Dan Robinson is GP and Head of Research at Paradigm. He, over the years, has done a lot of deep thinking about markets, auctions, and liquidity in DeFi, with a particular focus on Uniswap and Uniswap V3. Recently, Uniswap Labs released UniswapX, a new dutch auction mechanism, that Dan thinks changes the meta for swapping assets in DeFi, MEV, chain interoperability, and much more.
The last time Dan was on Bankless was September 2020…almost 3 years ago! If you have ever heard Ryan or I say the phrase “Ethereum is a dark forest”...it came from that episode.
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------ TIMESTAMPS
0:00 Intro 6:00 Why UniswapX is Needed 11:09 What’s New About UniswapX? 14:00 Intents 16:25 The Magic Behind MEV Reduction 20:00 Order Flow Auctions 26:25 It’s Still Early 33:05 Who Are the Nanobots? 37:42 How Rollups Will Change 42:22 How Bridges Will Change 49:55 UniswapX Complements Uniswap v4 53:30 What Uniswap v4 Do for LPs? 59:15 LPing with Uniswap v4 vs. v3 1:04:11 Uniswap’s App Layer & Yields 1:06:05 Why Be Excited About Suave 1:09:55 Closing & Disclaimers
------ RESOURCES
Dan Robinson https://twitter.com/danrobinson https://twitter.com/danrobinson/status/1681061703818305536
------ Not financial or tax advice. This channel is strictly educational and is not investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell any assets or to make any financial decisions. This video is not tax advice. Talk to your accountant. Do your own research.
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Welcome, Bangladesh nation to state of the nation where we dive down into a topic that is currently floating around the world of crypto. This week on State of the Nation, we are talking with Dan Robinson, head of research, GP at Paradigm. Recently across my Twitter feed, I saw a tweet thread from Dan Robinson about how there are five big ways that Uniswap X changes the game for swapping in DeFi, swapping in crypto. I learned a ton in this tweet thread, and I thought it would be super useful if Dan Robinson came on to the show and explained each point himself here, and so that is what you are about to get here today.
Because Uniswap X doesn't just stop at Uniswap X, it also brings with it a bunch of new changes for the DeX landscape that impacts so many other things across DeFi, across Ethereum. It impacts its bridges, it impacts rollups, it impacts MEV, it impacts market makers, and so there's about to be, perhaps if you believe in this new intent-based paradigm, which is something that we will define in the show, it flips a lot of what it means to be a DeX or to be a DeX swapper on its head. So you're going to learn about all of these details in this coming new meta for DeFi, as well as what it means for you, the user, you, the swapper, and also perhaps you, the LP, if you are an LP in this world of DeFi as well.
And we also open up some other doors as what does the future of LP yields in Uniswap look like? What can Uniswap V4 do for LPs? Well, Uniswap X is focusing on swappers and Y swappers and LPs are the two parts of a DeX that need to be held in the highest regard and why everything else is secondary. And then also we open the door to what flashbots is working on with Swav, which is at the very end of this episode. After all, you're going to learn a ton about the DeX landscape that is changing quickly, both with Uniswap V4 and with Uniswap X, as well as some other things in the intent base world, which is a hot topic in the DeX and Dev landscape.
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He is GP and head of research at Paradigm. He, over the years, has done a lot of deep thinking about markets, auctions, and liquidity and defy with a particular focus, I'd say, on Uniswap and Uniswap V3. Recently, Uniswap Labs released Uniswap X, a new Dutch auction mechanism that Dan thinks changes the meta for swapping assets in defy and also MEV, chain, interoperability, and many more things. The last time we had Dan on bankless was September of 2020, almost three years ago. If you've ever heard Ryan or I say the phrase Ethereum is a dark forest, it came from that episode. Dan, welcome back to bankless.
Thanks for having me. Dan, you recently wrote a thread, which triggered my imagination and was the impetus for bringing you onto this podcast that was titled Five Reasons. I think Uniswap X changes the game for decentralized exchange, MEV, and interoperability. This already kind of gave me a model, an agenda for this episode, which we want to get into, but I really want to start at the highest of levels. Maybe define the landscape for why something like Uniswap X is needed in the defy sphere. What are the current variables or the current things that are producing this need for Uniswap X? Yeah.
I can talk about that. I think it will also talk a little about Uniswap before and why I see that fitting in. From my perspective, decentralized exchange research, which is where I've spent a lot of my career and my research focus has been a paradigm with Uniswap. Decentralized exchange research, in my view, has to be about reducing the amount of value that leaks out of the decentralized exchange system. When you were in a decentralized exchange, it was particularly with automated market makers you have on one side, liquidity providers, and on the other side, swappers. Swappers are coming in because they can get the most liquidity from other best prices from your decentralized exchange.
The liquidity providers are hoping to earn the best returns from trading fees being paid. A lot of what I would say in decentralized exchange design that I've seen happen elsewhere has been focused on trying to tip the balance one way or the other between take money out of the swappers pockets and put it in LPs pockets or vice versa. When you see a lot of reactions to decentralized exchange research, it's often saying, oh, this hurts LPs to benefit swappers or swappers to benefit LPs. In my view, I think sustainable Dex research is going to be about reducing the value that leaks out of this system entirely.
It's not going to be about, you can't just benefit swappers by making LPs make less money. You can't just benefit LPs by having swappers get worse prices. You actually have to find where is the parts of the system where you can benefit both or reduce the leaks that come out of the system. Almost all those leaks go into MEV, and so I think the types of Dex research, the valuable lines of Dex research correspond to different types of MEV that come out of the system. Now, I think there's three kinds of MEV there. One is just EIP-5559 burn, just ETH that's being burned, gas cost from the transaction, and that's being paid by both swappers and LPs effectively.
That's a really important one, and you saw V4 and you saw VX both address that one. For the other two, one is loss versus rebalancing, and that's losses that liquidity providers suffer to arbitrageers, someone's coming in and they're trading on this pool at a better price than the liquidity writer maybe should be giving them, so the liquidity writer is losing money to ARBS, and that all goes basically to MEV in the modern system. You saw V4, and I can talk later about how we think about that, is about addressing those losses to arbitrage, and opening up new ways for developers, for AMM designers to reduce that, but Uniswap X, in my view, is largely about the other side, is trying to help the swappers, and a couple of ways that swappers lose money, they can be sandwiched.
You can have your transaction actually executed a worse price because somebody traded ahead of you. You can have just ordinary slippage. You're trading at a price and the prices moved away from you on the deck, so you're getting a worse price than you expected, and you could just be getting a worse price and is available somewhere else. In my view, if Uniswap the system is not providing swappers with the best possible execution they could be getting anywhere, then what are we even doing here? That's the motivation for me with Uniswap X is how can we actually protect swappers, the swapper side of this, from getting worse prices than they could otherwise?
