What are the implications of restaking? Not every Bankless listener will be prepared for this conversation. This one is a hard one. If you want to be adequately equipped for the conversation that awaits, we recommend listening to the Bankless episode we did with Sreeram a few weeks ago. That episode will get you up to speed to understand some of the nuances and problems that are discussed in today’s episode.
Because, today on the show, we have the largest and most gigabrain panel that we’ve ever had on Bankless…Vitalik Buterin, Justin Drake, Dankrad Feist, Jessy (aka 13-year-old VC - that’s her pseudonym), and of course… Sreeram Kannan himself, founder of Eigenlayer and perhaps the creator of restaking…all moderated by Tim Beiko!
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----------- TIMESTAMPS
0:00 Intro 4:45 Setting the Panel 8:51 Jessy’s Restaking Thoughts 10:20 Justin’s Restaking Perspective 11:40 Dankrad’s Restaking Views 12:30 Sreeram’s Restaking Arguments 14:00 Why Justin is a Restaking Doomer 18:30 EigenLayer’s Restaking Architecture 22:05 Restaking Builder Hooks 25:05 Vitalik’s Restaking Concerns 30:05 EigenLayer’s Acceleration 32:50 Sreeram Addressing Vitalik’s Concerns 37:48 Ensuring Restaking is Aligned 46:04 Reputation Systems & Alignment 51:35 Ethereum Protocol Complexity 59:00 Credible Neutrality 1:03:30 MEV Boost & PBS 1:07:10 One Shot Signatures 1:09:10 Closing Thoughts, Arguments, & Next Steps 1:16:30 Closing & Disclaimers
----------- RESOURCES
Sreeram Kannan https://twitter.com/sreeramkannan https://youtu.be/HcEGXoC57Rw
Vitalik Buterin https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin
Tim Beiko https://twitter.com/TimBeiko
Justin Drake https://twitter.com/drakefjustin
Dankrad Feist https://twitter.com/dankrad
Jessy https://twitter.com/13yearoldvc
----------- Not financial or tax advice. This channel is strictly educational and is not investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell any assets or to make any financial decisions. This video is not tax advice. Talk to your accountant. Do your own research.
Disclosure. From time-to-time I may add links in this newsletter to products I use. I may receive commission if you make a purchase through one of these links. Additionally, the Bankless writers hold crypto assets. See our investment disclosures here: https://www.bankless.com/disclosures
No summary for this episode yet.
Welcome to Bankless, where we explore the frontier of internet money and internet finance. And today on Bankless, we are going deep into the frontier of restaking. We are going so deep, in fact, that we are bringing in some extra help to guide us down the very thorny and unmapped landscape of restaking. What is restaking? If you don't know what restaking is, this episode might not be for you. This is not an afternoon hike of a conversation. We are not strolling around the park. We are going so far into the unknown that we need a guide to make sure that we don't get lost. Tim Bako on this episode is tapping in as our technical moderator for this conversation, our guide for the journey into restaking.
So not every Bankless listener will be prepared for this conversation. This one is a hard one. If you want to be adequately equipped for the conversation that awaits, I recommend listening to the Bankless episode with Sri Ram about the restaking meta that we are embarking upon. We did that episode with Sri Ram just a few weeks ago. That will get you up to speed and ready to understand some of the nuances and problems that we are going to suss out here on today's episode. Because today on the show, we have one of the largest and most gigabrain panels that we've ever had on Bankless. We have Dankrad Feist.
We have Jesse, a.k.a. 13-year-old VC. That is her pseudonym. Justin Drake, Vitalik Buterin. and of course Sri Ram Kanon himself, the founder of Eigenlayer and perhaps the creator of Resaking, all moderated by Tim Bako. Bankless Nation, I'm going to be with you in the audience on this one. This one is well above my pay grade, but you are in good hands with Tim. So I'm going to sit back and get my learn on, and I'm sure that you will as well. So let's get right into our conversation with one of the most brainiac panels that we've ever had on Bankless. But first, a moment to talk about some of these fantastic sponsors that make this show possible.
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Bankless Nation, welcome to our restaking deep dive. This episode is not meant to be an introduction to restaking. This will be a much more technical conversation as to the current frontier of thought from the ETH core devs and other restaking enthusiasts about how the meta of restaking might interact, interfere with the goals of the Ethereum execution later. For an explanation of restaking and what restaking is, there is a 101 or 201 level content that we did with Sri Ram not too long ago. So see that previous episode if you need to get downloaded as to the state of Eigen layer, what restaking is and what it does.
We hopefully want to go very deep in this episode. So deep, in fact, that I am only able to guide us so far in this conversation. So moving forward, I am tapping in Tim Bako as our guide into the frontier of the staking meta and the Ethereum protocol. Tim, welcome back to Bankless and thank you so much for taking the reins here. Yeah, thanks for having me again. Before we bring on the largest panel that we've ever had here at Bankless, I want to pick up a little bit of your brain, Tim. What are you hoping to accomplish in this episode and what context and frame of mind should listeners have as they enter this conversation?
Right. So we're going to have people from both eigen layer and then the research uh side of ethereum and and kind of the broader community and my goal is like if everyone can understand everyone's perspective a bit better by the end of the call i'll be happy and i think as a byproduct of that we're going to have to dive into all of the issues around restaking um so folks can expect you know discussion of like the technical issues the trade-offs uh the general roadmap and um the potential risks around restaking. And then hopefully the folks on the panel have a better understanding of each other's perspective by the end of the hour.
Why would you say that this has captured the attention of so many of the Ethereum core devs and surrounding Ethereum community? Like why in simple terms, is this a big deal? Yeah, I think it's because it introduces changes to the incentive landscape, which the protocol is not aware of, you know, natively. So obviously we have all these incentives in the Ethereum protocol, like how much stake do we issue, or sorry, how much rewards do we issue to stakers? What are the penalties? What do we do with transaction fees? And, you know, those sort of all work really well if you think of Ethereum as a closed system where, you know, there's not too much interference with it.
But then when you see something like restaking, you know, which fundamentally changes the reward landscape for stakers, and it might end up changing sort of the decisions they make around the risk they're willing to take. If they take risk and things go poorly, then it might change the decisions they make with regards to their role as a staker on the Ethereum mainnet. So it's really this intersection of the incentive design and the edges of the protocol and how they interact together. I think that's something that people in recent years have become much more attuned to. And yeah, it's why it causes so much conversation.
