Can a country wage war without ever firing a bullet? In this episode of Bankless, we uncover the surprising truth: America’s most powerful weapon isn’t its military - it’s the dollar.
Joining us is Edward Fishman, a former State Department official and the author of Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare. He explains how U.S. sanctions work, why they’re so effective, and what happens when countries try to escape them. From Iran and Russia to the rise of stablecoins and China’s digital yuan, we dive deep into the geopolitical power of financial infrastructure and crypto’s growing role in rewriting the rules.
If you want to understand the silent machinery behind global power, and why crypto might be the next battleground - don’t miss this one.
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TIMESTAMPS
0:00 Intro
5:51 Sanctions 101
8:32 The History of Economic Warfare
17:03 When Sanctions Precede War
22:27 Life After Dollar Disconnection
31:28 Sanctioning Russia: Methods & Lessons
43:49 Measuring Sanctions’ Effectiveness
49:20 The Strategic Tradeoffs of Sanctions
57:28 The Rise of Dollar Dominance
1:04:05 Unseen Costs of Sanction Power
1:08:15 Shifting Global Economic Power
1:15:47 Risks to U.S. Economic Leadership
1:20:43 Stablecoins as U.S. Leverage
1:28:13 Crypto’s Role in Sanction Evasion
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RESOURCES
Edward Fishman
https://x.com/edwardfishman
Edward Fishman’s “Chokepoints”
https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/726149/chokepoints-by-edward-fishman/
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Not financial or tax advice. See our investment disclosures here:
https://www.bankless.com/disclosures
No summary for this episode yet.
I think that we are at the precipice of a major shift in terms of how cross-border payments work. China has, by far, the biggest and most advanced state-backed project to do this, through both the ECNY as well as Enbridge, this platform that they built with other central banks. And so the question is, can the U.S. retain its lead? Welcome to Bankless, where today we explore the frontier of economic sanctions and internet money, an interesting combination. This is Ryan Sean Adams. I'm here to help you become more bankless. I've always wanted to do a deep dive in this somewhat nerdy topic. This is America's superpower of economic sanctions.
Our guest today Edward Fishman provides a crash course on this. Make no mistake, this is very much a crypto topic because the power of the U.S. comes from the dominance of the dollar. This is a topic we often discuss on bankless. And not only the dominance of the dollar, but the dominance of the U.S. banking system. 90% of all transactions are settled in the dollar today. But in the future, Edward thinks countries will have more than one option. They can either stay in the U.S. system, they can move to the new Chinese digital currency, or, and this is the most interesting, they can set up shop in crypto, the internet money system.
A few things we discuss, why sanctions are more powerful than tanks and missiles, the 2015 Iran sanctions, what it feels like to be cut off from the dollar, the 2022 Russia sanctions, how Ed found himself on Russia's sanction list, the effectiveness of sanctions, U.S. dollar supremacy, stable coins, as America's best hope, and whether Ed thinks crypto is a tool to evade sanctions, or a tool for economic freedom, please enjoy this conversation with Edward Fishman on America's financial super-weapon. In the Wild West of DeFi, stability and innovation are everything, which is why you should check out FRAX Finance.
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For M&T holders, every economic activity in UR drives value back to you, embodying the entire stack and future growth of this super app ecosystem. Follow mantle on X at mantle underscore official for the latest updates on blockchain for banking. That's x.com slash mantle underscore official. Bangladesh station very excited to introduce our next guest, Edward Fishman, is a senior research scholar at Columbia University, and before that he's spent about a decade in government designing sanctions on Iran, Russia, Europe, he does a thing or two about economic sanctions on our topic today. Choke points, in fact, he wrote a book called Choke Points, American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare.
Ed, welcome to Bangladesh. It's great to be here with you today, Ryan. Thanks for having me on the show. Okay, so this is primarily a crypto podcast, but we cover all sorts of things related to the economy and monetary policy, and I think what we want to do, Eddie, if this is okay, is get a crash course from you on financial sanctions, what you call a choke points, and maybe the way to start this is just to ask the question, how does America currently project its power through sanctions today? Sure, and I appreciate that question, because I think really my main motivation in writing my book, choke points is we hear about sanctions all the time, their front page news almost every single day, and very few people could even answer what they are.
Maybe to zoom out for a second, economic warfare itself is as old as history. From the beginning of recorded history, states have tried to advance their objectives internationally by applying economic pressure on other countries, on other states. Historically speaking though, up until very recently, doing that in any meaningful way really required the use of military force. So, for instance, as recently as the 1990s, the most prominent case of economic sanctions that happens in the 1990s is when the US and the United Nations imposed an embargo on Saddam Hussein's Iraq. This is right after Iraq invades Kuwait, the neighboring state, and annexes it in 1990.
That's ultimately what precipitated the Gulf War. And the goal of the sanctions that were put in place, and the UN imposed a full embargo on Iraq within 48 hours of Saddam's invasion of 1990, was to stop Iraq from selling oil on international markets. And this embargo stayed in place all the way from 1990 to 2003 up until George W. Bush launched the even bigger second invasion of Iraq. And the way that that was implemented, the way that the US and its partners actually set about stopping Iraq from selling oil, was through a multinational naval blockade. It was by having naval ships patrol the Persian Gulf 24-7 for that entire 13-year period.
And whenever they saw a ship or tanker going in and out of Iraqi ports, and they were suspicious that this might be in contravention of the embargo, they would actually dispatch commandos via helicopter to land on the ship. And if they found oil on board to take samples and send it to laboratories for testing. So as recently as the 1990s, really hard-hitting economic warfare required naval force. If you were a trading power, sometimes even Sieges, right? You go back throughout history, surrounding a city and stopping anything from coming in and out. But what happened in the wake of the 1990s, in the wake of what we now call hyper-globalization, when you really globalize the international financial system, when countries like China and Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union that had previously been outside of the dollar system, come into the dollar-based financial system when they start using international supply chains.
We see the creation of these choke points in the global economy, these parts of the global economy where one state has a dominant position and there are few if any substitutes. And this is key, the non-substitutability. The most important of those is the dollar, just given its incredibly central role in international finance, 90% of all foreign exchange transactions have the dollar on one side or the other. And there's $7 trillion worth of foreign exchange transactions, changing hands every single day. So just the scale is almost beyond our comprehension. And the way that the US has come to weaponize these choke points, and we can talk about this through the course of the episode.
Most importantly of all is through that financial choke point. It is through now not necessarily putting a ship outside of Iran's ports. That's not how the US stopped Iran from selling oil. It was by going to banks in places like China and India and Turkey, all of which were importing Iranian oil and said, if you were processing payments for Iranian oil, you have to comply with our policy or we're going to cut you off from the dollar. Basically giving a binary choice and being able to weaponize that choke point of the dollar-based system, what we have today is a system where the US government can oppose really devastating economic harm on any other foreign country without deploying a single US soldier or sailor into harm's way.
That's fascinating. There's so many questions that branch from this topic. And I guess what you're saying is the concept of economic sanctions and the tool of warfare of economic sanctions, that's not new. That's been with us throughout history. But the means to deploy that digitally rather than to use the nation-state level monopoly on violence and actually deploy troops and force the issue in meat space, or now we could do digitally rather than in meat space, and that part is all new. I'm wondering if you'd give us some history here. Unveilers were suckers for just some good stories throughout history.
I know your book talks about series like the history of economic sanctions. Early days, Greek city states, that kind of thing. How were these sanctions in the ancient world used in other stories throughout history that kind of show us the power of these things? Yeah, so I mean, I think if you look at how the Iraq and Bargo worked that I just mentioned, naval patrols, that really is what economic warfare even looked like going back to ancient Greece. The most prominent case of economic warfare in the ancient world is Athens on the precipice of what has became the Peloponnesian war, this 27-year struggle between Athens and Sparta, imposes an embargo on its neighboring city-state of Megara, basically to try to send us a signal to Sparta about its economic power.
The way that Athens actually cut off Megara from trade was through its naval dominance. At the time, Athens had a naval empire, so they controlled all of the sort of naval city-states around the ancient Aegean, and they had by far the biggest navy in the ancient Mediterranean. They were able, basically, to cripple Megara's economy with a naval embargo that looked very similar to the Iraq and Bargo of the 1990s. The way that we move from that sort of old style of economic warfare really comes about by accident. I think that's why choke points for some people say it can be very exciting to see how the story unfolds because it wasn't necessarily brilliant people sitting behind a room being like, oh, well, we can do this incredible new strategy.
It was like a series of discoveries, and the first really comes after George W. Bush is reelected. So just to reposition our listeners, what was happening at the end of 2004? This is right when George W. Bush wins his second term over John Kerry. You know, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are well underway. The Cassis belly for the US invasion of Iraq, which had been that Saddam Hussein was building weapons of mass destruction and principally nuclear weapons, by then had already been proven to be false that Iraq did not have any meaningful weapons of mass destruction. And yet at the same time, that discovery came to be confirmed in late 2004, Iran, which is right next to Iraq, and much bigger and more powerful than Iraq, actually was building a significant industrial scale nuclear enrichment program.
