shelling point just because everyone else is doing without doing it without even thinking about it. Yeah, totally. It's, like, that's a natural effect that happens everywhere, right? Like, uh, this is the whole, um, you know, if you do the same thing as everyone else, um, and you fail, then like, and it's not your fault, um, but if you do a, if you try something, uh, different, uh, from everyone else that you fail, um, then like, everyone yells at you and you get fired, right?
Um, like, let's just the story, like, that's the sort of thing that ends up causing a lot of problems and a lot of contexts. I mean, even like, you know, we have, uh, we have 206 different countries, but we have very far from 206 different, uh, approaches to policy and a whole bunch of important questions. Um, some of them, some of which really could use a lot, um, a lot more diversity and options. Um, so the, um, I guess, uh, yeah, like, I, I definitely am worried, um, that if ulcerative stew coin voting don't kind of get expressed, then at least intellectually expanded on, then like, things will set a lot of coin voting by default, and then we'll be having this conversation in five years anyway, but we'll be having it like just because, um, you know, the, the coin voting, uh, Dows will have all been captured in someone, uh, in, uh, some way or other, and it will be much harder to steer away at that point.
They used to say an enterprise sales circles, like, nobody ever got fired for buying IBM, right? It's like, it's so hard to get your product in there because if you buy IBM, it's just, that's what everyone's doing. Um, fatale guy, I want to, we definitely want to get more into the nitty-gritty details of this conversation. Uh, but I want to finish off this part, this, uh, introduction part with, with this question. I was recently in a debate with a, a Bitcoin maximum self-identified Bitcoin maximalist, uh, and one of his big critiques about Ethereum and proof of stake is that the proof of stake actually instantiates the value of the ether token, a little bit more strongly than it does in proof of work.
And so the Bitcoin, a Bitcoin or critique on Ethereum is that Ethereum is not a public resource. It's a private economy with private products that are meant to enrich ether holders. Uh, what say you about this? I mean, isn't that true with that Bitcoin as well? Um, right. Uh, I mean, Bitcoin is even more strongly enshrined into the Bitcoin blockchain that ether isn't trying to do the Ethereum blockchain because, like, for, in the Ethereum blockchain, while okay, fine, you have to pay EIP 1559 fees and EIF, but in the Bitcoin blockchain, like, Bitcoin is literally the only thing that you can transact.
Um, and, and yeah, that's, like, the Bitcoin blockchain almost explicitly exists to support the, the Bitcoin currency and therefore, like, to support the economic interests of existing holders of the Bitcoin currency. Does that preclude these two things from being a public good then? So, um, I think in general, um, publicness is always a spectrum and not a binary, right? Like, I think there's almost, like, there's very few things in the world that are truly public, right? Like, there's, uh, and even like, uh, national governments, right? Like, you know, national governments will have talking about themselves as, like, you know, we're public, quote, public, you know, the public sector and, and unlike these private, uh, and, uh, entities that merely represent their own interests, you know, we represent, quote, all of society.
But, like, you know, the reality is we live in an interconnected world and like, you know, it does the US government actively represents the interests of, say, society in Afghanistan, right? So, like, every, like, pretty much anything that exists in the world as it is, like, it's, uh, somewhere on the spectrum between, um, you know, being something that exists just for one person and being something that exists for the entire world. Some things come close to existing for the entire world, but some things are further, some things are even further. You know, I think, uh, in the case of, uh, cryptocurrencies, like, it's definitely true that their supply is, uh, kind of, like, supply distribution is kind of unbalanced.
Um, and I think, uh, like, that is a legitimate problem. Like, it would be nice if the, if the supply of cryptocurrencies was more widely distributed. No, at the same time, the, I think, if there, I'm, uh, did do a better job than, um, most other cryptocurrencies, right? I get, I don't know if you read my recent, uh, article on the, like, the, the genie index and inequality. Um, one of the charts that I had in there was just like, the percent pre-mind and, uh, like, the percent allocated to, like, existing kind of, like, closed off pre-investors and all these different, uh, blockchains. And, like, if and cosmos, I think it was that, that we're the only ones that were in the working decent and the rest of them were, like, pretty much completely downright dystopian.
Um, so, that was, uh, uh, uh, uh, so it's an issue, um, but, uh, right, it was, yeah, there it is, Eve and, oh, right, I know, it wasn't got, uh, yeah, cosmos is up there. Oh, Tesla's, Tesla's a good job, it's nice. Um, I guess, uh, Cardano as well. Um, EOS, I don't know, I mean, in the, yeah, in the EOS case, I guess, like, what, wasn't there a lot of just like accusations of all kinds of wash trading in the sale? So I'm not sure how genuine the 10% figure is. Um, but, like, you know, you can just look at the chart right and you can see, you know, like, which of these, uh, blockchains like are, like, which of these blockchains are the ones that, like, if Ethereum disappeared tomorrow, like, you would personally feel like at all comfortable migrating too, right?
Um, the, um, I guess, so as far as coin holdings go, that's a legitimate issue, but then, as far, like, the other thing is that blockchains aren't just about empowering people who hold the coins, right? They're about empowering users and they're about providing value to people by using those blockchains and the ability to use Ethereum definitely is something that is, like, I think, truly global. Um, like, and you do have people in all sorts of places that are, like, just benefiting from the ability to build things on Ethereum that actually, you, uh, have those applications, like, interact with each other and have people use those applications.
Um, so it is, I guess Ethereum is not a perfect system, but also, like, pretty much anything else that calls itself public is very far from a perfect system either. So, you know, you, like, you can't have perfection, but we can try to kind of keep getting better and better than what we had before. Okay, so we can't have perfection, but we can try to keep getting better and better than before. But I guess that, um, begs the question almost, why is decentralized governance better in the first place? Now, some, some people would say, like, why, why go to all this trouble? I mean, we have shareholder vote in, in corporations, uh, centralized governments, uh, do fairly well.
Um, I know you mentioned in the, you know, the top part of your article that, some of these cypherpunk values are kind of embedded in the blockchain movement to minimize coercion, maximize coordination with, with, uh, you know, minimal coercion, private property and markets. But like, why, from a values perspective, do you think decentralized governance is important? You mentioned credible neutrality, right? So it's just like a legitimacy and social scalability argument. When you have decentralized government, uh, governance, then you can get more people on board and it benefits more users or what's kind of the argument for all of this?
So that's one good argument. Um, another good argument, I think, is that users of want systems where the governance of, of those systems is just clearly not something that can easily screw them over, right? Like, if you look at, like, Twitter and Facebook and all the centralized left to our companies, like, this happens all the time, right? You have this ecosystem of startups that build themselves around Facebook APIs or Twitter APIs and doing interesting things with those APIs until eventually, well, you know, once they get big, get big enough, like Facebook Ruckfuls then it says, like, you know, hey, guys, you know, either we buy your company that you spent years developing for $500,000 or, you know, tomorrow, we're going to shut off your API and build our own competitor.
And that's the, Ethereum is not going to do that to you, right? You know, Bitcoin is also not going to do that to you. Um, so that's like the fact that Ethereum governance just has so many stakeholders and the facts that users have to actually, like, choose to download and accept any of these software patches. Um, and, you know, all of these things that together basically means that like there isn't this kind of ability to just, you know, immediately go and flip this switch on someone, which is, I think something important. And it's something that can easily make people feel much more comfortable building applications on, um, Ethereum than they would, the fuel building on like some of one of these stuff platforms that's just run by a single company.
That's a good teaser for the second part where we want to talk a bit more about how users download the software. But before we're, we're, you know, still on the subject of decentralized government governance, I'm just curious for people who aren't sure of the types of decisions that actually need to get made in blockchain systems or even in, in DeFi apps. Um, I think you did a good job sort of splitting this into two areas. Like, number one, this is category of decisions around funding public goods, right? How do you fund things for the continuance, the good of the protocol itself? Um, and the second is upgrades and improvements.
