David Chaum is a computer scientist and an OG member of the cryptography community. His innovation has driven much of the mathematical foundation of cryptocurrency, and he continues to work on projects like xx Network.
In 1985, David issued this warning to the public:
“Computerization is robbing individuals of the ability to monitor and control the ways information about them is used. Already, public and private sector organizations acquire extensive personal information and exchange it amongst themselves… The automation of payment and other consumer transactions is expanding these dangers to an unprecedented extent.”
In today’s surveillance capitalism, it’s clear that we need cryptography now more than ever.
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------ Topics Covered:
0:00 Intro 6:00 David Chaum 11:30 60s Technology 20:00 60s Culture 23:55 A New Direction in Cryptography 33:30 The Fork in the Road 41:50 Minimum Disclosure 48:25 Traffic Analysis 56:05 Surveillance Capitalism 1:02:00 The State of Data Today 1:12:00 New Ideas and Society 1:15:40 Advice to Crypto
------ Resources:
David on Twitter: https://twitter.com/chaumdotcom?s=20&t=u3ULosGOPIOTPZobdnMKkw
David’s Website: https://chaum.com/
----- Not financial or tax advice. This channel is strictly educational and is not investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell any assets or to make any financial decisions. This video is not tax advice. Talk to your accountant. Do your own research.
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Welcome to Layer Zero. Layer Zero is a podcast of unscripted conversations with the people that make up the cryptography community. Cryptography is, of course, built by code, but is composed by people, and each individual member of the cryptography community has their own story to tell. Cypherpunks understood that the code they write impacts the people that use it, and Layer Zero focuses on the people behind the code, because cryptography is people all the way down, and it always has been. Now, you might have noticed a little difference in that intro, and that's because I have not a member of the crypto community, not a member of the Ethereum community, but a member of the OG cryptography community, and I'll do a minute, it doesn't make complete sense to say that cryptography is people all the way down, because actually cryptography is one of the few things that is strictly math through and through and through.
Today, on the show, I have on David Chong. If you don't know who that is, you need to do a little homework, because we live in an industry that is built upon David Chong's work. He's the founder of DigiCash, one of the early experiments into online cash, but mainly one of the big proponents of privacy at all costs, where not just the data about a message is private, but all of the metadata is private, too. And I'd like to read a quote out to help emphasize the importance of who David Chong is and what he's done for this industry. This is Chong's warning to the world in 1985, where he talks about the dangers of users data that is building up around computing systems.
He says, computerization is robbing individuals of the ability to monitor and control the ways information about them is used. Already public and private sector organizations acquire extensive personal information and exchange it amongst themselves. Individuals have no way of knowing if this information is accurate, outdated, or otherwise inappropriate. New and more serious dangers derive from computerized pattern recognition techniques. Even a small group of them tapping into data gathered every day and consumer transactions could secretly conduct master valence, inferring individuals' lifestyles, activities, and associations.
The automation of payment and other consumer transactions is expanding these dangers to an unprecedented extent. Projecting the vision of these two futures, one built with current technology, and one will build with decentralized services, David Chong saw that the two approaches appeared to hold quite different answers. Project scale automated transaction systems are imminent, and as the initial choice for their architecture gathers economic and social momentum, it becomes increasingly difficult to reverse. Whichever approach it prevails, it will likely have a profound and enduring impact on our economic freedom, democracy, and our informational rights.
David Chong said this in 1985, before we had surveillance capitalism, before we had web two, and before we have the state of Facebook, Instagram, all this collection of metadata, and the resailing to targeted ads, and all these other practices that we now deem evil in this world, but we now also have to live with. And so David Chong saw this in 1985, which is one of the reasons why he's such a fantastic character, and he's been dedicating his life to building private cryptographic systems that protect users data, and not just the contents of messages, but all of the data that those messages leak.
And who is the sender, who is the receiver, how big is that message, what time was that message sent, all of these bits of data that create a Sudoku puzzle that's solvable to track who we live in the world of what we now call the metaverse, but what's previously called just our online footprint. David Chong, his name is on this shirt. If you aren't watching the podcast, it's the shirt with all the cryptographers that this industry is built on. And so I will stop with my gushing, and I'll allow this conversation to progress into one of the core cryptographers that this entire crypto industry is built on right after we get to some of these fantastic sponsors that make the show possible.
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David, I am so honored to have you on this layer zero podcast. Welcome to Banclist. And it says so great to be here with you, David. So David, there was this episode that we did on Banclist a while ago called Before Bitcoin. And it was just a reading of one of my friend's explorations into the early days of cryptography. And I think that's something that this crypto industry really forgets to pay attention to as to the significance of the shoulders of giants that this industry stands on. And so I really want to go and explore that part of crypto history, like the pre-currency side of this industry going back to our roots and going back to the cryptography side of this industry.
You ready to go down that journey with me? Sure, sure. It's, yeah, I think you're right. It's something that most people don't pay enough attention to these days, although it is a layer sort of below what we're using today in a sense, but yeah, we can talk about it, sure. Yeah. And I actually want to start at the very beginning, cryptography has many different parallels that are less about math, right, like just like it's a puzzle, it's a it's a lock that you try and break. I'm wondering when you were growing up as a child, what were like the early indications or characteristics that were things that you like to pay attention to that later would be obvious about cryptography?
Of you. Yes. I was, you know, really the truth is that I appreciated the super strength of secrets as a child much. Yeah. Of course, I was interested in all kinds of security mechanisms and this sort of thing, but I really had a reverence for how powerful it is if you know something and no one else does, and I thought that maybe there was a way to leverage that to help make the world a better place. And what were some of those first things that captured your attention when you were young? Well, you know, I mean, it was a different growing up than a lot of, I think your listeners have. So I've had because, you know, there was anti-war movement and I was, you know, very much caught up in all that kind of thing and, you know, I learned how to program computers by punching the, the little squares out of the hall with cards with a toothpick that would give the DAC and then the weekend, the next week we go to, you know, back to the science museum and they'd give us the output from the, you know, Fortran program and it would say, you know, invalid punch in column six failed, you know, and it's time to repeat this process.
Yeah, so it was, I was interested in all kinds of things, but I think the really powerful force in my youth was the idea that the world really needed, it was going to go off in the wrong direction and it really needed some help and the power of secrecy maybe could be leveraged for that. So that's kind of, you know, they say people know their life story when they're sick or something, if you're read that, you know, they, yeah, something like that. Do you have any, what was the indications that came to you that the world was about to go off the rails, for example, I will, well, we think that, you know, like, you know, January six was a, you know, unprecedented big deal, but when I was growing up, you know, there was the whole water gate thing and people found that, you know, equally shocking and, you know, it's, there's, I think there's a common thread running through a lot of that stuff.