All right, Tim, are you ready for me to hand over the reins to you? Yeah, let's do it. All right, Tim, I'm going to let you go. But first, I'm going to introduce you to Dankrad, the father of modern Danksharding, a researcher at the Ethereum Foundation. Dankrad, welcome back to Bankless. Thank you for having me. We also have Justin Drake, father of ultrasound money. He's been on the show a large number of times before. Justin, also welcome back to Bankless. Thanks for having me too. And first time on the show, we have Jesse, who I think has posed some of the biggest questions about restaking is definitely on the frontier of restaking thought jesse welcome to bankless for your first time thank you for having me and then of course we have vitalik buterin just some guy on twitter and also famous for having the most ignored eips and ethereum vitalik welcome back to bankless hello everyone it's good to be here again and last but definitely not least we have sriram the father of modern restaking himself sriram welcome back to your second time on bankless Thank you so much, David.
Excited to be here. Thanks to all the EF friends for coming here and Jesse. Tim, I am out of here, my man. This is all you. Awesome. Thank you, David. I guess one place to kick this off to make sure that we sort of dive into the deep end pretty quickly is if the four of you, Dankrat, Justin, Jesse, and Vitalik, maybe just want to take a minute to share your current brain dump of where your head is at with regards to restaking. We can kick it off from there. And then, Sriram, I'll make sure to give you some time after to respond to the comments that will come up. I think, yeah, quickly, Jessie, I don't know if you want to kick us off.
Yeah. What do you think restaking? Like, what are the things that are coming through your mind right now? Yeah. So I think to me, restaking is that one simple, elegant idea that's inevitably coming true. I think it has real yield for users that come from a real utility. It has real excitement and traction behind it. I think there's, in the process, real value capture as well. However, it's also an opportunity that I believe has been slept on. because I probably talked to hundreds of developers, one-on-one and tens of ecosystems. And some of our most smartest people are working on ZK on-chain games, MEV.
But restaking is, I think, some of the biggest upcoming nerds that there's just not that many experts in. There's many interesting topics to be explored that comes out of this Pandora's box. My friend Kaido once said that you could probably get a PhD just studying any of the rabbit holes into restaking. And there's just not that many experts in this space. So I would encourage everyone to study and become an expert. Awesome, thanks. Justin, want to go next? Sure, yeah. So my perspective is that restaking is a little bit like AI. On the one hand, there's an opportunity to really upgrade Ethereum, kind of make it the center of economic security and really strengthen its network effects, have more applications, more cash flows.
But on the other hand, there's systemic risks. There's big, big downsides. There's a large blast radius. And what we potentially could be losing is the decentralization of the staking operators. That's what I'm most worried about. And that could have ripple effects around losing credible neutrality, losing monetary premium and things like that. Now, I guess personally, I've been digging into restaking very seriously for the last two months. and I feel good about it as a researcher because it kind of extends my runway. But on the other hand, I must say that thinking about these systemic risks, you know, deeply has made me a bit more gloomy and doomy.
But I'm trying to remain optimistic in my research. Thanks. Vitalik, you want to go next? Yeah, I think I have pretty much the same perspective as Justin on this. Okay, Dan Kraad, anything from you? Yeah, I mean, I would just like to continue what Justin was saying. I think it's super interesting because, to me, like restaking has many similarities to liquid staking. And, like, I think the risks are in many ways quite similar. So it is very interesting in that at the same time, it could actually help decentralization in that it makes solo staking more competitive and more capital efficient, but at the same time runs the risk of completely compromising the protocol by re-hypothecating basically all the stake and removing our security by using the stake for something else.
So it's a super interesting topic to think about. Thanks. And yes, Riram, I guess we've heard it's almost like a barbell of opinions, right? like it could make solo staking better, super interesting problem for builders, new source of yield, but then it's like AI could destroy centralization and affect the credible neutrality. So how do you think about restaking from your vantage point now? No, I think we do agree that there are complex risks. And that's why I think it's important to take a constrained approach in building risk-taking. The constraints being like what is really good for the ecosystem?
And having constraint on that, building what new innovation can be unleashed based on this concept. So that's how we are thinking about it. Our driving value is permissionless innovation. The idea that anybody can come and build new things on top of this massive trust source. And I think the fundamental thing we are all seeing here is there is a kind of a tradeoff between shared security and, you know, risk contagion. And I think understanding that sharply, as well as building systems that make sure that there is, you know, a certain amount of innovation that can be unleashed while satisfying the constraints of minimizing risks and contagion is how we are thinking about it.
Thanks. Yeah, I guess, Justin, to go back to you, you said, you know, the past couple of months have made you into a bit of a restaking doomer. Can you can you paint us a picture of like your your mental evolution and like what your current view of the risks is and why they could be bad? Right. So things have actually evolved in the last few days where I feel like I've made some breakthroughs in terms of having solutions if we really want to kind of fight solo staking. So I used to believe for a long time that restaking was inevitable, but actually maybe there are some redesigns of proof of stake that make it like proof of work, where you can't really do restaking with slashing.
But putting this aside and just assuming that we continue on the current path where we're at, one of my main concerns is basically the erosion of solo staking. It's actually the opposite of what the Dankrat is hoping for. And basically, the reason is that right now there's one staking application, restaking application zero, if you will, which is to participate in the beacon chain and at the execution layer of Ethereum. But there's going to be many other options going forward. And for each one of these restaking applications, a decision needs to be made by the staker. Either you don't participate in that restaking application.
And I think that might actually not be really an option for some restaking applications. And the reason is that there's this economic forcing function going on. If you don't want to play the game, you are uncompetitive from an economic standpoint. The other option might be to become a solo restaker. So you retain your sovereignty. But my worry here, and there's basically a whole laundry list of things that basically jeopardize the possibility for solo restaking. So right now, when we think of solo staking, we think of a low-powered node that's, for example, dApp node. We think of distributed validators like OBL and MPC friendliness.
We think of the minimum stake being 32 ETH. We think of low maintenance. We think of client diversity, determinism, smoothing, synchrony, all sorts of things that we think about, each one of which could be jeopardized even by one single restaking application. And so basically what could happen is that these solo stakers might be forced to the third option, which is to do delegated restaking. And delegated restaking is all about trusted operators. And one of the problems here is there's a ransom attack. So we used to think that we can delegate and still hold custody of the stake. But it turns out that when you're delegating stake in the context of restaking, you're allowing this operator to slash you.