And so you had this really awkward situation for George W. Bush, which he literally just invaded a foreign country and overthrew their ruler to try to get rid of a nuclear program that didn't exist. And yet the neighboring country actually was developing legitimate nuclear program. And there was no appetite for yet another war in the Middle East. The US was already fighting too at the same time. And so there was a question like, what do we do about this? You know, how do we stop this really clear and present danger? And especially because Iran, if you think about it, was also supporting terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.
And there's real concern that if Iran had fissile material, you know, nuclear material, they could give it to a terrorist group that could then launch an attack that was an order of magnitude worse than 9-11. And, you know, people, there's actually this great press conference I recall in my book, choke points in December of 2004 after Bush is elected, where a reporter asks him, you know, well, why don't we try to do sanctions on Iran? And he says, well, we've sanctioned ourselves out of influence with Iran. We don't have any influence over Iran anymore. And his logic was that the US had already imposed a domestic embargo on Iran.
The US wasn't trading anything with Iran. You couldn't buy anything from Iran. If you were an American individual or a company, you can sell anything to Iran. And there was no appetite for this kind of naval embargo style, more aggressive sanctions that you would imply, because that was seen as sort of like on the on the same spectrum as military force. That could have been, you know, ultimately a segue to a war with Iran that no one wanted. And so he kind of viewed sanctions as not important and almost feckless. And when he said this, the official in his government, this guy named Stuart Levy who actually winds up playing a really important role in the history of crypto, too, that we could talk about.
He's at the time serving as the first undersecretary of the Treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence. So the official who oversees US sanctions. And he hears Bush say this and he views it as like a personal challenge. He's like, the president has just said that I have no role to play in the top most national security priority. Like I really need to figure this out. And Stuart, he's a brilliant lawyer. He's a soft spoken guy, but he's got a chip on his shoulder. And so a few months later, he's actually in a hotel room, or sorry, he's at a hotel restaurant in in Bahrain, you know, in the Gulf in the Persian Gulf, flipping through the financial times when he comes across an article about a Swiss bank that of its own volition has cut ties with Iran.
Basically, this decided didn't want to do business with Iran anymore. And he kind of has this light bulb moment at the time where he says, hold on, maybe it's okay if we can't persuade China and Russia and the UK and France Germany to cut ties with Iran, the governments. Maybe it's okay if we don't send a naval blockade into the Persian Gulf. Maybe I can just go around to the financial centers of the world, meet with bankers in London and Frankfurt and Dubai and Hong Kong and Singapore, bring with me declassified intelligence showing them how Iran was using their banks often unwittingly to funnel money into its nuclear program and to support terrorist proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah and persuade nine out of ten of them of their own volition to stop doing business with Iran because they didn't want, you know, front page article saying that, you know, HSBC is involved in funding Iran's nuclear program.
And so he kind of sets up sets this new paradigm of government to business diplomacy where he goes around and within a couple years pretty well isolates Iran from the international financial system persuades most of the biggest banks in the world to quit Iran of their own volition. So before Stewart levy, we didn't do this. The US didn't do this. They didn't impose sanctions and kind of a, I don't know if I call it self-power type way, but it just without any physical force, right, using kind of networks of banks and the softer sort of, I guess, you know, a digital touch to all of this, we didn't do this before Stewart levy.
That's right. Exactly. We thought of sanctions as basically just another, you know, sort of way station on the way to actual military force, right? You needed the UN to authorize them and then you send an embargo of your serious. You send a naval blockade if you're serious. And that's what's interesting is some time that in many cases, like the sanctions, the type of economic sanctions you were talking about previously that nations did to one another was a precursor to war, wasn't it? I mean, was the the Bantry Port point into wars almost verging on a declaration of war? Yes, 100%. I think this is the important thing when you think about it like from a mental standpoint is if you were prepared to go for hard hit economic warfare, which involved oftentimes the interdiction of cargo, right?
Literally inspecting ships coming in and out of a port. Like the way for a foreign government to stop that from happening is to physically fire on your ships, sink your ships, right? With torpedoes or missiles, right? I mean, like this is, you know, you could go back to the naval blockades that occurred during World War One and World War Two, where a lot of the sort of naval wars were all about, you know, making economic warfare possible on the part of the allies or the break blockades on behalf of Germany and its allies. So it was sort of seen as a way station to war, something that precipitated war, the advent of this new style of economic warfare, where you're not using anything besides effectively the self-interest of the private sector, banks deciding either that they don't want their reputational harm of being seen to be doing business with Iran, or for those who are stragglers, like I said, it's 9 out of 10, not 10 out of 10, who care about their reputation.
For that, 1 out of 10, you can go and say, okay, well, if you keep doing business with Iran, you're cut off from the US dollar. Yeah. Yeah, right. Reed Dolly who talks a little bit about kind of the trap, the Thucydides trap that nations, you know, often find themselves in. And he talks about kind of the precursor to hot wars are often economic sanction wars. And I recall I'm going through this scenario from, you know, Japan 1930s in the US. And I don't recall the specific legislation, but the US, as I recall, basically blocked Japan off sanction economically sanctioned them, cut off their entire supply of oil in the Pacific islands and that entire region.
And this was, according to historians, like a key reason that Japan felt the need to surprise attack and launch like Pearl Harbor. And his point being like, the economic sanction attack is just is often a precursor to war. It's almost an active war in itself and it can get nations into hot war scenarios rather quickly. Yeah. That's 100% right. And funnily enough, about a month ago, Ray Dalio and I spoke at the same conference in backstage. Oh wow. We had this conversation. And he was saying, you know, because I gave him a copy of choke points. He gave me a copy of his new book. And he was like, yeah, it's all about economic warfare.
That's always, and we had this exact conversation. And it's true. I mean, the Pearl Harbor attacks of Japan on the United States were precipitated by an American, a very aggressive American embargo of Japan. And so I do think that, you know, we should not be using economic warfare willy nilly. And what I will say, though, at the same time, is that because of the way that we are prosecuting economic warfare today, where it is much more economic warfare by paper, right? It's the main characters in my book are not generals and admirals, you know, their bankers, their lawyers, their government bureaucrats, right?
That are actually prosecuting this economic warfare. It is a little bit less risky today, but we ought not underestimate the risks when we go ahead with these, these weapons. So who makes these decisions, right? Where does this reside in the US government? Because you like to your point, it's not in the Pentagon. It's not in traditional military, yet these are economic attacks of a sort. So who's calling the shots for these who decides it strikes me that this is definitely not an act of Congress. Does the president essentially you know, sign off on all of these economic sanctions? Yeah. So economic warfare is interesting relative to military force and that the, the president does have tremendous power with respect to economic warfare.
It's actually what's being tested right now in some of the court cases around Trump's tariffs, because there's a 1977 law called the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which allows the president to declare a national emergency and then effectively cut off any foreign individual or company from the US economy, whether the financial system or imports from the United States. So it gives the US president a lot of power. For instance, the Russia sanctions of 2022, where the US government did everything from embargo, Russian oil to impose financial sanctions on the biggest banks in Russia.
They froze the sovereign reserves of the central bank of Russia. All of that was done by President Biden with the stroke of a pen, just with executive authority. That was not Congress. But the thing that is interesting is that Congress also can impose sanctions. So Congress can pass laws that have the same force. They can basically tell the president you must impose sanctions on this foreign company or foreign individual. And what that means is like there are two different actors and one of the interesting parts of the story of Iran sanctions leading up to the nuclear deal in 2015. And those are probably the most impactful US sanctions in modern times.
It starts during this short levy period, mostly through executive action, where it's really the Bush administration is passing executive orders. It's levy who's honestly pioneering the policy out of the Treasury Department. But then as we get into the Obama administration, an Obama famously wants to reach out a hand to Iran and try to do diplomacy, Congress really loses confidence in Obama's strategy and starts passing really aggressive sanctions over the head of the Obama administration, with oftentimes like 100 to zero in the Senate. And so when you pass something with that kind of a majority, it's veto proof, right?
The president, if the president vetoes it, Congress can then just override its veto by passing the law with a two-thirds majority. So, and look, I was involved in sanctions at the time working at both Treasury and State. And the thing that was interesting, I actually had to implement some of these sanctions. So I was the guy who had to go to places like Singapore and Vietnam and Malaysia and talk to shipping companies and oil companies and tell them, you know, if you keep processing payments for a running oil, you're going to be cut off from the dollar. I was the person who sent out to do those conversations.
It actually was very helpful to me, you know, because it's an awkward conversation to say, I don't want to be in this room, but Congress just passed a bill unanimously. Like, I really don't want to be here. And that makes it much easier, right? Because it's like, you're not the bad guy. You're just the guy delivering the news. You're trying to help them. You're trying to help them avoid this catastrophic consequence of being cut off from the dollar. And so in some ways, even though we kind of hated it at the time, that Congress was, you know, breathing down our neck and the Obama administration, it winds up being absolutely critical to, you know, tightening the screws on Iran.