But, yeah, it's, it's, you know, the one Vietnam was not really that popular, but it was a pretty tragic thing and I think it, it polarized a galvanized, but there was a very different era, you know, people were extremely excited about the future as well because there was a lot, a lot of other vectors besides that one, you know, the war and all, but, yeah, I think, yeah, the power of technology to influence society, you know, was very much atop of mine also with nuclear weapons, for example, in those days and, you know, Cold War and all these things. It was, yeah, so as someone interested in technology, I could see that this was something that, you know, could be used by the powers that be in their standard way of using these kind of mechanisms and so on to sort of buttress their position and not really innovatively or maybe there was a different way through.
Yeah, I'm wondering if you thought about technology back then, back in the 60s, 70s, but also its relationship to politics and institutions. I'm wondering when did you make that connection or did you? I'm afraid I did and I, you know, I could, you know, I got a little bit of trouble here and there for kind of, you know, doing stuff and I was also like kind of a student of what the government was doing with technology, you know, and I would call people up and pretend to be like, you know, I don't know, much older than I was and find out all kinds of things and then people started like threatening me because they felt that I was, you know, trying into things that I shouldn't and so forth.
You know, sometimes like these, you know, I'd call these companies and then they would kind of send me over to some other guy who tried to entrap me, you know, he was some kind of spook that worked there. I mean, scary stuff like that happened. It was, you know, it was a different time, you know, you could order manuals for like, you know, the kind of all kinds of stuff for free, like how to build the IBM System 360 out of, you know, or how to, you know, how the very sophisticated burglar alarm technology worked or all kinds of stuff was a little more available in those days. And so I was interested in all these things, but with an eye towards seeing how they could be deployed in the people's interest as opposed to institutional interest.
I'd like to jump to your time at Berkeley. What was your major at Berkeley? Oh, well, you know, I was a graduate student there. I had gotten this like 40 graduate fellowship, regions for your graduate fellowship. They only gave one every two years. And for UCLA and I transferred to Berkeley at the first quarter, you know, I felt, you know, I was much happier there and now, but most of the people who were doing photography there left. You know, so there were one guy went to work for the government and another guy went to try to influence government. And so, you know, and Merkel had left then and so on.
But it was, it was fantastic being there. It was the beginning of, you know, my advisor will ran the Berkeley Linux Unix distribution project. And so my office mate was Eric Schmidt, you know, just the two of us sat in this office looking out at the Bell Tower and Bill Joy for what other founders son was, you know, kind of around the corner, you know, talked to him a lot. And so it was a very exciting place. But there was also this feeling like, you know, the government wants you to work for them, you know, and a lot of the funding was from DARPA and, you know, all kinds of government agencies and military organizations.
And, you know, a lot of big corporations stuff. And then there were a lot of people that didn't really want to participate in that. And, you know, so, I mean, I saw one of these, you know, the DARPA funding, you know, they always had the tagline, their posters and stuff. DARPA, a mission-oriented agency. And so I thought, you know, I'm going to be a mission-oriented agency. And I really decided just to devote myself to trying to use cryptography to make the world more, let's say, democratic. And that was my mission. And I basically stuck with that over the last 40 years, you know. So there were people who were interested sort of the, you know, the, the layer minus one of cryptography, let's say, was public key cryptography, you know, and there's a big deal when it was invented.
And, you know, so I knew all these people like Diffie was a buddy month. And then he moved, he lived right at the border of Berkeley. But then he moved to to Mount View. And so, you know, and so Marty Helman, and so Ralph Berkel had invented public key cryptography, but no one wanted to publish his paper. So it was only published like 10 years later with apologies, you know, he didn't have, but Diffie and Helman, their paper was published at a conference. And, you know, then it turns out that some smart, summer interns at the British NSA had also invented public key cryptography earlier than these guys.
And now he's running that place. So it, you know, and then there was, you know, so there was the RSA work, you know, as well. And I knew those folks, of course, as well. And but, you know, this was also an error that's hard to, hard to appreciate these days because there was government pressure not to do researching cryptography, public research. And in fact, and he had of the National Security Agency, the NSA, you know, it's a pretty serious organization, started in effect saying that the cryptography could be considered born classified, right, like nuclear secrets. So if you just thought of it yourself, it could still be classified automatically.
And so, and there was this guy started writing letters to the major, you know, IEEE ACM, the major scientific organizations, they say, don't have any conferences or sessions of cryptography, we're going to throw the book at you. And this was reported in Science Magazine, and you could read about it on my website, chom.com, and also that I thought, well, man, this cannot stand because cryptography is too important in technology to, you know, to empower individuals. And so I, you know, I sat in my apartment with my girlfriend, and we, it stuffed the envelopes for this, we created a, you know, had a conference on cryptography.
And we did it without using the phone. So we got the label, the addresses on paper from Len Adelman, and we, you know, we got went down to this place where they printed the free press, a little like off of telegraph avenue, you know, this little print shop where it was like, you know, don't ask, don't tell, just pay us casual print stuff. And they printed the invitations, and, you know, we mailed them back up then. So almost, most people that were interested that we knew of in the field came to the conference about a hundred people, and, you know, I stood up there, because there's the general chairman and organizer, I just stood up on the stage and said, okay, you know, thanks for coming.
You know, lunch will be 12, 13 or whatever, but bathrooms are over there. But now that you paid your, whatever it was, like 75 bucks, you're now a member of the international association for cryptologic research, which I secretly found it. And these are the officers, and the next event will be in Italy, and this guy is going to run it, you know, and, so there were a handful of people attending in suits, kind of like with their name badges, all said, you know, private citizen from, you know, a Laurel Maryland, where the NSA said, you want to say that they were working for you. But they were all there in the front row, they were very anxious, and I, you could just see them all turn green, because it was over, you know, they were trying to stop this research, but at that point, you know, because it was an international organization now, it's basically backed by the UN, and, you know, they couldn't stop it, so they never, like, put me in jail or anything.
So, yeah, I said cryptography free, and that's still the major organization, by far, this, that does research in cryptography, have three conferences every year, plus a handful of workshops every year, and publish the preceding, you know, the Journal of Cryptology, and a bunch of, you know, proceedings, and it's the main event, so it really created a community. It's, you know, pretty vibrant, still. And of course, all of this is going on during the whole counterculture of the late sixies and seventies, right? And I'm wondering how much of that counterculture is like ice of the seventies, worked its way into the cryptography community, because it sounds like you are quite rebellious, but I'm wondering, like, were, if you were a cryptographer, were you likely also a rebel, or were you more willing to work inside of state lines, or was everyone kind of on board with the whole, we are not a part of, we don't work for the government, we work for cryptography.
