Today on the show, we’re talking about Oval, a new DeFi primitive that Hart Lambur from UMA is introducing to the world of DeFi’s biggest lending markets. Billions of dollars have been liquidated from protocols like Aave, Compound, and MakerDAO over the years, and these liquidations have been extremely inefficiently priced, due to reasons! Reasons that we will discuss here on the show today.
Hasu also joins us on this conversation today to discuss the way that MEV share from Flashbots is a part of this conversation, and he helps illuminate what this means for DeFi going forward as a whole.
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------ TIMESTAMPS 0:00 Intro 7:15 MEV & Oracle Foundations 11:19 Why Solving MEV is Important 21:16 High-Level Patterns 28:19 The Oval Mechanism 42:23 MEV Share Parameters 48:36 Decentralization of the MEV Share 54:30 Auction Length 56:08 Oval B/D Adoption 58:05 Uniswap v4 1:02:31 Oval Cut Upside 1:05:45 Future Questions to be Answered 1:08:42 Closing & Disclaimers
------ RESOURCES
What is SUAVE? FlashBots Phil Daian and Andrew Miller explain https://youtu.be/j3ZM2ZdUWXU
Oval https://uma.xyz/ https://twitter.com/UMAprotocol
Hart https://twitter.com/hal2001
Hasu https://twitter.com/hasufl
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No summary for this episode yet.
Welcome to Bankless, where we explore the frontier of DeFi market structure and capital efficiency. Today, on the show, we're talking about Oval, a new DeFi primitive that heartlambar from UMA is introducing to the world of DeFi's biggest lending markets. Billions of dollars have been liquidated from protocols like Ave, Compound, and Maker Dow over the years, and these liquidations have been extremely inefficiently priced due to reasons, reasons that we'll be discussed here on the show today. The long arc of DeFi has been one that trends towards capital efficiency, efficient price discovery, and ultimately better quality products for its users.
This episode today discusses a new mechanism to further DeFi's maturity on this very important arc. Hazu also joins us on this conversation today to discuss the way that MEV share from flashboss is a part of this conversation, as well as helping illuminate the further direction that DeFi is going forward as a whole with mechanisms like this. One more part to this conversation that I want to add here that was unsaid in the podcast. This conversation is about bringing mechanisms into DeFi that allows DeFi to leak less value to MEV boss, allowing DeFi customers and users to retain all that value, and also increasing the economic viability of the DeFi app layer on Ethereum and in crypto broadly.
This is a transfer of value away from MEV arbitrages to DeFi apps. What this ultimately means is that this is a transfer of value away from ETH validators, the ultimate beneficiaries of MEV and towards the users and customers of DeFi products on the Ethereum app layer. As in long been known that the ultimate destination of the DeFi landscape, no matter what chain we're talking about, Ethereum, Cosmos, whatever, is that the value that MEV has will ultimately be retained by the source of that MEV, not by any downstream actors. The reason for this is obvious, if you're an application that creates MEV, you're also the entity that has the most optionality of directing where that MEV goes and its conditions for capture.
So why wouldn't you just capture it for yourself and improve your bottom line and the quality of your product for your users? This early hypothesis has been stated by many in the MEV world, and it's the thing that the Cosmos app chain believers have been chanting about for a while now, and it's being shown to come true within the innovation being discussed today on the podcast. So enough of my table setting, let's go ahead and get right into the episode with Heart Lamber from Uma and Hazu from Flashbots, but first a moment to talk about some of these fantastic sponsors that make this show possible, especially Kraken, are preferred exchange for crypto in 2024.
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There's a link in the show notes. Thank you for the station. I'm super excited to introduce you to Hart Lamber, the founder and CEO of Uma. Hart, welcome to the show. Thanks David, thanks for having me. Hart, we had you on two years ago. I think to talk about bridges way back in the day, it's good to have you back, my man. Yeah, good to be back. Good to see you. And at reoccurring guests on the podcast, well, I guess both are reoccurring, but Hazu's been on a few more times than you, Hart. Hazu, strategy lead at flashbots, as well as just ecosystem, researcher, and crypto economic enthusiast, Hazu.
Welcome back to the podcast. Hey David, nice to meet you. Hi Hart, don't think we've met yet on a podcast, but I'm looking forward to this. I like the crypto economic enthusiast, Monica. That's a good one. I think that's the right title for Hazu. I think that's the right title for most people that come on this podcast, but Hazu especially. That doesn't make it very special, David, you know? The lead crypto economic enthusiast, I know, my preferred. Okay, guys, we're going to get into a conversation that I think bankless listeners will be familiar with long-time bankless listeners. This is inside of the subject matter of MEV, maximally extractable value, minor extractable value, later rebranded to maximum since we no longer have miners in Ethereum.
But we're talking about a specific kind of MEV, which has been dubbed Oracle extractable value. So I think this just falls inside of the category of MEV, but it's around a certain set of how the MEV arises, which is through Oracles. And this is going to be a conversation that I think talks about the way that applications on Ethereum produce MEV through Oracles, the sustainability of applications, the healthiness of the aggregate DeFi applications, a lot of these different subject matters. So it's probably going to be a decently technical episode, but I think we can also make it pretty understandable for people who already know what MEV is.
Hart, can I ask you to maybe just set up the context of what we are talking about, the foundations for what's going on. Like I said, bankless listeners will know what MEV is, but applying it in an Oracle's framing might be a little bit new for them. What is the landscape? What is the problem set that we are going to be addressing here on this episode today? Yeah, absolutely. And we can make it concrete and then maybe generalize it a little bit more too. But today, Oracle updates, and let's talk about like Chainlink updates. Chainlink updates drop into the public mempool on Ethereum. Chainlink price updates.