So if there's some upgrade that needs to happen, who decides what, you know, features that should include or how that's pushed out, could you get into these two things and the decisions that need to be made through decentralized governance? Right. Um, so there are basically, yeah, I mean, I outlined two categories of decisions that decentralized, like some kind of governance is needed for. And so if you want to be decentralized, that decentralized governance is needed for, one of those categories is funding public goods, just funding people who, um, or teams that do things that are useful to the gap project ecosystem or even just more generally to the gap projects underlying goals.
Um, so this includes things like documentation, like software development research, like basically anything where the benefit provided by what you're doing isn't something that can be kind of packaged up and separately sold to individual people, right? Like, you know, we're, um, or doing this podcast and then that podcast, you know, either it doesn't get published or it does get published and then once it gets published, anyone can see it. Um, and then if I come up with an idea and I write it up on a research like I can't, you know, charge subscription fees for that idea, I don't really give access to that idea to people who like pay some amount of money, but it's, you know, either I do it for the world or I do it for nobody.
Um, and they're in the internet world, um, a large portion of like pretty much all things are like that, right? Um, so, though like funding those things is often a challenge because they, because they suffer from the free writer problem, right? Like if one person funds it and the end another person doesn't find it, well, both people benefit and, and so why would the first person find it? Um, so the, the solution in the crypto space is basically like, well, if you have these protocols that do end up having some of some kind of ability to monetize, then, you know, like that funding could then be directed into these public goods somehow, right?
Like basically not every project that's useful has a monetization strategy. Um, and so what you basically do is you take the things that monetization strategy is and the things that are useful and you kind of like line them up and plug them into each other, right? And so, it's um, so this is one thing that needs that, you need to have some governance for because once you start funding public goods, other than things that are really trivial to measure, like for example, network security, uh, like once you start funding public goods, um, such as like software development and documentation and translation of research that you can't measure programmatically, then you need some kind of governance system in order to figure out what projects do you actually support in the first place, right?
So that's one thing that governance is needed for. The other thing is protocol upgrades and parameter changes. Um, so one example of this might be like, you know, in MakerDow, you have this question of like which assets are considered acceptable for collateral? I mean, I've actually been critical of like that aspect of MakerDow and like one of the reasons why I, yeah, like rise because it just says, one no, ethos, the only collateral that's ever going to exist. Um, and but even then, you need governance to figure out like, what is the work going to be like, who are the work providers? Um, in a system like you to swap, um, you would need governance to figure out, um, say, yeah, right now I think they use it to just, well, right now just for public goods funding, but in the future, it could be the use to decide like parameters of like fees of existing markets and things like that.
Um, in anything more complex, um, like you would, let's see, like in something like a ENS, well, in the case of ENS, I mean, they have these, like they want to charge fees that are to need the dollars, um, but then, you know, what happens if like do they charge it in one particular stablecoin, what if that one particular stablecoin disappears, do they have to switch to a different stablecoin, what there's these decisions that have to be made, right? And then there's just protocol upgrades in general, like what if, uh, you know, they come up with a just completely better version of the protocol and they want to switch over, uh, the current protocol to that future protocol without users needing to like move everything that they're doing over manually.
So that's something that's important as well. Um, I mean, these could be pretty major decisions, right? When we're talking about like, um, you know, just even 10% of eth annual issuance is like hundreds of millions of dollars, right? And the, the governance power to direct that fund, that funding is, uh, is quite a power indeed. Many of these dowels also have, you know, billions of dollars in their treasury and the power to direct that is, is quite a, uh, quite a power indeed. So we're talking now about pretty high stakes, not like the early days of crypto, where, you know, it was just kind of fun money.
But like now we're talking about real systems, high stakes, many users, billions of dollars. Mm-hmm. Absolutely. Um, the other thing I wanted to bring up with protocol changes is that like sometimes you might not even realize that you need to do an upgrade, but you end up needing to do an upgrade. Like one example of this is, um, let's say for example, like you take a ride, right? It's a, you know, this stablecoin project, they really value governance minimization. And so they're just going to say we have this fixed formula. We're going to, um, the target, um, price stability with respect to the US dollar, with this, uh, kind of slightly floating mechanism to it to have an adjustable interest rate.
And that's it. But what happens if let's say 20 years from now, the US dollar collapses, right? Like, this is, um, I mean, obviously, you know, like I tends to be kind of critical of, you know, the Bitcoin maximalist types that say this is definitely going to happen. But also, like, I'm definitely not the type to say that there's a zero percent chance this is going to happen. And so if the US dollar collapses in 20 years, then like, rideholders are not going to want a US dollar, right? Because the US dollar is just going to be something that's going to, you know, increase at a rate of like 10,000 percent one week and then 40,000 percent the next week.
Um, and so like, they're in order for ride to continue to be a useful product in that world, it has to basically make a decision and say, like, no, we're violating our original social contracts. And instead of a targeting the US dollar, we're going to switch to, you know, either targeting some other national fiat that somehow stays stable or potentially just like making their own CPI and targeting that. Um, and your government, Luke, in that kind of extreme situation, you know, the governance is going to need to be able to make that kind of decision. Um, so, like, how that could be done is, um, one of those, um, also a very challenging questions.
Um, but, you know, this is, um, the sort of thing that, like, decentralized governance could be really useful for it because it's, like, especially decentralized governance, um, because, uh, it's the sort of thing where if you require lots of different participants, you agree in order to make that kind of big step, then, like, you can be confident that if there really is an emergency that demands that kind of a drastic move, then it will, then it can happen. But if there isn't an emergency and someone says, like, hey, guys, you should stop targeting the US dollar, you should start targeting, um, you know, Bob's, like, uh, in, in, in that symposium, number 1455, um, then, uh, you know, people, like, even if, like, you manage just to corrupt a whole bunch of insiders, everyone else is going to go like WTF made it and it's not going to happen.
Right? Um, so that's, uh, you know, you know, like, that's another good example of where a governance can be needed, but, and the decentralized governance specifically could do even a better job than, uh, governance. So that's controlled by a centralized team, because, you know, if the governance is controlled by a centralized team, then the centralized team, like, even if some features intended to be only used in a emergency, well, the centralized team chooses what the emergency is. So, you know, you don't have that much protection. Every new technology that we invent as humans brings something new to the table.
And, uh, as we know, blockchains, crypto economic systems are coordination technologies. They bring new coordination tools and lets us play with them. So what governance or decentralized governance tools has specifically blockchains like Ethereum actually unlocked for us? Like, what are the new mechanisms of governance that we have now that we didn't have before? Hmm. Um, so things that you can do with Ethereum in general, um, I mean, large scale votes are definitely one thing. Like, I mean, there obviously we exist other platforms to do a large scale votes, but just the large scale votes where, you know, the outcome is verifiable where the outcome is actually tightly coupled to the implementation.
So you don't have to trust someone to execute the outcome once the outcome gets made. Um, that's like a simple thing that, you know, can be done. Uh, you can even like do something like Macy, um, as that a project improves over time and make the votes like privacy preserving any coercion resistant. Um, that's, um, so that's one thing that you can do. Other things that you can't, other things that you can do, like, voting with more advanced, uh, to kind of algorithm, it's like a quadratic voting, a quadratic, uh, coordination pairwise bounded voting in all of these, uh, fancy, uh, fancy types of voting.
Um, another thing that you can do is, uh, well, actually one of the nice recent, one of the nice reasons why blockchains or quadratic voting friendly is that quadratic voting inherently involves like making payments in order to vote. Um, and blockchains just happen to have a built in payments platform. Um, another thing that you can do is other kinds of mechanisms that kind of mix together markets and, uh, and of democratic approaches. Um, like one example of this is, uh, retroactive public goods funding that I've been a big fan of recently, right? Like basically, you know, you have a kind of voting based down that funds public goods retroactively.
