Futarchy flips governance on its head—decisions aren’t voted on, they’re traded on.
In this conversation with Felipe Montealegre of Thea Research and Proph3t, co-founder of MetaDAO, we explore how market-driven governance can eliminate the token “rug pull” problem, create true shareholder protections on-chain, and unlock the next era of crypto capital markets.
From prediction markets and token design to MetaDAO’s “ownership coins,” this is how futarchy could make crypto investable again.
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TIMESTAMPS
0:00 Intro
1:51 What is Futarchy?
4:26 US Capital Markets vs Futarchy
6:39 Futarchy Incentives
12:01 Futarchy Market Participants
16:05 A New Form of Governance
18:59 Liquidity & Insider Participation
24:03 Futarchy Genesis
31:31 Crypto Rugs
47:45 Trustworthy Tokens
53:00 Umbra Example
1:00:37 MetaDao
1:07:20 Unrugable Tokens
1:12:42 Regulation
1:18:31 What’s Next?
1:20:48 Closing & Disclaimers
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RESOURCES
Felipe Montealegre
Proph3t
MetaDao
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Not financial or tax advice. See our investment disclosures here:
No summary for this episode yet.
All of these rugs are stopped by Futurki. So if you say, for example, in Futurki, funds go into a wallet and they are controlled by the governance process. So if you raise $50 million, or $100 million is an ICO, and then the team is like, well, we want to send it to our own Binance accounts and cash out. Obviously, that market's going to vote no. Bankless Nation, very excited for this next episode. This is the bull case for Futurki. You've heard that term before. If you haven't, don't worry. We'll define it. How it's going to make our tokens more valuable, that's something we always want in crypto.
We've got two self-ascribed futards on the podcast today. No, I did not insult them. They are self-ascribed futards. Felipe Montelegré is an investor at Thea Research. He's actually been on the podcast before talking about how tokens kind of suck right now, and they're in need of a revolution, let's say. But he is a long-term token bull. He's also a Futurki bull. Felipe, welcome to Bankless. Thank you for having me on. Excited to be here. We also have profit on the podcast. He is a co-founder of a neat little project called Metadow. This is a Futurki and token launch platform on Solana. He, I think, is also a token bull, but he might call them, let's see, what's the term he used for this profit?
Ownership coins. Ownership coins. All right, not just tokens, ownership coins. Profit, welcome to Bankless for the first time. Yeah, thanks for having me. Okay, we should do a disclaimer here. Of course, the project we're talking about a little bit today is Metadow. So profit is, of course, a co-founder. He's definitely killed on the project. Felipe, I believe you are an investor in the project, too. So we should disclose that you're an investor. So naturally, you're bullish as well. That's the case, am I correct? That's right, yeah. Investors in Metadow investors in many of the companies that have spun out of Metadow.
And it's not investment advice. Very good, very good. Okay, with that out of the way, I think I want to divide this into three parts, to really set this up. So part one is kind of like, what is futarchy? We need to understand what this means. And then part two is kind of the case for why our tokens suck right now, at least from an investor perspective. I think we all kind of feel that. A lot of tokens in crypto, they're destined to go to zero. Many of them have been rugged. They kind of suck. We'll talk about that. And then we'll talk about how futarchy might actually fix this and Metadow's specific implementation.
So a three-party here. Let's start at the beginning. What is futarchy? I'll throw that over to maybe profit. You give an answer and then Felipe, if you could give your investor answer after that. But profit, go ahead. What is futarchy? Sure. So futarchy is essentially governance by markets. Like democracy is the word we use for countries that are governed by voters. And futarchy instead is market-driven governance. So instead of voting on what we should do, we bet on what the right thing would be to do. OK, that sounds simple. But also I have so many questions. Felipe, how would you flesh that out?
You know, I'll just, before getting to the mechanism, I'll just echo what Propon said. It's basically, in futarchy, you allow markets to say whether they think a particular proposal will make the price of the token go up or down. OK, so in theory, when a company is deciding, when a CEO is telling you what to do in the company in the US, they're thinking about maximizing shareholder balance, right? That's the culture of US corporate America, of corporate America. And in futarchy, you actually let the market vote on the proposal, trade on the proposal, and say, do I think that if the CEO is replaced, the stock price will go up or down.
And then based on how the market's trade, you loop the outcome back into the actual decision. So just to make that real with one example, if you were deciding to hire Steve Jobs back to Apple, after they had a few CEOs that were Steve Jobs, you could set up a proposal saying, Apple stock right now is 100. Let's let the market trade on whether if we rehire a Steve Jobs CEO, it will be higher than 100 or lower than 100. And you have the markets trade those proposals, which we'll get to in a second. And if the higher Steve Jobs proposal is 180, so 80% higher from the stock price, that is what will actually happen in reality.
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I guess the way things work today with that sort of decision in a shareholder vote company type of structure, right? Is large investors or the board of directors would make a decision on who the next CEO is and they would just not consult the market at all pre-making the decision and then basically they'd make the decision and after the fact the stock price would reflect whether their decision was bullish or bearish but they don't get to ahead of time a priori test the other outcomes, right? And you're saying futarchy is different because you actually ahead of making the decision get to somehow market validate and market test the outcomes ahead of time and then simply matter of like oh, let's pick the one that maximizes share price and you get to almost like see into the future before you make a decision.
That's what's different here, is that correct? That's right, when a board of directors makes a decision today in a current setup in the US capital markets, you assume that they have seen in the game because they are the large shareholders so they are trying to maximize their own share prices and they use, they kind of use their own common sense, they do analysis, they try to think about whether in this case changing CEOs will increase or decrease the value of their holdings. In a futarchy you actually open up the decision to the entire market. So it's almost like prediction markets on whether the token will go up or down based on the decision and people who are outsiders in the company and maybe don't own a lot of tokens can go and can trade the market based on their best assessment of whether the decision will make the stock price go up or down.
And the beauty of the mechanism and I'll let profit explain as well is that if you trade and you are right, you will make money and if you trade and you are wrong, you will lose money. How does that work profit? So yeah, what are the mechanics of how this works because I'm still having a hard time rocking how, like why market participants will make money in one case and lose money in another? What's kind of the capital at stake? How is this whole thing incentivized? Sure, so probably something most, I imagine that your listeners will be familiar with his Uniswap, so let's take that as an example.
So imagine Uniswap is deciding whether or not to turn on the fee switch, like the classic governance example. Here in Futarki, what would happen is you would have two markets, one for uni token, if you turn on the fee switch and one for uni token, if you do not turn on the fee switch. Okay. And you place what are called conditional trades in these markets. You can essentially place an order such like, an order like I would buy uni at say a dollar if the fee switch were turned on. Maybe I'd buy 500 uni, so for $500, if the fee switch were turned on. And then if the fee switch is not turned on, that trade is reverted.
So if I place that buy, I get my money back. And yeah, you place trades in both of these markets, so like you can buy if it happens, you can sell if it happens, if you think it'd be bearish, if it happened, you can be also like, you can speculate on what would happen if the event didn't happen. Like you could say, if someone could say, oh, uni would be worth, I don't know, 60 cents, if it doesn't happen, like maybe that's the market price and you're like, no, I think it'd be higher. So I'm gonna buy there. So I could either hold those uni that I've now acquired at a cheap price or just sell them on the open market, right?