Price updates, correct. Chainlink price updates get dropped in the public mempool in Ethereum, and then they get used by DeFi protocols. And if a Chainlink price update triggers a liquidation, if that price update drops below a liquidation target on an Ave or compound position, that liquidation then triggers a bunch of things, but basically claddle getting sold. And it triggers MEV. It's not dissimilar from a user submitting a Uniswap trade with slippage into the public mempool, which we all understand creates MEV and creates a sandwich attack, and creates other things where searchers will construct transactions to extract the maximum value possible from that Uniswap transaction.
Well, basically, we have the same thing going on with Chainlink price updates, where the Chainlink price update looks very conceptually similar to an unprotected Uniswap transaction with slippage. And it creates MEV that gets leaked and ultimately captured by Ethereum validators. And I believe that the amount of MEV that's captured from Ave compound liquidations can be quite large. I think this probably happens more. This amount of MEV capture is more when there's times of volatility and probably times of bull markets as well. And really just to set this stage here, we are talking about MEV. We're talking about MEV.
This is MEV. We're talking about specifically MEV that happens as a result of price oracle updates, which most of defies Chainlink. So, like, Ethereum is at $1,000. It drops down to very quickly $950. A bunch of DGens get liquidated. But then there is the fight to be the liquid data of these positions. Is there some numbers or some measurements or metrics about how valuable this MEV is? How much value is being squeezed out of these applications? Yeah, totally. I mean, estimating MEV is quite difficult. But within, like, Ave and compound, we can have a very clear theoretical kind of bound. And the way Ave and compound work is when a Chainlink update price update comes in that causes liquidation, Ave and compound then sell collateral at a discount.
And the reason why they sell that collateral at a discount is because they really want to make sure the collateral gets sold to keep the protocol healthy. So that discount is between 5% and 10% depending on the asset. And if we look back over the history of Ave V2 and V3 and compound V2 and V3 over the last about two years, we can see that $150 million ish of liquidation discounts have been sold. So there's been liquidations, a billion and a half dollars of liquidations that have caused discounts of about $150 million and that money has been lost to MEV. If we zoom out and go a little bit further and look at kind of, you kind of think of Ave and compound since their existence, I think that number is much bigger.
It's like quarter million or quarter billion, 300 million type number that has been lost because of liquidations that are really selling collateral to cheap. I want to get your perspective on what would happen if this were left unchecked. Heart talked about some parameters about collateral, ether or maybe less liquid assets being sold at a discount. Maybe you could talk about why it's being sold at a discount and why that's important to the protocol. And then overall, if this version of MEV is left unchecked oracle, extractable value, what would happen into the future because we all want Ethereum, DeFi, any DeFi and any chain to be the world's global financial system?
Why do we have to solve this problem? Why is it important? Yeah, so to the first part of your question, why is it sold at a discount? I think heart actually gave a very good explanation here. So when you want to buy a token on Unisop and the token is quite volatile, then you don't exactly know what slippage to set right. And so if you set a tight slippage, then you risk not getting in the next block because maybe the price moves against you, right? And the same is true for a landing market. So if they want to sell a token now, they have this trade off between basically setting a higher slippage, maximizing the chance to get into the next block or setting basically a lower slippage and risking that maybe the the price doesn't take place in the first block, maybe it takes longer time, right?
And so you have this. So it's just a protective mechanism that they need to sell this collateral because they must not have bad debt. Yeah, so I mean, this is really a design choice by the protocol itself, I would say. So if you're on Unisop and trading shitcoins, okay, so what's the worst that can happen if you don't get to buy this position now? Okay, you may be incur some kind of opportunity cost. But the landing market, you could argue, has a much higher responsibility to that capital, right? So they manage the the money effectively of many different depositors, right? And so if they let someone get away with bad debt, then that that has to that has to be socialized somehow.
So in the first charge probably would go in the first instance, they would probably go to the token holders of that project as a first line of defense. And if that doesn't help, then at some point you have to socialize the money on depositors effectively, because there's nobody else there, right? In crypto, you don't have any legal or anything like that. And so that's why traditionally, landing markets have chosen to be very rigid about how fast they want to liquidate in order to minimize the risk that they internalize any of that bad debt either to their token holders or to even to their depositors.
And I think that paradigm, I guess, is changing a little bit. So I mean, if you look, if you look kind of at the slippage that, for example, a protocol like RWA or Compant has been quoting five to 10% is a lot. And it's more than maybe they need to. And so they tend to bleed a lot of money by doing that. And we've seen some protocols basically handled this problem by spinning up their own auction mechanisms. Like Maker, for example, Maker has, I believe, a reverse Dutch auction. So basically the money that they, the price that they charge to liquidate this collateral basically starts low and then it increases every block.
And so this is at the opposite end of the spectrum, right? So where Compant says, I must liquidate this in one block. And so I'm willing to pay a lot for this. I'm willing to accept a low price, you could also say on the other end. Maker says, you know, I'm fine. You know, what Maker actually does is they only bring Oracle updates on chain with one hour delay. So the Oracle update comes on chain, but it can only be used for liquidation after one hour. So they actually say, Hey, boroughs, we're going to give you a big fat warning. Your position is underwater now, right now. And if you like, if you don't actually top it up within the hour, then we'll start liquidating you.
But even then they have this, this increasing price auction, where they give the boroughs are even more time, right? Basically to top it up. And sometimes transactions take or like that takes longer to liquidate in Maker. So Maker is a protocol. It's very borough friendly. And then a protocol like Avio Compant is much more lender friendly, I would say. And so you have these different sides of this spectrum. And it's really a design choice, you know, because they compete in the market. And I think it's TVD. What works better and what's ultimately preferred by the market. So the only thing I'd had is there, there is a trade-off here too, where in the Maker design, when you have that hour price delay and then the slower liquidation process, you need to have higher collateral requirements.