So after they've already been finished and they've already had some positive impact. And then if you want to, um, invent like, um, use retroactive public goods funding to get grants for something that you want to do, then what you can do is you can create a project token. You can announce that, you know, this project still can reflect this, my, like my attempt to make this particular thing happen. And I'm going to pre-mine some of that token to like my team and people that I think are like responsible for making this happen. Uh, obviously if the team disagrees, then they can kind of fork off and make their own projects, uh, token.
And then I can also sell some of that project token to people who want, who, who wants to provide seed funding to this team, right? And then once the retroactive, what's the project has a positive impact, then the retroactive funding doubt can choose to basically use its funds in order to buy off the project token. And then like anyone who participated in building the project and also anyone who bought the project tokens to give seed funding ahead of time, like they both, uh, and end up getting rewarded, right? So in that case, like you have a democratic mechanism for funding thing, like for like doing this kind of end stage retroactive funding, but then you have a market mechanism for a kind of carrying over that end stage funding into figuring out what, what things are actually we need funding in this each stage.
Um, so not kind of like mixing of kind of market mechanisms and voting mechanisms is something that I think blockchains are very uniquely friendly to as well. Um, so yeah, but we have a lot of goals. This kind of gets into like some of the solutions that you're proposing toward the end of the article, right? Like different ways to govern some of these applications besides just a simple coin vote. You talked about the hazards of coin vote. I, you know, I want to get maybe to the to the to the base layer though here. It's like just with the advent of Bitcoin, say, and then later Ethereum, I mean, they're governed in a similar way.
Maybe we would call this ungovernance. Maybe we would call this off chain governance. I'm not sure. It's interesting because it doesn't really fit in a, um, I don't know that there's a name for it that people would understand. Like what is blockchain governance? We know what democracies are, we know what, you know, uh, uh, toxicacies are and theocracies and all of these things. We know what shareholder vote is in, in corporations, but like what fundamentally is Bitcoin's governance or Ethereum's governance? Which, what would you call it? Ungovernance? Would you call it rough consensus off chain governance?
And what are the characteristics and properties of it? So this is actually the topic of a post that I wrote way back in 2018. I think this is the other one called that builds on blockchain governance, where I basically talk about how, like, viewing governance as a kind of what I call a decision function, um, and basically some kind of like mathematical function that takes inputs and possibly payments from different participants. And then like, you know, you have a piece of code that then computes an output and then output is guaranteed to be executed like that. It doesn't even necessarily cover like everything, what we want out of, um, out of governance, right?
Like it's, uh, like the way that governance of the access systems ends up working is much more subtle, right? Basically what happens is that like, at the bottom layer, you have this system where anyone can run whatever software they want. Normally people agree with each other, but then if some people really disagree with the majority, they can fork off and they can do their own thing. And forking a lot is obviously messy and expensive, but if that's the only alternative to like accepting some changes that you consider really unacceptable, then like people are going to do it, right? So that's like the bottom layer.
And then the layer above that is, well, let's take that kind of layer zero and let's build coordination mechanisms to ensure that the, yeah, like the nastiest outcomes that layer zero could lead to and end up not happening, right? So let's build mechanisms to ensure that like most of the time when there is possibility of agreement, people do actually end up agreeing instead of like resort, um, resorting to their, you know, natural, uh, right to be, uh, to exercise mutually assured destruction. Um, and that's, uh, something that, you know, we, you know, we do with, uh, like all sorts of, uh, community signaling, there's all court devs votes, um, there's, um, you know, informal kind of signaling, uh, coin votes, uh, there's, uh, kind of implicit votes on GitHub.
There's, uh, just conversations. There's all sorts of these mechanisms by which people can kind of, gosh, you know, if, uh, some proposal is looking like it has broad agreements or looking like it doesn't have broad agreement. So on, on, on blockchains, we have this base layer of italic of like, it's the right to fork. It's the right to opt out, right? That's so important. And the, the next layer above that is basically this, this rough consensus idea, all of these different, you know, signals, social signals that, um, feed into some signal as to whether the community will accept a change or not or whether they'll fork, whether they'll resort to kind of violence in that bottom layer.
I'm curious, even with these two layers, maybe there are other layers you want to describe too, but are these two layers new for humanity? Is this a new thing that wasn't possible in the analog world? I think to some extent, um, the analog world has this as well, right? So like, let's say, like, you know, take the US as an example, like let's say the 2020 election went even crazier than it actually did. And let's say, for example, that, um, you know, the Supreme Court, um, just decided to make a nine out of nine decision that, well, let's go crazier than 2020. The Supreme Court, um, like, like, like, uh, guy was given drugs by aliens.
So they made a nine out of nine, um, decision, um, that, um, I don't know, can we like, um, uh, pick a crazy guy? Like Kim Jong-un is the president of the United States, is, is the president of the United States of America, right? Like, technically, you could argue that like, you know, quote, legally, the Supreme Court decides what the law is. So then plus, like, I'm not sure exactly on the details of like, who technically has to agree, but the aliens can draw a couple of other people and they could make them just like decide this, just some incredibly crazy thing. And then, you know, if your model of, uh, governance is that it's a decision-making function, then like, hey, the law says that like, if these people say this, then like, that's the decision that's to be executed and all the, and all Americans are going to have to bow down to Kim Jong-un now.
But, you know, the reality is that if that happens, that, um, you know, the red and the blue are both going to be on the streets, and they'll be on the same side of the streets. And, you know, they're going to storm all the buildings and, um, you know, the, the people who got, uh, drawn by aliens, despite their legal power, are going to find, uh, you know, them, uh, themselves, um, you know, hopefully it'll be more, more polite than literal ropes around their necks, but they're not going to be in a good place. And even the military is, uh, probably, like, even if you drug the aliens, drug the guy at the top of the military, like, you know, they're going to rebel as well, right?
Um, so it's not going to work out well. It's a coup. It's a revolution. Now, uh, you know, it's, that's what a hard fork is in the real world, right? Exactly. So it's, uh, like, this idea that the, like, what actually happens in governance never matches what is formally described, um, uh, um, to happen by any kind of, like, attempt at a kind of math, like, description of the legal system, like, but that's something that exists in, I think, lots of contexts today. Um, in other contexts, that's a bit less extreme and less violence, uh, language, um, like, uh, you know, who decides whether or not the word literally can be in metaphorically.
Um, er, being dictionary. Right. Uh, or if I, uh, like, if I start using that, like, um, um, I don't know, the word amons for am not, like, that's something I was taught, I should not be doing in school, but like, uh, I don't know, uh, like, I personally am it really the type to, to, to care about such things. So if I start using the word, and if a bunch of other people like the word, then like, just what? It becomes part of English. Um, so there definitely are lots of, like, rough consensus, like, based, uh, constructs, uh, and just all in society and all sorts of places as well. Um, I think, uh, where blockchains are interesting is that they, yeah, they seem to, like, occupy the sort of niche that's maybe somewhere in between how, like, say, national governments work and where, and how something like language works, right?
Like, I think, uh, corporations, they tend to be closer to following the decision function of your governance because like, you can't make a revolution because like, um, ultimately, um, you know, like, people end up, uh, uh, end up suing each other and then the court, um, accepts, uh, you know, it comes up with a judgment that everyone makes the judgment and that's like ultimately kind of the, like, that's ultimately the last resort. Um, but, you know, in the case of, like, uh, of a country, like, that kind of last resort doesn't exist. But, you know, still at the same time, like, you know, there, like, it's, it's only in these very difficult and extreme cases that this sort of, like, extra legal pressure, um, and like, can influence the outcome.
But in the case of a blockchain, right? Like, it's this sort of like, uniformal pressure, um, and this knowledge that, like, you know, if you're pissed at the community off, they're going to fork like that's something that has a lot, it definitely has a lot more significance. But at the same time, the difference between a blockchain and say, the English language is that an English language forking is just trivial, right? Like, uh, like, the, the three of us can just decide that the word amatives, like an okay word to use. It's okay with me. Is it okay with you? Yeah, I'm a fan. Hey, it, okay.