So overall, what would you say is the rebellious nature of the cryptography lumped in with the rest, I don't think it's fair to do so, because my, you know, angle, if you will, my vector, my approach, my mission has been, as I mentioned, to use cryptography to protect members of society and to protect democracy, and to allow democracy to flourish. And that entails what I call, and what is called privacy technology, basically mixing and blind signatures to put it very simply, and refer back maybe earlier, showing you mentioned. So the rest of the community was not working on that kind of stuff, that working on the layer below that, which is, you know, encryption and public key encryption.
You know, it's a lot of good work and hard work, but it's all about communication, security of the very basic type that you understand when you're a little kid, you know, you have the key, you send the message, encrypt it, you send the message, counterparty has the key, they decrypt it, and they get it, and the e-stropper can't hear it. I can't understand it, you know, can't decipher it. So that was the thing, you know, Zimmerman, all these guys focused on that, and the government was trying to block this sort of thing, they want people to use it, and they were trying to wheel out, since they couldn't do the board classified thing, they were saying, well, now it's, you know, export controls, and this and that, it's military equipment, and you can't, but that was a whole war, crypto wars, unbelievable, went on for a long time, and there were all kinds of advocacy groups, and people focused on that, but I had steered clear of all that.
So I was pretty much the only one working on privacy technology, the layer above that. So hiding, who talks to who, and when, the social graph, what's called traffic, and pretending traffic analysis, and allowing payments in such a context not to unwind the protections, and so it was a bit different, and only now with the XX network, I don't want to jump forward, but you know, we have this, I founded this project, XX Network, and it has a messenger, and it protects privacy, and so for the now, you know, I have to get, I have to include the end ending friction as well, and be involved in that, but that's another story, because none of the messengers today, you know, even though people moved to them thinking they were more private, none of them has quantum resistant end end encryption, and we do, and we announced it very widely, and no one, no one follows it, so it's like, I think that that proves basically that, that that has never really been the issue.
The real issue is traffic is the metadata, since we used to call it, was, what you're used to call it traffic analysis, you know, because it's far more revealing and harder to, you know, compromise by lying, or, you know, mostly people, and so on. There was a paper you that you wrote on this titled, Untraceable Electronic Mail Return Addresses in Digital Signatures, but there was a paper, sorry, right, and there was a paper, but I want to get there, but before there was a paper that you didn't write that was monumental in the world of crypto, called a new direction in cryptography from Martin Hellman.
That was your new development paper, yeah. Yeah, and when you look at this story very well, but that was about, that was about, you know, end end encryption. So basically, it's a simple, it's the thing I was betting before. Conventional cryptography, it, you basically have to drag the key that you make up over to the other guy, person, and then you too can, can use it to keep the e-stropper from listening in, with, with the advent of public key cryptography, which I mentioned, you know, the different people that come up with it, you could publish one of the keys, and anyone could use it to, let's say, encrypt the message that you could receive, that you could uniquely receive, and that made it so you didn't have to physically transport the keys.
It was still had to make sure you were using the right keys, it's not a complete panacea, but that's right, yes. Yeah, that was, that was a, you know, that paper, and I think the RSA paper were, you know, widely heralded and influential, sort of brought cryptography out from the, you know, little codes that you did as a kid out into this modern cryptography world, but it was thought by governments, and, you know, it was, it was a, it was a whole war. And in the end, you know, you sort of think the government lost, but really they won because they were able to delay this dramatically. And, and I think then in the end, misdirect people into focusing on that stuff and ignoring the metadata for, for the longest time until now.
Right. Certainly. Yeah. And this goes to what you were saying where this whole that this was the foundation that cryptography is built on, but what you were doing is something a little bit more applied, a little bit more on the data and privacy layer on, on top of like this basic cryptography, but, but, and, and, and you kinds of cryptography in order to do the privacy stuff. Right. So the mixing paper that you referenced, you know, you could build that just from public key, just for the basic, but for the payments, which are also needed, you have to have privacy and payments otherwise it'll ruin the privacy, unlike the ability that you would have in communication, right?
You know, you'd be linked by your payments. In order to achieve payment privacy, at least in those days, it was thought that you needed these, at innovation, the blind signatures, which I created, like for a whole bunch of other kinds of signatures, and no one else really did, you know, the undeniable signatures and the, all these other stuff. So it was, extended the functionality of the primitives with new features that that have proved to be an enduring value. And so it wasn't just really building on an earlier layer, use those things, but it also had fundamental cryptographic insights of its own that enabled its unique, up protections.
There's a quote that I want to read that I'm hoping that you can help elaborate for the listener. This is coming from Choms warning to the world in 1985, again from this before Bitcoin series, where you say that there are dangers of user data that is building up around computing systems. I'm wondering if you could unpack this quote and tell us what this means. Well, I mean, you know, basically it was my realization early on that the only way that there were only two ways, because it was in my early papers, in the scientific American, and the earlier version of that which published in the academic journals, it basically always said there's only two ways that technology could go.
And we see it today, you know, it's one way is where the powers that be can see everything you do, you know, and the other way is where you have the keys to prevent that. And you run the show from, you have the, you control the use of your own information by possession of your own keys. And those are the two competing scenarios. There's really no halfway middle ground. And you know, it's really starting to come to a head now because the fundamental difference between China as we perceive it, you know, in the West here, and our ethos of personal liberty and rights, and so on, liberal democracy is, you know, it's crystallized in the simple question of, does your messenger allow the government to see who you talk to and when or not?
That's basically what it comes down to. We chat people in China know that we chat, you know, can see everything they do. And that information's available to the government. So it's a kind of panopticon, you know, it's, it's a, it has a chilling effect on society, but it's, that's the way they want to do it. And what I said in 2018 was that, you know, our, the XX messenger, the XX network project was going to, and the XX messenger was going to be a we chat with privacy built in. And that's what we've done now. And that's the fundamental difference. So, you know, we talk, you hear a lot about CBDC.
Is that something you talk about on your internet? Well, you know, there's only two kinds of CBDC. There's the kind with privacy and the kind without. And, you know, when the European Central Bank had a whole big comment thing on, on CBDC, you know, majority of the comments were about privacy that people wanted at it. And so it's not easy to get in the CBDC. But, you know, if, if we do a CBDC like that just fully surveillance, capable, it doesn't give the actual privacy keys to the users, allow them to create them. Then, you know, we're not going to have the moral high ground, over, over China.