And what this operator can do is basically threaten to slash you unless you pay a ransom, which is almost the full amount that they can slash. So for example, if they can slash you for 32 ETH, they can say, I'm going to slash you unless you pay me 31 ETH and you get one ETH back. And it's in your best interest to just go ahead and do that. And so you're effectively losing the benefits of the segregation between the staking key and the withdrawal key. Yeah. A brief comment there is, it seems like you can have immutable services whose slashing contracts are immutable. And as long as we encourage stakers to only operate to only opt into restaking where it is immutable service contracts, you don't have this risk that suddenly somebody can come and say something because it's not a thing that anybody can say.
Slashing is written into a contract. Maybe, yeah, on that point, Sriram, can you take a couple minutes to walk us through exactly what exists today in the restaking architecture, like for Eigenlayer specifically? Because I think it's probably helpful. I suspect most listeners have heard of restaking as a general concept. But if you can walk us through the flow of, like, I'm a validator. I set my withdrawals credential to this contract. This contract does X. Yeah, I think that would help kind of ground the conversation and what actually happens. Yeah. Yeah, absolutely. So there are two kinds of restaking we allow.
One is native restaking, which is essentially you go and stake in Ethereum and then you have a staking key and a withdrawal credential. You set the withdrawal credential to a smart contract, basically to the EigenLayer smart contracts. And in particular, inside the EigenLayer smart contract, you create your own zone or a pod called an EigenPod, which you control. And you basically set your withdrawal credential to that. And now like the Eigen layer system thinks of you as having restate. And then now you have the freedom to opt into new services. So what's a new service? So there's an Eigen layer set of smart contracts on Ethereum.
And then there are service contracts. Anybody who's building new services writes a service contract and has a service off-chain code. So imagine you're building a new consensus protocol. You basically, you know, have like a, like a get node and a prism node type of thing for that. You know, you ship it to people. You know, this is off-chain code written in arbitrary languages. They download and run it off-chain. On-chain, you have the service contract, which has basically three kinds of conditions. One is registration conditions. How to register into the or who's allowed to register into the restaking for that particular service.
Then you have payment conditions. Oh, if you validate X number of blocks or do X number of signatures, you'll be paid X. And then the third one is slashing conditions. These three are returned into the service contracts. So you're not really giving power to anybody else. You're giving power specifically to the service contract to enforce a certain kind of condition. And in the ideal eventual world, both eigenlabel, the core contracts have been immutable and service contracts, as they ossify and become correct, could become immutable. And when you're opting in as a risk taker, it is pretty much just fully algorithmic code that you're basically opting into.
So that's the structure of the system. So essentially as a staker, now you've set your withdrawal credentials. Why do you set your withdrawal credentials here is essentially you're adding one step in your withdrawal flow on the Eigen layer contracts, you anyway setting the withdrawal credential for your Eigen part to your own like wallet, right? So essentially it's just one more stop in the way of withdrawal. And the reason this is important is to impose any kind of slashing or negative penalties at the Eigen layer level. You promise to do something, you promise to validate some other set of systems, and then you don't do it.
Then, you know, these systems can enforce the system of like positive and negative penalties, positive incentives and negative incentives there. I just want to kind of just state one more thing. Our eventual view is something like Eigenlayer doesn't necessarily remain as a separate layer on top of Ethereum. just like we had a maybe boost and eventually it was understood what the right interfaces are or it is under getting understood what the right interfaces are and it becomes part of a native pbs type system we absolutely want to figure out how to make you know something like eigen layer a default part of ethereum that would be our ideal end state so as to minimize the accounting uncertainties between ethereum itself and anything else that can be built on top Our vision, like I said, is permissionless innovation.
We want to enable anybody who wants to build new kinds of infrastructure in the space to come and build it. As long as that goal is met, we have achieved our goal. Thanks. Yeah, I think this really helps ground the conversation and kind of be a bit more specific going forward. And I guess following from that, Jesse, you mentioned earlier, restaking is this really new primitive that builders should get excited about. like when you sort of hear this entire description like what are the the the hooks or like the things uh on which you think builders should be uh spending their attention and trying to extend and whatnot yeah um so in my spare time i run some hacker houses and just even from the hacker house applications and some of the residents that you know some projects that they're building um there's a few categories one right one is with security there's this project called jisera that is a hacker that we're hosting they're basically allowing you know restaked validators to detect and perform emergency responses for protocols of their choice whereby you know performing advanced validation validation checks on the protocol security um this part can be offloaded from the blockchain performed off-chain via you know commitments ensured by their collateral via restaking right another example is a lot of mev projects right there's another project that is doing decentralized auction market selling users order flow to searchers and in the process they want to essentially slash malicious participants stake who perform sandwich attacks and this can be ensured with you know igler another project that we see um this guy build restaking.
wtf it's essentially instead of leveraging only if as collateral for restaking you can essentially leverage any assets as collateral right and then he went on to build something else with objective credible commitments via via zk where you know validators actions that were previously non-binding via just crypto economic security for example maybe like non-inclusion of blocks can now be made binding with zk uh in a way where zk would actually extend uh crypto economic security um and in a way that scales so i think if i have the intel correctly maybe eichler has like three stages right and there's like one year away from actually launching middleware marketplace i think a potential um pattern or of behavior that i observe is we may see faster experiments where restaking emerge where there is an allegiance of restaking protocols meaning maybe five protocols out there are friends with each other and they want to essentially restate onto each other's network and share this uh security with amongst themselves i think that's a very interesting approach where you know like risk is limited only to these set of protocols and they can launch these experiments much faster um and then later i was told that this actually is happening on cosmos with mesh security where you know sovereign chains and roll-ups are across carrying each other uh but now we could potentially have this behavior on ethereum and other ecosystems as well got it thanks um and i don't know vitalik or dankrat if either of you want to maybe Again, to make things more precise, based on this entire flow of eigenlayer and what people build on top of it, what are the things that can break through this?
What are the specific attack surfaces that we should be really concerned about and where we should maybe try and limit degrees of freedom? Yeah, so I think I have basically two types of concerns. So one concern is the type of concern that I mentioned in my post about a month ago. Right. Like basically we're restaking in the sense of just like collateralizing or reusing your collateral for other applications kind of slides into restaking in the sense of like finding ways to sort of sneak other protocols into being enshrined as part of Ethereum in some way. And I think it's good to see that there is a desire from, you know, so many people across the spectrum here to try not to do that and to try to limit ways of getting into that.