You should have said, I am into the opponent. Yeah. Um, so, uh, I, right. And the three of us can do that. And like, anyone else who wants to join can do that. And anyone else who doesn't want to join can not. And like, there is very little, like, like, like social damage that comes as a result, right? Blockchains are not quite as extreme, but they're sort of in the middle. Um, so they do occupy this interesting space. And I think the facts that they're not quite so extreme does allow them to do important things that a language is can't do, right? Like, blockchains can create, like, maintain rough consensus on, like, valuable assets and on, like, who currently controls valuable assets and who currently has, like, some position with respect to some kind of valuable asset.
And that's not really something that a language can do. Um, but, so, yeah, so in some sense, like, blockchains are both a difference combination of existing ingredients, but they are also something that Shen, you would, when you would offer new possibilities. Yeah, it's super fascinating. It's like, for, for, forking a blockchain, of course, is, it's, it's a bloodless, you know, revolution, if you will. And you know, because blockchains are generally open source, you know, technology, uh, it, you know, it is fairly easy to do. Essentially, it's always an option. I think that might be part of the solutions you get to as well.
It's like making these things easier to fork. But I want to ask about this because so we have this ungovernance. We have this off, you know, rough consensus sort of mechanism at the, at the layer ones of blockchains. And that feels like a, um, a good mechanism to use at layer one. Um, but maybe you could comment on that. Why is kind of ungovernance the right to fork a good mechanism for layer one? And then why does it feel like it's just not a good mechanism for many of our DeFi apps? Like, it feels like we need some more significant governance for something like make her down. Maybe not right, but like for make her down, there are some decisions to be made that can't be achieved by rough consensus.
And it feels like we need token vote. So can you talk about that? Hmm, I think the difference that there is actually pretty similar to what I, yeah, just one of the examples that gave a couple of five minutes ago, which was like corporations, versus governments, right? Like in a corporation, if there is a dispute at the end of the day, there is this, uh, like, you know, there is a legal process and ultimately people can see each other. And there is this kind of court system as a layer one that you cannot be able to. Whereas in the case of a government, like if there is a disagreement about the law itself, then, you know, well, ultimately, it gets, uh, it goes down to some of these kind of more broad chaotic kind of, um, extremities that we were discussing.
Um, so in the, like basically the facts that, um, applications like like corporations in a nation state, like there are a layer two that sets on top of a layer one, um, like, means that, and also the facts that they control, um, external assets, right? Like Makerdal controls East, right? And so the problem is that if you try to just make a revolution inside of Makerdal and fork, the thing that the community like accepts as the legitimate Makerdal, then the problem that you get is that well, even if you, you know, you have this community agreement that the new fork is, you know, is the legitimate Makerdal.
Well, guess what? Who controls the East ultimately is dependent on like what the code of the smart contract says? And so like you better hope that the code of the smart contract is, uh, damn good, it actually reflecting what the community's values are. Um, and like that's a hard problem. And that case, like that's, uh, the problem that you actually do have to go and solve, right? Whereas like if a layer one does on, um, on does on chain governance and you want chain governance to resubble, you know, you can still do a, uh, do a fork to, um, you can get around that on chain governance. Whereas, uh, with a layer two, like, yeah, if the layer two gets a head gets, or if the application gets hacked, then you know, the application is screwed if it, uh, like you can't fork the application even in that case.
Well, you can sometimes. So like, for example, one of my examples was like if ENS gets hacked, right? Then well, okay, like maybe there's money inside of ENS that we get stolen, but like people like everyone who currently pays, um, uses the ENS system, they would just download updates to their software that start pointing to a fork of ENS. And so that situation would result itself pretty peacefully, right? So the question is like, is the app does the application control internal assets or does it control the kind of externally defined assets, right? And like a corporation inside a nation state, like if the only thing the corporation controls is the corporation's own shares, then like theoretically, don't even need a legal system because like if there's a dispute then, you know, you can fork the corporation and the fork would have new shares, but corporations that usually own like nation state defines, dollars, the nation state defines, office space, nation state defines, um, intellectual property, ICANN defines domain names, right?
Like corporations own the kind of like external capital in the same way that applications on Ethereum often own external capital. And whenever something owns external capital, then like you can't resolve governance with a purely internal forking system. And so you do need a, you know, quote on chain or kind of like codify the governance of some kind. When you shop for plane tickets, you probably use kayak, Expedia, or Google to compare ticket prices. So why would you limit yourself to just one exchange when you trade crypto? When you make your trades, you want to make sure that you're getting the best possible price on your trade and that you aren't paying high gas costs that you could have otherwise avoided.
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We've also talked about why we need to have governance in the first place and why we can't just completely strip away all governance. Sometimes things happen that needs to be updated. And as we've been circling around, coming to this point of conversation is to, okay, we have a bunch of things in DeFi on Ethereum that do need to have governance. And they are generally all just using coin votes for governance. But you are advocating that there's more diverse and more rich possibilities that we can get into to have better governance. But let's talk about why coin voting sucks. What options do people have in DeFi that kind of paints or ruins the power of coin voting?
Right. So the thing that coin voting really relies on for kind of the philosophical arguments for why it makes sense is this idea that it couples economic interests and governance power. Right? Like coin voting governance is supposed to work because the people with the coins have the votes. And so the people who have economic interest in the protocol success are the ones that have the governance power to make the success happen. The problem is that financialization is extremely good at separating out like different parts of an asset if the people in that asset want them to be separated. And like most people like because each individual person only has such a tiny name so you can share of the governance power, most people do not value their governance power that will highlight.
Right? Like even if there aren't any attackers, it's very hard to get people to be willing to vote at all. Like voter participation rates and most coin voting systems are tiny. And then if there is the ability to just kind of like split up your token that has the built the economic interest in the governance power and say like there's going to be token A that has just the economic interest and token B that has just the governance power. And then you can go like a Brent out your token B and keep your token A. Like that's a deal that a lot of people are going to find attractive. Right? And financial systems are just inherently about doing this kind of unbundling.
And so, you know, of course there's going to be lots of different ways to do that kind of unbundling. In my post I talked about two specific ways to do the unbundling, right? Like one specific way is you just have a smart contract where like it's basically a wrapper token, right? Like the same way, you know, you wrap your eith and you have left, you can wrap your maker, you have wrapped maker, except this wrapped maker has this very specific property that well, it's now the wrapped maker contract that that controls the that that kind of technically owns your maker. It has the rights to do governance with the maker.
And so the wrapped maker and the wrapped maker contract is just going to like auction off like every single vote. And let's say it's going to give half the auction revenue to whoever wrote this wrapper contract and half the auction revenue to you, right? And so, you know, every maker holder that is going to like individually find that in their interest to just stick their maker into the wrapped maker contract because it pays interest, but actually like while it's concentrating all their governance power kind of collectively in the hands of a few potentially unaligned actors, right? So that's method one.
Sometimes people find method one unrealistic because it just requires token holders to do something that's just feels so blatantly unethical. But like, which is fair, right? Like I think like even if token holders like like even if the amount like they are suffering from this kind of tragedy of the comments broke problem where they have the ability to sell their governance rights to the highest bidder, like a lot of them that you do kind of like feel this altruistic concern for makers out as a whole and they don't want to they want to feel like they're, you know, part of this exciting community and they're not selling them out.
And so like, you know, they might not want to stick their maker into the into the system. Um, also sometimes like if people stick their maker tokens into the wrapped maker contract, well, other people might like analyze the blockchain and figure out who they are and then they're going to have social consequences of all these things, right? Um, so you might argue that for these reasons, like this kind of super blatant um, driving attackers unrealistic, but then there's also a much more subtle governance attack, right? And the much more subtle attack basically says, well, let's just use like defile lending protocols, right?