So that's the stick that the US has being cut off from the dollar. I mean, that sounds, that sounds terrible. I said, but could you get into the nuts and bolts of what that actually means? So what does that mean for a country that's on the receiving end of this or a group of individuals? So Iran in 2015 cut off from the dollar. What ways were they cut off? What was the effect on, you know, their government, you know, the people in power? How did they feel it? Yeah, I'm really glad you asked this because I think even within kind of the national security community, people, even people sitting around the table in the situation room may not fully understand.
Well, they've never been cut off from the dollar, right? They've always had access to it. Exactly. Right. And I now have a bit of a taste in this because I was sanctioned by Russia in 2022. So, you know, not having access to the ruble, you know, it's, sorry, I'm not quite the same, but I have, I have a similar. Wow, we got to get into that story too. But okay, but first, what does it feel like to get cut off from the dollar? Sure. So let's just talk about why the dollar is so important for a second. You know, oftentimes it's kind of thrown around that the dollar is the world reserve currency, which is true.
So central banks hold 60% roughly of their sovereign reserves, their foreign exchange reserves in dollars and dollar-based assets. Treasuries primarily. Exactly. However, when people really say the dollar is the global reserve currency, it's usually what they're trying to say is the dollar is like the dominant currency across all, you know, use cases for currency. So, and the use cases as probably your listeners, no, it's not just being a store of value. It's also a medium of exchange and union of account. Yes. And when you look at medium of exchange, I mentioned earlier, you know, the dollar is involved in 90% of foreign exchange transactions.
And so, which is the staggering number 90% of all foreign exchange transactions. So does that mean effectively 90% of all purchasing activity across the world happens in the dollar? Yes. So look, there's some foreign exchange transactions that are happening because of, you know, fight for, you know, speculation and whatnot. But sure, I do think it is a, it is probably the most illustrative statistic of the importance of the dollar because it encapsulates everything. Because anytime two countries are training with each other, there is going to be at least one if not multiple foreign exchange transactions that happen.
Because, you know, a good example, let's say, you know, India is selling rice to Saudi Arabia, right? A Saudi bank isn't going to hold rupees, right? That's not, it doesn't make sense for a Saudi bank to hold every currency that they may encounter, right? They'll have Saudi reels because they've got customers in Saudi Arabia who deposit their reels in the bank. And then they also have dollars, right? And they have those dollars through correspondent bank system, this correspondent bank network here in New York City, usually through a relationship with an American bank. And so the way that that transaction would actually happen, sort of behind the hood, is that the reels would be converted into dollars.
And the dollars would give you converted into rupees to pay the Indian supplier for the rice, right? So that the Indian supplier could then, you know, go to the, you know, the rice farmers and pay them their salary in rupees, right? So the dollar is going to basically be serving as a way station in this to make this transaction possible, even though there's no US company that's clearly involved in the transaction. And that's what makes US sanctions really so powerful that you can interdict trade between countries that have nothing to do with the United States, just because they need access to the foreign exchange market to actually make that payment possible.
This is also why stablecoin and crypto potentially could be a paradigm shift for how the system works. I'm sure we'll get into that later. But beyond just also being the default medium of exchange, the dollar is the default store value. Beyond the central bank reserves, it's something like 78% of equity market capitalization is in dollars, ditto with debt markets. I mean, everything, basically, if you have money right now, most of the time you want to invest in dollar assets, we may be at sort of the end of that story now or at the very beginning of the end, but so far that is how things have been.
And then also when you think about unit of account, which is just how are you invoicing international trade? What is the currency that you're listing prices at? The dollar is by far the dominant unit of account. And most importantly, in key commodities markets like oil, where the global price of oil is quoted in dollars, oil contracts generally are in dollars. And if you just think about the scale of the oil market, just how massive it is, 100 million barrels of oil a day, I mean, it's just an incredible scale of money changing hands every single day. And, you know, the fact that oil is priced in dollars is something I talk about in choke points actually winds up becoming a sort of key linchpin of the entire dollar system when that deal is struck between the US and Saudi Arabia in the 1970s.
So for Iran, getting cut off from the dollar, what does that feel like? Got it. Yeah, and I appreciate you re-centering me on the key question. So what does that mean? So for an Iranian company, it means that it's really challenging to do any business outside of Iran because you are not able to basically make foreign exchange transactions. So how do you clear payment? Even if you have a good that you want to sell to, you know, Europe or China or vice versa, how are you actually settling that payment? What is the medium of exchange, right? Iran, by the way, when it was cut off from the dollar and still to this day, I mean, they use a lot of, you know, methods that we would consider absolutely insane, right?
It's like barter, right? Where they're they're trading lentils in exchange for rice or something like that, you know, which is extremely hard and cumbersome to do. You know, they use gold sometimes for certain transactions. The reason though it becomes even harder for Iran is that you have what's called secondary sanctions, where let's say even if Iran can, you know, decide, you know, we're going to just use the euro to trade with Europe, right? The US can say, well, if you transact with an Iranian company under sanctions, you will then be cut off in the dollar. You European bank, if you are processing payment with Iran, we're going to cut you off in the dollar.
And then the European bank has to decide, well, do I care more about access to the dollar or do I care about facilitating this trade with Iran? And so to go back to the example of oil sanctions, right? I mentioned there the oil embargo on Iraq in the 1990s, you know, US naval sailors, you know, inspecting cargoes, the way that the Iran oil sanctions work, which were even more impactful. They cut Iran's oil sales by over 60 percent. What they did was it was going around to refineries in places like China, India, Turkey, and their banks, importantly, and saying, if you do not reduce your purchases of oil from Iran every six months, basically, if you don't gradually wind down your purchases from Iran, you will lose access to the dollar.
And so in some ways, it's not even distinctions that are directly on Iran that are the most impactful, is being able to pressure Iran's trading partners. Finally, what does that all lead to, right? What it leads to is a country that is not only effectively severed from international trade, but it also generally means that you end up having things like substantial inflation. And so the purchasing power of the population goes down. You see living standards go down. You wind up seeing your currency depreciates substantially, because there's effectively very little demand for your goods, because people don't want to trade with you.
And so it does wind up having broad-based economic effects on the entire country. And so one of, I think, the biggest myths about sanctions that you hear policymakers say is, oh, well, these sanctions are narrowly targeted at the leadership. They're affecting Ayatollah Hameini or they're affecting Clinton. Right. I mean, it is very, very hard to like impoverish poop, right? I don't think you could do that. Yeah. We're powerful in the US, but we have that powerful, right? But so what generally happens is the brunt of the sanctions is really felt by everyday people. And I think what that means, if you're a US government official who's prosecuting economic war, you have to have a damn good reason for doing this, right?
There should, you shouldn't do this lightly, right? Because there are negative externalities. You're making people's lives worse. You're generating people who don't like the United States, right? So you have to have a good reason. With Iran, I think we did have quite a good reason, which was we were trying to get a peaceful resolution to Iran's nuclear program. We were trying to end Iran's nuclear program without risking a war. And I think the Obama administration ultimately succeeded with that. I think with Russia, you know, the goal was to initially deter Putin from innovating Ukraine, that fail.
But I think ultimately after that, it's about beckoning Russia. It's about making Russia less able to deploy its military in ways that are bad for not only Ukrainians, but the entire international community. And I think those are warranted. But I think in some of these other more edge cases of should be using sanctions or not, you should be default to not using them. Use of economic sanctions on a country by the U.S. is absolutely going to have big large impacts on their economy in a negative way. So I'm sure this impacts GDP, this can increase inflation. You're saying that the citizens of the country generally are the ones paying for this, but this does have a cost.
This does have an economic cost to the country that the U.S. I guess I could use the word attacking in this way. Can we talk a bit more about the more recent sanctions on Russia? So there are other things like cutting them off from the payment network, of course. And maybe you could talk about a little bit about the tools that are employed here, you know, kind of the sanctioned stack, as it were, because it was surprising, I think, to a lot of folks that the U.S. had the ability to just freeze bank accounts of Russian oligarchs, effectively seize their assets, take their money, and a lot of U.
S. politicians were talking about this. So what were the effects in the U.S. Russia sanctions on kind of Russian oligarchs, and mechanically, how did this even work? Sure, yeah. So I think it's helpful to go back to the circumstances of February 2022, when the big Russia sanctions went into effect right after the big invasion of Ukraine. The Biden administration and the rest of America's allies in the G7 had a fundamentally a problem, which was they needed to maximize the economic pain on Russia to try to accelerate, you know, change of heart about his war in Ukraine. But they had to do so in a way that didn't have catastrophic consequences at home for us.