And then the second type of concern, I think, I mean, I think it's important to stress that this is like not uniquely eigenlayer's fault. This is a discussion that stretches way beyond eigenlayer. It also, you know, it gets into LIDO. It also gets into like just the limits of the protocol itself, which is like basically, you know, the erosion of solo staking and how do we make sure that solo staking continues to be viable and competitive going forward. And that's a place where I think it's very possible to imagine ways in which all of these protocols can be designed in ways that are solo staker friendly.
I think the biggest challenges tends to come in places where like you're not just relying on the staked collateral as like what economists would call a hostage you're relying on it as a deposit right so like a hostage is you know if you do something bad it burns the deposit is if you do something bad then it compensates the people who get hurt and like one example of the deposit would be if you look at something like rye right like something like a cdp backed stable coin like for people holding the stable coin to actually be safe you need to actually have a deposit, right? It would be nice for that deposit to be staked ETH so that the interest rate from the, or the return rate from holding the Rai doesn't have to compete with the returns from staking.
And instead you can stack the two on top of each other, right? But you would actually need this reliable guarantee that, you know, if there is a margin call, like you actually get all of the ETH out instead of like potentially getting some random and now it's from zero to 32 of the E thousand, like most of the time it's 30, but some of the time it could be much less and then, you know, it gets weird. Right. And so that's like one of those kind of challenge points where I think there's a lot more room for kind of thinking around protocol design. Right. But there's a, but like, that's, yeah, like, like, like that's one particular application of restaking.
That's a little bit more, more challenging. And like the challenge is basically that it also creates centralization risks because again if trustworthy aps stakers would be valued more by the system than untrustworthy stakers because trustworthy seekers would would be much less likely to actually get slashed and and it creates reputation systems reputation systems lead to centralization and all of those things the um i think it's and then it's also important to remember that there's like a side to the whole I mean, a solo versus centralized staking thing that's have ultimately the responsibility of the staking system itself.
Right? Like one simple example is like, probably the biggest reason why I personally am not like just staking all of my ETH and I'm instead like staking a fairly small portion is because if you stake your ETH, it has to be like the keys that access it have to be public on some system that's online. And like for safety, it has to be a multi-sig and multi-sigs for staking are still fairly, fairly difficult to set up. And, you know, it just, it gets complicated in a bunch of ways. And like, that's the sort of thing that probably could be improved through infrastructure, right? Like there's this entire other conversation of like, if we want to make solar staking easier, then there's just like a lot of infrastructure work that needs to be done that's independent of what all of these staking protocols do.
But at the same time, there's definitely a lot of these problems where better integration with restaking and better integration with oral alternatives to delegation, all of these things can actually help a lot. Thanks. Maybe another framing for this question as well is You mentioned, I guess, Stalik, that this is not just an eigenlayer problem, you know, it's like a broader problem and we see similar parts of it in LSTs. But I'd be curious to maybe dig into this more, like, are there specific concerns about eigenlayers approach? And Sri Ram, don't worry, we'll give you some time after to respond on this.
But like, are there things, you know, with Eigenlayer specifically that can or that have, you know, shifted us towards a slightly worse equilibrium rather than, aside from just, you know, doing restaking? And yeah, let's start here. And then I'm sure some follow-ons from that. Sorry, can you go to like? Yeah, so basically, is there something about Eigenlayer's approach or design or, you know, like, way it's gone to market that beyond just the raw restaking risks that, like you mentioned, has, like, made things worse? Ways that it's made things worse aside from just that. Being restaking. Yeah.
Aside from being restaking. and so like specific decisions that the team has made or yeah or approaches because like you know you mentioned like or and through ram you touched on this as well you know you've obviously thought about like how people are gonna be able to restake you know which are like the first applications um how you think about your roadmap um so are there parts of that that you know could be better or it could have been different um it's fine if there's not don't have to like find something yeah I can't think of any amazing answers. I don't know if anyone. I mean, I guess one thing that could be said is the accelerationist argument, right?
Like 3RAM is here and it's accelerating the discussion. And I think one thing which would be very nice is if there also was an accelerationist effort for alignment. So I'm thinking maybe like an in-house team that is just dedicated to alignment. And I think there's some catching up that we're doing within the Ethereum Foundation in terms of building such a team. And plug, if you want to do restaking alignment research, do DM me. Yes, we also want to organize an event at DevConnect in Istanbul. So that would be one place where we can discuss both alignment and applications and we're very much open to this suggestion of actually building not only a team, but also a culture of alignment.
I want to just address like one or two points that were brought up by Vitalik. One is on solo staking. I think one of the things we are doing, so before that, I want to phrase the scope of what we are doing at EigenLayer relative to general restaking. I think you could restake and reuse collateral in financial or other applications, what Vitalik called deposit. And you could restake and use only your collateral for promising that you are doing validation correctly, the so-called hostage, I think that Vitalik referred to. EigenLayer's goal is to be a marketplace of decentralized trust, not a financial hypothecation platform for taking a collateral stake in Ethereum and then using it in other ways.
I think this is much more slippery slope and one has to tread very carefully. And one may ask, how do you, Sriram, or somebody else decide what set of use cases kind of get built on the system? Again, that is the starting point and that is kind of equilibrium for these systems. The starting point that we are taking is, you know, because new applications, when they are launched on EigenLayer, their contracts may have like bugs and other issues. One of the things we are building is that these be subject to a social layer inside of EigenLayer. We call this a slashing veto. the only role of the committee is to veto slashing decisions.
And initially, of course, this would be like a single committee, but eventually this could be an intersubjective thing like relays, right? Relays in the Ethereum ecosystem, anybody can be a relay, they just are a doubly trusted party. If a proposer agrees to a relay and a builder agrees to a relay, they have like a potential market making opportunity. In the same way, they can emerge a marketplace of slashing retos where somebody can say, hey, we are a committee, we want to participate in mediating these slashing veto decisions. And as long as the staker and the servers are comfortable, you can actually make the market there.
But the point is, whoever is doing this kind of a slashing veto also needs to onboard services because they have to veto the slashing. And so the way we restrict the scope of applications is first by shelling point. the idea that we are actually only building a decentralized trust marketplace or a validation marketplace, not a financial primitive. And number two, things like the slashing veto committee have the ability to onboard services. And eventually the way we think about it is when you're not very trusted, it's the same like training wheels argument for roles, right? So when you're building a roll up, initially you need to add training wheels, but eventually you move off and and say that I don't need trailing.