Like let's say, um, I have some maker tokens, then one thing I could do is, um, I could use my maker tokens and like, or I could lend out some of my maker tokens and it could get paid interest. And then if I am an attacker who wants to like participate in some governance decisions, then what I'm going to do is I'm going to take a whole pile of teeth and they're going to stick that teeth into the into SDB. And then I'm going to borrow some maker and I'm going to use my borrowed maker to have to do whatever governance things I want to do. Now, if you analyze that situation, right? The person who borrows the maker, they don't actually have an economic interest in maker because whatever the price of maker is, they're going to have to pay it back, right?
Um, so the person who is borrowing the maker, they have governance power, they do not have economic interest. And then the person who is lending them the maker, the person who actually sticks stuck the maker into the defile lending system and is getting interest rates off of that, they, they still have the economic interest because they still have the right to eventually get that maker back, but they do not have the governance power because at that particular time, that maker is in someone else's hands. Um, so one person has governance rates but not economic interest, the other person has economic interest by not governance power.
And so even though it does not look like a bribe, the, the, the practical consequences are exactly the same as it as they are in the, in the wrapped maker bribe and contract case, right? So there, and that's just decentralized bribing. There's also like examples of centralized that kind of de facto bribing that already happens. Like one example is that lots of people store their coins on exchanges. And if you store your coin on an exchange, um, like that exchange offers you personally a bribe in the form of services and the form of convenience and in the form of like fast ability to trade in all of those things.
Um, but then the exchange, like, has formal control over your tokens and the exchange can, like basically controls the governance power, right? You have the economic interest, the exchange has the governance power. And now a lot of the time exchanges say, oh, we're going to be nice and we're going to not either not participate in governance or we're going to run internal polls among our users. And so, uh, so we are, we're going to kind of like pass through the governance power, but sometimes exchanges do exercise it, right? Yeah. I talk about the Tron steam situation where Justin Sun ends it up, like basically making his final attack by cooperating with exchanges and using coins that people had inside of exchanges in order to vote.
And so these kinds of things do actually happen, right? So basically like the conclusion is that like once because of just all of these different forms of like financialization and like just the DeFi and C5 being really good on bundling, like you just how you went, even though the system is supposed to bundle governance power and economic interest, it ends up, it can easily end up not bundling those two things anymore. And once it stops bundling those two things, then like basically governance just becomes an auction and every decision gets sold to the highest bidder. And like that can start looking ugly very quickly.
Kind of sounds like how Congress maybe works to to to the skeptic, I'm not sure. But like so there are these issues, but like also there are issues I think people see every day like whales kind of controlling the vote in many of these systems. And maybe you'd argue that's a good thing because they have the most economic incentive, but there are cases where like you know, I don't know all the particulars, but like let's say there's a raid on Uniswap, right? And this you know, including set of actors rewards, you know, with nepotism their friends or their family and they award these people a specific Uniswap grant, for instance, rather than another set of people.
So there are issues like that too. I'm curious if you tell like they're like where do we go from here? So we have, it seems like these two governance forms that are active in working in blockchains. And that is the rough consensus, you know, ability to fork. And then we have for everything else really all the the app layer that's built on cryptocurrencies on Ethereum, it's all token vote. But like where do we go from here? You mentioned a couple of solutions. There are a few more. Maybe we should cover like is there a way to do some sort of one person one vote proof of participation? Do we need to centralize identity first?
What are some of the solutions that the community should pursue? So I think like before I get the solutions actually I wanted to comment on the whale thing a bit because like the whales are an interesting double edged sword, right? Like one of the points that I make in the article is that I think the reason why despite all of this economic theory that says that coin voting governance should break, coin voting governance most we has not broken so far is because in practice the token voting is of a lot of those projects are very centralized. And like if more than half the supply is controlled by 10 people and the 10 people know each other, then like each of those 10 people is not going to go betray everyone else by sticking their to a rap maker contract and collecting 1% interest, right?
There's off-chain reputation at stake. Yeah, exactly. And there's off-chain reputation effects are strong precisely because there is there are these kind of whale boys clubs that control a large portion of the supply of these systems, right? So you have this effect where the systems are like secure from being outright attacked in a part precisely because of the centralization. But at the same time like the centralization is something that has genuine risks, right? Like one example might be like what if there is some decision in the future to like stick mandatory KYC into one of these applications.
And the whales end up being in favor of it because you know the whales have close connection to say see if I interest some that wants to be friendly with whoever those regulators are or whales. They care about you know institutional adoption and the institutions like they want a yeah like a system where you know kind of quote unidentified actors can't participate in all that. And so you could easily have a small group of whales that will want decisions to go in the one direction of just accept like throwing in mandatory KYC to just to use the platform. But while that's something that the rest of the community does not want.
And so there are like these kinds of real like misalignment risks from kind of coin like coin centralized coin voting or I guess vote coin voting with concentrated coin holdings. And you know we do want something better but at the same time you know we want something better that's not attackable. So what is that thing that's better and not attackable? Yeah tell us. Yeah so I gave a couple of ideas. One of those is incorporate kind like one person per or one vote per person voting of some kind. So I talk about proof of humanity a lot right it's this project where you know if you're a human then you can put up your profile and you can you basically get like essentially an NFT that says like hey you are a unique person.
And that's something that other applications can then link into and they can say like hey like for example you know if you are one unique person that you can get up to one unit of governance power or if you are a unique person then you know you get like there's even a UBI token that just gives some number of UBI coins to every person like per period or I think it's like it might even be given continuously. And so you just have like actual sort of formally democratic kind of like one per person governance. That's one approach. My concern with one person one vote is that one person one vote fails to distinguish between a kind of different levels of commitment that different people have.
And like there like in any of these systems like there are people that show and have hundreds of times more of a gotten voting power than other people because those people like care hundreds of times more put hundreds put hundreds of times like bigger chunks of their lives into the projects. And look that's something that also needs to be recognized for it. Now coin voting does try to recognize this but it recognizes it in a way that also ends up empowering whales a lot. One idea that's interesting is like you could have quadratic but if you use a proof of humanity things you can have quadratic coin governance so you can say you know if you have end tokens then you have square root of end governance power and that would be an interesting kind of hybrid that gets us the best of both worlds.
Now like in that kind of situation you know to prevent this kind of governance financialization that I talked about you would need to use like something like Macy or like one of these anti-collusion gadgets to prevent people from like basically like credibly selling their vote in their governance power to other people but you know these are things that are being worked on already right which is great. So that's one idea. Another idea is instead of having governance be done by token holders you could have governance be done by like what I would call batch holders like basically holders of something that is like some kind of non-transferable token that gets allocated to participants that are kind of decided to somehow like it could be bootstrapped with substantialized set in and there could be some mechanism for updating them over time.
There are just somehow selected as being like just good contributors that provide like important governance input and like that could be used as just like providing a kind of an alternative chamber of governance that's like reasonably like both high quality and dedicated to the project and disconnected enough from the token holders that it can provide a check and balance in case like the in case token holder governance just goes in a completely crazy direction. So that's another idea. A third idea is like you can say well we're going to have coin governance but in order to limit the harm that they can do we're going to try to limit the power of coin governance in certain ways and projects do do this to some extent right like for example in a uniswap the coin governance can only do like one thing which is it can only issue new unit tokens and like you can basically turn the fee on it like the 0.
05% portion of the fee on and off and in that case like the good thing is that if the coin governance completely breaks and someone you can just fork the token and they can fork uniswap they can still fork everything and like it's not even until the fork happens like uniswap continues to be useful the people who like put their liquidity shares and like we can still take their liquidity shares out there's no way for the governance to steal the liquidity shares. So the power that the governance has is very limited. Another example of limited governance power is that a lot of D5 projects they have a time delay before any governance decision takes effect and that time delay gives people time to like move their money out if a project breaks.