I think to reword what I heard from you, research in AMM and just dexes on Ethereum and Encrypto Broadly has two players that you think need to be held as first class citizens of the highest regard, and everyone else should actually be minimized. These two players are swappers, people that want one token and have one token and want a different token, and then liquidity providers who are providing liquidity. I think what you're saying is that research in the realm of dexes in Encrypto needs to figure out how to optimize for retaining value by the net between these two players, and anyone else, MEV arbitrageurs, the Ethereum protocol with EIP1559 needs to be minimized while these two players are maximized.
That's how I would reword what you were saying, is that fair? Yeah, I think that's basically how I think about it. Then Uniswap X is specifically a technology that benefits swappers the most. Yes, largely focused on benefiting swappers, but I think again, in a way where you're benefiting primarily retail swappers, it's not about helping arbitrageurs trade against Uniswap all piece more effectively. It's the people who we care most about actually helping here. I'd actually like to take this opportunity to start with your tweet thread and number one, because I think this is where this goes. The first tweet in your thread goes, the architecture of Uniswap X opens up a vast design space for dexes.
Maybe we can talk about the secret sauce that Uniswap X is bringing to the table. We might actually need to define what Uniswap X is for people that didn't listen to our episode with Hayden, but I definitely recommend that as well. What is the new thing that Uniswap X is bringing to the table? What's the new secret sauce here? Yeah. First, I'll say, I don't like to use the term new because I think a lot of, as many people have pointed out, a lot of the ideas in Uniswap X have been around in the Ethereum Dex space. Actually, some sense before Uniswap, and I think some of the concepts, especially around signed limit orders, I think are, you can trace back through zero X or even before.
I think part of what Uniswap X is about is, are we actually at a time when some of these concepts that have been around for a while really make sense and start to be worth integrating into how Dex has actually done on Ethereum, which right now again is dominated by just on chain flows on AMMs. And I think actually that there's a lot to be gained from going into these digging up some of these ritual ideas. Yeah. So the key idea for me of Uniswap X is that we're moving from a system where all transactions created by retail or users are expressed as transactions with a specific path. Imagine just like an itinerary of here is, I'm going to take exactly this, this route on the subway to get from point A to point B to an intent, or a limit order.
And an intent, if you think about it, is just a statement like, I want to get to point, I'm at point A, I want to get to point B, but I don't necessarily care how I get there. And there's been a lot of discourse on intents and I think, and a lot prior even just on the more general concept and dex of limit orders, but I think it's very important that we start actually operating with user intents. I think they're incredibly flexible and powerful. And Uniswap X, the main thing to me that it achieves is starting to move toward users expressing their trades as intents as limited or as saying, I'm willing to, I want to trade at the best price possible, no worse than this particular price, rather than expressing it.
I want to trade on this exact AMM. So people who have swapped on Uniswap before, do you, you open up with the asset that you have, you open up the asset that you want, and then you click confirm and then you like approve that transaction, you're metamask, you're ledger, whatever. And then you like go to ethoscan to watch that transaction get verified. In that, what you're saying is that is a specific, the user has chosen their point A and their point B. And then the app, the web app actually codifies that into a specific transaction into, and then the user commits to that transaction and then that is committed to on chain.
And then a bunch of MEV happens in the background that the user doesn't really see, but definitely does happen. And so I think that's the current meta of swapping. And what you're saying is there's this new alternative called intense, which is can you explain like how that actually gets expressed and then how that actually turns into the outcome that the user wants. How is that different from an actual codify transaction and how does it actually achieve the same result? Right. So the way it works is the user, the user still sees a similar interface on the web interface. And when they go to sign, to sign their trade, instead of signing an Ethereum transaction that is again constructed by the interface, they sign just an off chain message.
They sign a message in a particular format, but it isn't an Ethereum transaction. And then it's the job of the entire MEV superstructure out there to get this turn, this intense somehow package it in a transaction that somebody creates and get it included on chain. But this can, you know, intense in general could include anything. It's a more general format than an Ethereum transaction. And this, the universal X uses a particular format where the user commits to a particular price that they're willing to trade at. The universal X supports the ability to do a Dutch order, which is a kind of off chain Dutch auction where they sign this order, they say, here's my decay rate and basically it's going to change the price to make it more, basically get a worse or worse price the longer it goes on until you get some limit.
And that's in order to facilitate some off chain price discovery for it. And then it also allows the ability to pick up a particular filler who gets exclusivity on the trade for a couple blocks. And that's in order to enable them to potentially through a request for quote-like system off chain find someone to fill this quote better. But all those, all these are details about how this particular transaction format works. And it's, I think, how we see sort of the initial way that the universal X helps find uses the best price. But again, to me, the key is you're moving into, now I'm signing a message that just expresses my trading intent and it's up to the system to try to find the best price for it.
So in the example that say just for around numbers, ethers, $2,000. And the old way is you would have 2,000 USDC and then you would say, hey, give me one ether. And then you would ultimately get like 0.97 ether before a number of different reasons. One of them would be gas fees, one of them would be slippage, one of them would be front running and a bunch of different participants, both humans and protocol, eat away a little bit at that. And I think the way that this intent system works is, you actually, since you don't broadcast a transaction, you actually, excuse me, you do broadcast a message, but you do not make a transaction.
And so I would guess maybe this like this package that you're talking about, you're just saying, hey, I have 2,000 USDC, the minimum price that I'll take is one ether for that. But if anyone can give me more than that, then you are allowed to fulfill this order. And then duck auction is just a defined a duck auction is, you set a high price and then over a period of time, that price comes down little by little by little. And I think that's kind of a magic. Can you elaborate on why that's so magical for how that actually reduces MEV? Yeah. Yeah. So the idea there is, but when I want to set a, if I want to discover the price, suppose I don't know at all what the price is.
And this, by the way, I use Dutch auctions all over in like every mechanism I've done, because I think they're just a fantastic way to get the centralized price discovery. But I think this is what it's, you know, it's one component of, of a piece of, of use up X. But the way it works is, when you put, if you publish this order to the world with some particular, starting, somebody to start in price, if that price is, if anyone in the world can actually fill that, they're incentivized to do it as fast as possible. And so you'll actually get, if they can fill that profitably. So you'll get that included as quickly as possible.
If nobody can fill that, then, okay, maybe that price is too high, I'm going to start lowering it. And as soon as, if the system is sufficiently competitive and there's enough, there's enough digital bitters out there and nobody, and people aren't censoring multiple blocks at a time. And again, I think these are assumptions that are worth questioning. But in that case, basically as soon as this order becomes profitable for anybody in the world to fill, they'll fill it. And we have the assumption that basically, once you hit that point, that's the right price to actually fill it at. Now, okay, like there's some, there's some possibility you could lose, you could lose a little slippage from the system, like if the price, you know, moves in the other direction at the same time that your price fails, you maybe don't get the best execution possible.