Same thing, services built on Eigen layer will initially go through a slashing veto. Eventually, as they also fight, they will just say, I don't need a slashing veto and stakeholders can trust me because I've been on this and running it for one year, two years. So they go to become completely non-subjective. So that is the roadmap that we envision. And it is going to be very difficult to go beyond a certain credibility for services doing all kinds of random things and ransom attacks and other things to gain enough trust for stakers to put their own money at risk. There is no incentive misalignment at the staker level.
The staker doesn't wanna lose their money to a ransom attack, right? Like, and they're not gonna stake two services which don't have not established enough credible trust or are fully immutable and programmable that they can actually verify. So anyway, that's a couple of points. One final point on decentralization is, I think Dankrad mentioned this a little bit, which is how potentially Eigenlayer could help decentralization. You know, if you remove Eigenlayer from the equation, like for liquid staking, the only benefit was in DeFi applications and the only yield was coming from that. And I think this has very strong like centralization tendencies.
Whereas what Eigenlayer is doing is try to establish a decentralization or decentralized trust marketplace where there may be a premium to be paid for decentralization itself. Because if people value decentralized nodes for doing validation, they could say, I only want to recruit the non-centralized nodes for my service. And this can lead to additional yield for, like, home stakers who might want to run lightweight services across the spectrum. So that's a few points on how we are thinking about both alignment and decentralization. Thanks. And I guess, you know, Justin, you were saying you're talking about like in-house alignment teams.
I feel like maybe the broader version of that is like, what should the Ethereum community be doing now as a whole to ensure like restaking is aligned? And there's different angles this can take, right? Like, but, you know, it could be building different like competing LSTs or restaking protocols like we start to see on the LST front. There's the whole area around protocol changes, and then there's also middleware, things like we've seen like MEV Boost. So, yeah, I guess pretty much from everyone here, if you have any ideas or suggestions to the broader Ethereum community of which paths should we be pursuing in parallel to maybe EigenLayer accelerating the restaking future so that we don't get caught by surprise.
I mean, I'm happy to take this. I mean, for me personally, there's kind of three prongs. The first one is to just build a team and build the culture around it. And I think the culture will come from an awareness of the risks. And I think maybe that we could spend a whole podcast on what are the really staking risks and really flesh those out so that there is a public consciousness. And then a second big prong of my research is around insurance, the nuclear option. If things go really, really bad, can we redesign a fair and proof of stake in minimal ways in such that we can neuter restaking? And I'm happy to say that the answer is probably yes, at least for trustless restaking, which is punitive, which has slashing.
So that is something that makes me sleep better at night, that we have this card in the back pocket. Can you explain to me how that would work, just high level for our listeners? Right. So there's two ways to unlock trustless restaking. One is through withdrawal contracts, which is what Eigenlayer is doing. And then the other way is to basically bootstrap yourself on top of the existing slashing condition. either using hardware, but maybe even trustlessly using very fancy cryptography called witness encryption. Now, on the withdrawal contract side of things, what we can do is we can actually make the withdrawal contract updatable.
And the reason why we didn't make it updatable by the staking key was that if your staking key gets compromised, then the most that you can lose is just the one ETH because you get slashed. And so the ransom attack is very, very limited. And so actually, you still hold custody of your funds. But what will happen with restaking is that you're going to be max exposed to slashing. If you mess up, you're potentially going to lose the 32 ETH or some very large portion. And so the separation between the staking key and the withdrawal key is not that valuable. And so making it updatable could be a way to basically neuter restaking.
And by the way, it also solves another problem, which is liquid staking token. So in that sense, it is really a nuclear option. And there would have to be a whole migration path, which might take several years. But if we do see that restaking doesn't lead to good equilibriums, then we at least have that option. And then the second thing that we can do is basically remove the ability to bootstrap on the stashing conditions by removing the stashing conditions. Basically, I discovered a couple of weeks ago this amazing cryptographic primitive called one-shot signatures. Basically one-shot signatures allow you to sign a message once and then the staking key magically destroys itself.
And you can think, okay, how is that possible? And the answer here is- You mean the signing key, right? You said the staking- The signing key. Okay, yeah. Just to get, okay, yeah. Cool. key, the staking key, the secret key, destroys itself. And the way that it's done is basically by combining existing cryptography with quantum mechanics. So in quantum mechanics, you could have your secret key be a superposition of states. And then there's a theorem in quantum mechanics called the no-cloning theorem, whereby if you have an unknown superposition of things, you can't clone this quantum object. And then the way that you sign the message is by measuring the secret key by collapsing it, and thereby destroying it.
So you can only sign one single message. Now everything else is just as normal. The signature itself is classical. And so really, it's a potential future upgrade for removing the slashing conditions. Now, one of the things I guess worth mentioning is that you get 80% of the neutering from the withdrawal credentials. And the reason is that, um, the, the, the, the slashing conditions, um, are kind of limited, right? If only a few validators get slashed around the same amount of time, they only lose a very small amount of EIF. They only really start kicking in when there's this mass slashing going on.
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With Arbitrum, experience Web3 development the way it was meant to be. Secure, fast, cheap, and friction-free. So I guess I have a more vanilla idea. Building on top of what Vitalik said about reputation systems. I think this is much more maybe easily built. some sort of reputation dashboard where it's either both in-house by restaking protocols or by third parties, where all three parties in the marketplace, the stakers, devaluators, and the middlewares that require staking, would essentially get reputation points. For the stakers, you can bench on the amount of time they've staked. I think Igler is already doing something like this with restaked points.
You could have a retroactive calculation based on their on-chain or even off-chain behaviors of that staker's address. On this validator's end, you could display things like amount of uptime they've been running and some sort of effectiveness rating like the rated.network. I think it's a website that displayed this metric where maybe the bad validators not only get slashed, but also get decreased in the reputation points where they would maybe lose priority access to other middlewares. And then the good validators would then be rewarded with reputation points, incentivizing them to behave more honestly and reliably for the longer term.
And last but not least, for the nodal wares that are actually requiring restaking, I think it's very, very important to displace the sort of the security measures that this protocol has taken, right? Whether it's through, are they done with auditing? Do they have monitoring, like risk monitoring? Is there circuit breakers in place, et cetera, et cetera? What are their slashing criteria? Their slashable quota? The amount of ETH you can actually slash? What is actually the hardware, etc.? Things that you very, I think, directly display for the users, whether they are individual stakers or the protocols to participate in such network.