I mean, the people are trying to precipitate some kind of new cold war or something. I'm not a big fan of that, but it would seem that the basis of it is that if it's not a free society and they're spying on people and, you know, the state has too much power. And that really comes down to, does we, can we chat, see who you talk to or not? And what kind of CBDC, are we going to build and what kind of message are we going to have? The ones that actually let you protect that or it's going to be like, trust us, you know, or the government has the keys because we might need to check on you, you know, and all that.
You know, that's, that's, that's basically the fork in the road. And I wrote about that and saw that a very early on in no uncertain terms. And it remains the central issue because it's so fundamental. There's no way to protect your own information, unless you have the keys to it. You know, it's, you just can't trust other people with your keys because you don't know if they leak what they leak and what they do. And so it's as simple as that. This is one of the immaculate parts of your story, I think, is that in 1985, you talked about this fork in the road where one would leave lead to a panopticon and one would lead to user privacy.
And it seems to have not true. Yeah, yes, certainly. And it seems to only get more and more and more true as our technology these days becomes more and more powerful. Oh, yeah, people are realizing it. Now the surveys show, you know, we hear a lot about web three, but look at the surveys they show international and US surveys. The major, you know, giant thousand people surveyed show that people find three quarters of people find privacy of the internet. So web two, as the biggest problem, the one thing they really don't like, it's also the top three things they don't like, you know, different, different names, you know.
So it's like the world has come around to the, you know, so if you're going to build web three, you better build something that people want, which is something that allows them to protect their own information. It's not good enough that you say you're going to protect it or that, you know, there's a presumption that you will that that's just not going to cut it these days. And so that's that's the hope for me for web three. And that's basically reach out with privacy inside. That's the thin end of the wedge. And then from there, you can build out more privacy platform. And then, you know, there's other things that you want to decentralize, of course.
And, you know, and I mean, and I'm not trying to diminish the significance of, you know, the new kind of models and paradigms that have, you know, emerged from the, from the crypto blockchains phase. I mean, there's a lot of interesting new stuff. But that's the fundamental divide, yeah. Still. What would you say? Can you take us back to David trauma 1985 and tell us what made it so obvious that there was this massive fork in the road? Like what did you see that no one else saw back in 1985? I saw it in the late seventies, late seventies, yeah, was the first, I published the mixing article, which now there's 65,000 references to technical papers.
I don't know what that translates into in terms of likes, but I think it's a lot. And so because it's not, you know, they had to say something about it, I guess. So, it's, you know, that I was sitting in the hot tub in Berkeley with my professor. Yeah, okay, you know, we were, you know, swim trunks or whatever. It was like, like, you know, it was like, he had this hot tub. And he said, come on over, you know, a house, you know, we'll talk, you know, about your research. And, you know, that's the way it was. It's not like now, you know, where people are afraid it, you know, your professor's house had hang out.
And so he had like the redwood trees in his backyard, you know, sitting there and looking up at the redwood trees and trying to figure out, well, if we really need to sell the privacy problem, how can we work on that? Well, let's see, what would be the simplest kind of basic problem that you could start with, you know, to, you know, to kind of toy problem to work on it, you know, that's the way often you sort of get you know, make progress in science. And so, you know, I said, well, voting, you know, let's work on voting. And so I came up with mixed nets to solve voting. And it's still in that mixed paper.
There's a couple paragraphs on the voting, but it's a little bit broader than that. You know, then I read this article, this guy named Paul Baron at the Rand Institute, you know, like these kind of government sponsored think tanks that, you know, was involved in all kinds of spooky stuff. You know, they were talking about traffic analysis and all this. And I'm like, well, this is bad news. So yeah, I was like, doubly motivated to work on it. And, you know, in those days. So, you know, I think what gave me the insight that, you know, circle back your question is, is that I knew that you could solve it.
I think that you're still the case. A lot of people think, Oh, you know, I can't, you know, there's fine on me. They're spamming me with fake news. They're this and that. They're exploiting my data for making money off it. But, you know, what can I do? I need to be on this or that platform to, you know, like, you know, there's nowhere else to go. Really, you can't really vote with your feet. I mean, some of the platforms that have held themselves out, like I said, to provide privacy. I now really question, I don't want to, you know, malign them. But I, I challenge you to find any message or besides the exit, you know, the liquor that actually uses quantum resistant security on the end and encryption.
So, they've always been saying, use end, you know, end and encryption. That's the B.O. That's why you should move to our, but it's, it's fake because they're not upgrading it. And the US government has, you know, there's a presidential directive. All government has to use quantum resistant VPN and everything because otherwise, you know, the point is, you know, for privacy, if, you know, you may think quantum resistance has something to have some tinfoil connection, but actually, for privacy, it's like extremely conservative and solid because it's not questioned that quantum computers will ultimately be able to break these codes that are used.
You know, because people use public key to set up the communications, quantum computers can break it. And so, ironically, so, you know, Ed Snowden told us that the government was involved in what they called the full take. They capture everything and they save it. They've always been doing that. We knew that back back in the day. The NSA said, oh, send us your used magnetic takes with all those phone records on them. You know, we'll give you brand new tapes in exchange. And the phone company said, oh, that's, that's great. Yeah, it's like, yeah, they have these huge facilities. So, you could, you know, look at them.
It's frightening. Like store all this stuff. They're just waiting, or maybe they already have quantum computers or whatever. When they're interested enough, they'll be able to, you know, to look into that data retroactively. And so, governments have taken the affirmative stop this possibility. And I think that the public should as well. But the people that we're trusting with to help us seem to be asleep at the switch. And that's leaving the whole metadata issue out. There is no messenger out there besides Elixir that's protecting your metadata. So they're all just keep talking about how they have strong end encryption.
But it's not that strong anymore. You know, it's, it's public key base, which means it's, it can be broken by quantum computer. So, yeah, I mean, Russian speaking, you know, it's so it's based on, you know, earlier and government standardized public key group systems, which are, yeah. So, yeah, I think it was, you know, the more I looked into it, okay, and I said, well, great. I've got this communication system that can solve the metadata problem that can solve keep confidential who you talk to and when. But then I had to find a way to do payments over that system that doesn't undo the privacy.
And I found that. And then the third and final piece with vice-aggressive was that the blind signatures could actually be generalized into what I call the credential mechanism that, which you might think of as a kind as your knowledge minimum disclosure proof or something like that, but it's a little different than that that allows you to basically answer, you know, you can keep the full database of information about yourself that normally would be under the current paradigm would be maintained piecemeal by different organizations, you know, government agencies and companies and so on. And they could potentially link all your records together by your identity, right?