If I buy at 60 cents and then it actually turns out to be 70, if the proposal fails, then I can sell and pocket that 10 cent difference. And then, yeah, so you have these two markets and we just take a time with an average price of both the markets and if one of them, if the market is saying that uni would be worth like a dollar, if you turn on the fee switch and 60 cents if you don't, then that's a pretty clear signal that you should turn on the fee switch and then you can just turn it on automatically. Okay, and then you turn it on and those who voted that, okay, so how are the participants rewarded again?
So let's say, you know, the market dictates which outcome increases uni token price more, then tell me again, how are participants in the market actually rewarded for this? Yeah, we had these two markets, which were like, if the fee switch is turned on and if it isn't, all the trades and if the switch is not turned on market would be reverted. And then all the trades that happened and if the switch is turned on market would be finalized. And so if you like, yeah, let's just say that the fee switch is turned on and then uni goes to a dollar and 10 cents. So the market was like under by 10 cents of what the price was.
Then if you bought in that market at like 70 cents per uni, then you could now sell at a 40 cent profit, right? Or you could just hold and be up, like have high unrealized PNL. On the other end, if you sold like for every buyer, there's a seller. So the person who sold at 70 cents is probably not very happy right now because they sold their token at 70 cents and then just watched it go up to a dollar and 10. And yeah, so like those are, it's not really, it's pretty much the same way you make or lose money just by buying and selling tokens in general. It's just that here you, it allows you to like speculate on, or like kind of remove risk for you, right?
Because maybe your bullish uni, only if they turn on the fee switch. And you think a dollar is a good price there. So you buy there, then you're not taking the risk that they don't turn on the fee switch was actually happened before, right? Like, actually, yes, and you just bought people, a lot of people traders got burned because they thought the fee switch was gonna turn on, get turned on, a lot of people bought uni and then the fee switch ended up not being turned on and then it sold off. So if you bought at like the higher prices, you've just lost money, right? Right, there've been a lot of fake outs with respect to the fee switch.
It's always a kind of a one fee switch. I can't believe we're in 2025 and it's still sort of a when fee switch situation for uni token. But then you said so, the outcome would be based on some sort of time-weighted average price, okay? And then there's, is there, would there be for an example of this type of example, kind of a date, you know, within one week, you know, uni price will be X or Y, is that kind of how it works? There's like a time-based deadline or like what are the specifics of this binary outcome? Sure, so it's just trading in these markets over three days, which, yeah, are just like spot markets.
They're not futures markets. You're just buying and selling uni, condition on an outcome. And we run this for you. I see. Take the time-weight average price and then finalize whichever market and take the decision that the market thinks is better. And you're saying we in this case profit, that is meted out specific implementation of these types of futarchy decisions, but there could be other implementations of that, right? Correct. Okay, that makes sense. All right, so who are the market participants in this case? So you sort of know who the market participants are if you did something like a uni token holder vote, which is anybody that has the uni token is eligible to vote on something with respect to governance.
This is kind of like Dow 1.0 that we've seen in crypto, you know, since the beginning of these governance token experiments, right? And the prop, you know, there's lots of problems with this, which we'll get into. One is like, who's participating, right? It's like very, there are very few participants or the participants even informed as the outcome. I get the sense that the participants for this type of futarchy market in driving one decision or another doesn't have to be the uni token holders. And in fact, could be a completely different market in general. So profit, who is participating in the market for this type of a decision?
And then like, how informed are they, are they? Like, and we know that they're informed that these are smart market participants who will drive towards an effective outcome. Yeah, so I think they are generally sophisticated. At least the people who trade in size for the simple reason that like, yeah, I mean, if you're listening to this and you understood all that perfectly, you probably have like at least one standard evolution above the average on IQ, right? Like, it's not super easy to grok the first time or even the second time. It takes people some time to like figure it out. And yeah, but it generally is like, the people who are kind of involved in the community is one that's like one cohort of people that traded in these markets.
They just care about the project. And then we also see some just generalized, we call them decision market traders. Like these are decision markets who trade in pretty much all organizations markets, even if they're not like a quote unquote community member of that project. They're just basically saying like, no, I think this price is wrong and I can profit by trading against it. I think that, you know, one thing to add is that these markets call the people with the most information trade and naturally. So, you know, one example is like, think about prediction markets. The people with the most information have the most incentive to trade those markets.
So there was a prediction market recently about whether Taylor Swift would get engaged. And obviously, you know, her family had information she was engaged for a few weeks before it was public. And they all had a strong incentive, I don't know if they did probably not, but they all had a strong incentive to trade the prediction markets because they had information that she was engaged and the market was trading like a 20 cents, right? So they could have made a profit that way. And that's true for every prediction market. Whoever has the best information can beat the market and make money by trading.
It's true of future key as well. So if you are an investor and you have a very strong view on some governance decision, you can come into those markets even if you're not an investor in the project and have never been an investor in the project. And ultimately, you will only, you will own the outcome. So, you know, one example is at say that there was one market where we were a very small investor in a project and there was this decision, you know, proposal where we thought it was pretty negative to the project and we were willing to put our capital behind our, our, our, our, so we ended up trading very aggressively in the field market, you know, for that, for that proposal, which means we said we were willing to buy a lot on this token if this proposal fails.
And ultimately the proposal failed largely because of us trading the market. And is that fair? It is because then we ended up owning a lot of the token after the fail. So that's the beauty mechanism. If you are aggressive in trading a market, you have to own the outcome if it happens. So you own the outcome and you own a specific outcome, let's say. So I guess you're making the case, Felipe, that this will attract. So these are more granular types of decisions. This is not, are you bullish unit token? Yes, no. This is a decision like that's more granular. It's still sort of high level in a very important strategic but still granular.
That's like if token, if he switched on, then this, if he switched off, then that. And so you're not even, you're getting more informed investors even than the average unit token holder or the very involved unit token holder because you're getting investors that are willing to put skin in the game and substantial liquidity on a particular granular decision of which like you presume they know a lot about. And the reason you presume that is because they're willing to bet big on this particular decision, right? So you almost like you broaden the market and you create a more informed market participant for specific granular issues or governance items.
And I guess the expected outcome or the hope is that this leads to better governance decisions around in particular the thing that investors care the most about, which is capital allocation. So few turkey for these types of decisions is the idea that it even beats shareholder vote and it can be even smarter than say a very well-informed board of directors. Is that the concept here? Definitely. So in a board of directors, in board directors in the US couple of markets work well. But you do have board members who have outside incentives. Maybe they're friends with the CEO. Maybe they are not big shareholder as they're just on because they're famous or they did something.
I would say most board of directors are like that. Like, isn't that the default case, would you say? There's a lot. It's default to have some members like that. You know, I think the best case is private equity boards where everybody there is like a 100% owner of the company. And that's more, that's gonna be more similar to few turkey, right? But in a lot of public boards, you do have, you know, Dana White on the Facebook board. He's great, but he's not like a top 10 owner of Facebook, right? So it is a default for some companies. But in few turkey, you know, you said, well, you only get to vote trade, we say trade, but vote to the extent that you're willing to put skin in the game behind that decision.
So you should actually call out the most informed and most aligned decision makers for having market. And ultimately, you do get better outcomes than from a typical board director in terms of shareholder alignment with the token price. I could imagine some failure scenarios here with respect to liquidity. So say you had some sort of few turkey decision, but you didn't get enough market participation or enough liquidity or enough size to actually like make it a meaningful decision. Is that a failure mode? And how does one prevent that in a few turkey type scenario? Yeah, you definitely need liquidity because liquidity is what my and like you need liquidity so that traders have an incentive to look at these decisions and participate, right?