Because if you do have a kind of worst case scenario where price is trending in a negative direction, in the Maker system, you need more of a buffer because it takes longer to perform liquidation. So you need more higher collateral requirements or generally required there. And it also, the kind of Maker design wouldn't work very well for higher volatility assets like checkpoints, right? So there's this sort of trade-off space that you're alluding to where you could run this slower kind of reverse touch-action to more to bleed less money. But you, you know, can't support higher-vol assets and you probably have higher collateral requirements there too.
So yeah, big trade-off space. Definitely. And so why do we care about, I guess, MEV in general, right? So the, by the way, the connection that I would draw between MEV and OEV is that MEV is basically money that privileged parties in any system can extract from other participants of that system to a symmetry of power or information. And it comes always from a conflict between different preferences, two people wanting the same thing and then basically bidding to that centralized party in order to get that preference ultimately. And so in the context of MEV, that's the validator, right? So two people want to make the same trade, then the two people compete on the fee that they pay to the validator and then spit up the price and so are the money goes to validators.
And so how does it, how does it fit in the context of an Oracle update? So when the Oracle transaction actually goes on chain, then the liquidations basically become unlocked, right? And the transaction that's immediately following that Oracle update, then is the one that can capture that slippage limit, that slippage tolerance in value effectively. The difference between that and kind of the price at which they can internalize that trade. And when you kind of let that uncheck the disability for validators to really extract different amounts of value from their blocks, then what you end up with is basically possible centralization spiral in the system.
And for some systems, that's okay. In many cases, we saw actually MEV through centralization in many real world systems. But in crypto, that's explicitly not what we want, right? We want to have this really decentralized base layer because that's like the validator layer is the root of trust in Ethereum. And we want Ethereum to become the root of trust in the global kind of financial and economic system in the future. And so that's why we put so much emphasis on keeping that validator layer decentralized. And yeah, the company that I work for flashports and many others, I would say, have done a lot in order to, in the first step, keep the validator layer decentralized by making kind of the same value blocks available to all validators to techniques like MEV boost.
And I mean, but what we're seeing right now is, for example, that a lot of decentralization is basically accumulating at the block building layer. So right now, that there's one block builder that's building, I think, 70 percent of blocks. And this is also something that we predict that because there's a lot of network effect and scale economies and kind of rich get richer effects in MEV and in block building. And so if you look at the block block building layer now, and you say, wow, it's looking very centralized, and this is effectively what was prevented on the validator layer by introducing systems like MEV boost.
But in the block building layer, it's kind of more isolated and compartmentalized. And we are kind of, it's more solvable in some ways. Right. Yeah, this has been my understanding since we did our end game episode with Vitalik where centralization in the block building layer has more optionality in checks upon the block builders than we do with validators. Once one centralization happens at the validator level, it's kind of a one way street kind of hard to go come back from that. But with centralization in the block building layer, there's a lot of checks and balances. Like, proposer builder separation is one of these things.
I kind of want to zoom all the way back out and talk about like the highest level pattern that I see happening here, especially once we extend DeFi to be coming, you know, the global financial system, you know, that's why I'm here in crypto, that's why many of us are here in crypto. And so say these markets aren't growing just by like 10 X or 100 X, but like are like 1000 X bigger like in we have applications like of a like compound like maker, becoming some of the foundations of borrowing and lending for the entire globe. This is this Oracle extractable value in the in his current form without a solution here would be a transfer of value from these applications and from the users and customers of these applications towards the infra level.
So it's like the infra level taxing the application level applications are leaking value to the infra. And Hauser, I think with something that you kind of alluded to is like when you do that, you're kind of pressing the gas on the centralization of the infra level. And so with higher level solutions, which I think we're about to get into with what is being built here at oval with higher level solutions applications can actually stop leaking value and start start retaining more of their value. And then the infra level. It's a little bit just more like streamline. It's just like smoother because there's less just like random volatile volatility of like 100 e to M.
E.V. blocks being going on and everything's a little bit more stable and dependable. This is my understanding of the highest level patterns heart does that vibe does that check out anything you want to add there? Yeah, totally check out checks out and I think where you're going with this, David is like honest, honest, more of like the business side, business strategy side or like application revenue side. So Hauser's perspective, you know, he wants to kill M.E.V. because he worries about the centralization risks it creates, which I completely agree with. But I think there's another interesting byproduct here where if you can harness M.
E.V. within your application, you can use it as a revenue stream to do useful things. And I'm of the opinion that just the way this all works, applications will leak M.E.V. There's ways to design them so they leak less, but eliminating it is going to be impossible. So if we, you know, being big picture here, design tools, order flow auctions that we're going to get into, if we can design tools to capture that M.E.V., we can not only decrease the centralization risks that Hauser was referring to, but we can also use that revenue stream to build business models and do useful things. And I guess the analogy here, and it's a little bit dangerous because I think people, some people have controversial views in tradify on payment for order flow.
But if you think what Robinhood has done in the stock market, is it used to be that brokers would have this order flow and kind of throw it out there for high frequency trading firms to use. And they were effectively leaking, revving you, that those high frequency trading firms were capturing. And Robinhood, I don't exactly like all the ways they do this, but conceptually Robinhood said, okay, actually, we're going to auction off this order flow and use that revenue to run our business so that we can offer free trading to users. And I think conceptually, if you think about DeFi protocols, doing similar things with maybe like better rules, more auditable rules, more transparency, you can actually get some pretty interesting business models where Med Capture can drive sustainable long-term protocols that do useful things.
Yeah, I definitely agree with that. I would say we definitely don't only care about the decentralization of Ethereum. It's very important because without the decentralization of Ethereum, the whole experiment basically comes to stop. There's still the kind of gambling technology that's built on top of it, but especially kind of the base layer of Ethereum is very important to fight for. But that said, so I mean, Flashboards has a triple vision or a three-part vision for a good reason. The first part is to illuminate the dark forest and can see this through, for example, orderflow.r, which is this really cool visualization of how your order, like any order, is routed through the MV supply chain, like who touches that, who exactly contributed to its eventual filling and like getting on chain.