You could maintain all that data yourself. They wouldn't have it because you would deal with each of them under a different digital pseudonym, a different public key. And then if they wanted to know something about you, they could ask you. And then you would, you could answer if you chose to and whatever way you wanted, but then you could prove that your answer was correct with like zero knowledge minimum disclosure. This was the cryptographic stuff. So that you could, so basically you could organize society that way. Only you would know who you talked to when you could do payments privately.
And the database of information about yourself would be your exclusive property. But I argued in those papers in the mid-80s that the data that organizations would get would actually be better and more useful to them. Because right now they ask for you to voluntarily tell them all this stuff and you could lie to them and so on. And then they have to sift through all this. And whereas this way, you know, you just answer the exact question that they want to know. Are you allowed to be here in this event? You know, do you have a driver's license? You pay your car insurance or you at least 18 years old, you know, whatever.
And you just say, yes, I am qualified. And that's it. They don't need to know all the, you know, supporting information. And why do they need it? It doesn't really help them. And then so it's just it's a better way to do it. And I, that was the, I showed how to do that in the scientific American article, achieving electronic privacy. And it's more technical antecedents. So, but that, so once I realized that you could do all three parts, just all you really need. That's when I, you know, that caused me to double down my commitment to try to push this all forward. But the public awareness wasn't really there, of course.
You know, back in the day, you talk about privacy, it sounds like a very kind of wimpy, you know, issue or some kind of thing. But now, you know, there's a massive recognition that this is the whole game, I think. That's what I've always experienced. You said the phrase minimum disclosure. I'm wondering if you could unpack and elaborate on what that means and how you might organize that around as a principle. A couple of fish. So I was at an event in Marseille at a university called Lumini. It was a little mansion. And there were these ladies there in, in cook outfits, making this giant of Marseille fish soup to celebrate the end of our one week conference on randomness.
But at that conference, I presented a model that a technique basically commuted the circuit diagrams. And you can still see it on my website, that my publication is strom.com, that with Kropow and Brassard. I believe that included both models, both what's called zero knowledge and what's called minimum disclosure. And the zero knowledge people just hated us and they kept trying to say, oh, you didn't really do it. And, you know, suppressing our papers and the references. It was so painful. And, you know, dishonest in my view. But in any case, we cut a deal with them. That they would call the more, you know, such the one model minimum disclosure and they would call the model that they created zero knowledge.
So I showed you to do both. One construction they could do either mix and match them. And then also if you look on my website, this five master's double agent that showed how you can combine all the models and get the best of both worlds. So it's, that's why. So it was a weird political thing that happened in science. And that's why it's called minimum disclosure. But, you know, it just depends on whether you want the secrets to be protected unconditionally. In other words, against the quantum computer and infinite computing power or whether you're willing to allow the secrets to be protected by some problem that you assume is hard to solve.
And so, of course, in my early career, I was all about protecting secrets unconditionally because I argued that, you know, how could an individual know what kind of computing power, you know, governments would have or in the future and so on. But it turns out that in voting, what you really want to be sure of is that the outcome is correct. And so what we proved is you can't have it both ways. You have the secrecy of the secrets and the correctness of the outcome. And one of them can be unconditional and that forces the other one at best, the force of the other one to be based on a computational assumption, assuming a certain kind of, you know, problem can't be solved.
And so for voting, you want to do it the other way. And, you know, can I just interject something about voting? I don't want to, I just want to mention this because it's not a thing a lot of people don't realize. And it's very interesting to me because we just saw that we just got this paper, except in the last couple of weeks. So there's this longstanding issue with voting technology, one of vote online, you know, you're not in a booth. So someone could bribe you or course you like threaten you. And there's really, you know, you could lie stream your voting act. So there has not been a satisfactory solution to that in a literature.
You look at my website, you see I did a lot to try to create a voting technology community as well, the books that I published and stuff. So it turns out that we finally found a way to do it. And it's called vote xx.org. You can look at, you can see it, but basically it just says it's kind of like quantum mechanics. It's an interesting, I won't go into it here, but it's quite practical. And we've built the software for it. And we're going to let a lot of people help us. And some people have volunteered to incentivize that process. And so we're going to try to make it really usable, but the basic evidence are running.
And so we proved it with the strongest type of proof, which is the so called universal composability framework proof. So it's like really really strong, but basically, it renders voting, um, unimproperately influence a ball. You can't go or sort of a bribe voters really effectively. And so that's necessary for if you want democracy to flourish because, you know, I think you need a little more voting and a little more unstructed, you know, sample voting, if you could read about it on my website, you know, that's the way I think it really needs to be done because that that scales with the complexity of society, you know, and that, um, is a, um, and I've got some new results coming out.
It's, you know, it obvious a lot of these theorems like arrows theorem and stuff like that, you know, big problems with social choice theory. So it's, uh, sample voting is a really, really nice, um, but it means that people aren't always voting at the same time. So you can't really go to booths. You got to do it. You got to be able to, that's everyone realize you got it's democracy to flourish. You got to be able to, you can't have the booths because if you booths sometimes they spy on you, people, you know, harass you, you can get there, all the stuff. And, you know, and here, you like in LA, uh, you know, there's a lot of polling places that never open every election, handful of them, you know, because that, and that just that locks out a certain group of votes.
So even, um, yeah, uh, we solved that recently in the VOTIX X and, uh, that, it's a subtle thing, but it was the final sort of missing link, uh, to allow, uh, democracy to flourish because it's not enough just to be able to vote securely online. You have to stop this improper influence. And so it's proven elusive, but now we got it. We nailed it. Certainly. Uh, the, the other part thing I'd like to define is, um, just the traffic problem. We, we talked about that a number of times. Uh, could you talk, let's talk about traffic analysis and just the nuances that that brings to the table when it comes to like, uh, privacy.
Yeah. Well, there's, uh, it, thanks for asking. Uh, it's, uh, you know, the basic traffic analysis. That's what the military used to call it. And I mean, one of, let me just fill it a little bit to your list. Let's just get the sense of this because one of the, the really crazy things about trying to find out who talks to whom and when is that it's always been legal for any government agency to ask for that information. So there was something called a mail cover, you know, any agency, US government could fill out a form and get your, your, make your postman right down every single address you send to and every single address that sends to you in the weight of each envelope, but not open them.
Open them. That's different. That requires, you know, a court order and the same thing with the phone company, you know, like, oh, sure, we, you know, we can tell you who you, who this, who calls and who you call and so on. And I think that, um, you know, where mobile phones are sort of seems to fall into that category too, right? And so, you know, most people are unaware of this. And they think that that's information is somehow protected. And so when a company says, oh, we don't, you know, we don't respond to, you know, unless they have a subpoena, we're not going to tell them, you know, but, but the traffic data they give, they look at the, you know, Apple said, oh, we're not going to give the keys to open this phone, you know, the password for that phone famously, but they gave tons of information about all the transactions that were done with that phone.