Like if there's one dollar of liquidity, even if I think the market is super mispriced or if like I had a lot of alpha, it's just not worth me digging in placing all those trades. So you need liquidity and what's nice here that you have where you don't have in like prediction markets is there's an organization that's pretty well prime to provide that liquidity, which is the project itself. So what we do is the projects themselves provide liquidity in their own token and well yeah, they provide USDC and then their own tokens. So like an example would be OMFG, which is one of the projects that launched on us, OMFG USDC and then that liquidity can also be used in decision markets.
Okay, talk more about that. So the liquidity of basically the project or even the founders can also participate in these markets. I think previously I'd been considering few turkey markets and sort of the decision is all outside investors, but certainly insiders could participate in these markets as well. And why again profit is that a good thing? Does that not present some sort of conflict of interest or like why is this in addition to providing liquidity? Why does insider participation drive to better outcomes? So the liquidity itself isn't coming from insiders, it's just coming from the project treasury.
So like today when a project launches on us, 20% of the USDC that they raised, which I know we're gonna get into this later, but like basically it's all automatic where they just automatically are providing liquidity, USDC and their native token and that automatically goes into these decision markets. In terms of is it good if insiders trade the markets? I think this is actually an open question in economics in general, right? Obviously in US and many other countries, insider trading is illegal. Like you're not allowed to trade a security where you have material and non-public information. But actually, I mean yeah, some economists think that insider trading would be better like if we allowed it because this idea where yeah, you generally want people with alpha and a market correcting prices so that they can like, so the prices can be more efficient.
Well, it's always struck me that basically the bull case for all prediction markets, it's just outside of futarchy, but prediction markets as information markets is basically all insider trading. So flip A, like even when you mentioned Taylor Swift in kind of that market, I mean, you're basically advocating these there's a lot of securities of course, but you're basically advocating for insiders to inform the market and to participate in that market because that's how we get the most accurate markets possible, right? So there's certain element of like prediction markets kind of does depend on insider trading, and I guess that would extend into futarchy.
I guess the one thing I'd say there is sometimes you have people with very informed views using public information and they would be very helpful to the price as well. So you know, what most, what most hedge funds do today is that they kind of think deeply about a sector or think deeply about companies and then buy or sell based on their superior judgment on what company is good, what management team is good to allocate capital. And for the most part, they're not using insider information because insider information is defined as it's like knowing whether a company will beat earnings or not, right?
Things like that, you can also have a superior judgment on a stock or decision just based on doing analysis with public information. Sure you can, but you'd have even better information on that if you're an insider, right? You'd be even more informed participant. Yeah, and that's where you get into profits straight off, which is where do you want to cap how much insider information do people are allowed to have? And but capping, capping it does come at the cost of market efficiency, okay? If you allowed perfect trading on instant information, markets would be slightly more efficient than they are today.
So you're gonna have earnings pops. Is a good way to, I guess, summarize what Futarky is, is it's applying prediction markets to decisions, to governance types of decisions, is that a good summary? Sure, I would say just markets, like you don't need to have the prediction there, but if it makes it easier to understand, sure, prediction markets for decision making. Okay, who created the idea of Futarky? So I recall reading a post from Robin Hansen a long time ago, he talked about prediction markets, and I believe he was applying this to a political systems, actually. I think he's written some white papers after that.
I've browsed them. I haven't dug fully into Robin Hansen's massive brain. I've also read posts from Vitalik talking about this in the early days, but how long has the idea of Futarky been around and who created this? Yeah, it was Robin Hansen for those who don't know. Robin is an economist at George Mason University, and who's also somewhat calm, the inventor of AMMs, somewhat also calm like the primary person behind prediction markets. But yeah, he also invented Futarky and decision markets back in 1999. It's a fun fact, actually. The only time we've had Robin Hansen on bank lists, we actually didn't talk about any of those things.
We talked about his grabby aliens theory. Have you guys ever crossed this? Which is basically his answer to the Fermi paradox, which I think is the best answer. And he basically thinks we're too early in the universe, and they're too far. But the aliens are all coming towards us as we approach them. It's just a really elegant, interesting theory. Anyway, we talked about that. We didn't talk about Futarky, and I feel like that was somewhat of a missed opportunity. I guess it shows you his brain, his mind on so many different subjects. Yes, he's very cross-disciplinary. And he also has this book called The Age of AM, which is, I believe, about minds and potentially how we can create a computer mind.
Yes, yes. Okay, so he wrote this paper some time in the 2010s, I believe, or came up with this concept, Futarky, but we really haven't seen it applied anywhere in practice. So certainly, the governments of the world are still, like the US is still running. It's governance software is like representative democracy, and so it's not using Futarky. We've got other nation states that are using some sort of a dictatorship or like small cabal kind of ruling their country is something like Russia. We already talked about how our corporations are governed, and that's shareholder vote. I think in crypto, generally aside from Dow governance vote, which is sort of similar to shareholder vote, except like worse in some ways that maybe we'll talk about.
We have this other governance mechanism that may be partially we created. It's kind of the technocratic Linux-based technocracy, sort of or benevolent dictatorship type of model where you have this technical elite, and there's this rough consensus. I would say something like Linux and Bitcoin and Ethereum run on that governance mechanism. So that's four that I've named. Futarky would maybe be a fifth, but so far it's just been concept. We haven't actually seen it at play. I know Metadow is starting to do some of this, but maybe my broad question is, why haven't we seen Futarky out in the wild if it's just like applying markets to making decisions?
It seems fairly simple, but why haven't we seen it? Yeah, I mean, it's a really good question. The simple answer is just no one really tried it before Metadow. So I mean, yeah, there are a few people who said they were gonna do it, like you have Metallic with that blog post, Nosis said they were actually gonna do Futarky as a Nosis Safe, but yeah, no one really did it in production. Felipe, do you have any ideas to why? It's just the rest of the world is kind of entrenched in their existing decision making frameworks and governance and there's kind of power dynamics. And so it takes a net new experiment to actually try things.
I think that's part of it. And I mean, there are a lot of cases where there have been these big ideas and economics for finance that were never tried until blockchains made them possible because in the kind of traditional financial system you have all of these permissions, regulations, blockers. I mean, you can have a situation where like a group of two engineers just tries an idea in the world. So you've seen it, like even like CalSwap is a good example too, right? Like Professor Budish wrote about CalSwap's mechanism 15 years ago, I think almost 20 years ago now tried to get it on to every exchange and just never had the opportunity to really try it out until CalSwap reached out to him and said, we want to try it out.
You know, the mechanism you wrote about 15 years ago. So there's a lot of precedent for things not really being tried until crypto rails opened up this permissionless system for two engineers to give it a go. I guess that makes sense, right? I mean, so the Robin Hanson, if he dreamed up the concept of AMMs, he didn't specifically apply that to crypto. That could work in tradfights. Just tradfights never tried it. And it took crypto to come along and actually have the blank white space to actually experiment and make that idea real. And I suppose something similar you're arguing is happening with Futarky.
Yeah, I mean, the number of new banks open since 2008 is almost zero, right? Like the restriction on new experiments in the finance system is very severe. And that's why so many of these things are being tried for the first time in crypto works for missionless. But I think the other big thing is, you know, in Vitalik's blog, he had a big con for Futarky, which was that token price isn't always the objective function. Okay. And I think that's that you can argue that for different scenarios. You can say that, for example, in a democracy, you know, GDP or whatever isn't the right objective function, right?