And then the democratize access to MV, that's the second part. That's for validators that they all basically get access to the same MV. But the final part is distribute value back to users. And this is exactly where MV share and over are coming in, because we have this vision that all MVs should be returned to the parties who created. Because you can look at this from a few different angles. So on the one hand, all of the applications are in competition with each other, of course, to like if they leave so much money on the table that really belongs to their users or to them, and they could reinvest it in the business and make the experience better for users than applications that don't internalize to MV will eventually, like to themselves, so their users will eventually be out-competed.
But even more importantly, I think every, like when we look at this crazy number, so much money is lost to MV every year, like billions of dollars. This is money that somebody lost at the other end of it. So this is money that's straight coming out of the pocket of someone making a swap on a decentralized exchange or someone providing liquidity or someone borrowing on a landing market and getting liquidated. So there's actually a real counterparty behind all of these. And so if you want to build better systems, then we have to build systems that basically are robust to MV in the sense that they like expose less of it, but the ones that they still expose, they internalize it back to users to employing techniques like MV share and over.
And I will add, as the industry of DeFi has progressed, it is a story of efficiencies and capital efficiency and like less leakage over this has just been the arc that DeFi is on. Like this isn't something brand new, just all applications are innovating on how to be more capital efficient, how to best serve their customers. And this is just like another milestone on that arc of evolution of DeFi. And with that as the context, maybe we can actually get into some of the specifics of the oval mechanism and how we are actually doing this, how we are actually returning value or keeping value in the applications in user's hands and kind of like stopping nipping some MV in the bud is kind of maybe how I will frame it.
And so heart, I'll throw this one to you. Can you just kind of explain the oval mechanism and what it does? Yeah, absolutely. So oval is a mechanism for OEV capture or capturing this specific type of Oracle created MV. OV is not an Oracle, it uses chain link or chain link price updates. But what it essentially does is say, hey, liquidators, searchers, if you want to use this chain link price update, if you want to be the first one to use it, you have to participate in an auction. And the winner of that auction gets the first right to use this chain link price update for a specific protocol. And so really, all oval is doing is saying chain link updates come in.
Let's run an auction on them. And we run an auction for each protocol. So there's a different auction running for Ave or and for compound. And that's so that we can actually understand exactly how much OEV is created for Ave or for compound. And we use flashbots MevShare infrastructure to run this auction process and to actually guarantee or enforce that the the the searcher that paid the most in the auction, that their money actually gets returned back to the protocol. Seems like a relatively simple mechanism. This is an opt-in mechanism by lending applications like Ave compound maker, for example.
So these things need to elect to use oval, correct? Correct. You can think of this as like a bolt-on for chain link. So a bolt-on chain link, okay. It like wraps a chain link price update. So right now, Ave and compound and many, many other DeFi protocols have an address for their like, give me the E-FUSD price feed from chain link. And what oval does is says, okay, we have a contract that looks like chain link, but only lets you use that chain link price update if you participated in this auction for a very short window. And after that short window is done, then it now looks exactly like chain link.
It just passes through. So it's kind of just a gate that enforces this OEV auction happens for a very short period of time before just defaulting back to chain link. So all DeFi protocols have to do is swap a single address via governance to kind of bolt-on this oval intermediary and begin extracting OEV. So it's like an auction module that's being appended on to the Oracle price updates that chain link is providing DeFi. And hard, this makes sense as to how you brought up the Robinhood analogy where I won phase in Robinhood's life. They were just casting off their users order flow into the wild and then suffering worse execution for their customers because whoever could do the high frequency trading would get their first.
And instead they opted in for an auction mechanism instead in lieu of that. So it's like this little like waiting room before the free market happens for an auction to discover the price before their users were able to actually like get the better price and they would get a better price as a result. And in this analogy OVAs are the users, compound as the users, maker, Dow as the users. And instead of just having access to their liquidations being free for any and all MEV bots that come first and execute it sub optimally, instead there is a short window of time for market price to be discovered, fair price to be discovered.
And then that value is retained by the lending applications is correct. Yeah, exactly right. So that analogy totally holds. And if we go back to the kind of slippage analogy where we're saying, hey, this liquidation is going to have a fixed 10% liquidation bonus. We're going to run an auction that says, okay, what does it actually cost? What will people pay here? And people say, okay, I'll actually only pay all by this collateral for a 1% discount. And 90% gets captured and rooted back to the protocol. So we are using the auction to create the market clearing price for the right price to perform the liquidation in these lending markets.
So this solves the problem of some of these lending markets not knowing, not knowing what the fair price of their collateral is, whether it's a large supply of ether or a supply of shit coins, they don't know the governance parameters around collateral in Ave compound maker, etc. They don't know what the market price is. So they have to basically give themselves worst execution in order to protect themselves. And so this is like a best execution module appended on to their liquidations, which ultimately flows back into the collateral that's liquidated at a better price from their customers, correct?
Yeah, I like this best execution module, but I'm going to use that really high as a necklace. Hustle said it really well. You go back and you think about on USWAP, I'm wanting to buy a shit coin. Price is all over the place. So I set a wide slippage limit just to guarantee I get a fill or I set a tight to keep the price more price guarantee. I don't know. So lending protocols are in the same scenario. They really need to sell this collateral, but they don't know how cheap they need to sell it. And so by running an auction and going through this order flow auction for the right to perform this liquidation, we're able to use market forces and competition to precisely set that liquidation bonus to the market clearing price.
I have some, I have some follow on thoughts to that. So this is one of my favorite topics for years. And it's very hard to like nuts and I people on it so now it's my time. Okay, so give me my student born for this. But so both you actually, so we talk about oracles, which is funny because like both setting your fee, how much gray you basically want to run a bit per gas and how much slippage you want to set those are both oracle problems in themselves. So they are both problems that are basically you as a user, you have no idea what you should you should put and they are very hard to parameterize.