And I think there's, that's why there are these other systems as part of it. And to me, you know, so back again, is not about just the Dutch order, it's not about the RFQ. It's about this general concept that we actually get a lot more flexibility from intense. But Dutch, that's one mechanism that you use of X uses to try to make a competitive market for filling orders. I think another way, the way that resonates with me in my brain is that the Dutch auction mechanism say, say, Ether is 2000 price, $2,000 give or take. But like you said, you actually don't know in the, in one single moment of time, you actually don't know what the fair price of Ether is.
So you start at like $2,010 and this Dutch auction mechanism less that decay, you know, 10 cents every second until someone fills it. And I think the idea here is that the, the, the most profitable person who can make that trade profitable first at the highest, at the highest price possible will fulfill that because they can squeeze a profit out of it. And, and it allows the margins of what you call the system, like this MEV system, the market maker system, it allows the first reasonable, rational person who can make a profit will fulfill that order first. And that's how you're can come into the conclusion that well, yes, that was the best possible price for the swapper, right?
That's exactly right. Okay. And so I think this is, this is why you come into the second tweet saying it's a better foundation for order flow auctions order flow auctions versus what was the opposite of an order flow auction? What's the other half? Yeah. Well, so, right. Well, so, so back in up a little about order flow auctions. So I think we've seen some systems and flashpots has one called MEV share and I think there's some others out there with the ideas right now when users trade on decentralized exchanges often they, they may get sandwiched, they may get front run. And one way that you can potentially just make the user strictly better off than they otherwise would be assuming already that there's so many transactions is instead of just letting anybody in the world far run this transaction or even maybe instead of just letting this transaction get included and see what happens.
We can auction off the right to background new transaction and the background happens because, you know, when if I trade on an AMM I might push the price, it might be such a large trade that it pushes the price to a level where it's profitable to trade after me. And so I could potentially get a rebate on my transaction by if I transaction gets included by basically selling off the right to say you're allowed to trade immediately after me. That's a right that I in some sense have, although it can be hard to facilitate this market between me and somebody who might want to background me. And so if I can get someone to pay me for the right to background me, I will get a rebate effectively on on my transaction.
So this is how order flow auctions have been implemented by flashpots and others with the transaction model. Now the thing is it's sort of a hilariously inefficient way to actually pay somebody for the mev that's being created by their transaction. Because what's actually happening there is I'm trading at a worse on the AMM, at a worse price than I actually want to trade at, you know, I want to trade maybe at the current price or at a better price, but I'm trading at some bad price on the AMM, such a bad price and causing so much price impact that actually it's profitable for somebody to pay me to be the trader afterward to trade the AMM back in the other direction.
And this involves at least two transactions on chain. It involves fees being paid to liquidity writers who haven't actually really done anything because what's happening in this transaction is economically is that I, the user, am actually just trading with some backgrounder. I'm buying a token that they are selling and I'm buying at a such a bad price for me that they can sell it back to the AMM at a better price that is profitable for them. And so we should just cut out the mental man here. We should actually just have the user and the backgrounder basically trade with each other, but the transaction format doesn't allow this kind of order flow auction.
And so that's why when you move into an intent suddenly, you know, I'm saying as I want to actually trade, I'm not saying it has to be on this particular AMM so that you have to extract this money from, you know, by backgrounding and then being a side payment to me, you can just come in and trade with me at a better price. The metaphor that I'm getting here, I mean, maybe you'll like this one, is like it sounds like we're trying to build a ship, design a ship that doesn't leave a large wake. And it sounds like in this, the current paradigm of Uniswap trading where the reasons why the pools get balanced or who we're trading with is because in order to fulfill that order, there needs to be enough wake for arbitrageurs to come settle the waters.
And right now with this off chain intent model, we actually are just designing a ship that doesn't disturb the waters that much. Is this a fair metaphor? Yeah, I like that. I think that's the idea is you're ultimately getting more efficiency from doing it this way because it's just a more flexible format. And so these things that people are, it's so needed that it actually getting hacked into the current model. And I'll give you another example, which is just in time liquidity or jit liquidity, which I've been going on like a rampage about for about a year, partly in preparation for anticipation of Uniswap X coming out.
I think to jit liquidity, the way it works is when somebody's trading and they're going to trade at a bad price, someone can come in and provide concentrated liquidity right around the current tick right before their trade and then withdraw it right afterward. And what they're functionally doing is they're improving the user's price impact. They're actually helping the user a little bit by trading against the user. But this is this too, very gas inefficient. A lot is being paid in 1559. And it's not in this case, like not actually going to liquidity providers, who's it going to, it's basically just being wasted or it's going to gas costs that all the inefficiency of this system was really what we want is, okay, if I'm using them without a trade at a bad price, can someone just come in and save me?
And again, the intense allows us to do this more efficiently. Your second point in your five point tweet thread is, it's a better foundation for order flow auctions that return MEV to users. This is what we're discussing, correct? That's right. Yes. Right now, the way that those work and the way they fit into the Uniswap model involves like this multi-transaction, expensive and often inefficient protocol for like back pains, I'm going to backrun them. When really, again, when you run an intent, it's much easier to just batch these together and match them against each other. So maybe to summarize points one and point two to the best of my ability, there's two, there's kind of two birds with one stone in this intent model.
We get the elegance of the Dutch auction model, which like we said earlier, naturally emergently finds the most profitable actor who can give you the best trade and still be profitable themselves. And because it's not on chain, we don't have all of this wake in the transaction. So there's not just in time liquidity, there's not back running. There's not two trades that help settle a first trade. It is all done off chain, which helps retain value from going to EIP1559 and it's helped retain by swappers and also therefore liquidity providers. So that's my summarization of your first two points.
Would you say that's fair? That's right. I think I would separate out the Dutch auction point as being maybe part of, yeah, it's part of point one where it really is like this is the kind of thing you can do with intents that you actually can't do with with ordinary transactions on AMMs. Beautiful. Okay, let's go into number three, which I love, it's so simple. It's still early, which is you say that we've opened up a new frontier of exploration. So elaborate on like what this new frontier looks like. What's needed in this new frontier? What kind of infrastructure do we need to settle on this new frontier?
Like what's left to build here in this new design landscape to help this efficiency become even more efficient? Yeah. So I think part of, support of the motivation for you to start back is, okay, we see all this behavior that's happening on chain with say like jit liquidity or people like designing mev order flow auctions of like, you know, mev auction background in auctions, right? And thinking, okay, like this is a sign that actually there's some serious inefficiency here that should be, that should be streamlined, that should be improved. And I think in my view, the design, I think does this and gets users better prices and is more gas efficient in many cases.
And I think that's, that's, you know, why I think it's, I'm excited about it a bit rooted out right now. But really, once you're now we're up in intense space, the sky is really the limit on just like how you can actually match these orders and process them. So for example, right now, the way that use up xworks every order is, well, there's, there is a, there is a star of key process which I alluded to earlier where you can use, you can choose a particular filler to fill your order and give the next specific for a couple of blocks in exchange for basically giving you this good quote early on.