Sure. Or whatever you end up making it. Or even for Ethereum or Solana, where it's like an ecosystem, I think you can argue that token price may not be the objective function. Right. I would probably take the counter of that, but I think it's a debate. But when you're starting a company, right? When you're launching a token that represents the future cash flows of a company or an equity, that's where you have your tokenized price has to be your objective function, right? Because you're asking people to give you their savings. So you can start a productive enterprise and make the money. So you have, I think that situation where, it's a situation where like future key found, it's found, it's like killer app with tokens, right?
Because if you're launching a company in U.S. capital markets, U.S. capital markets work fine, right? You don't have this kind of underserved market situation where you can raise capital through VC, you can go private to private equity, you can go public through, you know, the NASDAQ or the NASE, and corporate law is basically good enough to get you what you need out of capital markets. But if you're launching a token, you're in a situation where there's no legal protections, there's so many ways to rug investors, you don't eat people that don't even know, there's no way to govern these things for the benefit of token holders.
And you have this kind of underserved market with a severe problem. For the first, you know, I think for the first time, that future key just neat, neat, exactly solves. But it's both things. It's a limit on, you know, limits to innovation outside of crypto rails, but also you'd now have the killer app with tokens and token hold of protections. I see. So you're saying is like, you know, one of the limitations of future key is it has kind of singular objective functions, right? That can be too narrow. So for example, if you're trying to like govern the United States of America, and I think even Robin Hanson is initial proposal, he's still, you know, he's not saying not a democracy.
He's saying you vote for representation, but then you use futarchy for these objective base decisions, such as like which policy is going to increase GDP by the higher amount? And you use futarchy for that amount. But I suppose what you're saying for capital markets, and this is certainly true of stocks and US capital markets. There really is a single objective function. Now, it's not the only one, but it does make sense to have the focus of the entire company be to maximize shareholder value. I would edit that and say maybe long term shareholder value. In fact, that's the entire fiduciary responsibility of a board and a management team.
It's kind of embedded in our laws around US capital markets. Maybe let's talk about that for a little bit. So we've set up this idea of futarchy. Let's talk about Felipe, something that you've, you've, I've seen you write about many times, you think futarchy's a partial solution. But like today, our tokens kind of suck, our DeFi tokens, that is, and like as an investor, I still feel like I have better protection and better shareholder rights and better commitments to maximize the price of my investment with stocks versus tokens. Tell me why I feel like that, why you feel like that, and why to date a lot of our crypto tokens just like don't have good investor rights.
You feel that way because it's true and it's been proven thousands of times across the past 10 years since we've been launching tokens. So right now, most people who invest in tokens and believe get rocked, that's the reality. So, and you're not just talking about mean coins here. You're actually talking about like everything. legitimate projects that have some sort of concept, have some group of believers are trying to build something here, right? Yeah, if most like case in the majority of cases, not all, but the majority. If you gave money to somebody over the internet in the past 10 years through an ICO, you were rocked, which is really unfortunate because that is like one of the most exciting things that we're working on in crypto rights, ability for anybody to raise capital on the internet at a reasonable cost of capital and build a business with those funds.
You're using the term rubbed, which is different than the project not working, right? So like investing in anything at an early stage comes with massive amount of risk, which is like 95%, 99% of companies will fail anyway. But you're talking about not just failure, you're actually talking about something that's like rug, get into that term. How are we getting rugged with our tokens? So I'll go through the, there's many ways to get rugged. And yeah, I'm talking about not a good faith effort by a team where the project failed. That is to be expected. It's part of capital markets, part of capitalism.
It's normal. I mean, a situation where the team acted in their best interests or the best interests of a few shareholders at the expense of everybody else who gave them money over the internet. So I'll give you more of these big examples. You know, we had a company a year ago where we gave, you know, we invested in them when they were making like 400 K in revenue. And it was a exciting investment. We put a few million dollars to work within about six months. They were hitting $50 million of revenue, right? So it's a tremendous outcome for us. That's the kind of thing that you look for as an investor.
And the team reached out to us and said, we decided that, you know, we're gonna abandon the token. And our response is, what do you mean abandon the token? Oh, well, you know, this is a lot of money. You know, we built it as a team. We're gonna just give in ourselves, give it in ourselves to money. And did you just have the token or did you have the token and also the equity of whatever entity was receiving the revenue distribution? Just at the token. Okay. There was no equity entity here. That's a pretty common occurrence. There are many cases like that where projects do well and teams either siphon all cash flow to themselves or part of the cash flow to themselves.
You know, there's the case, that's one type of rug, right? Another rug is when there's a token in equity to your question. And the team decides to siphon cash flow to the equity entity instead of the token entity. So we mentioned you as well. If you bought the insub token right now, you have no rights at all to the cash flows of the insub app. Only the insub labs, the equity entity, has the rights to those cash flows. I hope they're a great situation. But as of today, if you bought the insub token, you don't own the company, you don't own their frontend fees. You don't own any of the fees related to that.
There's the more obvious rug situation where people raise money through ICO and they just walk away from the project. So I think on the metadata website, you have a few examples, like Pixelmon raised $70 million and the token's down 95% from our friend Kevin, right? This Pixelmon creature, that was very popular in 2021. I believe that's right. But yeah, that's right. Yeah, okay. Am I remembering my NFT lore correctly? I think the project's down 95% from mint price. Where did that cash go, right? There are so many teams that have ICO and the cash goes to the team. They stop working on the project altogether.
Keep the cash and walk away, right? Parrot is the same thing, where they raise $90 million and they get back money, but they kept $45 million for themselves for doing approximately no work. There's cases where teams build a business, they have a token, they sell the company, and they get payments themselves, and don't distribute them back to token holders, right? There's the Bali slow rug where the team raised money, they moved to Bali, they worked four hours a week, and they get paid $500 a year for working four hours a week in Bali, and there's no way to get the cash back to the investors. There's the, I mean, I see this all, so I'm a liquid investor full time.
Right. I see this happen everywhere, basically everywhere all the time, all at once. There's the kind of foundation rug where teams will keep all the money to foundation, but then maybe they'll do a little bit of branding work through an agency, and charge the foundation $5 million for like an hour of branding work. And what is that? That's a dividend being paid to the team, to wanting member as opposed to shareholders. And all this is really sad, because what's happening is people are giving money over the internet to people in good faith, hoping they build projects, and then either the team or a subset of investors end up taking that money in a way that would never be legal in US capital markets, never even be close to legal.
And that's happening to just an extent, and it makes it very difficult for internet capital markets to take off. The reality is that ICOs are a killer app for blockchains. You know, people have trouble raising money out of the US. You can raise money over the internet. That works. The tech works. We've been able to do ICO funding since 2017, right? People are contributing hundreds of millions of dollars to projects, so the tech works. The problem is what happens after, which is all these rug problems. And the natural consequences of all these rugs is that if you invest in people on the internet, you lose your money because of something that you consider to be inappropriate or bad faith.
You don't come back, right? And that's why we've seen these waves of ICOs taking off and then failing, because people get rugged, get burned, don't come back, or if they come back, they come back smarter, which means that they sell the top. After you hear all these people talking about selling the top or kind of getting out before the music stops and some of the stuff. Yeah, you call them. What's your term for them? Is it, there's the foxes and the rabbits, right? And sometimes when people, once people get rugged, they come back as foxes, which is basically like predators that are just trying to kind of sculpt the true believers and you know, get them to bid up projects and then they dump it on them in some way.