In the U.S., the way that that manifested was we already had oil prices over $100 a barrel in 2022. Inflation was at a four-decade high. It was over 7% at the time. And so the Biden administration was really nervous about targeting the key export from Russia, which is oil. And so in and of itself, it was a really hard problem to maximize pressure on a country like Russia without targeting their main export. So what the U.S. and the rest of the G7 did was they focused on finance and technology. We imposed blocking sanctions on the biggest banks in Russia, spare bank and VTB, which fully cut them off from access to the dollar-based system.
We also kicked a number of the big Russian banks out of Swift, which is this financial messaging service based in Belgium. The thing that's interesting about Swift, people talk about is you say, oh, this is a huge sanction that the U.S. can deploy. Well, actually Swift is based in Belgium. It's a European Union entity. And so it was actually the EU that kicked Russian banks out of Swift. It wasn't the U.S. The U.S. of course has quite a bit of leverage over Europe and so can pressure Europe to take that action. It can also deploy pressure directly on Swift, which it has done in the past. But in this case, it was actually the EU that kicked the Russian banks out of Swift.
And then I think the most important sanction of them all was sanctions on the central bank of Russia. So between 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine and Axe Crimea and the U.S. put sanctions on Russia, and 2022, the central bank of Russia and other economic technocrats in Moscow tried to sanction the true Russia's economy, basically to try to harden themselves for what they thought was going to be a new economic attack. And the main way that they did this was through accumulating $630 billion worth of sovereign reserves. Basically, they thought if they have this giant stockpile of hard currency, even if their banks are cut off from the dollar in the euro, they ultimately can defend the rubble, make sure that it doesn't absolutely collapse.
They can buy critical imports for a long enough time that the crisis will blow over and basically the West will eventually come. And these sovereign reserves, what were they denominated in? Were these U.S. treasuries and bonds of other foreign currencies, or are these like harder assets like gold or something like this? It's a really important question. So I mentioned earlier, 60% of sovereign reserves globally are dollars. Right. Russia really looked like a normal allocation up until 2018. And in April of 2018, under pressure from Congress, Donald Trump during his first presidency imposed unilateral sanctions on a Russian aluminum company called Rusal, which wound up really stoking chaos in aluminum markets.
The company's stock was cut in half. And Trump ultimately pulled the sanctions back within like 24 hours. But the lesson that Putin and his team took from that was if the West one day goes on an economic offensive against Russia, it's only going to be the U.S. acting alone. The Europeans aren't going to follow suit. And so what they did after this action in 2018 was they actually dumped a lot of their treasuries over $100 billion worth of treasuries and reallocated primarily to the euro. And so by the time the war starts in 2022, of those 630 billion of sovereign reserves, something like 250 billion are in the euro, which is kind of remarkable.
You had another 50 billion give or take distributed between the dollar, yen, and pound. And then the rest of it was gold and RMB. And so Russia had this sort of untraditional reserve allocation where the biggest part of their reserves was euros. And after that was really sort of gold RMB in dollars. After that, they also interestingly enough beyond even their reserves, they started using the euro as their key medium of exchange. So between 2018 and 2022, Russia was clearing its cross-border payments in euros. Like when it was when China and Russia were doing trade, China was buying oil or gas from Russia.
They're paying Russia in euros. And that bet ultimately proves catastrophic because you know, one of the upsides, I think of of Joe Biden's pension for multilateralism and working with allies was it wasn't just the US and imposed sanctions on the central bank of Russia. It was also Europe. And so to this day, we still we have something like $250 billion worth of Russian foreign exchange reserves sitting in European bank accounts. They're denominated in euros. Just frozen. Just sitting there. Russia cannot access. So it's okay. So the central bank, the sanctions against Russia's central bank, you said were the most impactful, maybe the most devastating.
So basically all of those foreign reserves that Russia had been hoarding, you know, some treasuries, but now mainly diversified into your your back bonds. They they were in the stroke of a pen or kind of the I don't know if it's the stroke of the pen or like you see something in some computer system suddenly frozen one day. And so Russia has no Russia central bank has no access to any of those reserves. Yes. And to add insult to entry to the Russians. So these reserves actually a big part of them is kind of interesting. It's like 200 billion euros there are actually in one institution called Euroclear, which is a Belgian institution.
And what has been happening now for the last, you know, since the end of 2024, so late in the Biden administration, is that the US and Europe have been using the proceeds from those frozen assets. Basically the interest that it's throwing off to finance aid for Ukraine. Wow. And so a 50 billion dollar loan that was basically given to Ukraine is being financed, being repaid through the interest proceeds from Russia's sovereign assets. And all of that money is being used to buy weapons for Ukraine, ultimately, to fight and kill Russians. So how painful is that for Russia is when they get, you know, I don't know what in terms of what percent of their central bank reserves this was actually about half was frozen.
Yeah. Oh my god. Okay. So what does this do to the local currency and basically their monetary policy? It crush. I mean, if you go, I mean, this is the thing that's interesting too, is now people say, well, look, Russia's weather, the storm, I mean, go back to March of 2022. For a full month, the Russian stock market was, was closed completely shut down. You couldn't trade anything in Russia. The rubble collapsed to something like 135 rubles to the dollar, which was by far the lowest it's ever been. And you wind up having, I mean, effectively, what, what happens in that scenario when you're, if your currency is, is completely collapsing, normally what happens is a central bank will intervene in foreign exchange markets to try to prop up the value of the currency.
So let's say Russia had access to its dollars in euros. Sure. It would take dollars in euros, go on foreign exchange reserves and buy rubles. And what that would do is it would create demand for rubles, right? That then would kind of check some of the demand on the other side of the transaction. The purpose of having these reserve assets. Exactly. And because if you think about the other side of the transactions, all these individual Russians who are saying, I don't trust my currency, I want to have dollars, I want to have they're taking their rubles and converting them into dollars and and and and euros and as as well as foreign investors who are pulling money out of the country.
And so that is why you have foreign, foreign reserves. They couldn't do that because all of them are frozen. What the Russian government did though actually was quite clever. And what they they effectively exploiting one of the gaps in the Western sanctions is they told all of the state-owned enterprises in Russia, critically like Ross Neft and Gazprom. Ross Neft is the state-owned oil company. Gazprom is a state-owned gas company. Remember I got over telling you that the US did not want to affect the sales of Russian fossil fuels because they were worried about spiking oil prices and worsening inflation in the United States.
They forced the Ross Nefts as the world to sell 80% of the dollars that they were accumulating for rubles. And so effectively they took the balance sheets of state-owned enterprises and leveraged them to intervene in foreign exchange markets on behalf of the Russian government. And this by the way in retrospect was the key error I think that the sanctions made was they didn't realize that Russia could do this and they didn't act quickly enough because theoretically you could have said okay well frozen those assets too. Totally. You could have said well Ross Neft has cut off from the dollar and so has got all state-owned enterprises in Russia cut off from the US financial system.
But they didn't do that. It was just focus on the central bank as well as the big commercial banks like spare bank and VTB. And that winds up being I think a really important gap in the sanctions and it's what allows Russia not to fully recover but basically to avoid a catastrophic financial meltdown. Right and some bad weeks days and weeks I imagine for Russian oligarchs as well who received similar treatment right to the US effectively find their bank accounts wherever they were located internationally freeze those assets as well. Yeah so with the Russian oligarchs I mean I'm always I'm always hesitant to be like bad weeks you know because these guys you know maybe they're doing okay.