Now a lot of the time these times delays are fairly short they're like one day or one week. I personally am a big fan of times delays that are much longer like I'm a fan of times delays about least two months. Like basically you want something that's long enough so that even lazy users who barely only pay a little bit of attention to the protocol have like enough time to discover that like hey there's something crazy happening and they should consider moving out of the projects and moving on to a fork. Patel, some of these trade-offs are like don't they affect your decision making like speed and doesn't you can't that potentially put a protocol in an uncompetitive position relative to its peer.
They can I think but I think in general like if something is decentralized at all then like it's not competing on like rapid like like day-to-day scalability like it's competing on the ability to provide its users promises of stability and now I do think that in early stages while a product is still rapidly evolving it makes sense to have shorter time windows but like I personally am a fan of time windows that potentially are even programs to increase programmatically. Maybe the time window should be proportional to a percentage of the time since the project launched like after a year it's a week after two years it's two weeks after three years it's three weeks or something like that.
Like basically I think projects like there is a need for rapid decision making especially in early stages but the rapid like the early stages should always be designed designed and with the mindset that eventually the rapid stage is going to end and the project is going to transition into something whose rules are like more focused around giving people stability than being able to like adapt really quick way to change the circumstances in one week instead of six. So Vitalik I feel like we've we've extensively covered this topic of decentralized governance and it seems like the key message is like hey let's not build this entire DeFi ecosystem this entire app layer ecosystem on coin voting it's brittle you know and maybe there are some other mechanisms the community can start experimenting with let's not just you know you use coin vote as the shelling point but I want to you know pull back another thread that that you were talking about earlier and we were talking about the ability of users to opt into software download their own software.
This is something we're kind of seeing and we see maybe every full market this conversation of when transaction fees start to go up because there's demand for block space then inevitably there come you know a number of projects who just say hey we can create more block space we can solve the scalability trilema and you know this decentralization thing like maybe it's not so necessary and maybe it's not even necessary for users to have the ability to run their own notes maybe scalability of transaction speed is more important you wrote another post called the limits of blockchain scalability that maybe we want to want to tug on a little bit but this was like in response to Elon Musk I think we had took triggered this conversation where he's talking about doge speeds and he said ideally doge speeds block time by 10x increases block size by 10x and drops fees 100x then it wins hands down right it's kind of this notion like hey we're coming to crypto and we need more scalability and I've got the solution we just increase everything by 10x or 100x can we have a conversation about the limits of scalability I think in fact that's that's your post title but maybe let's start here why is it so important for individuals individual users to have the ability to run notes David and I were just in a conversation with you know group we're talking about another non-ethereum blockchain and we're having this debate as to whether indeed is important for individuals to run those they were make the point that it wasn't we can get into some of those critiques but from your perspective why is it so essential for individuals to have the ability to run non-validating blockchain nodes so the thing that is blockchain node does I'm I think non-participating might be better might be better than non-validating because the thing that the node does is validate so like in the sense that it verifies the every block that's coming in and it checks that everything in the blockchain actually is happening according to the rules right so if like ethereum users all switch to using like clients for example then what would happen is that the like more than 50% of the consensus participants the you know miners or perver mistake validators could just come together and say like hey you know we're going to make a change to the rules like we're going to like say throw in a dev funds that that distributes like an extra five billion coins to our friends or we're going to double staking interest rates because we decided that we need that or whatever and users are going to be at an extreme disadvantage and like even being able to rebel against that change because like their clients are going to accept the blocks by defaults right because a user does not see that the change was made and that the new blocks are no longer valid according to the old rules because all DC is the headers like the the users are by defaults not going to reject the new blocks they're just going to kind of keep humming along as no nothing went wrong and users are only really going to detect that something happened like possibly hours into the future right like maybe one some one community actor is going to be making a word and then over the course of a couple of hours that hours spreading the spread over social media and then a couple of hours later more people are going to wake up and well well by the time that and like users understand what's going on and the really upset about it basically there will have already been like eight hours of blockchain activity that happened and that like there could have been really a lot of really important things that happened there and like well guess what there's going to be a large constituency so we're already going to be against reverting the chain and it would be the onus would be on the users to successfully coordinate reverting the chain right or the onus would be on the users to make a fork and even when the users make a fork they would be disadvantaged in making a fork because well if the blockchain is big then syncing the blockchain is hard and syncing the blockchain is going to take like a week instead of an hour and so there's going to be a huge amount of downtime before a fork can start now it basically the entire game ends up being tilted heavily against users that are that are trying to rebel against that sort of situation there's a protection against the elites is how you phrase things in your article exactly like the game is tilted in favor of the elites winning by default whereas if you take something like Bitcoin or Ethereum where you do have a lot of users running notes so Ethereum by the way definitely can be better at this and like a lot of the things like stainless clients like for example that we're doing are fundamentally about Ethereum becoming better at this like like basically if you have at least lots of no users running notes then what's going to happen is that what's the if the majority of these stickers kind of quietly agree on this protocol change and they push the protocol change through then the like by default the users are just going to see that those blocks are in that one and they're going to ignore them right and so when the users wake up like what they're going to see as they're going to see if there's one chain and that one chain has like for some reason 80% of the stickers from their point of you just once offline right like all they see as they see their chain and they see that 20% of stakers or whatever it is that are still staking on that chain and so they think okay well 80% of the stakers wants offline when in reality of course 80% of the stakers are continuing to make their own chain that follows different rules but the users just by default state like they might see some in that one block errors but like from the users point of view it walks extremely close to those 80% just going offline right and so here the default is tilted very much in favor of like this cabal that wants to change the rules of losing and when the cabal loses then like basically like they don't just they end up I mean in the case of proof of stake even like their validators would just all get inactivity at least they lose a huge amount of money and for the rest of their users like their user experience only experiences like a tiny degradation because for like a couple of days instead of having a block every 12 seconds they're going to have a block every 60 seconds or whatever right and that's something that like okay fine you know the gas price goes up to 2000 way for a bit but like you know the chain keeps on running so it's a sort of situation where like yeah the default is tilted in favor of the regular users and people who oppose the fork not suffering that much and the people to try to force the forks for real suffering a really huge amount so that like the closer we can get to that world the better right and the further away we get we get from that world the worse and so so in order for that world to exist though it needs to not only be possible to for regular users to run a node but it needs to be easy enough for regular users to run a node that regular users choose to do it and don't get too lazy right like if the the amount of hard disk space needed for a node is two thirds of your hard drive then sure you can technically run it but you know realistically if you want to like have your video games on your on your laptop as well then like you're not going to want to run your node and so you're going to still feel like and you know whatever I'm just going to go like hook up to a light client or hook up to a meteor or whatever but if on the other hand a node only takes up like 10% of your hard drive then suddenly running a node is a much more reasonable value proposition and so that's the sort of like the sort of world that we want to live it right like oh the world we are running a node is something that's both possible for average users but even something where users like can do it even if they're even if they're fairly lazy and that they're not that willing to like enter a large amount of inconvenience and I think that's a world that we can get to I think you know even with if you're in blocks being as large as they are like there's been the guest team has been doing an amazing amount of work on improving client efficiency statelessness could mean that you can have verifying nodes that do not require any hard disk space state expiry could mean that the hardest space required for even a state storing node goes down to like 40 gigabytes or something small you know eventually you could even you know we're going to see a snark the EVM and so a node can just verify a snark instead of verifying transactions the node would still have to verify data availability but you know we we can get to a you know a world where running a node is very easy and even today even without the fancy technology if area is still like much closer to ward a yeah world where running a node is easy then but almost basically any other of these kind of high blockchains that's that has a large amount of usage so that's something that we want to preserve and build on.