But right now, that's, you know, the trades are being matched primarily against these, these fillers. What happens when you actually start to match user trades against other user trades? When you do something more like a batch auction, like, like Kawaswap, innovated. I think what happens when you start to do, you can do some sort of more interesting math with that, right? Suppose you have like a bunch of user orders, you can execute them all at a common clearing price. So there's algorithms for trying to do that. You can, you can do like, you know, match ring trades where you have multiple assets being traded and you try to like maximize the total amount of volume.
These can be, you know, you can encrypt these orders, right? Like you can, and I'm not sure how much other, some of these other solutions have done this yet, but you can actually say like, all right, we're going to have everybody do a sealed-bid batch auction that's actually enforced by cryptography where you encrypt your orders, you do a, there's one more for computation on it to try to compute basically the, the common clearing price or you unseal it by using a, using a group or some multi-party computation. And that gives you like a more decentralized or fair, potentially fairer auction. You can match it against on-chain liquidity using it, using a particular algorithm.
You can put it in trusted hardware, which I got in a moment, but like you can, you know, it's much easier potentially for a trusted hardware to operate on orders because they can include basically all the information you need about them right in the order without having to involve interaction with a bunch of Ethereum state. Like for all these reasons, they're just more tractable. And so I think like in the long run, I have no idea actually what these things will look like, but I think I know I'm pretty sure it's going to look like some kind of intense, some kind of, when users express their, their desire to trade, it's going to look more like an intent, I think, than a particular on-chain transaction.
And that's because they're just so much more flexible, so there's just a lot more room to explore. Yeah, it's the flexibility of the expressivity of an intent as in it's very, very open ended. I think maybe another way to help define an intent is it just provides like kind of the bowling alley guardrails as to like, here's what I, here's everything I don't want. But anything inside in this specific, specific landscape of what I do want, you're allowed to give me. And so basically saying, you just write the rules of like, hey, you can't give me less than this. And then the mechanism will naturally give you as much as possible.
And but not codifying it, I think allows for a lot of expressivity. And I think that's one half of the magic that I think you're talking about. The other half is that like, since it's off-chain, the cost of computation are zero. If there's no gas costs to matching orders of user A to user B to user C, you can compile every single order together all at once. And all of that computation that it takes to clear those orders doesn't have to actually run on a blockchain that can run on some local market makers server. And all of a sudden we get really good order execution from not having to be encumbered by blockchain computation.
That's my intuition. Is this right? That's right. And I think just off-chain computation is incredibly powerful. And we actually saw it as with the rise of the professional, professionalized Mav ecosystem. It's a tremendous amount of ingenious work being an optimization being done off-chain. And I think this is something where a lot of people see Mav as a threat, but as a protocol designer often it is. And I know that if you leave some opportunity open to be optimized for Mav, someone is going to take it. And so you can't be lazy as a protocol designer, maybe as lazy as you could have been maybe in 2018.
But it also is a huge opportunity. It's a massive support. And I think of it as a swarm of nanobots that's always in the error around us. And if you just leave out an apple on the table, it's not only just in your, it becomes a core, right? Because the nanobots like a swarm need it. And if you, you know, this is scary, because you can't leave your food out, lie it around. But it also means, okay, this is useful. It's like, if I want to like, you know, clean something, I can just like spread, you know, spread some jam on it or something. And you know that the nanobots are going to come eat that and do that task for you.
And that's what, that's how we, how we rely on this system in the, in with Dutch orders, right? And you just say, like, we know that with a Dutch auction, if we auction this, like, it's a, it's a, an efficient enough nav market that like someone's going to take it. Someone is going to pick up this money that's lying there. And as a result, we can, we can rely on this. And the user, it helps the user, right? That like, this, this opportunity for profit is not going to, to be left un, unclaimed. Because if it were, then the auction might clear too late at a worse price than the user would otherwise get.
But because you know that this is a efficient off chain, you can rely on that. And that's like, that's something that I think is, is really has changed in the past a couple of years, where there were a lot of protocols and people were talking about in like 2017, 2018, where you couldn't actually rely on just there being efficient, every efficient arbitrage being taken. And like, oh, someone is incentivized to like challenge, you know, challenge this thing. So they will, that's something that today is actually much more realistic than it used to be. And who are these nanobots? Who are the players that make up this like swarm of, of nanobots when we open up this new frontier?
What are the like verticals that actually compose this swarm of nanobots? I'm sure we got like market makers, we got M.E.V. bots. What composes this swarm? Yeah. So I think there's, I think there's professional, that's right, there's professional market makers. There's a lot of, especially for atomic, we have a lot of amateur, um, Mav searchers who I think, you know, it's just like, uh, it's just sort of amazing how you've seen this actually happen where by lowering the barrier to entry to becoming a Mav, a Mav searcher, you actually just found that, um, basically all, you know, all topic Mav gets, gets extracted pretty quickly by often people, you know, who are, um, in high school or, um, or in the basement somewhere, um, or, you know, I don't, I don't, I really don't, I don't actually know, um, that's part of the beauty of it.
And that's, you know, what, what we're talking about, the Ethereum is a dark forest post, uh, before that's, that was this, this realization that we had that actually, um, the bots are a lot smarter than you might, than you might even have, haven't dissipated. Um, and so are you actually, you know, this, this, this, someone has, if there's some behavior out there, like, you should suspect or worry at least that somebody's ridden the bot to take advantage of it. Um, but I think, like, once you get to this, uh, uh, once, once you're, once you're in this world, yeah, and like, you, you can sort of just treat it as a force of nature, the, the, the, a kind of a fish and market hypothesis here that, okay, if we, if we're creating Mav here, then it's going to be claimed.
And we rely on that, for example, and like, blend is a protocol that I worked on with with the, with the blur team, um, where we also use Dutch auctions because they only love Dutch auctions. But, um, if, you know, you might get your NFT liquidated, if there wasn't an efficient market here because, because, uh, if somebody closes out alone, um, what happens is there's a Dutch auction to continue it. And if nobody was out there just looking for opportunities to, um, uh, to lend at a profitable interest rate, then like, potentially someone loses their NFT, but you can kind of rely on, have, do, do a trust fall onto the Mav searcher ecosystem, and just know that somebody's going to actually claim that.
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So how does Uniswap X in this intent-based meta change the game for the nature of Ethereum's role of centric roadmap? How is this a player here? Yeah, so one way I can talk about this, OK, so I'm really excited, but this is something that Uniswap is planning to roll out later this year. This is for cross-chain swaps using Uniswap X. And you can use Uniswap X for, you know, it's in the white paper, the description of how this protocol works, but it's pretty simple adjustment to the algorithm where, if I'm, you know, if I'm, I express my intent on Ethereum to have ETH on, on Optimism rather than just, like, to have, like, die on, on Ethereum, or you could say, you know, I've ETH on Ethereum, and I want to have die on Optimism or something like that, you just express where you want to actually have the asset.