And so we've created these lemon-type tokens with more and more fox types of incentives. You're saying, none of that would fly in US equities markets and stock markets. Why? Because we have shareholder protections. We have a legal system. We have Delaware sea corps and LLCs. And like shareholders, which is take those founders to court, right? And get some sort of retribution. So there's a legal code protecting us in the share situation. Is that the difference? That's the difference. And by the way, before that legal code had fully developed, US capital markets were also full fraud and rugs. Yeah, you have this story of what shareholder primacy come to be.
Was this a court case in the early 1900s? That's right. There was a court case of those versus Ford. So Ford, founder of Ford, Motorco, decided that he had earned enough money and wanted to spend some of the routine earnings at Ford on social causes that he considered reported. And the Doge Brothers, which were too early in the 2000s. Is that Dodge? By the way, maybe Dodge. Maybe you're criticizing that. Yeah, Dodge, you're not doing this, Dodge. Okay. I've got in too much. It's a Dodge Brothers. It's a Dodge crypto on the brain. Got it. Dodge versus Ford. The Dodge Brothers worked 10% under the company.
And they took in the court saying, we invest in this company for a return. We can't have the CEO making decisions for the benefit of social causes he considers important instead of shareholders. And the Supreme Court agreed with the Dodge Brothers and set up the Dr. who's shareholder primacy. So now if you're the CEO of a company with outside investors, like any public company, you have to be making decisions for the benefit of shareholders over the long term. Now, you get a lot of leeway. There's another rule called the business judgment rule that says, you know, if you turn down a big deal because you thought it was a bad for the reputation of the company and would hurt you down the line, you can say those that you can protect yourself that way.
But ultimately, you have to be making decisions for the benefit of all shareholders. And if you do anything that obviously hurts all shareholders or shows negligence in terms of thinking about them, you will be sued. You will be sued and the shareholders will be made whole. I'll give you one easy example. And I don't want to go too hard on Uniswap. But there was this case where the Dow voted through $29 for the DeFi education fund, right? And that's fine, but I have nothing against DeFi education fund, but there was a discussion of how it benefited shareholders, right? And that was a trend. You need to have an older specifically, yes.
You need to have an older specifically. And that's like a legitimate project with good people don't need to legitimate cause. But in any kind of, if it was a decision in the US capital markets, the first thing discussed would be how does this benefit unit token holders? How does this benefit our objective function, right? And what Meta Dow does or what Futurki does in general is it solves this token problem. Because now every decision needs to be go through the test of whether it benefits token holders or not. So, and I've been going for a while now, but this is kind of the big thing is for me, is all of these rugs are stopped by Futurki.
So if you say, for example, Futurki funds go into a wallet and they are controlled by the governance process. So if you raise $50 million or $100 million an ICO, and then the team is like, well, we want to take it, we want to send it to our own Binance accounts and cash out, obviously that market's going to vote no, right? You don't need to think about all this, like, insider information and who's smarter, the market's going to say absolutely not. That would hurt the token price of this project. If you want to do the Bali slow rug, you know, it seems like, oh, we raised $100 million when we went to Bali work far as a week.
You submitted a proposal through Futurki saying, return the funds. Because the token would start trading below cash value if that happened. And that actually happened to over 100 tokens during the bear market where the teams kind of went away, the tokens traded below cash value. And there's no way to get the cash out. If Futurki is simple, it's a three day process. I would submit a proposal saying, get the cash out, the team moved to Bali, it's over, right? They're not working on this project anymore. If you want to do, you know, back to our friends at Uniswap, and I think it's a great project, you know, there's reasons why they developed the way they did.
But if they want to say we want to send funds to equity as opposed to token, there'll be a Futurki proposal saying, do we want to send funds to the equity entity? And the market would say absolutely not. That's terrible for Uniswap token, right? So basically all of these, the example that I gave where the team took the IP away from the token, that would never pass because the IP is owned by the token, right, by the Futurki. And they would put a proposal saying, can we remove the IP from the token and do it into ourselves? And the market would say absolutely not. So Futurki, I think the killer app is not really, you know, deciding so much on these like fine-grained, hard issues.
It's just baking in shareholder protections, tokenholder protections directly into the mechanism so that whenever teams or minority shareholders proposing this bad for token holders, it gets immediately shot down. Okay, I really want to get into how this all works with metadata and Futurki and you've started to go there, Felipe. I do have one more question before we do. And this is sort of maybe partially a defense of the DeFi 1.0 tokens and the previous Dow type models. And like a defense in general of kind of the uni decisions and what they made, which is regulatory, which is basically big bad Gary Gensler didn't allow us to have actual on-chain tokens with any shareholder rights.
So we're forced into creating kind of these governance token charades that like couldn't provide true utility or revenue back to token holders. Basically because if like we did that, Gary Gensler would come down on us in our crypto capital markets and indeed, I mean, Uniswap was like, what do they get a Wells notice along with how many other companies? So like part of the reason we are where we are in crypto with our futility tokens is because subregulators and Gary Gensler and it's not so much futarchy. What do you say to that kind of counterpoint or retort? You're absolutely right. I usually give that in this framework when I talk about Uniswap because I think they're a great project that's been acting good faith the whole time.
The reason I mention it is because it's a very well-known example of sending funds to the equity entity. I believe there's a big chance that had Gary Gensler not been the chief regulator and Uniswap had been allowed to give utility to token they would have done so. So I think in this particular case, you're right. I don't think that's true for the much more obvious rugs which I kind of don't mention because it's almost a criminal implication in most cases. But with Uniswap, I agree with you. They're well-intentioned. They're probably putting in the right thing for the token holders. Had the regulatory situation been different.
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Maybe that's because they weren't based in the US, for instance. There are tokens like AVE or even tokens like new class of DeFi fluid that are actually returning revenue back to token holders. And so they're doing this without futarchy. They're sort of, quote unquote, making the right decisions. And indeed, in the case of AVE, it seems like they're making fantastic decisions, almost in kind of a dictatorial type of way where you have Stony and a fantastic management team and then input from the Dow and like they are the leaders in their respective ecosystem for collateralized lending. So without futarchy, we've still made some of these token experiments work.
I know maybe we could make more work, but there are still some investible tokens that made it through this gauntlet. How do you explain that? So I mean, I invest in liquor tokens for a liby. So certainly I agree with you that there are a lot of tokens that have worked. The entirety of my net worth fund is in these tokens that have worked. Again, so I couldn't agree with you anymore. The problem is, there's two problems. One, there are two few of them, right? I count by all account. I think the max number of tokens I can say are indestible is 50. After all this time and one of the most exciting industries in the world, 15 less whole tokens at the most is just not enough.
Well, it's too much. It's too much because you have some sort of access to basically trust that's upside, shareholder revenue, or token revenue, something like this. Because you trust the team, do you do the right thing for the token? Trust-based, right? And sometimes that's trust is earned because the teams went through brutal bear markets and proved that they can do that in the case of like Maple, Euler, Ave, Fluid, or sometimes you can trust them because you know them and you know they're based in the US and you know they have family networks in the US and that helps a lot actually. So there are ways to earn investor trust and there are people who want to do the right thing, of course.
Again, I make my limiting investing in those projects. The problem is one, there's two few of them. Two, it really is hard for new teams to prove that they are trustworthy and this is where we get to the lemon prop, right? If you're a new team attempting to raise funds through an ICO, you don't have a good way to differentiate yourself from the teams that are untrustworthy, which is the majority by number in these ICOs. So what you get is you get higher cost of capital issue for tokens. So again, I invest in tokens for a living. The return I need to promise our investors is significantly, significantly higher and the returns that hedge funds needs to promise investors.