Where I think something like this would incentivize people to play repeated games with each other as opposed to one-off malicious games. Sriram, you have any thoughts on that? Yeah, I mean, in terms of alignment, I think one of the things that I think about a lot is how do we make the Ethereum protocol layer one by itself have a self-sustained system of kind of karma? You know, the action and consequence at the layer one are fully like taken care of. So we don't really have to worry about these like extraneous fixes. like what are the things that we care about for ethereum as a layer one we want to make sure the system's safe and the system's live like these are the two fundamental things and i think rethinking a little bit deeper what can we do to actually make sure that it doesn't matter who builds what on top of it there is no externality because the system has internally kind of consistent punishment.
And I think I'll just give two quick examples of things that we've been thinking about. One is on safety. One of the things is how much security budget is sufficient for Ethereum itself on the layer one. And right now it equilibrates due to the rewards curve and what the market is happy with the returns on. It doesn't equilibrate to how much security is actually needed on Ethereum because that's unmeasurable right now? And is it possible to actually build mechanisms where this information is solicited in some kind of like an incentive compatible way? So that's one example. And this may be things like a portion of the slash fronts from the Ethereum L1 is allocated as insurance to harmed parties so that harmed parties or potentially harmed parties have a way to actually go and buy this insurance.
So what we can start doing there is establishing markets which can try to understand the security needs kind of more natively. That's number one on the safety side. On the liveness side, again, one of the most important things is how to make sure that we have a system that doesn't have censorship. And I think this is something, part of the main reason we worry about decentralization is that decentralization leads to censorship resistance? And what are the kind of like checks and balances that we can place on censorship itself? I think, again, here, but, you know, thinking a little bit more about what what we can do here, for example, is censorship, how do you make censorship easily observable by the vast array of wallets, which could then become light nodes, which are monitoring the system?
You know, can can we make censorship observable there? I think we have a bunch of new ideas coming up there, so that when you want to slash some block proposals for not only not including the transaction, but also not attesting on other people's blocks, which include the transaction, I think this is, if you can slash people and very quickly detect and come to social consensus that actually censorship is happening, not only in proposal, but also in attesting, the faster we can come to a social consensus, the easier it is to impose like UASF and other things to actually slash censorship. So by making the Ethereum L1 much more powerful and self-contained, we simply don't have to worry about what anybody else is doing anywhere, thus actually unleashing way more, you know, activity.
So that's at least my, like, hopes and dreams for where this would go. And I'm curious to hear from the folks on the EF research side, like, how do you think about the protocol complexity associated with something like that, which is obviously the main thing we have to consider in those changes? I feel like I've definitely like slowly becoming more okay with enshrining more things than I was like probably like five years ago. Like I remember the dream in the early versions of account abstraction is basically that the base protocol would just define a call and the transaction would just be a call and everything else would be defined at higher layers.
And account abstraction, for example, is like really starting to move away from that. And the reasons why it's moving away from that is because we realized that like we want to guarantee fairness of the mempool, guarantee censorship resistance of user transactions and all of these other goals. and being able to guarantee those goals does require having more legibility into the structure that's getting used to agree on what transactions are getting included. And so for that reason, more types of enshrining make sense. And then there's other kinds of enshrining that Justin and various people have talked about, like even enshrining, you know, ZK EVM verification at some point.
If like that's the way that reduce costs for or reduce code risks for roll ups, for example, or. Potentially other aspects of the protocol, so if adding more more features to the base staking protocol reduces the risk that like weird stuff happens on L2, then I or So I think that is something that we should be open to. Justin, thank you. Rad, any thoughts? I guess one of the difficulties is that you need to have adoption of this enshrined infrastructure. And I guess with restaking, if you don't activate the nuclear option, then there's always sneaky ways to avoid this enshrined infrastructure.
But what I am hopeful will happen is that we will see what I call a generalized PBS infrastructure come to play. So PBS, Proposal Builder Separation, is this really amazing thing because it basically allows solo stakers to delegate most of the work to builders. And so the builders are extremely sophisticated. They could be centralized, whatever it is. But 99% of the sovereignty remains with the validator. 99% of the rewards also remain with the validator. And then 99% of the work that needs to be done is delegated away trustlessly. And this is the key word is like trustless delegation. And I think what we can do is basically come up with this framework where most restaking applications would play well in this generalized PBS.
So we'd have generalized builders and generalize blocks and would have generalized relays and generalized slashing conditions and generalized inclusion lists and all of that can be generalized. And that is kind of the happy path where we really delicately thread the needle and don't fall into this dystopia where we have the trusted delegation at mass scale. But there's a lot that needs to happen for that. One is a lot of engineering work. Even PBS and then trying PBS, that's just focused for one restaking application, which is the execution layer. That's already a humongous amount of work. And so doing it for a whole class of restaking applications will be very difficult.
I think another thing that needs to happen is basically social norms and social education. We need to understand as a community, as developers, as users, that it is beneficial to fit within this framework. And so if you have kind of stray restaking applications that don't fit within this framework, then maybe they should suffer competitively relative to others that do. And then I think another really important component, and here it's kind of more of a wait and see, is what are the economic forces at play? So really what we want is the staking yield for institutions to be no greater than the staking yield for solid validators.
So what is likely going to happen, unfortunately, is that we're going to lose this property of fairness. So if you put one unit of stake, some amount of ETH, different people, different stakers are going to get different returns. Now, the reason is that there's going to be some restaking applications that are only going to cater for institutions. So for example, if there's a restaking application that can only support a thousand nodes. Well, we have hundreds of thousands of validators. And so in order to become a node, you need to come in as multiple validators, as a lump. And so if you only have 32 ETH, then you're not even eligible to this restaking application.
But the good news is that there might be some restaking applications that are kind of anti-institutional. Some of them maybe because they really want to tap into this decentralization. And but some of them, one of the things I've been thinking about is Ponzi games, right? If you have some sort of Ponzi games, a sort of duck token or whatever it is, that then the institutions, the buttoned up Coinbases and BlackRocks or whatever it is, they're not going to touch it. And so, weirdly enough, I've become bullish on Ponzi games in the context of restaking. Wow, they cried just give off youth. Well, I mean, yeah, not what I encourage the last part, that's my least favorite part of crypto.
But generally, like I think my comment on like trying to enshrine and putting something into good rails, I think it's possible actually, and we should be doing more of it. I think this is a great point to start thinking about it. How can we take more active control of how people use the protocol? And I think if you give something that gives most of the economic rewards, then people will accept it and will not build around it. And then you can actually make some opinionated decisions inside the protocol and try to avoid the worst. Yeah, this is an... Oh, go ahead. One other thing I would add is that if we want to add more kind of cherries on top to encourage solo staking, then there is always off-protocol things that we can do to encourage it.