And the thing is, if there's a message-passing bridge from the place that I want to go to, to the place where I currently am, that can pass basically the proof of the fulfillment of this through, then I can have my order claimed on, you know, on Ethereum, and then filled on, on Optimism, and then the success of this is actually passed through. And a couple of cool things about this. One is, with the Dutch order mechanism, this can actually be a really decentralized competitive market for how to get money off of, from one roll up to another. So like, the price is set by the market, and anybody who actually has assets on both chains and wants to run this strategy can do this.
You don't have to depend on being, like, a trusted party, or having, or having, like, on-chain liquidity or anything. So again, I think the liquidity can be off-chain, and I think it's just much more efficient. For one thing, if you just have bridges, and you're trying to bridge over, you know, ETH from one, from one chain, until, like, some rap teeth on another chain, bridge teeth on another chain. If that involves a huge AMM pool, like, a lot of liquidity fighters with just static bridge dashes there, that's a massive honey pot. You just have to hold, have exposure to this, to, like, bridge teeth over there.
And I think it's actually a much cleaner model to have the liquidity be off-chain. And like, I'm holding, they're an aid of asset on this other chain, right? Or I'm holding, um, something else, you know, or, or, or, or die or something. Like, I don't actually have to have a huge pot of, of bridge dashes over there. I think that's just, like, huge, valuable. With roll-ups, again, often, you have a canonical leap there. In 30s, um, there's a really nice property where, and I mentioned going in one direction, but if you go the other way, for fast roll, exit-side roll-ups, this is like, this is a design we talked about for fast roll-ups and exits, like, uh, on, on Plasma and, and roll-ups, like years ago.
Uh, but it's, but it's, uh, it's a very neat feature is you can, um, uh, I, there's a fast bridge from Ethereum to Optimism, right? Like, there's just a, uh, uh, native bridge in Optimism. You don't have to use the, the slow exit for it. As a result of that, you can actually build a fast exit protocol from Optimism to Ethereum, where if I have a E-Thon Optimism, I can get onto Ethereum or onto another roll-up for that matter. You can get it over to, uh, but let's just talk about Ethereum for now, um, really quickly. And the way that works is I have my, my E-Thon Optimism and I basically auction off the right to, um, uh, do a Dutch auction and say send me E-Thon, on, on Ethereum.
Um, and once someone does, they will basically be able to, they'll be able to send a message, a fast message from Ethereum to Optimism that then claims my, um, you take five minutes or 10 minutes or whatever, uh, whatever it does, um, that then claims the, uh, my trade. So the filler, um, I'm sorry, the swapper in the happy case, the swapper immediately, basically, like faster than, um, uh, even this bridge, uh, you know, within, like, within like a minute, uh, gets the, gets their money on, on mainnet, the filler can actually conclude this swap by the time the their transaction, uh, their message has moved from Ethereum to Optimism.
Um, and, um, and yeah, so in the happy case generally, like this, uh, all concludes within, you know, like, uh, within 15 minutes or something. And I think that's just going to be incredibly efficient for, for getting money off of rollups. One final, really cool thing I see about it is, um, if you want to go the, the, the example I started with, you want to go the other direction, you might actually get paid to bridge from Ethereum to Optimism because you can effectively rebalance somebody who wants to exit. So if somebody's trying to exit, um, Optimism, whether they're, they're a mark, maybe they're a market maker, um, uh, who previously bridged somebody onto Optimism for, uh, or off of Optimism for a fee.
So now they have Optimism Eath. Um, they might actually be willing to pay you more than one Eath to get your Eath, um, uh, made netEath. And so you might actually, and I'm not sure how the economics will work quite yet. Um, but they're, it's conceivable that you might actually get paid to, to bridge your money onto a rollup. How does this change the nature of bridges? Because they're, they're, I remember in 2021, 2022, the building a bridge cross rollups was like a big movement, right? We have, uh, socket, we have li5, we have hot protocol, we have a cross, uh, all of these bridges. How are these bridges?
If we go into this intent-based paradigm, how would do the nature of bridges change? So I think some of these bridges, and I'm not an expert in, and how all of these work, I do think across, actually, as some, has some similar characteristics to how universal works, and other, other ones do. Um, so I'm not, I'm not calling on any particular bridges, um, either positively or negatively, uh, here, but I think some depend on, on this kind of like, on chain liquidity. And this is ironic for, for me, and, and you know, it's about to be, to be sort of, uh, talking about moving away from, from having on chain liquidity for, um, for bridges.
But, um, having, having, uh, uh, yeah, like having, if you imagine just, oh, you, you actually get some like, right, some canonical representation of like optimism on, um, uh, or optimism, optimism bridge, teeth over on arbitrum. And then there's an AMM on, on arbitrum where you can not like trade that. Um, I think that, for one thing, it becomes a honey pot where if this bridge, there's a lot of money right now that rides in the security of this bridge, um, and potentially could get, could get hacked by this. And we've seen, we've seen catastrophic, the most catastrophic, uh, hacks, of course, in, in crypto history, our bridges.
Um, and part because you just have a lot of money, um, it's just, that's just sitting there, right? It's sitting in like one contract because the money's off like off doing something else, but the representation of the money is, is going somewhere else. But here, it's like, it's just like, it's sitting in this bridge contract that, and it's exposed to this, um, to this thing. And when I like about, you know, stop X, uh, from security perspective is only, only, only the only money that's at risk is swap, uh, that's exposed to the bridge is, um, it swaps currently in flight. Um, swap is currently in flight.
In flight. Yeah. So basically, like once the swap has concluded, so the somebody, somebody starts a starts a swap, right? Um, and then, uh, the, a swapper, a swapper expresses their intent, they want a bridge over a filler on, on that chain claims, okay, I says, I'm going to, I'm going to fill you, they basically make a promise to fill them. Now this, right now the swappers exposed to the bridge risk. But then the filler immediately, hopefully fills them on the other, on the other chain. And now the swapper no longer has bridge risk. Like they, they get, they, they've already been filled. So they, it's like, they're exposed for like a minute.
And then if the, uh, if the bridge gets hacked, like, people should stop swapping on it. Um, so, but you know, like, there's that minute, maybe when, when, when they're exposed. Um, and then for the filler, um, they actually, now they, they, they use the bridge, they have to use the bridge to actually send a message back to claim the swapper to get the swapper's money. Um, but once, once they do, they're no longer exposed to the bridge risk, they don't have any money, like, like overnight, if they turn off their server and they stop, uh, fill in stuff, they're not exposed to the bridge so they can, they can sleep easier.
And I think that's getting rid of that honeypot quality of, uh, of bridges is just, is just a, a huge improvement. To make sure I understand this, there are certain bridges that when you use them, you create a representation of the asset on the chain. That is beholden to the bridge that put it there. Correct. And so like, that's right. Say, say, we have bridge, just to make up a bridge name bridge, like bridge 123, do bridge, I just invented bridge 123. And then you have ether on main chain Ethereum and you use bridge 123 to get your ether onto optimism. It's not optimism ether. It's bridge 123 ether on optimism.