In large part because of all of these token rugs and all of these token holder rights problems. So if I go to an investor I'm like, oh, we're gonna earn you 15% a year or 20% a year they're laughing out of the room. Again, because this industry is so fraught with all these token holder rights problems. So the, and then the downstream effect of a higher cost of capital is lower valuations. So if you are a token launching in a world where there are all these token holder problems, you're gonna trade for the same earnings or for the same promise or the same team quality at a lower valuation than an equity company.
Trading in public markets or trading even in venture markets because of all these issues. And then that, again, there's one more downstream effect, which is if you trade at a lower valuation if you raise a token, then if you're a really good team, just go raise equity. Why not? We'd get a better valuation with better terms. So I just think that this kind of, even though there are many good teams that can make a worker tokens. The fact that the majority by number don't make a worker by tokens means you have higher cost of capital, lower valuations, and wave you were good teams launching tokens than you would otherwise.
Yeah, so recently we did an ICO for a project called Umbra which is an early stage project, it's new. It's even pre-product like many seed stage startups where they've developed the product but they're waiting for Archaea made net. And there was a $156 million committed to that ICO. So they didn't take all that, but they actually, they could've, all that could've gone to the project. And I think a big reason for that is because people knew like, hey, even if this money goes to the project, if it goes to, it's not going to the team. Like we're not just giving $156 million to some team to walk away with, it's going into this treasury governed by this, or like with oversight by markets such that yeah, like if they try to rug, if they try to walk away with it, we can get our money back essentially.
Like we can raise proposals to do partial liquidation, do a full liquidation. Yeah, so I think that is like a pretty good data point for. Well, let's talk about this more than profit. Okay, so Lepe, your interest isn't making, you know, our crypto capital markets like great, and having more investable tokens, and making these as good as like kind of US equities markets. And so part of the solution to this is few-tarky. So profit, let's go through that Umbra example some more. So Umbra, it's kind of a startup phase type of project. They have some sort of concept similar to ICOs, maybe we saw in 2017, it's a real team, let's assume real team doing something real.
And they're trying to raise on crypto capital markets instead of through securities. Now, I believe it's like a privacy thing, is that what they're doing profit? Yeah, exactly. Okay, all right, so they raise 150 million using this mechanism in ICO 1.0 in 2017. That would just be the team's money. Like there's no strings attached for investors. There's no protection here. How is this different with Umbra? You said profit, it goes into, I assume some sort of smart contract-based system. So it's not directly going to their bank accounts or their multi-sigs, the teams, I mean. It's going to a smart contract-based system, I assume, that has some strings attached, that has some governance associated with it, some sort of few-tarky.
Describe that in more detail, because I'm not sure I understand. Sure, and to be clear, they didn't take 156 million. They could have though, that's like the key point. If you put money in, you risked that happening. Or like that could have happened. And they would have been 2017, right? They would have just taken all of it, yeah. Yeah, for sure. Okay. And the reason why they didn't is actually because of the mechanism, which I'll explain. So they ended up taking three million. So that three million then goes to the project. Just three million? That's very not greedy of them. Yeah. Because they don't want to trade for below nav.
Because yeah, so the three million dollars goes to the project treasury. That project treasury is on chain. It's like, yeah, a smart contract. They, the team, it's actually built on squads, protocol for familiar, like the, the multi-sig on Solana. But it's not a team multi-sig. It's a programmatic treasury, where the team gets to spend their burn rate every month, which in this case, they've set that to be 40K a month without needing to do any... They set that as part of the ICO terms, basically. Correct. Our burn rate is 40K per month and we're raising on that basis. So we get the smart contract kind of kicks that out every month to them as part of the initial programming.
Yeah, and we recommend adding a buffer, just so like, you have enough. You don't have to constantly raise proposals if you're like, oh, it turns out we need to spend a little more or whatnot. But yeah, so they get up to their burn rate every month that they can pull, which in yeah, their case is around 40K. And if they want to make a large spend above that amount, so say they need to spend a million dollars on CapEx or something, that would need to go to a proposal where decision markets would decide whether it goes through. And also, if they want to issue new tokens, that also goes to a proposal.
So yeah, every token in the system is mintable and it can only be minted by decision markets. Why they only took three million, right? The status quo would be like, why not just take 156? Like if the market wants to give you 156. And the reason why is because in this system, as a team, you, like you have actually a lot of discretion. Like I, as someone building a product I can't expect founders to just be like, constantly negotiating with their DAO and like raising proposals all the time. I think probably the right number of proposals is, we'll see where this lands, but maybe between two and four a year.
Like not a lot. But what would these be like big budgets, annual budgets, kind of major cap X spend above a million, like who the CEO is, kind of board level decisions is that the granularity for these types of futarchy votes? Yeah, like fundraise is a big one. Like if you want to OTC out tokens to a big investor, that would be one. If you want to issue new tokens for like a liquidity mining program, that would be one, things like that. We've actually, we've not had yet had a situation yet where a team needed to raise proposal for a big cap X. Like including ourselves, we're also based on this mechanism or like all of our money is stored in this programmatic treasury.
And yeah, so why did they take through a million? Because imagine they took all 156 million. And then the market cap of the token traded down to like 130 million. In that case, then there would be the possibility of someone creating a proposal to do buybacks. And that proposal should in theory pass because it's trading below the net asset value. As in like the market, if a $156 million of cash is trading for $130 million, the market is basically saying that this cash can be better invested elsewhere, right? If you're only willing to buy a dollar for like 70 cents, that implies that you think that dollars gonna kind of potentially be squandered away, at least partially.
And so that would make it possible for someone to raise proposal to do buybacks to like shrink kind of return some of that capital to token holders, which we've actually had before. So yeah, Philippe earlier mentioned a fund that was governed by this mechanism that kind of failed to deliver returns to shareholder or to token holders. And so gradually shut down. And yeah, so Umbra essentially, like I actually don't like it's that bad to have to deal with these buybacks, but it can be a distraction. I understand for teams to have to deal with this. And so they don't want to deal with that. And so they want to have, they want to always trade above Nav and they've decided that there's probably enough market demand for the Umbra tokens as they can trade above essentially $3 million market cap.
Okay, so they raised $3 million, right? I see right now their market cap right now in terms of token supplies, something like $11 million. The fully diluted valuation is 32 million that excess in kind of the fully diluted valuation that's not on the market right now. Is that in their treasury? Or is that tokens to be minted later? Sure. So some of it is tokens in liquidity. Like I mentioned earlier, the project actually provides a lot of liquidity in its own token, which is yeah, like kind of a pump fund inspired mechanism where like yeah, the people buy and then you take some of the money and you take some additional tokens and provide liquidity.
And then the other component is we allow teams to set up these performance packages where they get tokens dependent on both time passing and hitting price targets. So in their case, they just use the default performance package where if there's five charges and if they, if the ICO price is 2x, or sorry, if the price is 2x above the ICO price, they unlock 20% and if it's 4x, they unlock another 20% if it's 8x, they unlock another 20%. But yeah, basically this kind of like performance package where they get, they will, they would get tokens or they will get tokens if the price is higher than ICO price in about 21 months.