Yeah yeah you know they're net worth maybe went down from 10 billion to 2 billion but you know they're not living on the street. Yeah I mean and look I also want to want to be you know in some in some way empathetic and that you know that a lot of them did have to change their lifestyles a lot of them were spending time in New York and London and you know owned properties on the Mediterranean and now you know they spend more time in Moscow and St. Petersburg and you know on the Black Sea and their dacha instead of you know instead of in the Mediterranean but yes but a lot of these Russian oligarchs I mean if you think about any state where you don't trust property rights you don't trust that the government isn't just going to come and take your money which is the reality in Russia right I mean the the way Putin really consolidates his power in the early 2000s was he is he gathers around the oligarchs and says if you don't say out of politics I'm going to take your money right and this one guy Mikhail Kotorkowski who's the most powerful oligarch at the time oil kingpin he doesn't listen and Putin not only expropriates his oil company which then becomes part of the state owned oil company rouse nift but actually throws him in prison so yes in countries where you don't trust that the government's going to respect your property rights a lot of people offshore their wealth right they take that's why Russian oligarchs have these giant properties in London and Miami in New York and why they many of them had giant bank accounts denominated in dollars in euros a lot of them were frozen their yachts in many cases were were seized and so yes the sanctions did affect their lifestyles to a certain extent but most of them wind up going back to Russia and and doing okay so these sanctions of 2022 against Russia are these sort of the the largest sanctions that we've seen so far and kind of the biggest targets I mean I know there's been sanctions you know North Korea we talked about Iran 2015 but Russia is I don't know order of magnitude more sophisticated and or the sanctions that level of more devastating and more aggressive versus other cases yeah so the sanctions on Russia are not as comprehensive as the Iran sanctions so I mentioned earlier you know with Iran we're going around to buyers of Iranian oil and telling them if they don't listen to us if they don't I mean and when I maybe I'll just do one quick tangent because I think it's quite remarkable the most impactful sanctions on Iran and the ones that actually give the Obama administration the leverage to cut the nuclear deal was eventually we went around to banks in China India Turkey and said you can pay Iran for their oil but you can only pay into a central bank of Iran account domiciled in your home country and you can only allow those proceeds to be used to finance bilateral trade so you know if China was buying oil from Iran they pay an Iranian account in China and the money could only be used to buy you know refrigerators from China it couldn't be they couldn't you know bring it to Lebanon to to finance Hezbollah they couldn't buy nuclear equipment with it and within two years of this policy going into effect there tens of billions of dollars of Iran's own money sitting in these offshore accounts that Iran basically can only access for very limited purposes and the way we got the nuclear deals we told Iran we will give you unfettered access to your own money in exchange for you getting rid of your nuclear program that was enough that was enough so we did we the sanctions on Iran are much much more comprehensive than the ones against Russia because you have much more leverage over that scenario than Russia I think we could have been tough for frankly on Russia I think it's it's because Russia is so much bigger as you said and particularly there's such a large exporter of fossil fuel so seven and a half million barrels of crude oil plus petroleum products each day we were more cautious about going after Russia we have the same power we could do the same stuff against Russia for sure we didn't because we were worried about the ramifications for the our you know our own economy in the United States and the European economy but yes the Russia sanctions are the the biggest in terms of when you take both the scale of the sanctions and the size of the target but we have had more comprehensive sanctions on smaller targets like Iran and we've also had less comprehensive sanctions on bigger targets like China right with China being fully cut off from frontier semiconductors from the United States I mean China is another order of magnitude bigger than Russia and we haven't yet gone after gone after China with the kind of full-scale financial hammer that we we've used against you know the Iran's and Russia's in the world so in the case of Russia did it work Eddie um it's a it's a it's a harder question than it seems yes well because and I'll break it down into into sort of two phases the first phase really runs from 2021 the fall of 2021 to February of 2022 because um that just to uh job people's memories you know the US intelligence community determines in the fall of 2021 six months almost before the full scale invasion that Russia is about to invade Ukraine which is really almost historically unprecedented to like see a crisis coming from months away you know you know ordinarily you know a crisis happens and everyone in the White House finds out about at the same time that everyone does on CNN and you run to the situation room with your hair on fire saying what do we do about it with this it was like no we had you know five six months of advanced warning um and so the initial goal of economic warfare vis-a-vis Russia was deterrence it was to use the threat of quote the most severe sanctions that have ever been imposed to convince Putin that the costs of invasion would be too high and then he shouldn't do it right that clearly failed right once Putin invades Ukraine deterrence has failed and so you move into a different phase of the sanctions where the phase is what I would call attrition what you're really trying to do is weaken Russia as much as possible and when you think about um if one side of of your policy is strengthening Ukraine through military and economic assistance as well as you know targeting assistance with uh you know uh their their war uh of defense against Russia's invasion the other side of the equation is weakening Russia right so you're trying to strengthen Ukraine um and weaken Russia at the same time in that respect it's it's very challenging to to say you know yes the sanctions have been impactful or no they haven't what I can say with complete confidence is that we would be better off with the sanctions in place than with help um because if you didn't have any sanctions on Russia um Russia's economy would be humming along um even more so than it is now they would uh have probably overwhelmed more of Ukraine's territory and life would be just a lot easier for Russia and I think this is one of the things that I came to realize during my time in government is you know no tool of state craft especially if you're trying to use a coercive tool is like gonna work in exactly the way you want that often right I mean even military force you know the US is the most powerful military in the world uh you know Trump has been you know gloting about the fact that we had you know uh B2s uh take off in Missouri and bomb Iran's nuclear facilities in like a 37-hour flight which is an incredible technical achievement but we're not even sure where you know Iran's high and rich uranium is right now right and they may actually you may have inadvertently accelerated their push for a nuclear weapon so even military force doesn't always achieve the aims that you want it to and I think the same as true of economic warfare let's talk about the pros and cons of economic warfare then so maybe maybe maybe the pros first right so it strikes me that um for the US with this level of economic power the ability to cause uh to have deterrence and coercion and to cause some economic pain to an adversary without a tank without a missile without the sacrifice of any American lives that's got to feel pretty high return on investment so me let's talk about like why economic sanctions are a good tool and then we'll get into the other side of it like you know why in many cases they're not yeah so um I'm glad you're asking this because you know I obviously I wouldn't be it be an odd decision for me to spend so much of my career working on this if I didn't think that they had some utility um look I guess my own belief is that you know the world is a messy place we oftentimes are dealing with problems in the United States that are really hard and we really don't want to fight wars particularly with other great powers right the the prospect of a war with China or Russia is really almost hard to imagine right these are nuclear arms states and anytime you're you're directly engaging them in warfare you're risking the extinction of the human race right I mean yeah and like I say that you know like in this friendly podcast the conversation but it's it's true you know and and probably like our parents and grandparent generation that was more like oh yeah of course right because they were like you know ducking and covering in their classroom we don't have a timer yes yeah right um but like that is like the world we live it right um and so there's a question like well if you want to advance American interests internationally without using military force whether options you have my own view is that the next best the next next most impactful thing we have is our economic power and so I do think that sanctions and other weapons of economic warfare like export controls have an important role to play in advancing American interests around the world do I think that the U.
S. always uses these tools wisely of course not and I think in some ways we we very you know and we we perhaps use them unwisely more often than we should um but I think that they have a very important role particularly in uh you know trying to try to address really hard problems without risking war it seems like they're pretty fairly high return investment as well I mean how much does it cost the U.S. to impose these economic sanctions versus kind of its military might yes they cost of that in any individual case and I think this is what what also makes this question hard to answer in any individual case it almost feels costless right where it's like okay well we're cutting this Russian bank off from the U.
S. financial system okay you know like it's just another one you know I think the reason it's hard is when you zoom out well what is the cumulative impact and this is actually something I'm I'm focused on right now and sort of the next frontier of my own research is you know this age of economic warfare we're living in in which sanctions export controls investment restrictions tariffs have become the primary way that great powers compete because I'll also say it's not just the U.S. who's using these tools more and more it's China is the EU it's Japan it's Russia um they're always deployed in response to a specific problem it's okay we want to stop around from getting a nuclear weapon or we want a weakened Russia's military or we want to you know uh win the AI race against China so we want to prevent them from getting Nvidia chips right but like the cumulative effect is a full scale restructuring of the global economy it's undoing sort of the core tenets of globalization and hyper globalization from the 1990s and that is the cumulative impact and so it it the I think there's a huge incentive for policy makers particularly in Washington to use sanctions to address every single problem because it does feel kind of costless but then if you don't have a more disciplined strategic approach you're like okay hold on a second how about half of the countries of the world from the dollar maybe I'm endangering the dollars role as the global reserve currency and that has a whole litany of other problems that we probably don't want to I bring about I mean this seemed to me part of the argument of of your book is that there is really no free lunch here and then there is kind of a hidden cost that compounds in the background and that cost might might cost the U.
S. the entire empire or dollar supremacy or things that are like we're we're very hard one for the U.S. But before we get there I actually want to ask the question of how the U.S. even got to this place so you mentioned earlier in the conversation Eddie that you're actually on a sanction list is you know thank goodness not sanctions from the U.S. dollar but from the rubble the Russian rubble and I got to imagine that doesn't affect your life in the slightest maybe it does yeah I have you felt any effects from this no I mean I have felt no effects but I will say though and this it may sound strange because when this happened a lot of people emailed me and text me saying congrats you know this is a side of bad to cry I mean my own view is like look I mean I you know I spent a summer in college living in Russia like I love Russian literature like I like to think that one day in the future you know Russia may be a you know not the worst of itself right it could be a more a less imperialist country you know and so it made me a little bit sad and nostalgic right and you know the fact that I lived in Russia at a time before they you know had launched imperialist wars and it was just in some ways a marker of just an end of an era a Ethereum's layer two universe is exploding with choices but if you're looking for the best place to park and move your tokens make your next stop uni chain first liquidity uni chain host the most liquid uniswap v4 deployment on any layer two giving you deeper pools for flagship pairs like each usdc more liquidity means it better prices less slippage and smoother swaps exactly what traders crave the numbers back it up uni chain leads all layer twos in total value locked for uniswap v4 and it's not just a deep it's fast and fully transparent purpose built to be the home base for defy and cross chain liquidity when it comes to costs uni chain is a no-brainer transaction fees come in about 95% cheaper than Ethereum may net slashing the price of creating or accessing liquidity want to stay in the loop on uni chain visit unichain.