And that is the honeypot because it's this bridge that is now this persistent custodian of this ether that is a IOU on optimism, but it's not canonical ether. And canonical ether, and he would say is ether that's deposited into the canonical optimism bridge. Correct. Yeah, exactly. And, and you know, it's possible for the swap. Maybe the swapper trades immediately from that optimism myth into, uh, or start from that one to three eth into optimism. Uh, so maybe the swapper doesn't have long term exposure to the bridge, uh, to the bridge, but someone does, if that liquidity's on chain, if the liquidity's on chain, it might be like, they've got an LAMM, right?
Like some, anyone could provide liquidity on this AMM on a particular roll up between one to three eth and OPE. And that's exposed, as long as somebody's providing liquidity in that, uh, as an LP and that pool, they're exposed to that bridge risk. Whereas if that liquidity's off chain, the way that it is in the swap X, they're actually not exposed while they're not actually currently executing a trade. So this, um, I would, it logically concludes in that it assets that are on layer two's or, you know, non Ethereum chains are most likely going to be assets that are represented by the canonical bridge for that change, like the optimism bridge, the arbitrum bridge, the actual bridge that creates the layer two, not another ancillary bridge that isn't relevant to the layer two.
That's right. And this is why I think it's, it's incredibly, um, powerful in the roll up case specifically, because so every, every roll up, uh, has a canonical bridge, a message passing bridge from main net to, um, to the roll up. Um, every roll up has, uh, canonical versions of, of all like a year, so 20 and Ethan NFTS, that's, I think, generally, uh, from the, from Ethereum that have been bridged over to that, right? So you don't actually have to have a, a remote representation of the, you know, the way that you might with Solana, you have to have some remote ethics, like, so like, how do we get there?
I think there's a lot of challenges in, and how to, and how to figure out how to do that securely. We don't actually need that with, with roll ups, because there's, there's the canonical bridge. Um, and so, uh, it becomes really useful, you say, let's just, we don't have to solve that problem. We only need to solve the swapping problem. I've got ETH over here and ETH over here. Um, and then we just try to reduce all the risks around, um, around that. And then, you know, I think the, the other benefit is because this bridge to main net, the nice thing is the bridge to main, from main net to the, to the roll up generally is a fast bridge.
And like, the, the big, one of the biggest downsides of especially optimistic roll ups is the exit is, is slow. Um, but the nice thing here is this, uh, optimism, uh, I'm sorry, uh, Uniswab X turns a fast bridge from, uh, message faster bridge from B to A, uh, into a fast asset passing bridge from, from A to B. Right. Um, and so it makes, it, it's designed basically to, to create these trustless, um, fast exits, um, which I think is very nice. Would you say an intent-based swap paradigm is also a bridge minimalism paradigm? Um, I would say they, they, they, they fit together very nicely. And, um, yeah, I'd say, I'd say they fit together very nicely.
Cool. Okay. And I would just just, I would just assume the nature of this is like it's probably one of the big UX UI problems, UX problems of just like bridging is not, bridging is a burden bridging is a chore. It's not like friendly for users. And so this is probably one of the many things that we need in order to improve the, um, composability issues that Ethereum's roll up centric roadmap brings to the table. Yeah. I mean, in my view, it should be really easy. If you want to buy a token and that token happens to be native to, to some roll up, um, and you had your money's on some other roll up, it should be basically like, you know, it should be transparent.
You, you should see that, that you're buying this asset on this, on this roll up so you know, actually the exposure you're getting, but it shouldn't be any harder than buying an asset, you know, you should just go to Uniswap where you're already maybe going to buy the asset and you can just trade it from one, uh, from one chain directly to a different asset on a different chain. Um, I think that, I think that's, it's a big UX problem right now that you actually have to even think about bridges at all. Yeah. So of course, this is a panacea for solving the cross roll up composability issues, but man, it sounds like a really big step towards that direction.
Yeah. That's a hope. Okay. So that was number four, moving on to number five, the final one. You say, Uniswap X complements Uniswap V4, which is designed to enable new techniques to sustainably improve passive liquidity provision. Can you unpack that statement for us? Well, why does Uniswap X complement Uniswap V4 and what, what's the significance of all this? Yeah. So a couple of ways. First, it going back to what I, how I started this, I do think they are, Uniswap V4 and Uniswap X, each are primarily designed to serve each, each half of that, of that ecosystem that I was referring to earlier.
Uniswap V4 is about new ways of protecting passive liquidity providers. Uniswap X is about ensuring that swappers are getting the best prices. Um, and so I think, I think, you know, maintaining that balance is important. Um, and I, I think they're the designs that help one are often very sort of very different from the designs help the other. But when you're helping them, it's generally not at the expense of the other. Um, at least at least in my view, because again, like in the long run, these are, these are our users. This is the, um, uh, the system and like, you can't, you can't like just screw over swappers in order to help LPs.
Um, long term, you'll, you'll end up with, with no one swapping on your, on your decks anymore. Um, or vice versa. So, um, some specific ways in which accomplishments, it's one is I think, uh, well, they have some, they, another way, they've common themes. So Uniswap V4 is about, um, flexibility. It's about allowing someone who has a cool design for a decks to build it as a, as a, as a, on, on this platform. Uniswap V4 rather than building it as a, as a, as a fork or as a, as a different pool. Um, and I think, uh, that's, you know, that's similarly with, with Uniswap X, uh, it's much less opinionated about how this trade actually gets, um, gets executed.
And, you know, again, like I said before, you can use a, basically the same on chain format. Um, basically you don't have to change Uniswap X to protocol itself at all in order to radically change how you actually match these things off chain. Um, and I think that's, uh, yeah, I think that's just just a really, um, uh, it's a shared theme there with that. Oh, like, you know, there's, there actually is this very wide design space. And Uniswap doesn't have to be as opinionated anymore. Um, and, and, and, and, and we can open up more, more innovation, um, from others and from, and from, um, I use up labs and from people who contribute to the ecosystem.
Um, so that's the second way. And then the third is, uh, some specific ways. Uniswap V4, because of this, of this new innovation, uh, and openness, means you'll probably get just a lot more pools, um, on chain and rounding, uh, across, um, between those pools is going to be a tough problem. Um, and, uh, I, I think it's one nice thing about Uniswap X is that actually outsources the problem of figuring out how do we route across, um, this multiplicity of pools to this incentivized network of, of fillers, um, and, and generally the, the Mavikers system. And right now already, Mav does a pretty good job of arbitraging pools.