Interesting. And so part of your job at Metadow is to be sort of a steward of kind of like the most, I guess investor friendly kind of ICO and sort of launch kit with some of these recipes, right? Which is like, you know, founder, performance bonuses and just I guess some of the recipes that you guys are providing. Now in the case of like Umbra, let's say, so let's say down the road, they want to unlock a million in CapEx, right? Because they want to invest in something that exceeds their 40k per month burn rate. And their token right now is trading at $1.12, right? Then the few Turkey decision, one of these two to four types of board of director type decisions per year would be give Umbra team $1 million to do XYZ, whatever their proposal is, versus do not give, you know, the team $1 million.
And then the market would determine whether the token price is higher in the event that they release that $1 million CapEx, say, $2 for the Umbra token versus one, or whether it kind of like goes down in that scenario. And then few Turkey would be at play and at work and essentially resolve as to whether the team would get $1 million in CapEx from their smart contract multi-sigma or not. Is that how it works, profit? Yep, at a high level, yes. Interesting, all right. And so it seems like you'd have to have tokens like fully launched on this platform from inception, from birth. You know, so they have to be involved in kind of the ICO process.
And so it's really meant for new projects, new tokens. In other words, I guess Metadow doesn't allow for an existing token to sort of append few Turkey governance decisions on top of it. You're more doing it from like inception in the full lifecycle, but they have to really be born on Metadow for this whole thing to work, right? We actually do support the like an existing project wanting to migrate to a decision markets. And that's what I spent about a year, like we spent about a year trying to get existing doubts to move over. So it's less so us wanting to not support there. I just don't think that there's PMF there yet.
As in the, it's not like the number one, two or three priority on an established projects priority list, which makes it a tough, especially on Solata, right? Like on Ethereum, you guys care about governance. We don't really care that much on Solata. And yeah, so we definitely support it, but I think the real value add is to an early stage founder, yeah. Yeah, I do have to say, mostly we cover a bank list, we cover the Ethereum ecosystem. And there have been many really interesting innovations on Solata. This is one of the first ones where I'm like, oh my God, this is so Ethereum-coded. Like I'm jealous.
Like I want Metadow on Ethereum too, because it seems like it's really innovating in the governance space. So well done on this. What you're doing is very cool. And so you like to call these not few Turkey, because that's governance nerd shit. But profit, you call these ownership coins. Can you talk about what that meme confers? Yeah, I mean, I think, yeah, there's been so many failed governance projects and like Dow projects. I've even considered getting rid of Metadow. Like we have Metadow, that's our name. Just, but then we would just be meta, which I guess is what Facebook is now. That's a tough kind of task.
It'd be a lot of things for you there, profit. They've done it before. But yeah, so, and also I think few Turkey as a name, like I almost kind of want to distance a little bit from that, because like if you're in a early stage entrepreneur, you're not thinking about, oh, I want to go start a democracy, right? You're just like, I want to go build a business. And ownership coin as a term, I think, well, encapsulates what we're doing here, because yeah, if you think of the word ownership, it actually becomes obvious why governance is actually some components of that, right? It's not the only components.
We actually do a bunch of other stuff too. So, yeah, like Philippe earlier mentioned the IP thing where we spin up legal entities for every project where the legal entity operating agreement. Well, so that legal entity owns all the IP and the operating agreement actually enshrines the on-chain governance as like the arbiter of what's allowed. Okay, all right, so talk about that piece because I think that's an important component here, right? So, you're actually also spinning up a real-world legal entity, some sort of C-Corp or Delaware thing somewhere that actually owns IP and is owned and that IP say whatever code that they create is actually owned by sort of the token holders as well as part of the smart contract, is that correct?
Yes, so yeah, like basically if there's a proposal that passes to, I don't know, sell, like yeah, to move IP, you would need to get a proposal pass essentially. And there is some legal structure, meat space structure that has to own that IP in the real-world and that comes with a metadata package. Yes, and yeah, so for today, we use this offshore jurisdiction called the Marshall Islands, I think. Oh, okay. I'll see. And we're working with Metalex, like Gabe Shapiro from our QC at Delphi's company. Gabe, well, yeah, yeah, very cool. Okay, cool. Yeah, he's awesome. And we're probably going to move to Cayman.
Okay, wow, very cool. All right, so Felipe, what do you think of when you see this, like what's new and different versus kind of our Dow 1.0 governance 1.0 stuff? It's really just the token holder projection. Where you can't do that, it's a versus token holders. I think that is, it's really the killer app. Like, if we can solve, you know, raising money on the internet is the most exciting thing that's, I'm going to at level, it's the most exciting thing that I think we can solve as an industry over the next few years. And the thing that's been stopping that is poor token holder connections. And the ability to defraud or skim off the top from token holders.
So I think if we can solve this token holder rights problem, all of a sudden we will get thousands, tens of thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands of companies raising capital on chain through the internet. And just to be clear, so raising capital on chain through the internet is so great because it's borderless, it's available to anyone with an internet connection. It's a global market from day one. You get all the benefits of DeFi and liquidity and markets and everything we built up. So it's like, it's way better than US capital markets in this certain perspective. What this is solving, profit calls it ownership coin.
We've used the term futarchy. It's almost sort of like an unregable coin though, right? It's an unregable token. So we're not solving all the problems here. Let's be clear. So there are still tokens that will go to zero here because there are still projects that just won't achieve product market fit or founders that can't execute or ideas that were too early in their life cycle or just things that that didn't work, right? And that will always be the case. What we are solving for here is something that feels small but is vitally important, which is we're creating ICO mechanisms, capital market mechanisms that can't be prone to all of the rug risks that you were talking about earlier.
The bally slow rug, all the kind of the diverting, like revenue into some other token, all of those things, that's what we're solving for specifically. And that's going to improve the quality of tokens that we have on our platform. Is that the case? Well, exactly. And I think all the things that you mentioned, permissionless capital markets, global capital markets, D5, programmability of tokens, all of these things are amazing. I think that the token problem, the rug problem, we call it the token problem, is the Cheeto and the Door meme that's holding all that back right now. Because fundamentally we created this amazing ecosystem in D5.
It is, all the things that are possible are incredible. But people do not raise money for most businesses on-chain. They don't hold most of their assets on-chain because you can't pick up high quality capital on-chain, right? This team, the Umbra team, I don't think they would have gotten $156 million of demand had the launch to a random ICO with the protection. Or I know for the fact that they wouldn't have, right? But as soon as that of a money becomes available on-chain for people to raise funds on-chain, like they will come, and as soon as the returns are there, because you're gonna move the rug problem, capital will flow into the space.
It's very easy to raise liquid capital for an industry that's growing when it returns your good, right? If we had three years of good returns through ICOs, you would have billions of dollars on-chain chasing these ICOs. That process is really fast. You get good returns. A new fund's come up to get good values with those returns. Fund to fund and see that they're liquid token allocators doing well. Again, getting those with dollars on-chain is very fast. And for teams, the Umbra ICO happened, they got $156 million in capital and profits getting dozens of DMs the next day from teams I wanna raise on metadata, right?
Like both sides here wanna meet. Both sides you wanna cooperate. But you have this token problem, the rug problem in the middle, stopping it from happening. And I think that as soon as you kinda get rid of that through future key, you were gonna see a tidal wave of on-chain capital raising. And I would say, if I could just add to like the entrepreneur, say like why is an entrepreneur go this path? Because I think the obvious answer is just because they can raise money here, where maybe they can't raise money elsewhere. But I think I'm also, I've seen like the really high quality founders that I talked to that wanna raise with metadata, they wanna do a token because they like the distribution edge of doing a token, like they like the idea of getting all these bad holders that are then, instead of I still like, shield them on CT into their friends or whatnot.