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available in certain countries including the United States check its terms for more information so sad mildly inconvenient but certainly did not cause you much of any economic harm zero okay so zero how how does the US have the ability to do this the leverage to do this where do we need to go back in history to understand how the US became I guess I mean we could sit off when we talk about the dollar at bankless it's sort of the US's chief export really it's you know we're most successful export is our capital markets are our dollar our banking system and we export it all over the world and it seems like the entire world has adopted it into their economies as the the global reserve currency you know how did how do we get to that place was it an accident of history was this just like because that the US you know post Bretton Woods kind of dominated economics and monetary policy like where did how do we even end up in the state because it seems like I don't know that you tell me has there ever been a time in history where a country a nation state and empire had this much economic power no and and to answer your initial question which was was this an accident or part of it was accidental because if you go back to Bretton Woods right so this conference in the summer of 1944 where the allied countries while World War II is still raging set kind of the architecture for the new international economic order the dollar is installed as the global reserve currency but it's also pegged to the dollar at $35 an ounce so the way the Bretton Woods system works the gold right yeah is the dollar is the US is responsible for exchanging any dollar anyone gives it a four gold for thirty five dollars per ounce of gold and then every other currency in the world whether it's the French Frank or the British pound is pegged to the dollar within a narrow ban I think they can move it one percent or so every year but it's effectively pegged to the dollar and so the dollar is officially made the global reserve currency by Bretton Woods right but it is effectively a fixed exchange rate system so there's only so so far that finance can go right I mean and and if you go and read sort of the the writings of John Maynard Keynes who's a bit important to architects like the belief of Keynes as well as Harry Dexter White as US counterpart was that fixed exchange rates were good because you wanted to actually prioritize the real economy you know exports manufacturing over finance and capital controls were actually a core part of the system you couldn't freely move capital across borders there some some ways you it was illegal in other parts they were high taxes on capital exchanges and so it was it was not economically you know useful really to do the thing that's super interesting and we're we get into accident as you go to 1971 August where Richard Nixon goes in front of the American people and says we are no longer exchanging dollars for gold at thirty five dollars now so US you laterally terminates this system and says we are no longer part of it and it's really because in the years leading up to that with the Vietnam War the US is starting to run deficits more and more countries starting with France are actually going and exchanging their dollars for gold so there's a run basically on the on on the dollar and and America's gold reserves and so the US can't defend that price anymore and and within two years there's also the Arab oil embargo which is catastrophic for the US economy it causes the start of this decade of stagnation the thing it's so interesting is you go back and you read contemporary or contemporary accounts and everyone says it's over American economic dominance RIP right like in the 70s they're going to miss yeah in the early 70s right because you know we had just ended we basically abdicated our position at the center of the international financial system and you know we're reeling from this you know you know inflation driven by an Arab oil embargo and in the wake of that with the US running these completely unsustainable deficits in 1974 Richard Nixon is a is floundering amid the watergate scandal is completely distracted he appoints this guy as treasury secretary named Bill Simon he's a former bond trader he's from New Jersey I've got this great picture my book him testifying before congress with a plume of smoke over his head like these are these are people that you don't really see too much uh you know the relic of the past but and maybe for better maybe for worse and and Simon comes up with this kind of this scheme that I think only a bond trader could have come up with where he says well maybe what I need to do in order to allow us to keep running these deficits is I need to persuade the countries that are accumulating dollars to buy our debt to buy treasuries and so in July of 1974 he flies from Andrews Air Force Base in uh in wash or in outside of Washington to Jeddah and he has the Saudi coastal city long flight gets copiously drunk on the flight by drinking whiskey um which is he does by he's watching really gruesome like horror films on the flight he's doing this because like yeah he's like this say macho american he's like oh that you know it's illegal to drink in Saudi Arabia yeah and yet despite his you know crazy behavior he does strike a deal with the Saudis where he persuades the Saudis both to continue pricing oil and dollars and to take all of their excess oil profits and reinvest them in US government debt in exchange for the ability to buy US debt outside of the normal auction so they didn't have to participate in the auctions that are public that other everyone sees this could be done sort of in a in a under the radar way and for preferential access to US military equipment so there's a deal that links the dollar to oil so initially the dollars linked to gold basically that it kind of de facto becomes linked to oil and with by the way the end of capital controls with the end of fixed exchange rates the dollar then can kind of fluctuate based on market demand you actually see an explosion of the use of the dollar around the world um and also the other interesting thing another story I tell them choke points we could go on forever the euro dollar market which is this initially elicit offshore dollar lending market that originates in in London right um the US government basically endorses it we said we start saying okay well even though this was sort of developed by in a private banks we don't these these are not the same as dollars that are backed by you know the full faith in credit of the United States the federal reserve like we think this is good because it increases ultimately demand for US dollars and ultimately US treasuries and so this is the beginning of a whole new system where instead of trade and the real economy being the main thing that America is solving for is the financial sector that's a let loose and then that gets kicked into high gear with the deregulation drives during the Carter administration the Reagan administration and the Clinton administration where you get to a point by the time the Cold War ends and China and Russia are about to enter the global economy we live in this hyper dollarized world it's striking that it is this combination of uh strategy and also accident of history maybe or you like just serendipity right that the the petrodollar which is you just described basically the birth of of the US petrodollar was more successful had higher product market fit than the goldback dollar of of the previous era and is just saturated into every nook and cranny of of the financial world not to say that this hasn't cost the US I mean I think there's increasingly some chatter and some argument you know talk about the Triffin dilemma that sort of thing that this really fueled our our trade deficits how did that the manufacturing class of the US and has has really like made the US economy thrive on on financialization and like weakened our position globally and maybe maybe let's talk about not not quite that but going getting back to the cost of economic sanctions so moving back to Russia and do we describe this where you know suddenly in a couple of days or or weeks uh 250 billion of their central bank reserve assets are just frozen um they have to be thinking to themselves I can't believe we got ourselves into this like what the hell I'm sure there was much more that Putin said about this uh and like this can never happen again and so let's talk about the cost of economic sanctions because it strikes me Eddie that what countries will just do is not let this happen again they will start to route around build around the US petrodollar you know infrastructure empire and create their own networks in their own monetary routes uh can you describe that story a little bit yes and I think this is a very astute observation and it's not just Russia by the way who's saying we'll never have this happen again it's any country who worries that they may one day one day come into the crosshairs of western economic warfare right and so I think a big reason you've seen this massive run up in the price of gold since 2022 is because central banks in this sort of store of value uh bucket of uses of currency are saying well we feel more comfortable accumulating gold than we do accumulating US treasuries I'm sure although I would defer to you as the export on crypto that they're run up in the price of Bitcoin potentially has something to do with this as well where you have bigger buyers in offshore jurisdictions who are saying this is a hedge against uh against the dollar I think the in some ways the thing I'm even more interested in though is this a medium of exchange element because I got over telling you how even when India and Saudi Arabia are trading with each other this is cutting through a US bank account ultimately and so there's a choke point that the US government can use to stop the transaction from happening since the Russia sanctions a number of efforts to try to evade that choke point have been really accelerated so one that predates it but I think um it was also motivated by American economic uh power was the uh ECNY or the digital remnambi it's the Chinese central bank digital currency um you now have many central banks around the world actually the US is an oddball that we don't have this we're building these central bank digital currencies and China in association with the central banks of Thailand uh the UAE Saudi Arabia and the Bank of International settlements has actually built a platform called embridge that allows uh uh different countries who are part of this platform to clear cross border payments using their own central bank digital currencies and that in those types of transactions do not have to touch you know a city bank uh you know corresponding account here in New York City right they have no nexus uh to the US financial system at all and actually at the end of 2024 the Bank of International settlements dropped out of this project embridge which has effectively left the people's Bank of China the Chinese central completely in charge and they're now basically trying to expand that bringing in other members you've seen the bricks uh talking about uh you know clear and cross border payments as an incredibly high priority so it wouldn't surprise me if embridge winds up becoming the main vehicle for that uh oh okay so let's talk about that more because so you're you're talking about the uh the different um use cases of money right we have store value we have medium exchange uh you don't have account so the store value perspective yeah I do think you're right this has been part of the narrative of some of the um advocate US adversary central banks and even non US adversary central banks are saying yeah do we really want to hold you know this this level of treasuries if they could be frozen so they're slowly diversifying to other assets maybe harder assets particularly gold at this stage what's interesting though is it seems like for the store of value use case there's a little bit of mutually assured destruction there which is like the central banks could also sell boatloads of treasuries on the open market and to do really nasty things to US bond prices and yield prices so so maybe that's kind of like happening in a slow way but what's happening in a faster way are these alternative payment networks and so when you're looking at the alternative payment networks is the the kind of the Chinese alternative payment network in their central bank digital currency is that the one that is vying for um kind of alternative primary alternative to the US or are there their pockets their fragmented pockets of different payment networks that are started springing to action like when the US when when when Russia and China do some trade like what do they use in the sort of non uh digital currency world the non blockchain world China has also created something called sips or the cross border interbank payment system which is the