I mean, if you build a new AMM, it, you know, even if your docs are terrible, um, and you don't have an API and everything, it will probably get arbed, basically. If anyone can, if it's, if it's easier to arbed than it is to like hack, find a zero day in, in Viper, um, because that happens. So like, if it's easier, if it's easier to arv it, um, then it will get arbed. And so, um, you just, you know, similarly, we have that for arbitrage across pools. We don't have that right now for, for, um, routing like swaps for if you've got like an uninformed flow order, like, what's the best way to actually route it?
I think we don't really have, um, a decentralized ecosystem trying to get users the best swap possible. Um, and that's what we're trying to do with Uniswap X. Yeah. The, the thing that I saw between Uniswap V4 and Uniswap X is, is both that it pushes computation to the margins. And like you said, you know, like you said, Uniswap X is for the swappers, Uniswap V4 is for the liquidity providers. Maybe you can take a moment, uh, bankless listeners, I'll have told them to definitely listen to our episode with Hayden on Uniswap V4, as well as our episode with Hayden by Uniswap X prior to this. But just to unpack Uniswap V4, why does Uniswap V4 benefit LPs?
And how does that, how does that, if we've been talking about this entire episode about Uniswap X benefiting swappers, what does Uniswap V4, what's the secret sauce about Uniswap V4 and what it does for LPs? Yeah. So I'll start by talking about Uniswap V3, and so, you know, with, with Uniswap, uh, when we started working on Uniswap V3, we're thinking about what are the big challenges to, to, in Uniswap, or where we're trying to solve? And I think we landed on capital efficiency for, for liquidity provision, um, as a, as a major problem solve. And I think that's true, both because, um, it was just very, it's very capital inefficient to provide liquidity at all, and all price ranges, and you actually just get, it's much easier on LPs, it benefits LPs, but also because it increases the, the creativity that LPs can, can approach this problem with.
You can say, like, oh, I'm going to, I'm going to provide using this, you know, some particular, I want to provide during, during, using some different, like, static curve, and you can construct that with just a bunch of the, of Uniswap positions. You might want to, like, actively rebalance, and you can do that as well. It opens up this, this range of possibilities and this freedom for LPs to, to figure out how they're actually going to, going to use the system, as opposed to reinforcing you all into one bucket. And I think, um, you know, that, that made sense in, in, in 2021, um, in part because a lot of the innovation that was happening in, uh, around AMM's at the time was about, like, well, what's the shape of the liquidity curve that I'm providing?
Um, and you're trying to, so like curve, for example, like, providing a concentrated liquidity, um, you have, you know, pretty opinionated, but like, very much designed for, for pegged assets or for stablecoins. Um, that was, that was a big innovation in, and, and, because it actually makes a lot more sense for you to provide liquidity that way. Um, so, so, you're, so if you're, maybe three is a way to build, like, your own curve, like AMM, right? You can, you can pick us, whatever AMM you'd want to do, you do that. With, uh, we saw actually in 2022 and 2023 is, um, the innovation is moving away from just how we're, you know, what kind of liquidity shape is your liquidity?
It's moving toward these more creative, um, things that actually get into how the decks is designed itself. And a lot of that is around, for example, um, uh, well, what's, what's, what's like the initial price? What's, what are the fees that we set? Like, can we change the fees? Which is not possible to really do in V3, although you can pick, you can pick which, which pool to provide in, but unlike one pool, the fees are static. Um, can we force only particular uses or allow to trade or you get to auction off the right to, um, tell like to set the fee or to, or to, um, or to be the first trader in a block?
There's a lot of different new features you might want to add that just don't fit into the V3 framework. Um, but you could, they do into V4. So with, with V4, the idea is we add these hooks that allow people to get more creative and, um, in what kind of, uh, uh, strategies they provide. And so, yeah, I'd see it as, you know, this is a way where, where if a liquidity fighter wants to actually run a particular strategy, they can actually just build their own pool or someone can build one that they can aggregate many liquidity providers in. Um, so getting into the details of where those are, I think, so I will say, I don't think we have a solution to loss versus rebalancing, which is this, this general problem of liquidity fighters being armed.
And in fact, I think there is no, there's no general solution. Um, and I think like you can, there are ways that we, we think, uh, can actually minimize and reduce it. But ultimately, and I think it's, it's, it may also be a cat in most game forever. And that's one of the reasons why it's not we're trying to enshrine this one solution. And before it's instead, we're opening up this, this design space where anyone can, but some of the ideas I think that, um, that can be done. I think Alexander and his logo on Twitter had a, had a neat idea about setting fees, um, based on the, on where the price moved in the previous block.
And I'll give you just a very quick, uh, design of it, but this is an example of one of the things that can pretty easily be built using hooks, um, using, using you swap before. The idea is if the, if the price has, you know, is in block and suppose the, um, the price has moved from, you know, the price has moved from, um, uh, from $2,000 to like $2,100. At this point, so then there's, there's probably been a big arb, you know, price move that happens, um, uh, in this pool where somebody arbed it basically to exactly the right point where they made the, imagine the profit maximizing arb. Um, so the price has now moved to like, you know, to $2,100.
Okay. The thing is when they were trading, they were paying a fee. And so they probably pushed the price so that not like the midpoint price, but actually like the very extreme of when you're trading up, they were paying, they were paying exactly $2,100. So if, what uniswap V3, you know, or V2 or whatever thinks is the price right now is like $2,100 minus 30 bips that it's actually like, like the midpoint price, but a better estimate would actually be exactly $2,100 because that was the final price that the, that the arb, previous arb paid for it. And so that's, so then you can adjust the fees so that actually, um, just move, move the fee window so that, uh, it takes that into account.
So anyway, that's, that's like the core idea there, but it's, it's just, all it involves is adjusting the fees, which is provided by the uniswap V4 hook. Um, and I think, I think it's a clever idea. And that's like the kind of thing, you know, we have other ideas on it. Um, and I think we'll be publishing some stuff later this year, um, on some of my ideas. And I'm, I'm trying to be pretty open about what kind of ideas I'm working on with this, um, in general, but like in my view, those are the kinds of things where you can just eke out some improvements, um, for, for liquidity providers using V4 features that we may not even imagine.
That was an idea that I had, which I think is pretty cool. It's been a while since I've been, uh, an LP and I've never been an LP in uniswap V3 because I just, it's seemingly pretty sophisticated and also intensive. But the meta that I've come to understand through my conversations with people is that being an LP is losing, generally, like you're losing money on average, especially if you're passive LP. And so I'm wondering if like this side of the uniswap equation isn't complete yet. You, we've talked about uniswap X and intense and that feels like a logical conclusion of where swapping goes.
But it's, but I don't know and I'm maybe asking you for a little illumination here. It doesn't seem like we've reached a point of sustainability for liquidity providing inside of uniswap, because uniswap V2 definitely, and uniswap V3 also for my intuition and for my conversations, people aren't making sustainable money in order to supply sufficient liquidity into this side of things. So maybe you could help kind of just like define the contours of this conversation. It's like why aren't LP's making money? Where's that, where's that coming from and how and, and does uniswap V4 fix this enough or like maybe, maybe you can kind of take it from here.