You can read it's in the court records. It was known, you know, it's, there's a, it's, this is the double thing that I was, uh, referring to, right, that, that people say, uh, you know, oh, you know, it's like, don't look behind the curtain, don't look at that. No, the man behind the curtain, you know, you've got strong end in encryption here. Let's look at this. Zuckerberg, you know, uh, statements on privacy that he's made of several really long statements even and that it's all about this. Well, you know, it's strong end in encryption working. I moved to that, but don't worry about the traffic data.
We'll take over that. We may need that to stop spam, you know, something like that. So it's always been, uh, something that's never really discussed in a clear open manner. But yeah, but basically, you know, uh, the, the social graph, who your friends are and when you talk to them and so on, is so revealing. Like I said earlier, you can't lie about that really. You can't mislead, you know, uh, so for instance, when I was at Berkeley, I went over to the, you know, the Doe Library, the main library and they had the congressional record on the steps, you know, in the basement there. And um, you could read the hearings where, unless you recall, but during that period, the CIA was compelled to reveal their message in one example of their covert, you know, whatever they call it, claims some methods.
Uh, and the Congress was going to get to choose which, which instance they would look into. And that wouldn't really set them back too much, what it would give the Congress this oversight. And so they chose the, the, the coup in Chile. And so that you could read the, the sworn testimony of the CIA about how they did it. How did they go in there and just take it over and get, you know, switch the government there. And how do they do it? Traffic analysis. They just put software in the phone exchange at the presidential, whatever, you know, palace or whatever it was facility. Because of the American made photo exchange probably, right?
But they just put some like malware in there that, um, would every night call Washington DC to some random number and upload all the traffic data, which, which phone called which phone at what time and how long they spoke. And then the CIA, it's also public. They, they, they, they paid all these universities to develop sophisticated analysis of, of data like that. You know, it wasn't, I don't know exactly. I think it's an advance so that they had this capability, social graphs, and they could, so basically you could look and see, oh, who called who just before this event and then who called who after it and so on.
They knew exactly who was running the country and they just went in there and, uh, you know, surgically took it over. No big deal traffic analysis. That's, that's, that's stock. Just to double down on the metaphor that you used earlier, we have this envelope that has a packet of data inside of it. So it's just a letter, for example, and end-to-end encryption assures that that envelope is going to stay closed and it's going to protect the data that's inside of that message. But what it doesn't do is all the rest of the data that's outside of the envelope, which is who is coming from where it's going, the time that it's going, and then what you said also like how, how much of a, of a payload that data is like how is there a little bit of data or a lot of data?
And what I'm, what you're saying is that, well, you, sure, if the encryption, it hides the actual, met actual message, but when you have so much of the metadata, the peripheral data and you have, you collect all of that, it's a little bit like a Sudoku puzzle. You can kind of fill in the blanks just by, just by kind of figuring it out. Yeah, you can link it to all kinds of other databases like this, this data about where your phone is at all times. That's like, you can buy that for almost nothing from these companies that just capture it. So any other data you have, you can start to correlate and link in.
So let me mention something else real briefly. I just presented this at a conference in Berlin a couple of days ago for the first time, but let me just point out to you that if you are listening, maybe some messenger service, let's just say, it's not going to give you the traffic data because they know it because they route all the messages, right? You just listen near their location because you have the full take, right? So or whatever, you just tap the internet near their location and you just notice all that the IP address is coming in and going out. Well, it doesn't take long to use statistical techniques to find out how many, let's say server processes, they are running how many threads, how many cores and threads are running in there and you'll start to see that certain IP addresses always end up talking to other ones.
So then assuming that the processing is first in first out, which of course it is, all of a sudden, now you can see the full interconnection, which IP addresses are talking to which IP addresses and then you can link that with the phone number stuff and you've got it all, you don't have to get the cooperation of the messenger services. So that's a programming project for undergraduates in my opinion. That's not really that hard to do. So this traffic data is not well protected, not under law and not in practice. Is this what supports? Is this what supports this surveillance capitalism that we have today where I get targeted ads based off of certain data that I like exhaust into the internet?
Is this that same problem that we're talking about? It's tightly coupled. In a lot of cases, Web 2, you have no real choice, you sign up, now you leave for this service and you start exploring a lot of data to it. They have a lot of data internally. They don't need to do traffic analysis. I mean, they can just link all kinds of things they have the data and that's I think a part of it. But yes, those surprising little ads you get for whatever the funny things. Yeah, that's when one service links to another just based on your IP address, for example. Yeah, so it's extremely poor. I don't know if it's easily interlinked based on, just riffing on what I was saying about breaking a messenger's traffic data.
But there's a lot of different sources of data and it's not hard to link them all together because they're all based in effect on your identity. It could be your IP address, your name, your Google, whatever, but it's location. There's a lot of different clues and you can just link it all together. That's why, like you said in the mid-80s, I said, look, we got to the only way so that you can control your own information is just to make sure that you talk to everyone under a different pseudonym and you talk over a mix network. So there is no metadata linking. No one knows your IP address. That's how people were surprised to see how much Bitcoin they're doing with Bitcoin.
That's the IP address. Don't see your IP address because you speak over a mix network and use a different pseudonym. So yes, you can authenticate yourself as the owner of that account or whatever and you can prove that your answers are correct with minimum disclosure as we discussed, right? But you don't have to allow those entities that you talk to to know enough about you to link whatever it is they're collecting about. Each one is collected about you to the stuff that the other ones have collected. That's precluded. By that technique, you divide them up. You know, you partition them. You build firewalls between them because you have different identities with each one.
That's the only way. I think the metaphor in the crypto world is that it would be like if you made a new transaction with a brand new wallet every single time. Well, that's not going to do it, but yes, but with a different IP address. With a different IP, oh yes, right. The principle there. The only way to get that different IP addresses to use a mix network to appear somewhere else in the world. So basically, you're going to have mixing and you're going to have digital pseudonyms and you have to have a way to prove stuff between them. If you want to benefit from your, you know, you can do anything totally all the card.
But if you want to be able to say, well, look, I paid my taxes. I, you know, I've got this much money in the bank. I paid my insurance. I got this, this advanced degree or whatever it is, this passport, this, you know, I'm at this age or whatever, then you need to have a credential mechanism that allows you to approve things about the statements that each individual organization gives you under the respective pseudonym that you uniquely use with them. There is a brand new staking feature in the ledger live app two days. We all like staking the assets that we're bullish on. And now you can stake seven different coins inside the ledger live app.