I want to keep on actually parsing this apart but I want to ask this question from a different frame of reference than what you were just talking about you you talked about how the Ethereum community could be better at running nodes and that's how there's something that you kind of aspire towards as as part of this Ethereum community is like we could all be doing this a little bit better then there's a relationship between like the culture that we want to have of the of the people that make up our our blockchain with with the actual technology that is a part of the blockchain and so you you talked about how like okay great like we have I have my computer and it has a terabyte of data storage but I just have my computer I don't necessarily have a computer that I specifically dedicate for all of its resources to running a node and so you're talking about making as a cult as a values choice for the Ethereum blockchain you want it to make a reduce the cost so that the individual user can be enabled to run a node where we've seen other like I would imagine Binance smartchains which are forks of Ethereum or avaliant which is a fork of Ethereum have just juiced up these juiced up these metrics about running a node to the point where like it actually sucks up every computational resource that a computer has so can you talk about the importance of establishing a culture around running nodes and what that can do for the security of a blockchain and as that relates to the hardware requirements um sure um so you know the culture of running nodes basically just means that you know there just needs to be all of this difference the kind of infrastructure development and just like mine sets of you of users that were just running on node is something that happens by defaults right and uh that's the sort of thing that you can have more of and um that you can have less of um so one example of this for example like one way that if you aim can improve is um when the merge happens right the merge one of the things that we have in the proof stake design is a much better like client and uh when we have a much better like client to one of the advantages of this is that the like it will be possible to just have a like line the inside of uh inside of your browser right so you could imagine a meta-mask like wallet or hopefully meta-mask itself upgrading so that instead of just trusting in if you're offer information about the blockchain like it it asks for merkel branches that it actually verifies those merkel branches against the like clients and it checks that you know hey like the you actually have this like client that's run that's kind of listening to the blockchain itself and getting the information about what the latest blocks are now the like client is still not doing full validation so it's still vulnerable to a 51% attack um but at the same time it's still much better than you know being vulnerable to an inferior attack right um so that's uh one of the like that's one example of a way that if you're aimed to improve and I think um i'm hoping will improve um after the merge um one of these kind of underrated benefits of the merge uh to having some more of a yet-no running culture um another example of this of course is that if uh it continues to become easier to just run a node on your local computer and like there's all sorts of these work streams that are trying to make that happen then that's um you know if more people start doing that then like you could imagine more people just running their own node um and then you could you could just have more people you know instead of talking to one fewer they could just then have this uh uh when they access um just random ethereum applications through up three like they would just talk to their own node um and their own node would give them information about the blockchain um i think that that even offers um uh potentially um a bunch of privacy benefits like there's potentially even even like good reasons for the user to do that right but once you have a critical massive users doing that then that just makes it much harder for like kind of proof of state like validating elites or like pools or mining pools or mining elites to kind of do do any kind of like um hostile takeover without people's consent um and also like it reduces uh the decisive power that um the uh like centralized providers have in uh deciding on like what they're not to adopt a hard fork that like isn't evil but actually we just case controversial um so like the more you have a node running culture the more the kind of the layer zero this kind of final um layer of last resort indecision making um actually ends output being a genuinely democratic one so vatalk we've had a number of conversations with i would say maybe uh high throughput chain apologists right let's call them that right and so this is kind of how they would counter some of the things that you're saying right um basically everything you you said would be really nice vatalk if everyone ran their own node but practically they'll say vatalk how many people do you know who actually run their own youth out and now you probably know a lot of course but like for the average person are they actually running their node that like the subtext is hey the the the battle is lost right it's too late if you're in already like relies very heavily on third parties like infura and alchemy to power some of its app layer uh services so it's kind of like if you can get past having all users have the ability to run their node and i understand that that that would be a nice i guess balance of power but if you can get past that and realize that's not practical in the real world then we could boost up throughput by a heck of a lot and um you know is that so bad and is ethereum like practically not allowing everyday users to run a node any way today and so why don't we just make that tradeoff is it kind of a tradeoff like um you've you've written posts before about you know big pointers not being comfortable with weak subjectivity but ethereum is for instance you know or is this is there something even more important about users running their their their own nodes that make this kind of an iron clad tradeoff that change shouldn't make what's your take here i think um like this gets back to their concave versus convex post that we talked about a while ago right like i i think people think people seem to keep wanting to trade off to be binary but they they never are right they're like in like a ten people running ethereum nodes is better than one person running ethereum node a hundred people running ethereum nodes is better than ten people move away from the ability to run a node as a hobbyist.
You lose even more once you start thinking about not just users, but services, like even exchanges, deciding that they're too lazy to run a node. And it's complicated to figure out how to get this $5,000 server working and they're running like 57 different chains anyway. And once you have services like exchanges of themselves making the trade off to be lazy and go talk to a centralized provider, right? And then once you start talking about, you know, staking pools, like sharing, node infrastructure, like the more centralized you get, like, you know, it's not, it's very much not binary either, have it or you don't, like either you could have all of it, you could have less of it, you could have even less of it.
And the more and more you lose, the more, the progressively more and more of dystopian the system gets, right? And I think like there might be a pretty sure there have even been cases in the wild of like, either staking pools or exchanges or other kinds of major actors like that. I'm just sharing node, you know, I'm a node infrastructure or just kind of offloading that decentralized providers, right? And like the more of that you get than the more the set of people you have to, like you have to get on your side to make a hostile hard for a cap and like shrinks from, you know, 10,000 through 100 to 10, or potentially even lower.
So I think, I believe actually even in the case of EOS, I can't remember exactly, but I remember vaguely hearing about this sort of thing happening, like I remember hearing about this kind of, like, like basically running an EOS node took a lot of resources. And so even some of the validators, like even some of the like 100 delegates ended up being too lazy and ended up kind of outsourcing their node running to someone else. So yeah, like, you know, you think that we've given up the fight, but no, like there's way more fights that we could lose. Valek, Vitalik, I recently asked you this on Twitter and I'd love to dive into the subject even more.
And this is becoming very, very invoked to talk about this subject because we're all kind of realizing that it's here or at least the beginnings of it. So what in your mind is this metaverse thing? What is the metaverse? I guess like it's this general concept, right? That, you know, you have the internet, but then you try to, you're trying to sort of take the internet to the next level with some kind of like greater level of immersiveness, I guess. Now what that immersiveness is, I think it's still really big and a lot of people's minds. Like to some people, it just means you have really good virtual reality.
And you have like some kind of internet that feels like it's seamlessly integrated with the virtual reality. To some people, it refers to some notion of like shared objects and shared state. Like, you know, you can have like, you know, the magic sword from one game and then you can port it over and like move it to your other game where it can move your entire character to another like a world and still keep the same scan and the same like other kinds of details. You know, you could even have these kind of virtual environments that I'll talk to each other. Like you can have, you know, NFTs that have, that get assigned meaning that gets respected in like multiple people's kind of applications and sort of sub-universes.
So I think like people who use the term for a lot of things that it's still very big in people's minds, but there is this notion that this sort of interconnectedness is something that people want. And I think that's a big reason why something like Ethereum is really well suited to be a central part of the metaverse. Like because you know, Ethereum is this environment that's really well suited for like creating these objects where those objects like once they create them, they can then easily be moved around between different applications and they can have like value assigned to them or value respected by different platforms.
Like one interesting example of this actually, I guess there was this elude project that like I think popped up a couple of days ago. All right, well, you have these NFTs and every NFT by itself is just like a bit of text, right? It's like, you know, like wizards robe of the tiger and like magic sort of excaliburantist or whatever that or whatever that or whatever. And like, okay, fine, you have NFTs that are a bunch of text and then you have this ecosystem of all sorts of different like applications created by community members where those applications then assign meaning. Like it could be assigning pictures it could be assigning like stats it could be assigning all sorts of things to these objects, right?