And so in the example of a regular transaction, right, this is the fee estimation problem and for regular transfer, this is not too hard to say because you can just look at okay, what's like the lowest fee that's the got into the last block, basically. And you use that as your oracle. Okay, so and then you parameterize your trade like that. But once there's basically contests between different preferences over the same state. So for example, in multiple people trading in the same unistoppool and somebody like the one person's trade might make another person's trade invalid because it's now beyond desktop tolerance, right.
Now all of sudden parameterizing your transaction fee is a very difficult problem. And so it basically spills over into the slippage tolerance, the slippage tolerance, basically an extension of the transaction fee. And I mean, what happens here is that you have no idea like how much you're paying for your transaction right now. So it's basically is your fee plus your slippage, like you can basically add those and they become in any kind of dextrate, they become your actual transaction fee that you're willing to pay. But you don't know even how much you're actually bidding because that depends on like other parties in the block as well.
And so this is where an order flow auction comes in that runs basically, you know, at block bidding, at block bidding speed as well. Because this is it what it really does, it gives you this oracle for how much you should bid in order to get into the block. And so yeah, that's the connection between that's the connection basically between OFA's like they reveal what is the correct fee to set across all of your parameters, just like the transaction fee and this slippage tolerance together. And then they get you into the block at the cheapest possible price when they work, when they have like enough bidding taking place.
Yeah, well to keep going on this, right. So the nerd sniping of it, the the liquidators in this system are off chain actors that are that have full visibility into all these costs and fees. And then through force of a competition, they're figuring out who's going to serve you the best price. So we're able to utilize off chain actors to know things that the protocol itself doesn't know at that moment in time. And I think that's pretty cool. The off chain actors, they're just the market and the market knows a lot. The market is the aggregate of all information. And so it's a place where just like the aggregate knowledge of the market can actually become to be expressed and then leveraged by the DeFi applications.
Yeah, exactly. And you know, while we're talking of premarization, there's interesting not going effects here too. So lending markets like Ave, they can't easily on board like shit coin collateral because price moves too much or whatever it could create bad debt for the system. But you could imagine where they on board a shit coin collateral with like a potential 40% liquidation bonus, like something really big that if you had to pay that every time, it would be incredibly painful. But you can now do it safely because you have a huge potential bonus, but you have market forces that actually means you're never going to pay that, you're going to pay the market clearing price.
And so we've inserted a new tool that gives us real-time information to parameterize some of the important parameters with the anal lending market like Ave. And we can use that tool to actually like on board new collateral and kind of adding features. Right. So the net effect of this is that blue chip collateral in systems like Ave compound maker ether will probably be able to achieve even better collateral factors. It will be even more efficient to use ether. And this will be true for all the collateral that's currently in there. There's more efficiency, more capital efficiency for all capital assets.
And then also the hurdle, the requirement for actually being onboarded into Ave gets easier. So we can actually extend the long tail into further less liquid cladderals simply because we have better market clearing mechanisms in order to enable these things. Which is to the net effect of Ave just like a increased revenue for the application and increased a better product for its customers. Yeah, they have a they have a useful new tool in their toolbox to make Ave more efficient and support more collateral tips. Mantle, formerly known as BitDow, is the first Dow-led Web3 ecosystem, all built on top of Mantle's first core product, the Mantle network, a brand new high-performance Ethereum layer 2 built using the OP stack, but uses eigenlayers data availability solution instead of the expensive Ethereum layer 1.
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The part of MEV share that Oval taps into. Yeah. So, MEV share is what I would say, what I would call an orderflow auction protocol. It introduces one new party that we don't typically talk about, and it's called the MEV share node. It has advisor to protocol because it allows basically for OFAs or applications to be built on top by wallets, by applications like Oval that then kind of extend the service to the landing markets. And it's very customizable. So, you can basically customize it across two different dimensions. One is the privacy. So, a lot of in MEV, it's a lot about privacy. Since we said it's about in basically value that can be extracted by having some kind of asymmetry of information.
So, how much information you reveal and who you reveal it to is a very big level in MEV. And so, in MEV share, you can customize exactly which parts of your transactions are revealed to the bidders who are the searchers. And there's a kind of general tradeoff here where if you reveal too much, then you can be frontrun off chain. For example, you reveal your intent to trade a certain asset, but then somebody just buys up the asset kind of outside and just they sandwich you basically outside of the auction. But when you reveal nothing, then you leave a lot of guesswork to the searchers basically to guess what your intent is and they may not be very close in their guess.
And so, you want to find the exact sweet spot between revealing some details, but not so much that you can be frontrun. And it really depends on the exact application and asset that we're talking about. And this is why we leave this choice to the applications that build on top of the protocol. And the second is for any surplus value that's created. So, for the money that's coming in from the bidders, how is that distributed? And so, this is also the choice of over. So, between the over and the landing market and the block builder and like any other party that they want to specify, who do they want to send the value to that's being created.
So, that also affects kind of the dynamics of the auction. And so, yeah, you can basically create an order of auction. You can parameterize it kind of across these dimensions. And then what happens is in a very simple flow. So, like a transaction comes into the MEV node and then the MEV node reveals selectively reveals information to searchers that they can access. And any searcher can access this because it's permissionless. And then the searchers basically send back their bits and very often they will be kind of guessing based because they cannot actually see the full intent of the transaction.
They can only, for example, see, okay, this is like a certain Unisop pool. So, it's just like if USDC or something, but they don't know whether the person is buying or selling or how much. And so, they what they basically do, what is the right strategy for searchers is to submit not just one trade intent, but submit basically like a whole order book, if you would, right? So, they would basically submit, okay, if they want to buy this much, here's what I would want. If they buy like this much, here's what I would want. If they want to sell, here's my bit. And if they want to sell more, here's my bit, right?