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So go to across.to to quickly and securely bridge your assets between Ethereum, Optimism, Polygon, Arbitrum, or Boba Networks. And there's a, I want to go back to this fork in the road comment and there's another quote that I want to read that I thought was really, really powerful. This is from an article that says projecting the vision of the two futures, one built with the current technology and one built with decentralized services, David saw that their two approaches appeared to hold quite different answers. Large scale automated transaction systems are imminent. And as the initial choice for their architecture, it's rather economic and social momentum.
It becomes increasingly difficult to reverse. Whichever approach prevails, it will likely have a profound and enduring impact on economic freedom, democracy, and our informational rights. Now, sadly, I already kind of know, David, which path we went down. It's kind of the one that we give away all of our privacy. But I'm wondering, like, if we go back to 1985 and then zoom forward to where we are today, is it as bad as you worried about? Is it not as bad? Currently, the state of like user sovereignty and user data today, is it as bad as you thought it could get? Is it worse? Is it better? Just like, how bad is it in like what were your thoughts on where we are today?
Well, it's pretty bad. Currently, it's worse than it seems to be because, you know, as they say, they keep it all. If you had a massive data, you're not going to, you know, announce it. And there's a lot of progress in machine learning and so on that's unreported. And that, you know, this people, you know, economically, benefit enormously from this data capture, as you know, and they're, they're, you know, going ahead very aggressively trying to, you know, squeeze more out of it. But what I would like to, so it's worse than you think, however, in my own defense, I want to say that if you go back and read those, you know, those statements, what I actually let's say, prophesized was not so much an inevitability.
I mean, I was trying to, you know, scare people, say, you know, if you get really bad, hard to dig your way out of. But, you know, what I, what I prophesized was that, you know, it would be kind of a, a Gaelian, you know, say, you know, the people would get all riled up and push back and, and win some stuff back. It would be a, it would be come up a bit of a struggle. And, but make no mistake, you cannot win the local war. You know, it's one thing. It's, you know, it's all that data is ligable or, or not, you're either hosed or you're not, you can't, can't have it halfway. And I was going to like, well, it's pretty much okay.
Because in this part, it's, right, you know, okay. But what I will say also, the, the qualify that briefly, and I think, and importantly, is that, and this is an insight that I've had subsequent to those publications. You know, I mean, because of the internet of things, let's say, and all the cameras that people seem to have put up with and all this existing data that's out there, right? You know, there are certain things that are pretty much hopeless, and probably not worth finding about. And there's certain, you know, when you're walking down the street of it, you know, you know, you're going to wear a bag over your head or what, you know, it's kind of hard to really win in that domain.
So what I argue now is that what is strictly needed for democracy to prevail is that individuals must have a protected sphere where they are certain that are free to discuss, you know, political and other matters and pay for information and be paid for information with their, let's say, friends and family and their people that they want to communicate with. You must have that protected sphere. Otherwise, you cannot have democracy. It's a necessary condition. And now, with the stuff you know about voting and so on, it's actually sufficient to have democracy. And then that's democracy. Can later, you know, take the cameras down and do this.
But you've got to get over the idea that the government needs to see everything you do. You have to give people a protected sphere or there is no possibility that they can really be participants in a democracy. So, you know, if you want to say that we're different from China, then you either have to provide the protected sphere wholeheartedly, you know, no, no, no, no, see your little holdbacks or just, you know, just give it up and say, okay, we're, you know, we're just going to spy everybody just like they do and there's no real difference. That's, so that's my, you know, I think that's very pragmatic.
Approach so it's very optimistic because the XX network has those capabilities already. We have a way to have those protected spheres. You know, a thing that just to drive it home for a minute, you know, a colorful thing is, you know, that I don't know how many of your listeners realized that coffee was criminalized both in England and also in the Middle East for the longest time by rulers who felt that if people got together in coffee houses, who knows what they would be talking about, it's, look it up, it's startling, you know, and this revolutionary thought. Yeah, it's, it's really, it's quite surprising.
So, 500 years, so it's like, you know, this is, I think it makes the point, you know, you'd need, you know, there was this bookstore in San Francisco, I think it's the fung now, but it was called a clean while well-lighted place for books. I always like the name of it. You need a protected sphere, a place where you can be, where you can have a actual political consciousness and development and discuss issues and actually meaningfully participate in governance. Absent that, there's no, there's no democracy and it's not much to ask for. And, you know, if you try to criminalize that, claiming, you know, some kind of, you know, abuse of this or that, I mean, you're throwing the baby out with the bathwater, you know, yeah, sure, there might be some trade-offs and I don't want to get into all this kind of, you know, don't kill people, it's the people, whatever it is.
But, no, you want democracy, that is a necessary condition. So, just understand that and get over it. And, you know, like, the thing is that, you know, the NSA said, oh, we need to spy on everybody and they had all these programs spend billions of billions of dollars. They never caught anybody. And, if you read the reports on that, it's just ridiculous. You know, they had all this, this surveillance, so they never really found any, you know, so it's like, okay, you know, if there are a few people that are really doing evil, then don't follow them around, you know, use the old, you don't need to use the new techniques to stop that.
There isn't, it isn't at that scale. There's really no rationalization for it. And then if you take it to the next level, I mean, those countries that try to suppress this will lose out, in my view, in the, you know, in the medium term, because there's so much economic opportunity in creating, let's say, a level playing field for financial transactions and services globally, you know, we're paying basically $3 trillion annually in fees for financial services. It depends on your school of economics, but that's at a huge cost in society. And what one thing that blockchain has done is shown that you don't actually need that.
You can do financial services. I mean, two trillion of that is payments. You can do it without, you know, this whole huge overhead. And so when you, you know, if you unleash this, there's a lot of economic opportunity there. And if those governments that don't have a way to allow people to pay their taxes meaningfully, in that context, will suffer. They'll either try to stop it and that'll be horrible for them or they won't get the revenue and that could be a big problem. And so those kind of techniques that I mentioned, the credential mechanism will allow you to say, okay, I'm proving that I'm paying the correct taxes without telling you anything about what I'm doing.
And that's way better for, just like I say, for, you know, for companies. That's way better. Because now they actually have a proof, you know, you send the taxes. Who knows? It's really true. Whatever, you know, everyone's fudging on it. It depends on the country, right? In Brazil, it's like 50% fudging. I think that's what I heard when I was there. So it's, you know, you, you basically prove that you're paying the right amount and that's it. Done. You know, so that's far better strategy for a liberal democracy than trying to say, oh, no, no, we can't let you have your, you know, your protected sphere because it's just too dangerous to society.