Like even things like if some off-chain mechanism detects and verifies that you're a solo staker, you get a free DEF CON ticket or something similar. I think the strongest such mechanism would be that basically, Justin mentioned in a Bankless podcast earlier that, hey, if you're a solo staker and you restake, you might actually get like an ad drop, which is kind of disproportionate to not just like the amount of ETH, but also to individual units, using some kind of a quadratic mechanism there, for example. So I think there are so the subjectivity layer. So the way we think about like restaking is this, you know, the platform itself would need to be neutral, but there is a lot of intersubjectivity like services building on top can express their own subjective views on what what the important dimensions are.
And I think that is a new, I think, new powerful thing where the society and the community can guide where that energy goes. And I think, you know, the EF researchers and team has a kind of a big role to play there. yeah i had a question so around like the enshrining and potential you know neuterings of these protocols i feel like this is a topic that comes up over and over where you know we see this with obviously liquid staking tokens um there's a whole question around like you know should rollups be enshrined and to what extent and with components and now like with restaking um And there's almost like a paradox around credible neutrality there, where if you make these protocol changes to keep things more credibly neutral, but then end up in a way like censoring what is one of the largest users of the protocol because we fear that it becomes a monopoly, that's also like a form of non-neutrality of the Ethereum base layer, right?
Like if we do, you know, a protocol change that like neuters Eigenlayer or neuters LIDL or neuters, you know, Arbitrum, because there's like this fear that like it's growing too big, then effectively it's like a weird form of censorship in that. So, like, I'm curious. Yeah. How do you think about doing these changes or potentially doing them in a way that's maybe less like adversarial or potentially risky to like. Not only in the risk taking context, but generally people who want to build something that's going to end up being used by, like, most Ethereum users. Yeah. So my opinion would be this, that we should establish a social norm here that building on Ethereum, like building smart contracts protocols on top, that should be, we should almost never touch that.
I mean, it would be in a very extreme, very rare situation. But messing with the staking layer is a different matter. Like, for example, if lots of validators start censoring, we do want the ability to intervene. And so I think it would be a good signal to send, yes, we might be opinionated on what you do on a staking layer. And that might include messing with your protocol and destroying it. Justin, Vitalik, I don't know if you have thoughts on that. I mean, for Lido specifically, one of the amazing consequences of the one-shot signatures that I mentioned is that you can do trustless delegation.
So you can imagine a system like Lido where you don't have to trust the 29 operators in any way. And that would basically give us all the advantages of Lido, which is the liquid staking and really none of the downsides. For restaking specifically, I don't have the silver bullet right now. So it's kind of more of a, you know, hope for the best and embrace things and things go well. And kind of if things don't go well, then, then neuter it. Yeah. I mean, I think, I mean, the other thing I'd add is that it's always, you know, importance to be careful about neutering things and to, you know, create kind of maximally clear norms about like what is an okay situation and what starts looking like a very not okay situation that requires some kind of action and you know hopefully the very not okay situation is something that ends up happening zero times.
Yeah and I'd say I think one spot where we're doing a decent job at this is around like MEV boost this does feel like something where um although far from like perfect having had like the you know mev teams actively contribute to it having had like obviously ultrasound relay and like infrastructure that's been built around it it seems like this yeah i wouldn't call it like an equilibrium quite yet but it seems like we've at least created like a semi-stable middleware that we can have both like private companies and like protocol contributors work on um and test some of the incentives at play obviously see some of the issues uh with the sort of shortcuts that uh we're taking to make this possible a bit outside of the protocol but um yeah justin i don't know like do you have thoughts from just more than like collaboration and engineering process of like having done this around mev boost and relays sort of outside the protocol to start as we go towards PBS?
Right. So I guess one thing that I believe is that there's never a rush, right? We always have a lot of time to discuss these big changes. And part of the reason is that proof of stake has an inbuilt healing mechanism. So if the worst were to happen, mass censorship or reversion of finality or whatever it is, we have ways to identify the cancer and excise it from the system using either automatic systems or using the social layer. And because we have time, that means that we can experiment with solutions that are off-chain, as you said, and those might be good enough. now one of the i think things we should be striving for is doing all sorts of upgrades that you know have very little downsides and so we should be using this time to think of end games that are you know maximally simple maximally optimal so that we once we do the change then we don't have to do it again and i think another thing that's important is is around timing so a lot of the future upgrades of Ethereum are actually security upgrades, but they're hidden in the back pocket.
And if and when they start becoming problematic, so for example, secret single leader election, that's something we've been working on for years. And we haven't really prioritized that because we haven't seen validators being DDoSed despite the fact that their identity and their IP address is public. But if and when this were to happen, this is something we can prioritize. I guess another thing in terms of timing is around, you know, making use of sunk cost. And so more specifically, I think there's going to be this massive upgrade to Ethereum that's going to come maybe in 10 years time, 15 years time, 20 years time, I don't know, around, you know, making Ethereum post-quantum.
And there we really need to rip the bandaid and and remove a lot of the cryptographic guts of Ethereum and make them post-quantum. And this is kind of a great opportunity to put into place all the upgrades that we've wanted to put in place because we're going to be changing everything anyway. So might as well make Ethereum as close as perfect as we can. I have a quick thought to add to Justin on his worry about restaking in the post one shot quantum one shot signature well i think you know there's no use for restaking restaking was there to write underwrite trust in distributed validation if you could have like distributed validation already certified by one shot signatures you don't need at least my own rules would be satisfied so uh i think uh because you know it's taking what's there to underwrite trust in you know certain kinds of correctness and if it's already kind of comes out of that quantum principle.
So other people, not only Ethereum, that'll be beneficiary of it, other systems that want to build on top of, are also beneficiaries of the same thing. Yeah, that's a great point that, you know, these one-shot signatures remove equivocation. And so a huge subset of restaking applications no longer really become meaningful because you can just do them with pure cryptography. but there's these two other things that still remain one is uh liveness and the other one is non-determinism and subjectivity um if you're building oracles for example you you you can't use you know pure determinism and pure pure cryptography oh sorry were you gonna say something sorry no just uh one more thing on like uh things like uh letting staking key change withdrawal keys is I think there are complex second order effects that may emerge with these kinds of things which may lead us to exactly the opposite of the goals.