So, every searchers submit basically their own order book. And then inside the MEV node, you have what is basically a matching engine, you know, same as on an exchange. So, you have to, you have now all of the order books from all of the searchers laid on top of each other. And you have the one. So, these are all the bits. And then you have to ask from, from the user and you just match basically the most, the best bit against the user's ask, you grab them into a bundle and you forward it to block builders. And then it goes into the block and kind of the value, like part of that bundle is also the redistribution of the value, like who it goes to, right?
And so, that's being forwarded to to the builder. And I think like the top X bundles are forwarded. And then the builder can still choose like which ones they take, but usually they take the one that pays them the most, right? And so, yeah, very roughly speaking, that's how it works. The pattern that I'm seeing here, I'm just going to go back to my line from earlier, is that the cool thing about MEV is that we once thought it was this massive problem. And one of the patterns that I've seen over time is actually mechanisms are allowing us to leverage this problem into market clearing forces. And Haza, when you say, when you tell me that like in each individual searcher will dump an entire order book into this node, to me, that's like saying one of these many thousands of searchers out there are taking their entire view on the market, placing that into a codified order book, depositing this order book into a central clearing entity, which is this node that you're talking about in MEV share.
These orders get matched up, everything clears, and all of a sudden we have market clearing forces happening in a very short amount of time, very, very quickly. And so what was once this very toxic centralizing system that was liquidating people at suboptimal prices and was creating centralization forces in our infrastructure has instead resulted in just super efficient markets, which has always kind of been like the sci-fi vision for DeFi, I think. Yeah, cool. Haza, when we talk about one node, maybe more nodes, a few nodes collecting all of the market information sounds centralized, is there like a decentralization of MEV share conversation or of the infra that makes this whole system happen?
What's this look like? Yeah, for sure. So you're absolutely right. The MEV share node is a new centralized actor in the system. So I think in this case, it's not a problem because the searchers, it doesn't introduce any new trust assumptions in the sense that freshness is already a block builder and a relay. And so effectively, everybody already trusts us with all of this information. So for us in particular, it doesn't add any trust assumptions. But nonetheless, I mean, we want to decentralize all of our products. So from builder, relay, MEV share, and that is the vision behind Swarth. And so you did this really great episode with Phil Day and Andrew Miller, where you dove into this and for anyone who hasn't seen it, I would strongly recommend it because it's such a great intro.
But that just this, I would say, that Swarth is a platform that enables new primitives, in particular, the ability to write private smart contracts and have credible off-chain computation. And so for example, when you look at an order flow auction, you see, hey, these are exactly like two things that it uses. It uses privacy, but it solves it basically through centralization. So we just send it to a centralized server and we hope that the server doesn't leak the information or like not more of the then the information that it's supposed to leak. And well, it's also it's running off-chain and nobody can validate that the like we are we say that the you know, the MEV share node runs certain code and it's open source on our GitHub, right?
But do you actually know that this is what we're running? No, you don't, right? And so one of the beautiful things about Ethereum is anybody can see the code behind a smart contract and know that this is exactly what the virtual machine executes, right? And so this is basically what Swarth does, introduces a new virtual machine that can do private computation and has private storage for private data. But it can also you can also write code as smart contracts that could otherwise only execute on an off-chain server. And when you put those things together, the off-chain the credible off-chain computation and the decentralized privacy, then you get access like you unlock a whole new part of kind of the tech tree for crypto and MEV in particular.
And so where we eventually want to go with this is decentralized block building, right? So we want kind of the whole auction like intense coming in from users and like the whole shebang about how that's that's basically turned into a block and eventually executed on chain. We want to decentralize the whole of that. But for something like MEV share, this is actually really easy to see how it's one of the first things that benefits from Swarth because all you do is like you run the same code, but you run it instead of on our centralized server, you run it on Swarth. And all of a sudden you no longer need to trust flashboards as a centralized party to run the code that we say and to keep your information private because now you basically delegate all of that trust to a decentralized network.
So the if listeners are curious into going down that rabbit hole, how's it just pointed to you to the the bankless episode about Swarth that we did? I don't think it would be a mistake to rehash all of that here, but I think this is where that part of the conversation leads. Um, hard to go for it. Yeah, no, no, to add to that first of all, that episode is really, really good. And I do think of like Hossie said, MEV share is a protocol for building for order flow auctions with some points of centralization. I look at Swarth. Swarth is a lot more than that, but I look at Swarth as going to be a decentralized protocol for order flow auctions.
And I'm actually really excited about it. The one other point I want to make on the oval side, um, the way we've architected this, uh, the the trust assumptions oval introduces, uh, I think are just pretty brilliant, um, because the way it works is the absolute worst thing if like mev share had rogue code that was stealing the mev or oval decided to send the mev to a different address or anything like that. The worst case from a lending protocols perspective is that they don't get the mev that they weren't otherwise getting. So it's like, you're just the worst case is tables, table stakes. The worst case is table stakes.
Um, and the other answer here, just because there have been some questions around, uh, centralization concerns in the oval design, even if the mev share node goes down, um, or the oval, the oval node goes down, that infrastructure all breaks. Um, as soon as this short auction, uh, passes, the oval contract on chain on Ethereum just passes through and lets you read chain link prices. So it can't censor chain link prices. It can't prevent liquidations. Um, it really is like worst cases, table stakes to what lending protocols have now. All you're doing is inserting this short auction that, uh, if it were to go rogue, would steal the money you didn't get before.
So, um, it's like a really elegant bolt on, uh, you know, best execution module as you put it, um, that doesn't, um, it does have a point of centralization, but the fallback is super elegant. You're just back to where you started. You talk about the this short auction. How long is it? It's a parameter of the protocol. They can set it to what they want. Um, and this gets a little bit technical in terms of like why, why would it be more than one block? Um, and the answer is not every block builder, um, or, uh, not every block builder is connected to mevshare. And so you don't necessarily have complete coverage on every slot.