And so you have this basically virtual world that not only like it even goes beyond decentralized decentralized type things where like you just have like a decentralized substrate you have a virtual world that's here that has collaboratively created laws of physics. And that's something that seems potentially really powerful, right? You know, what people are going to do with the metaverse? I don't know yet. I mean, it seems like there's a lot of space for creativity. I definitely see it becoming a really powerful like kind of interesting place to do all kinds of gaming things. What other things people will do, like does it make sense to have like have a work meeting inside of the metaverse as opposed to just like doing it in a Zoom call or whatever, whatever.
I don't know. I think people are still figuring that out, we'll see. You know, are we going to have like social platforms that are like more deeply connected as part of the metaverse somehow or they're going to be conferences and, you know, in the metaverse and what does that even mean? Like I think these things are still being figured out. I do think about the Ethereum like ecosystem has a big opportunity to be in the middle of this whole transition. So we'll see how that goes. Well, yeah, I was about to bring up loot next, but you did it for me and took and ran exactly where I wanted to go with this.
I read before we hopped on a call with you, I tweeted out, loot is Ethereum coming full circle because Vitalik originally created Ethereum because of his World of Warcraft items that got nerfed by Blizzard. Now we have this metaverse that is actually instantiating the values that you wanted to have loot in your World of Warcraft account exists in the first place. And so like you said Ethereum has the opportunity to be at the center of this whole thing. And I recently just put out an article on Bankless that more or less talked about exactly like this where Ethereum is an object issuance platform.
And that's all it needs to be to offer this skeleton or this structure to allow this metaverse to ascribe meaning and purpose to the value to the objects that Ethereum has inside of its state. And so what I'm trying to wrap my head around is like is Ethereum like this first skeletal structure that allows for the metaverse to kind of like envelop around it? Yeah, and I think Ethereum's definitely gone further than anything that we've seen before. Right, now like in a lot of different ways, right? Like there's definitely been this kind of this rich object ecosystem in Ethereum. There's been this rich kind of gaming ecosystem in Ethereum and you know with like Dark Forest, the ZK game and all these other things.
There's been this rich, yay, and also financial ecosystem and so it's also a type of object. Like actually we see in these different pieces like start talking to each other. And it'll be very fascinating. But talk as we come to a close here and again, thank you for your time. We want to just kind of check in with the update on Ethereum since we last talked roughly three months ago. EIP1559 has come live with the London Hard fork. Beacon Chain has launched this new NFT mania has made Ethereum closer to a household name than it ever has before. So how would you describe Ethereum in its current state and history?
Like where are we in the course of Ethereum history? Help us find ourselves, where are we? And we're on the finish line to the merge, right? I think that's the most important thing right now with the EIP1559 behind us. Like there's basically nothing else. It's something like right in front of us that was that lots of people were really putting their souls into and focusing on. And EIP1559, I think in addition to both correctly proving out the burn and correctly proving that it manages to actually really increase the user experience efficiency of sending transactions. And I don't know what experience you've had, but for me, it definitely feels like it's much easier to just send a transaction and get it included in one block.
And I don't have to worry about adjusting gaspies anymore. But in addition to all of those things, EIP1559 also proves to the world that the Ethereum ecosystem really is capable of making big changes and it's not just vaporware. And I think people are increasingly confident it's now that the merge is something that is going to happen, too. But it's a big shift, it feels so long ago, but even as late as at the beginning of 2020, it was still a common Bitcoin maximalist position that the merger will never happen. And since then, they've obviously moved on to other arguments and just embraced the whole mistake will happen, but it's bad thing.
So when you make enough progress to force other people to shift their narrative, that's definitely something assigned that you're doing things right. So that was an answer from, I would say, the inside out of Ethereum, focusing on where Ethereum is as a protocol. But what about viewing Ethereum from the outside in we have government regulators looking at what's going on in DeFi and we have cute penguins working their way into the Zoomers, like computers that they come home after school. What about from the social level? Where is Ethereum and its acceptance as a social technology? I think it's finally breaking out.
And I think it's amazing that it's finally breaking out. The NFT space did a lot, I think, because the NFT space showed it can just hit you and see other than finance people that if you're in it has something really cool and interesting inside of it, right? Like you have all of these artists that are selling these NFTs, gamers are obviously increasingly interested. You have just this ecosystem of people just doing all sorts of really cool and creative and fun stuff. ENAS is slowly continuing to make its way forward. Maybe having a bit of a logic because there's high transaction fees and it's expensive to interact with anything, but once our rollups come online, which is very soon, I mean, Arbitrum, my understanding is that it still has training wheels, but it did launch a kind of available to everyone version a couple of days ago.
So like, big congrats to Arbitrum. I'm amazing progress there. The optimism obviously, they're continuing to run. I think they have about $100,000 a day of transaction fees now. So they made that blog post, right, where they promised to put a large portion of I see what's the revenue sensor attract to public goods funding and like, we're talking $100,000 a day for it to attract public goods funding. Like, that's bigger than the Gateway Matching Bull budget. So let's see, let's see. Yes, let me see. So where rollups are increasingly being used, I think it is definitely like one of the places where I was over optimistic before is that I thought that, you know, once you had things like Ubering and ZK sync, people just start adopting them immediately for payments.
But I think what ended up happening is that we showed that like you actually do need the richer, kind of fully EVN capable ecosystem with all sorts of applications on a rollup for people to like really wants to jump onto one on mass. But that's actually happening now. And I think the jumping is happening. And once that happens, the fees are going to go down and all of this kind of lot and interest in just doing all sorts of like interesting and cool things on Ethereum. Like that's gonna really blow up even more. So looking forward to that. Yeah, we talk about packing our bags and going off to the layer two suburbs because it's cheaper to live there.
What technologies do you think we will finally be able to unlock now that layer two is here that we wouldn't have been able to use because of the prohibitive computation and fees on the main chain? So ENS becoming a much bigger deal, something I already mentioned, like even like something like status, for example, like I think ENS, high ENS fees are one of the biggest barriers to adoption at this point. And at the same time, like the other barriers to adoption, like how syncing between devices doesn't work well. And like you can't really see people's names clearly that in all these other things.
Like those are things that the team is also actively working on fixing and they have a whole bunch of other awesome features that are in the works. So I expect status will to become considerably more amazing once it both integrates the layer two is Aenza. Those are all these other things. All of this gaming stuff obviously, like hopefully ZK game is not gonna be on a testnet forever. There's basically all of these non-financial applications at the stations, like just like claims being made about different accounts. Just much wider adoption of like pop and perfect humanity and all these other protocols.
Like just, yeah, I mean the entire non-financial Ethereum ecosystem being able to just be much bigger and be accessible to people who are not like basically already rich from having held ETH for the last few years. Vitalik, ETH just passed its sixth birthday so that means we're in the sixth year and it's been a pleasure to have you on the podcast, Sir, we've gone over so much. But I wanna ask you kind of this final question. Each year maybe has had kind of a feeling, a trend, something about it that's new, you know, 2015, there was launch, then there was, you know, Dow, maybe 2016, ICO 2017. What do you think is that, you know, the word or phrase or theme for the year 2021 for Ethereum?
I would say scaling, both in the sense of technical scaling of roll-ups finally coming online. Also, and in the sense of social scaling of communities other than finance caring about Ethereum for the first time, and just Ethereum becoming much more culturally mainstream. And of course, some, you know, in the sense of kind of the Ethereum, so we are one scaling things, not quite happening yet, but definitely, like being on a path, getting onto the path where people are increasingly convinced that they're going to happen. So scaling in many ways. Awesome, Vitalik, thank you so much once again for joining us on Bankless.
Thank you, thank you for having me. Guys, action items today. We have a couple of links for you to Vitalik's blog. The first is you got to check out the article we talked about in the beginning, moving beyond coin-voting governance to get some of the details and written form from Vitalik. Also, read the limits to blockchain scalability. We touched on that in the second part. Of course, as always, risks and disclaimers, ethosrisky, crypto is risky, DeFi is risky. You could definitely lose what you put in, but we are headed west. This is the frontier, and we're glad you're with us on the Bankless journey.
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