For example, it may just end up that if that's the case, I can only delegate to somebody who's really trusted and everybody delegates to the same party and it's just going to be like so, you know, we all know here that we don't know the second order effects of any of these systems including restaking and And we just need to kind of bounce off each of those ideas and to find what the best yet you can for the space and theorem is. Thanks, yeah, I think this is a good place to start wrapping up. Maybe as a like closing question, I'd love to hear from each of you in like a minute or so, like any thoughts or change in perspectives you had from this conversation or things that you'd like the community to take away.
Jesse, you wanna kick us off? Sure thing. Yeah, I am pretty excited because I think previously a lot of the protocols are secured by multisigs. And, you know, whether it's crypto economic security or it's security guaranteed by cryptography, I think it's a huge step up to like much better security. And I would argue that, like Justice said, right, like crypto economic security plus cryptography are kind of the most comprehensive solution for both deterministic versus non deterministic results that you kind of want to get. And I, you know, like I have, I'm publishing some thoughts on like, you know, a lot of questions regarding restaking but overall I think I'm pretty bullish I think I can learn realizes the full value of Ethereum right like the large trust layer is much more explicit than, you know, sort of like discussing staking, providing security to the network.
And Eigenlehrer makes that relationship to security much more explicitly. Awesome. Digrad? Yeah, I mean, I think the takeaway for me is we need to like at the same time be careful, but also like probably nimble and see how we need to develop both social norms and the protocol in the face of this. And it's a similar situation that we faced a few years ago with MEV and something new was added to our table and we need to handle it. Thanks. Vitalik? Yeah, I mean, I think same thoughts as everyone else. Like, I think there's a lot of value in using staked ETH in other protocols. And I mean, like, I personally, you know, continue to want to see stablecoins work, like, decentralized stablecoins have, you know, competitive rates.
And so if like that use case can somehow be figured out in particular, then like, that would make me very happy. though I'm definitely bullish on other kinds of restaking as well. But at the same time, making sure that staking decentralization gets preserved as well as the neutrality of the protocol is super important. So I'm glad to see that we're all facing the challenge. Thanks. Justin? Yeah, I would echo what Vitalik said, especially on the stablecoins. One of the ways where restaking can help is to build just much better oracles. So right now, the oracles that we have are basically multisigs.
So for example, Chainlink, I believe the EFUSD oracle is a 21 out of 31 multisig. Can we build an oracle which reuses to a large extent the economic security of Ethereum layer one? And I guess another thought that I have is around maybe the evolving role of researchers. We've been doing crypto economics for a long time, but maybe to an extent, we're going to move to memento economics. And what I mean by that is that there's some things that are really rooted at the social layer with humans. There's this whole education thing, but there's also the social norms, for example, of not encroaching on the social governance.
the whole post around that Vitalik wrote. And then another kind of question that I've been wondering is what is the value of decentralization? Because there is one possible scenario, which is that we lose decentralization with restaking, but it doesn't actually matter. And maybe decentralization is only a bootstrapping mechanism to gain credible neutrality up until the point where we basically have technology, we have systems that don't rely so much on decentralization of the operators specifically. We still need decentralization of the nodes. But if the operators are basically handcuffed, you know, they can't do censorship because we have inclusion lists and they can't do any of the other bad stuff, then maybe we only need decentralization for the memes because it kind of looks good.
But once we've won, once Ethereum is a $100 trillion settlement layer for the intent of value, then maybe the value of decentralization goes down a little bit. Thanks. Sriram, want to close us off? Yeah, no, I think we're, I'm really glad that we are having these discussions in understanding what the constraints and the contours around systems that can be kind of built around this are. I think there are clearly, I think going back to my own team, which is open innovation, there is a tension between open innovation and security or safety. One of the things that excites me is finding new things that actually has satisfied both of these things.
You know, it's very safe, but it's also like expands the scope of innovation. One of the things that we have like this is the idea that anybody can build new consensus protocols like arbitrary consensus protocols. But the slashing condition is very simple. It's just, you know, don't double sign. sign. And, you know, on the node, we have like a separate zone, we call an anti slasher, where you check that you've never signed two signatures. And now you can like, you know, as a node operator, you don't need to kind of trust any of these special like node software that you're adding on, because the anti slasher is the only thing that you need to trust.
And it's simple, and it is universal across a whole class of applications. Now, anybody can write new like BFT protocols, you know, consensus protocols, and you can just like download and run them without without even having any program integrity on them because you've already checked the slashing contract, which is just a double signing contract and you have an anti-slasher. Maybe this anti-slasher runs inside a trusted execution environment. So even if somebody delegates to you, they have a kind of a sense of assurance that they are never getting slashed. So finding examples like this is what gives me kind of hope that the set of constraints and the set of like things that we want to do are not completely intentioned, that there's no use case, no interesting thing that can be done.
There's actually a large class of useful and interesting things. And my own interest in actually starting EigenLayer was because we had new consensus protocols. And as long as, you know, we can start enabling other people to start coming up with these new things and building it, I think that's already like super interesting. Amazing. Well, thank you all for coming on. David, do you want to wrap us up? Yeah, guys, that was a fantastic conversation. I really enjoyed sitting in on the background for that one. And Tim, thank you for guiding us down this rabbit hole so well. I think this answered a decent number of questions, but also opened up the doors for further questions, further exploration.
There's a lot of surface area here for conversation. So hopefully the listeners are routed to the spots that interest them the best and that they can contribute to the most. And Tim, I also want to give you a chance. What are your reflections on this episode that was? What are your thoughts floating around? I don't have much time to think through as I'm doing this, but I have about five, six pages of notes from the conversation here. So I'll get back to you after the show. But I think we should definitely do one of these again in 12 or 18 months once we've seen this go into production at scale and some more evolution in the space.
Well, like we like to say on Bankless, we like to front run the opportunity. And so hopefully this conversation gives us a little preview of what could be in the future when it comes to restaking. Tim, once again, thank you for guiding this conversation. And Jesse, Justin, Vitalik, Sriram, Dankrat, thank you for all being here. The largest panel that we've ever had. That went pretty damn well, I'd say. Thank you, too. Thank you. Thanks all. Thank you. You know the deal. Crypto is risky. Staking is risky. Restaking is even more risky. You can lose what you put in, but we are headed west. This is the frontier.
It's not for everyone, but we are glad you are with us on the bankless journey. Thanks a lot.