Uh, so you could have, basically, by our math and hustle one of those better, you have like 90% of blocks are mined by builders connected to mevshare. Um, so if you don't have your, if your auction happens to land in a block that is not, uh, mind or built by mevshare or validator picks a block that's not coming from mevshare, you might not capture your, um, OV, but yeah, it gets a little more technical. Otherwise, it's one block. It's supposed to be one block. Yeah, 90% of the time you're going to happen the same price update, uh, or the same block that, um, the chain link update would get mined if you didn't use over.
Yeah. And the nice thing about mevshare is that it doesn't actually increase, uh, the latency of transactions that go on chain because it runs during the one block window. Um, and yeah, so as hard was saying, uh, in the positive, like the normal case, you don't incur any, uh, additional penalties. So this is really more of a fair, safe mechanism. Right. So just in case kind of, I doubt the two notes is offline than you want to have some kind of for, for back so that the the transaction can still go on chain. Cool. Cool. Understood. Um, so hard. I think this kind of brings us to the last bit of conversation, which did we look at the technical conversation under the hood, the economic conversation as to the incentives as to why protocols will adopt this.
But I think now we have to get into the BD conversation because ultimately, uh, things don't move unless humans like shake hands over telegram or in discourse or whatever. Uh, and so you actually need protocols to adopt this system. Uh, how's that going? Going well. Um, the, we, we put a proposal up to, uh, to, to adopt oval in a very, very limited way. Um, so one of the advantages of Ave, um, their standard markets are, you know, all interlinked and they want to be very, very cautious of changing anything because there's billions of dollars at risk. Um, but they also have Ave V3 isolated markets, which are siloed and separated from the rest of the system.
Um, so we made a proposal to integrate oval in two, uh, Ave V3 markets, um, that have about $10 million dollars in total TBL, which is 0.1% of the total Ave TBL. And it's a pretty cool way for Ave to experiment with OED capture in a very safe low risk way, um, and get comfortable, get familiar with it, um, and potentially roll it out to the broader protocol where I think, again, if it rolled out to the broader protocol, I think Ave would be more than doubling the revenue, um, they'd be earning another 25 million bucks a year, um, type thing, um, same with compound. And then, of course, there's all these other, uh, we, we talk about Ave a lot on this podcast, just because it's a good example.
But there's all these other defy protocols, um, that we're really excited that are using chain price updates that are leaking mev. Um, and we have this really easy integration that we've been chatting with and really excited to integrate. Interesting. I want to actually, um, go down a side quest that's parallel to this, I think, uh, how do I think you might be familiar with this? Maybe, maybe both of you are, um, Sorrella Labs and their Uniswap V4 hook. Uh, maybe I'll can set this up and Hase, you can take uh, the rest of it. It's a very similar mechanism, although it's not at all to do with, uh, Oracle extractable value, uh, but it has to do with, um, uh, uh, impermanent loss in Uniswap, which is now being, I think, rebranded to LVR, which is an equally bad name, but whatever.
Um, and so like, you know, Uniswap LPs are getting, uh, squeezed by, uh, sex, Dex arbitrage. So in like, Binance updates, it's price that eventually turns into mev on Dex's, and then Uniswap LPs are just having this arbitraged out. And something that Ludwig at Sorrella Labs is building is this hook on Uniswap V4, which is kind of just like oval, a gate for liquidity. And if you want to access the liquidity in Uniswap V4 that, uh, that liquidity providers have deposited through this gate, then you have to operate by the rules of this gate. And the rules of this gate do something very, very similar to what Hart was talking about here at oval.
Maybe you can talk about just like how this works with a little bit more clarity than what I just gave, but also talk about the pattern and how we're seeing this kind of being extrapolated into different contexts. Yeah, so you're, you're exactly right. So it's, it's the exact same pattern. And I think the pattern is what's most interesting, um, to understand. So if we kind of go back to what we said earlier, so user wants to trade a token, they don't know what feedersat they don't know, what slippage tolerance to set, so you kind of have this oracle problem, like how much to bit basically to the value data and you don't even know how much you're bidding.
And so the, the very same problem that a piece also have, because so they have a price and maybe the price is, is kind of the market price, but then 12 seconds pass and now all of a sudden they're still quoting that price from 12 seconds ago, right? Because of, it's an AMM, the price didn't move unless someone trades against it. Or they kind of updated manually, right? But they, so they are quoting this outdated price. And now somebody can, can trade against them. And, you know, whether it's an oracle or whether it's, whether it's liquidity pool or so user making a dextrate, if you're, if you're accepting a certain price, then, and somebody else can see that intent, then they will always push you to the worst possible price.
And so that's what happens in arbitrage. And I mean, arbitrage, like the AVR problem is, is a problem that's like 20 times bigger than, than even the oracle problem. So it's just like a huge, a huge problem, I would say. And yeah, so the, but the very same insight that overdoses can be exactly applied also to liquidity pools. So you basically put, like as you were calling it, you kind of have two ways of doing it. When you put a gate, and it basically says, in order to earn the right to trade on this pool over style, you have to pay me. And so we run an auction. And so you basically unlock the right to do this.
The other way is to basically the pool, there's also an auction, but instead of running the right to trade, it like increases, basically, the transaction fee to the fee that goes to the LPs in the pool. So it makes that variable. And so when it knows that there's like a large specific demand to trade in the pool, then it would increase the, it would increase the fee to capture more of the MEV back to the LPs who are in the pool. So I'm not familiar with which model exactly. So I'll use it if they found a third way. But yeah, I think the insight is basically to use some kind of mechanism, some kind of auction that discovers basically the price at which the LPs should quote to the market.