sort of the Chinese equivalent of swift uh or the you know the the Belgian based message message service we talked about before as well as chips which is the clearinghouse interbank payment system is the US based system that actually clears dollar transactions so China has created their alternative um Russia also has one called SPFS that they created both of these by the way initiatives interestingly enough were founded in around 2014 so after the initial uh Russian uh invasion of Ukraine and and sanctions that were put in place so interesting they've been in they sort of been percolating for a while but sips the Chinese version has grown quite quickly i mean Russia has effectively you wantized its economy really they're they're their main foreign exchange uh reserve right now asset is the Chinese Remembee they settle most of their payments in in rmb oh yeah and so and and look that's put them at the mercy of China yeah which i think eventually is going to be a very big problem but it's been a survival uh sort of tactic uh for Russia and China's been only too happy to oblige i think strategically though if you are going going to fundamentally threaten the dollar's role as a minimum exchange i don't think it's going to be done through you know China creating corresponded bank networks and using sips and i think it's really going to be done through a paradigm shift through okay it is just better to clear cross-border payments using digital currencies it's way faster it's more trackable i don't know if anyone listeners to your podcasts have tried to make an international wire transfer recently it's a constant complaint this podcast is called bankless eddy so yeah so yeah it may it could take a week or more um there's a lot of middleman involved there fees you have to pay for wires right i mean there is a a setting aside any geopolitics like technologically cross-border digital payments are better they're faster right they're faster um they're more direct right and so i think that we are at the precipice of a major shift in terms of how cross-border payments work China has by far the biggest uh and most advanced state-backed project to do this through both the ec and y as well as embridge this platform that they built with other central banks and so the question is can the us retain its lead and the us as listeners to your podcast will know has made a big bet that it will actually be through the private market it'll be through stablecoins not through a digital dollar or a us back central bank digital currency that the us will be able to retain its lead and we may be right but it is a really interesting bet to make when you look at all the other big central banks pboc uh you know the european central bank has a digital euro they're all doing central but at least wholesale central bank digital currencies the us is going all in on stablecoins and in some ways interestingly enough it mirrors this period in the 1960s and i talked about this in my book in 1970s where the euro dollar market kind of starts as this like quasi illicit dollar market that exists offshore and eventually the us governments like hey this is really important we actually should just co-op this and so i kind of see the same thing happening at the very least with stablecoin right now where the us governments like look we need to figure out a way to actually win this race for the future of payments and the best way to do it is to take these various us dollar pegged stablecoins and co-op them and make them sort of there are you know the instruments of our own influence yeah i like i like that very much like that your dollars comparison with stablecoins fact uh friend of the podcast frequent guest Nick Carter you know off he's tried to rebrand these things to call let's call them crypto dollars rather than stablecoins why don't we just do that that's more fitting and i think that's a good label for what they actually are and so are you painting a picture Eddie i want to talk more about stable coins and in crypto digital assets and how they fit into the the full story here but are you painting a picture of maybe three networks three types of networks uh emerging here so we've got the traditional us dominated network you know chips and swift and that's like got full dominance you know the 90 percent then we've got a payments network coming out of the chinese central bank so the pboc and that's doing its thing maybe rushes the first to you know uh you want toize their economy maybe they won't be the last maybe china continues to try to use its economic might to co-opt countries uh you're closer to that system so that's maybe the second and this this third is maybe decentralized crypto networks as another viable successor to uh i don't know i want to use the successor term but to start eroding market share from the the current dominant uh monetary system which is swift and chips yes i would i think that's a fair outline of the current kind of players in the race i don't think that's necessarily the the only players that may enter the race because i mentioned sort of we've talked about the russia sanctions of 2022 as this big pivot point where china starts building its alternative infrastructure i worry that trump's liberation day tariffs from early april may have been sort of a similar you know fork in the road where now europe may also become a player right because you because you're you're seeing the your the dollar for instance steadily uh to appreciate decline against the euro since uh april um and i think um in some ways the euro has like a fighting chance now um particularly if this digital euro thing works so i wouldn't say that they're anywhere close to uh where the other three projects are but i wouldn't fully count them out because they are they start from a pretty good spot where 20% of foreign exchange reserves right now were in euros and um a lot of the reasons you may not like the european union which is like it's slow it's bureaucratic may actually be effective when it comes to payments because with payments like you just don't want to think about it you just you don't want to be to worry about arbitrage and capricious move so i do think the euro may also be a a fourth horse in the race but we'll see how that develops yeah this is fascinating it's just not just us adversaries but it might even be us allies that are looking to alternative to swift it you know as a maybe a bellweather of this i saw this post from somebody i follow just generally he's in traditional finest he writes a lot about money his name jp coning i don't know if you've ever run across his blog i i think i i've read a few things by him but yeah he's so he wrote this in april so his his his Canadians who lives in canada and uh he he wrote this blog post trump proofing canada means ending our dependence on swift okay this is our neighbors to the north you know the the peaceful uh Canadians and the the first line of this it's it's time to stop shit staring at the headlights and respond to the fact that canadas being eyes as a choice choice morsel by the much larger predator our former ally the united states of america basically goes on to make the case that we can't to be as canada if we want look there's economic warfare going on there's tariffs going on we don't know what the shape of the us as as allies are going to look like in the future we're utterly dependent on swift and one tool that trump hasn't yet used in the tariff negotiations is like heck cut you off swift canada how would that feel right anyway i mean i don't know how widespread this is but even allies are sort of looking at this and saying should we be dependent on the us as a as a payment network at this point so the difference between what trump has done in the last few months on economic warfare and his predecessors i think is important to call out because in the one on the one hand like it is a continuation in that i'm every single present in the 21st century from george w bush to brako bama to trump's first term to biden and out of trump again is actually impose sanctions at twice the rate of their predecessor oh wow so there is this structural secular trend where there's this more and more sanctions tariffs export controls the thing that trump has done differently is this weaponization of american economic power against everybody yeah and unilaterally right critically doing it all by ourselves because as we talked about earlier you know with the russia sanctions of 2022 the us acted in unison with the issuers of the other big reserve currencies the euro the pound the yen to sanction russia and so as a result it wasn't like the euro was seen as a viable hedge against the dollar if anything actually the euro lost share against the dollar between 2022 and 2025 because they were seen as geopolitically equivalent but the dollar is much more useful but if the if the us is just weaponizing the dollar and american technology against everybody else there's going to be an incentive to hedge and it's not just the the rmb or bitcoin or gold it's also the euro that could be a viable alternative and you know i mean there's there's there are people in Canada who want to join the EU you know they're talking about building oil and gas pipelines so that they can export their energy you know from coasts to places like europe and asia instead of selling everything to the united states so i i do worry that that is the novelty of trumps approach which is this unilateral use of economic warfare against so many other countries adversaries and allies alike which i do think could it you know put more horses in this race for the future of global finance is that just generally what you see in the future view to kind of predict the future Eddie is it is it the balkanization of the financial system i mean 90% market share is pretty hard for any entity to maintain and kind of monopoly status and it appears like that is fragmenting at the edges but is that the future we just balkanize the us loses maybe not it'll still be a reserve currency but maybe one of several and not the only do we lose kind of that uh that that dominance that we've had in the past yes that is definitely the direction of travel if you were to sort of just look at all of the various factors and make the most rational forecast it's that the dollar isn't going to be supplanted as the global dominant currency it's just that other currencies including these these challengers like crypto currencies are going to chip away at the dollar share across all of the metrics whether it's you know the account medium of exchange or store value and so you will eventually get something like a multi polar monetary order at the same time we also got over talking about a few minutes ago the fact that if you went back in the early seventies and we were doing this podcast then we would say oh the US is over yeah so you know right we may pull a rabbit out of the hat and i think right now probably like if i were to make the case that actually know the dollar is going to be even more dominant ten years now i think you have to make some sort of big bet on stablecoin on the idea on the on the on the idea that you could in a way start seeing every day consumers businesses etc in the developing world start using the dollar in their everyday transactions and i know you had the head of tether on your podcast recently making this case yeah and i think like that is possible right i mean in some ways that would make the dollar even more ubiquitous right but a lot of things have to go right uh for us to get to that for us to get to that endpoint well let's talk about stablecoins i would love your perspective and somebody that that has previously worked on you know economic sanctions financial sanctions that kind of thing right so we have stablecoins um now it seems like the trump administration is full steam ahead it looks like let's say the genius bill passes you know that's in the senate it's going to kicked over to the house it could pass in july august it still has uh sanctions it's part of it there's a the full bank secrecy act requirements amlkyc there's a bit more freedom of travel with respect to from one crypto wallet to another crypto wallet which is somewhat interesting it's something that i think on privacy and crypto advocates have have really hoped would happen and seems like that's the case but just generally what's your you know like your lens on stablecoins and you thinking about that and maybe through the lens of economic sanctions as well i do believe we are on the precipice of a big change in terms of how cross-border payments work because my own view is you know when there are new technologies that clearly improve the status quo it's hard to restrain them indefinitely right and if you can clear a cross-border payment in seconds as opposed to two weeks like we should probably do the thing that allows that payment to happen in seconds right um so my own view in terms of of of stablecoins is it's that it seems like unless there's a big political shift in the u.