You know, that's, that's, it's really a doomed take. So, you know, we are at a critical juncture. Certainly. I'd like to actually zoom back in time really quick because there's this line that stuck out to me while I was doing some of my homework from one of your headteachers. I believe at, I believe at, at Berkeley. And it was while you were working on your mix networks. Yeah. The, your headteacher said, and this is when you are getting into that. Manwell Blum was the head of the department is a theoretical computer scientist. You know, I took his graduate theory seminar, and I knew only one who got an A plus in it because I proved a more general result in half the page.
All his, his, you know, star students like McColley and, and, and so on. They didn't do anywhere near as well. So, but I was in the theory student. Right. So, but, yeah, man, he was, you know, it's quite a, you know, a presence in the department. And again, this, yeah, going, this is going, I believe in it with mix networks, which is the concept of like decentralization, but, you know, all the, all the way back then. And he said, don't work on this because you can never tell the effects of a new idea on society. That's right. What, what did you, what did you think when your professor told you this?
You know, well, this was, this was about my dissertation topic, which was, you can see it on my website is actually blockchain. It was actually, it was called the, you know, computer systems established maintaining trust by digit by mutually suspicious parties. It was a way to do a consensus, you know, with cryptography with a bunch of nodes, and they could add nodes and take them out. And so, this was, you know, aimed at providing multi-party computation, which later I found a theoretical way to solve. And you can also read about that on my website, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, uh, uh, spinester's double agent problem that I mentioned earlier.
But, yeah, so, uh, in that district, the, it's, it's in the acknowledgments of my dissertation. I think, Manuel Blum, for, you know, trying to tell me that you could never anticipate the effective technologies on society. This is a common, uh, thing that's believed, you know, because it's too hard to anticipate, you know, so I should not work on things that I thought would make the world better because who knows, they might make it worse. But I, I, I dedicated to him because I said it was the rejection of that principle that, you know, uh, uh, you know, it's the motivation for, for, for doing this dissertation because I think that privacy technology is different, uh, from other technologies in that respect.
The only known use is really to allow, you know, liberal democracy to flourish. It's really only about empowering people. You don't need anything fancy to allow, like what I call a monolithic model of security, or, you know, it's all controlled by the government and everything's hierarchical. Uh, and so, there's no real evil use for privacy technology in my, in my view. It's, it's, it's our main way through. It's the way to make information technology create a, a, a real, a new world that we would like to live in as opposed to a new world that we really will not like to live in. David, Tom, privacy is the way to have a flourishing liberal democracy is definitely one of the, the subtext that we talked about on this bankless podcast.
So you could not have said it better myself. If you had a message for the cryptocurrency industry, not the cryptography industry, what would it be? What would you say to the collective cryptocurrency industry? Well, I mean, it's been a blast. It's been so, you know, what has been achieved is so fantastic because it created so much outside of the control of government. It's, it's, it's caused a lot of, uh, heads to turn and, and, and possibilities to be opened up and, uh, you know, it's, uh, it's a, it's a, it's a very, uh, exciting, um, community and, um, you know, uh, I'm, um, yeah, I'm, I'm just, I'm thrilled that I, you know, could have been doing some of the early work that, uh, you know, that led to this.
And, but, uh, yeah, I think it's also, you know, don't, don't forget about the kind of future we're trying to build here. Also, I guess, based on, you know, uh, but I mean, it's not front and center, you know, it's not everyone's focus. It is mine. Um, you know, and, um, I mean, I'm not, not even enough to think that, you know, one can force this through. I mean, you have to find sort of a way to incentivize everyone and then sort of spread the word and, and, uh, create a situation where it's, uh, you know, uh, everyone's pulling together to make it happen. But I guess right now we have the wind that are back because the vast majority of the public realizes this is what's needed.
It's quite different from just even a few years ago. It's really, uh, you know, it's, it's a, it's a profound, uh, opportunity at this moment. And, um, yeah, so I hope we can, uh, seize it and, uh, yeah. Yeah, having, uh, trying to get the crypto world to zoom out and focus on the long term, sometimes it only works in the bear markets and not the whole markets. Yeah, I mean, that's an optimistic way to look at the current situation. Yeah, people can, yeah, work on stuff now because yeah, when you, when things are really, yeah, I, I know you, that's, that's a good point. Yeah, this is the time to do it.
And, you know, I'm certainly, uh, trying to double down and, and, and move this all forward. And, um, yeah, I'm, uh, I'm excited. I'm , yeah, it's, it's, uh, it's a little bit of, you know, uh, unfortunate that we can't all like, you know, meet and try. Oh, there was kind of wear me out, you know, you know, but, um, yeah, it's, uh, hopefully, I mean, I think, yeah, it's certain, I believe it's certain that we're going to pull through this and, uh, it's, you know, and, uh, I think you're right. We will probably come out way more medium-term focus than we were when we went in. And so that's a huge opportunity right there.
Yeah. Certainly. Uh, the other fantastic thing I really enjoy about this industry is that the cryptocurrency industry stands on top of the cryptography industry, but the cryptography industry is, it's, it was built in the 60s and thrived in the 70s and then came alive in the 80s. And that is not that long ago. And so, it's an honor, David, to be able to talk to you and, and host you on this podcast because we stand on top of the shoulders of giants and you are one of those giants that the entire industry stands upon. So just thank you so much for everything you've done for the world of data, privacy, cryptography, and allowing us to have this flourishing ecosystem to, uh, play fun games in.
Well, I, you know, thanks, thanks for recognizing it, uh, David and I, I just, I have to say, watch this space, as they say. You know, I've got some, uh, new stuff, which I'm very, very excited about. Uh, some of which you can see on my website, some of it's not up yet, but, uh, yeah, I was, you know, even though we saw the basic problems in our, uh, current stuff is, uh, really, uh, enough to move things forward. Uh, there's some, some interesting new developments that I'm also super excited about and I, uh, uh, uh, I don't judge it to, uh, uh, listeners that, you know, keep the airs open for some new stuff coming out soon.
It's, uh, it's, uh, pretty, pretty exciting stuff. Certainly. We will, we will put all of the links to, uh, charm.com, I believe, uh, in, in the show notes and also everything about a link style to, uh, XX network as well. Awesome. This was so great. Thank you so much. Hey, we hope you enjoyed the video. If you did, head over to bankless HQ right now to develop your crypto investing skills and learn how to free yourself from banks and gain your financial independence. We recommend joining our daily newsletter podcast and community as a bankless premium subscriber to get the most out of your bankless experience.
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