And I'm going to go ahead and hard to say something. No, I just think this is a solution. It is using the gating mechanism. I mean, again, we should have let look in all them talk, but it is a very cool, elegant solution that says, hey, we know there's like sex, sex arbitrage that's getting leaked here. So you just, if you want to trade against this pool, you got to pay us. And that goes back to the LPs. So I'm really excited for that to get deployed to one last conversation here. So we have oval and this gate. We have this pattern that we were saying applied on to uniswap with V4 with the project that we just brought up.
Um, uh, Srello labs. Um, but each of these are taking a cut, right? Like because, come on, like we are at rational economic actors, we want our upside. I'm assuming there's a cut that's part of the whole oval process. Is that correct, Hart? Yeah, there is. I mean, um, I think it makes a lot of sense. Like Hossley said at the beginning, um, MEV should go back to the protocol that created it or the source that created it. Um, and we very much believe that. So this MEV that we're capturing should go back to Avea compound and they can mostly go back to Avea compound and they can use it to say, Hey, uh, we're going to keep it for revenue for the protocol.
We're going to get back to token holders. We're going to reimburse the guy that got liquidated. We're going to make transaction costs fee free. We're going to pay everybody's gas costs. Whatever they want to do, that's their call. Um, and then I think the infrastructure that extracts that MEV also deserves a fair share, um, for the work of building the building and maintaining the infrastructure to do so. And so that's that's the business model for oval, um, where we would retain, um, our share, uh, for the infrastructure costs. And the other thing I'd add is there was other infrastructure costs besides us.
Um, there's flashbots, MEV share, um, swab in the future. And importantly in the case of, um, Oracle updates, uh, there's also like chain link or your Oracle provider. And, um, one of the things I'm excited about, uh, is using this as a sustainable way to pay for Oracle infrastructure as well, uh, because it's not cheap. Chainlink is spending millions of dollars a year in gas fees, supporting their price feeds, um, as a sort of public service. And, uh, this, this is something that long run is actually a risk to Ove and compound, because like, it's not currently sustainable, um, chain link can skip it.
Ove compound maker, maybe not maker, uh, are consuming chain link Oracle prices, and chain link is just giving this out to the D5 for free. I'm assuming they make money on that somehow, um, maybe not. That's complicated. That's a good question as chain link, um, but the price feeds are permissionless. Anyone can access these price feeds for free. Um, so, so chain link itself, or, and you know, insert your generalized Oracle provider here also needs to be a part of this process of, uh, achieving some sort of take rate in order to make themselves a sustainable business, otherwise they go away. Yeah, I agree.
And like, again, chain link has many different kind of products and business lines, and they, they do charge or have fees in other circumstances, but the core product that, you know, supports most of the D5, uh, like their ETH price feed, it's freely accessible, um, and D5 is built on top of it, and figuring out a way to make that be sustainable, um, seems like, seems necessary. Right. Totally, totally. Uh, Hart, Hazu, I have turned learned a ton in this conversation. Is there any stone left unturned, or maybe just future questions that you have or future topics that I think that you guys might think are next in this conversation, uh, maybe if we were to resume this conversation in like a year or so, maybe what if some ideas that, uh, you would hope would have answers or any future conversations that, uh, do you think spawns out of this one?
Hazu, I'll start with you. I need to think about this, Ken Hat, go first. All right, you first. Well, I'll give you an easy one. I mean, how does this work on layer 2s? Like what does the mev supply chain on layer 2s look like? What are the types? What's the type of like Oracle or Oracle related mev that gets leaked on layer 2s? And there's actually a whole slew of mev that gets leaked by, uh, perpetual exchanges, like perfect exchanges, decentralized perps, um, and ways that I think that they could be made much more efficient by, uh, using auction-like structures to price their trades. Um, so that's where my mind goes.
And we've actually done a lot of work and a lot of research on how Volvo would work on L2s. Um, and I'm not enough for this podcast, but I think it's a super fascinating topic. And I think it's going to be a big deal. Yeah, I agree with that. I think if we go, if we come back in one year, I would be very interested to kind of just do a checkup on how much mev is to being leaked at the application layer. Uh, how much basically extra money is leaked by lending protocols, but also we talked about a piece, right? So for me, that would be interesting. If that paradigm that, uh, with the gate, basically unlocking kind of certain actions on chain to an auction, uh, if that's taking hold also in the deck space.
Um, and then for sure, as hard was saying, as more and more activity goes to L2s, so how can we, how can we import some of that same paradigm, basically to, to the L2s? The L2s today all have centralized sequences and they don't have much of an mev supply chain to speak of. So they're all of a kind of shadow mev supply chain that's kind of, you know, like co-located around the sequencer, like, but like again, a kind of uncontrolled way that doesn't benefit the users at all, doesn't return any, doesn't even return any money to the sequencer. Um, nor can really be leveraged to build any kind of applications on top, like, like, what are fluctuations yet.
So I would say, um, there's, there's some kind of ground infrastructure that needs to be created. And then I think a lot of this technology can be scaled to L2s and it will be very interesting to see if, if you know, if it looks the same or if it looks different and if it looks different, like, in what ways? Beautiful guys. I think we have a long roadmap of content ahead of us. There's a lot of juice left to squeeze out of these conversations, a lot of juice left to keep in the DeFi apps. Heart, Hazu, thank you so much for coming on and explaining this part of the DeFi world to us. Thanks David.
Thanks David. Thanks for having us. Heart, if people are just interested in learning more about oval, where should they go? Yeah. So, um, oval is an uma product. Go to uma.x.wz and you can read all about it. Um, and then Twitter, it's at uma protocol. Um, yeah. Guys, this has been fantastic. Thank you so much for coming on. Bankless nation, you know the deal. Crypto is risky. DeFi is risky. Hopefully it's becoming a little bit less risky, but you could still lose what you put in. We are headed west. This is the frontier. It's not for everyone, but we're glad you are with us on the bankless journey.
Thanks a lot.