s um we are really putting all the eggs in the stablecoin basket we're not doing even a wholesale central bank digital currency and even if there's a new president in 2029 who does do it you know authorizes a fed to do a digital dollar like it might be too late at that point right given how fast some of these you know alternatives coming out of China are developing so my own view is if i were you know uh you know the wave of magic want i would say we need to figure out a way to ensure that uh a a well regulated stablecoin ecosystem develops one is not used for corrupt practices is not used for illicit practices where American consumers are protected where it's not you know just uh you know they're not going to lose their money um you know because of some sort of you know scam or something like that and critically that there are these AML KYC requirements so that they're not being used as a way to skirt sanctions my own view is that's possible right you could build a stablecoin ecosystem where the u.
s has zero uh less power than they do today to impose sanctions and that would be good right because i think ultimately you get the benefits without having the cost with you know the dollar being used for you know to you know fund your runs nuclear program or finance uh you know uh Putin's imperialism right so that that would be sort of my macro take um and and and you know i hope the genius bill is is a step uh in that direction have you read the text like what do you think about i'm not steeped in it i'm not steeped in it um i it's it's something i need to do uh probably a little bit more of but um but you know i think it's better than the status quo for sure and the idea that you could actually start going in this direction i think the idea that you're going to have one piece of legislation that you know builds the you know is the perfect regulatory framework is not going to happen right you're going to need uh um you know the willingness to iterate over time to see how things are working to have different regulations that are put in place to have new laws put in place um but i think it's a step in the right direction you need a well regulated ecosystem if this is going to be viable over the long term yeah i mean that we had a senator bill haggardion a couple of weeks ago he's what the one of the bills uh co-authors and uh he kind of like you walk through it obviously he's a you know proponent of it since he is one of the authors and it does have some of the protections you're talking about like uh you know full reserves you know audited they're all backed by you dollar backed instruments you know treasuries and um and the like and so is an improvement from some of the other so-called stable coins that we've had in crypto that were like endogenous collateral and you may have heard of terrell luna there's a stablecoin that collapsed in 2022 and some of those things so i think some of that regulation is is happening but let me ask you a question you know from the desk of somebody who's sort of been inside of the belly of the beast and the us government so in all of the cases of economic sanctions you know you've talked about we've seen those economic ascensions being imposed on you know foreign adversaries uh not us citizens right and there's an interesting kind of like a civil liberties take and like worry that um i have personally about these same powers being deployed domestically and they are incredible powers we just illustrate like you're going through the what would it feel like to be cut off from the us dollar one thing if you're in a you know like a foreign country what would it feel like to be cut off from the us dollar if you're a us citizen living in like new york city what do you what do you do right and there are totalitarian states like um you know china for instance that do seem to have that power tying it to social credit systems and and the like and that level of capability deployed domestically in the us is just some you know a path that we don't want to go down so what's your concern about that i know there are some laws that protect against it but there are i mean i'm not like i'm not sure that we have good kind of privacy and protections uh in place where it's the extent that we need i'm not sure patriot act bank secrecy act even like i'm not sure that that is protecting citizens to the extent that it could be it's pretty rare for the treasury department to impose sanctions on us citizens almost always in in the cases where it is it's a you know dual national you know where you know they're a russian who's gained american citizenship or something and even in those cases oftentimes they don't they refrain from doing it just because you know americans have due process rights and it's it's quite a step i think for an executive branch agency just to freeze your bank accounts and cut you off in the dollar yeah that that is terrifying right right so i'm i'm with you i think that um you know it's it's it's it's scary and i do think that in some ways we've seen the trump administration be willing to weaponize parts of state control over economic organs to advance its own agenda against american citizens right and there are accusations that this also happened during previous administrations i know um through uh crypto companies not being able to get bank accounts i don't have any insider uh perspective on that but i think that that's absolutely terrifying and that these tools um should never be used against us citizens i think that even when we use them against foreign citizens we really do need to have some level of empathy because um you know they're not friendly to us right like you should really only be using these tools when there's a vital us national security interest at stake we shouldn't be using them willy i think in my ideal world we would be we would have probably five sanctions programs instead of thirty but in the cases where we actually do think that we really need to use economic warfare like russia trying to conquer a sovereign country or iran trying to build a nuclear program that threatens uh you know the existence of israel and potentially could have a nuclear uh terrorist attack on us oil like then we should go much harder right like i would have fewer sanctions programs but the times when we do use them when it's like a serious vital national security uh interest at stake we should go very big what's i'm interested in this as we maybe start to close this out eddie and um you know if your opinion is different than than the bankless opinion that's maybe even more interesting about this but so we've talked about stable coins which have uh AML KYC sort of attached and they're like more regulated much more regulated uh cousins to crypto native assets or something like a bitcoin or something like an ether right something that um really uh us economic sanctions have much less power over because they're just centralized network now maybe you're kind of shaking your head because you're like wow we haven't really tried and it means to some extent that's true i mean there's the ability to kind of free stable coins but i wonder are there any cases where the us has actually gone out and tried to like see someone's bitcoin in a foreign country and what would that would even look like could they even do it yeah so i'm skeptical there are there is this take in the crypto community which is oh this is you know this is going to end American sanctions power like to me that is just not the case and interestingly enough if you look at the biggest fine for sanctions violations that the us government has meted out in recent years it was against finance right it was about again four billion dollar fine against effectively a crypto company which the CEO actually went to jail right so i mean like us government has quite a bit of power even over crypto companies um the other thing too is when you think about the concept of choke points and this gets into the broader concept of my book and takes our conversation full circle like there are areas of the global economy where one country has a dominant position there are few if any substitutes right the dollar is this really important choke points the most important today so i've talked about it there are other ones right the us has used semiconductors and you know with uh as a choke point against china china has used its dominance of rare earth minerals and batteries as a choke point for economic warfare against the united states well think about you know bitcoin right there are you who who's running all of the cloud computing network in the servers that all of these uh bitcoin miners being a choke point basically so yeah i mean you know it's it's there are there are probably other infrastructural layers in the economy that the us government could use if you really wanted to come down hard on crypto companies i don't see why that should be the case but i also don't think that you know we have not yet seen industrial scale sanctions evasion using cryptocurrency and i think there's a reason for that do you are you glad we live in the world where there's at least that option or that kind of release fell for but like a way to sort of route around some of these choke points and maybe the the the cases to get around totalitarian regimes yeah no for sure and i and i i do think that you know there is this scenario where you know especially dollar backed stablecoins right could be used as an alternative to you know domestic currencies that that really you can't trust right or domestic regimes where you may have your assets confiscated so i do think there is a role there is a civil liberties role uh for various crypto currencies to play at the same time i do think that is important for the us to retain the power when i say the us the us government to retain the power to use economic warfare against foreign countries and again i wish we lived in a world where this wasn't necessary but if we're gonna accept that geopolitical competition is a fact of life and unfortunately it's intensifying it's much worse than it was when i was a kid the 90s when we sort of basically didn't have geopolitical competition for a short a period of time like you need some tools of leverage and if you don't have viable economic tools i worry that will wind up fighting more military wars that basically the alternative to sanctions oftentimes isn't peace or doing nothing it's dropping bombs and i think the clearest demonstration of that is in 2018 when Donald Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal he made a bet that maximum pressure sanctions on Iran that crushing their economy even more so than Obama did would get him an even better nuclear deal and ultimately that bet failed and the result was airstrikes against Iran first by Israel then by the United States which does potentially threaten to bring us into yet another war in the middle east and so i do worry that if we don't have these tools we will wind up fighting more wars and it'll be more risk to the us ultimately so is that the message of your book we want these tools but we need to use them sparingly in order for them to remain effective exactly we need to use sanctions more intelligently and i think maybe my biggest takeaway is you know the way that we plan and execute military force is incredibly serious right we train and protect and recruit professional troops many of whom spend decades of their life in the u.
s military we game plan out wars we table to table top exercises military exercises so by the time the chairman the joint use of staff is advising the president the situation room about what to do like there is really good basis for these decisions even though sometimes you make the wrong call with sanctions and economic warfare oftentimes it's it's a whimsical poorly stopped through decision and so i think we need you know honestly like the biggest goal of my book choke points is to demystify economic warfare so more people can feel like they understand this topic so that they could weigh in and prove our policy outcomes and ultimately get us to a better place well i think that's exactly what you did today and i was hoping for a crash course in sanctions and i think that's exactly what we got so eddy fishman thank you so much for joining us on bankless the book is called choke points american power in the age of economic warfare i highly recommend it and i'll end with this of course you guys know none of this has been financial advice it's not even economic sanctions advice okay crypto is risky so is the monetary system of the world you could lose what you put in but we are headed west this is the frontier it's not for everyone but we're glad you're with us on the bankless journey thanks a lot and thanks eddy