But they wanna do it the right way. And today there's a few playbooks of doing a token. Like the main one is this low-float high-fd playbook, which is really not a fun game to play. Like you're basically just trying to hype up your thing as much as possible, get as many Koreans to buy it. And then like your token is gonna go down over an extended period of time. And like it's not, yeah, it just is not really purpose-built for building a business, the existing, the established token playbook. And then we have this new token playbook where you can launch a meme coin on pump fun or like some other bonding curve-based platform, which does solve the low-float high-fd problem, but then you're not actually creating a valuable token, right, you're launching a meme coin.
And that tends to attract short-term holders and just like people betting on tension because the thing itself doesn't have value. And here's like, if you really wanna do things like a grassroots way, we're launching a token on day one, allowing it to potentially appreciate over time. Because you're not launching it like a $5 billion FTB or $1 billion FTB. But you wanna do it in a way that you can sleep at night and get high quality people to surround you. I think that's like the main pitch. Right, and if you're right, and if this works, then you become kind of the anti-Lemon ICO platform where all of the good teams and the good projects kind of come to you and you slowly kind of transform our token markets to higher quality projects.
Let me throw out one wrench that could totally gum up the works here. Sure. This is, I'm gonna invoke that the G name again, Gary Gensler, okay? And let's talk about maybe a V2 of Gary Gensler. Right now we have a favorable SEC and Paul Atkins who seems to be sort of letting things happen, letting experiments play out. Indeed, someone like Hester Purses, fairly very in favor of kind of sandboxes and all of these things. That however is not the last word on the SEC and securities regulation. And coming back to kind of like full circle lessons from 2017 through 2022 is the SEC as kind of the king capital markets.
They are going to have something to say about these types of setups and ICOs on internet, in internet capital markets, right? And there's existing US law for this, right? There's an credited investor laws. They feel like they have the investor protection capital markets thing figured out. Of course, we being crypto natives were like, okay, well, we're still in the spirit of everything you're provided. You want investor protections, we could do you one better. Smart contract-based investor protections where no one gets the money and you could see it all on chain. And it's all glorious. If they were thinking from first principles, then they might come around to our idea.
Anyway, this is a long-winded way of saying what happens with regulation, okay? So we gotta be still somewhat in the gray zone here. I've seen enough crypto projects get torched by angry regulators, the SEC. We've seen the anti-crypto army. This is not a settled matter in the US. So I don't know if you have a perspective on this, Felipe or profit, but I'm a little bit worried that some sort of form of a Gary Gensler reincarnation comes back and strikes back at these ICOs that we're trying to do and kills our experiments. Do you have any takes on this or any perspective here that you can lend?
I have a take, which is essentially, this is a risk, like this is a real risk, and I understand that. And I mean, there's two things I would basically say. One is that there are countries outside the US. I know the US has like a long arm. I live in the US in San Francisco, which I love, but there are plenty of entrepreneurs who are outside the US and like, potentially don't have to care that much about what the SEC says. And then the other point is that, I think like if you work in crypto, like if you're building something in crypto and you're not willing to enter the gray area at least, you should probably find a different industry to work in.
Because yeah, like if you go back the history of crypto, Bitcoin is an unlicensed money transmitter, right? There were previous iterations of Bitcoin that got shut down by the feds because they were unlicensed money transmitter. Only difference with Bitcoin is that it's decentralized so it's hard to shut down, right? I think a lot of DeFi as well is like probably if you were to look at it with a really sharp eye is breaking at least some existing rules. I mean, I'm skeptical that the existing token playbook even is not a security, right? The like model that Fenwick dreamed up where you have the labs entity, the foundation entity and then the Dow and there's like these different relationships between them.
Like that's not been tested in court. We don't know that that's not a security. It still seems to satisfy some of the requirements of being a security, right? Investment of money in a common enterprise with the work with expectations of profits based on the efforts of others, right? Most people are buying tokens with expectations of profits on the efforts of others, right? Like if the team just went away tomorrow aside from maybe Ethereum and Bitcoin, like there wouldn't, their most tokens would go down at least 50% if not more. And so yeah, those, I guess then that's three points. One is like outside the US, two is, yeah, if you're working crypto, you probably be okay with gray area.
And number three is like, even if whether you like it or not, you're actually already in the gray area. Can I add a number four, which feels like the being on the right side of history, I feel like is important. And like when you're in the business of, you know, quote unquote, doing the right thing and providing value to market participants, I think you are on the right side of history. And I think there's the case that you can blitz gale such that regulators just have to start accepting you. I was gonna add something a lot like your point four, which is, you know, I have faith that people who are concerned about crypto and how it messes with US capital market regulation will be much more open to hearing arguments from the people who just had an hour and a half podcasts on how to secure shareholder protections and onto capital markets and how to stop rugs from happening and how to make sure that, you know, people who put their savings in these instruments don't lose all their money.
Like we are trying to achieve the same goals here. So there's always gonna be some friction between old regulations and new technologies. But if you're on the right side of the argument and you're trying to, and you are trying to adhere to the spirit of the law as much as possible, I think you have a much better shot at being listened to and being in the conversation than if you are going very much against the spirit of the law, which is what I think a lot of the industry has been in over the past few years, you know, better for worse. So profit, scale this forward. What's next for metadata? It sounds like you've got active ICOs kind of launching today.
What's kind of the next step in this platform? Yeah, I mean, really just scaling out the number of projects. I think it's a really tough, like market sequencing is a really tough problem. Like how do you, how do you introduce this in a way where that's okay, basically, because you have this two-sided platform on one side you have the capital providers on one side you have the founders. If there's too many founders and not enough capital providers, then things under raise. And if there's not enough founders and too much capital, I guess that's slightly better, but still like people lose excitement because they're like, oh, I don't go to this platform because there's nothing to participate in.
And that all happens in waves, right? You're never, there's never a time where you're going to have perfect balance, I suppose. Yeah, I think it's kind of like a zigzag. To some weeks I focus on getting more capital providers, like DMing people on Twitter and being like, hey, you should check out the CCO thing. It's actually kind of interesting. And then some weeks I focus exclusively on meeting founders. But yeah, I think we are more, and there's also some things that we need to tweak with the mechanism itself. Like more I would say around the edges than than core changes, but yeah, basically just I have reasonable conviction that this market like this product will work.
And so now it's a question of how do we improve the product incrementally and then how do we capture the market and like go to market as quickly as reasonably possible. Felipe, what's your take on where all this leads? I think that you'll know that future key and ownership coins are one when existing projects get evaluation bump from converting. So I think at some point in the future you will see projects like Ave and Maker and these well-known tokens that are reasonably good faith convert into future keys and get evaluation bump on the news, basically. Because investors will, and that's when you know that investors have appreciated the mechanism, understood why it's so valuable for them and decided to put more money all else equal into future keys than then unprotected tokens.
Well, Felipe Profit, it's been really a pleasure to learn about this very interesting project. Love what you're doing over there. Hope maybe you come to a EVM chain at some point profit maybe a base or something like that, but cheering you on in this governance experiment, it's certainly good for crypto. I mean, yeah, if the market wills it will go to base. But yeah, thanks so much for having me on. There you go. Maybe we'll put up a prediction market or free-tarkey decision on whether the market wills it at some point in the future. We'll see. Guys, thank you so much. Bankless Nation got to let you know none of this has been financial advice, has not been ICO advice either.
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