Yeah. So first of it's a, it's a very complicated question and it's one where I've, I've mostly just been relying on others' work for this, I've tried to look into it a little myself. My best read of the literature on this, I think the big focus, they're almost like half of uniswap V3's volume is the USDC with five bit pool. And that's like, that's just like the big, I consider that that's all right, let's like focus on that pool. My best understanding is that the average liquidity provider on that pool loses money. And I'm, I don't actually, so to me, this is a weird mystery, because I don't actually know, I don't know people who provide liquidity on that pool.
I don't know why people do. I have a few possible theories that I can go and do it a little more, but part of what I'll say is I think we design the system so that if it's, you know, you should see some equilibrium where, okay, if it's not probable by liquidity, then there should be less liquidity. It, my best understanding of what people have, people have published is that it seems like liquidity is over-provided and total on that pool. But I actually, I don't, you know, I don't know that for sure, and it seems confusing to me why people would, would provide liquidity if they're consistently losing money.
So I just don't have an answer to that, to that puzzle. And if somebody has a good answer, I would actually love to hear it, because I feel sort of dumb that I, that I don't, don't have a better explanation than, but maybe they know something that we don't, or maybe they're doing one point is they're just lazy, not a valid answer. Yeah, I don't think so. And one of the reasons is you mentioned passive is active. At least one of the studies I saw says that active liquidity providers lose more money than passive. Oh, wow, really? Well, for one thing, you know, you're, when you're rebalancing, you're paying gas every time you rebalance.
You're also probably in practice trading, maybe trading on chain, being an active liquidity provider and also being a trader is slightly synonymous. Right. And so you're maybe getting some slippage or price impact when you rebalance. And so I don't remember if this, if this analysis actually included that, but like it, it doesn't actually, it doesn't shock me necessarily that actually like providing really active liquidity on a pool like you might lose more money, because yeah, again, you're, you're basically paying, paying fees during slippage every time you do that. But yeah, I'm willing to believe that the liquidity is overburied on V3.
I just don't have a good answer for why it still happens. One possible theory is there are people who are making, so all these results are on average, basically. And I think some have tried to, I've tried to break it down a little bit, it's hard to identify who liquidity providers are. One possibility, some liquidity providers are making just money hand over fist and everyone else is losing money. And there's a constant tournament to try to, to be that guy, to try to get ahead. And so people, so you know, that's, that's like one sort of like the like online poker theory of, of liquidity provision.
It's like, on average online poker players are losing money. And yet, or in the peak of it, I think there were studies like they were all like mostly on average losing money, but partly there was just a lot of churn and who is actually trying to be there and whoever is at the top is making money. So that's like one possible theory. And another is just like people are dumb. But it also is weird, because like when you mention laziness, like the people who are doing the most, like who are writing these complicated bots seem to be losing money, maybe more money than others. I don't actually have a good explanation for it.
Oh, yes. So, but going back to going back to your, to your question, yeah, I mean, I agree. And that's why I think V4 is largely focused on, can we actually really address this and make liquidity providers more profitable? Cool. And of course, the beautiful thing about you know, so I before is that these hook strategies are likely going to be built, not obviously holistically, not as a sweeping broad statement, but a big source of innovation, to demand for innovation for hooks is going to become from LPs trying to figure out how to fairly capture sustainable fees in order to make their activity more profitable.
At least, that's my interpretation. Yeah. One thing I quickly want to get, provide a take for you on to get your reactions to is Uniswap's own app layer. Infinity pools is a new app that's built using Uniswap LP tokens as assets. And also I think like the success of something like Infinity pools would create demand for Uniswap LP assets, which creates demand for liquidity is Uniswap's own app layer that has LP tokens as assets, a potential source for LP yields. Yeah, I think that's, I think that's possible from what I've seen. In general, the idea, okay, look, there are these passive liquidity providers.
There seems to be demand for this kind of exposure. Maybe they're rebalancing or hedging or something. And so like, are there ways we can actually provide them this exposure? Like basically you get paid yield for holding this convex position or concave position, I guess actually is the term. The question is, I'm sorry. Yeah, so the question is like, are there more interesting products that we can provide liquidity providers to get this and potentially increase their yields? I think quite plausibly. A lot of the designs I've seen involve basically removing your liquidity from like basically you borrow some liquidity and then you actually pull the liquidity out of the pool.
And so it's never been that clear to me for a lot of these products, why actually you need the Uniswap part? Or like, is it actually, does it actually cause liquidity on that to be more often in Uniswap? And I've easily seen like different answers for some of those. So I'm not as sure about any of the particular instances of this, of these kinds of products. But generally, I think, yeah, like trying to find ways to make liquidity, give liquidity, there's demand to provide liquidity. As we see on Uniswap V3, there is demand to do this. And so the question is like, okay, can we actually provide them this, what they're trying to get out of this, better with a better price or with better yields?
I think it's definitely something, I think it's something where innovation at the app layer is awesome. Well, Dan, I think this was a fantastic first exploration into what is a brand new rabbit hole in the world of intense and off-chain orders and Uniswap X and bridging. It seems to be that, you know, crypto always has some cool rabbit hole to throw at us. One rabbit hole that I know that's out there that we're going to go investigate is a swav out of flashbots. We're doing an episode in three to four weeks with Phil Dianne and Andrew Miller. I'm wondering if you can just help me and set listeners' brains with swav why they should be excited about it, what the TLDR is and just overall prepare them for an episode that's going to come in the future.
Yeah, so I'll give you, I think, why I'm excited about swav and it's maybe a, it's as a kind of like user application developer. So my perspective on what makes me excited. And part of it is, you know, we have this on-chain infrastructure and what was one thing that was exciting about Uniswap V1 and V2 is that we could build these protocols, decentralized, completely decentralized protocols that were basically everything happened on-chain and then all the stuff is done for you where you can just write your logic on-chain and basically, you know it'll actually be executed and it's like decentralized.
But there's all these costs of doing stuff on-chain, especially with stuff you don't actually need like global consensus on. And so we now have this incredibly sophisticated off-chain infrastructure with particularly like, you know, MEV searchers, but also I think are really sophisticated builders where often, and red relays, these parties where they're doing all these complex computations, but they're often doing it in a way where you're involved, involves points of centralization. And I think the MEV ecosystem overall is incredibly decentralized like as a system, but there are points there where there's actually benefits to being centralized.
And I think this is a potential risk and it's one that flashbots has been concerned about for years. And it's also one where if you're building applications in this MEV space, you potentially find yourself, you have to find trust somebody to run, you know, a searcher for a, what did it called, a solver for some protocol, right? Like, you know, or our matchmakers or something, you know, there's many different terms for this or a relay. Someone who plays some semi-trusted role in this off-chain infrastructure. Again, once the stuff gets on-chain, like it's, you know, it's all non-gustardial and the trades are settled or everything, but there's this point before it where a lot of stuff ends up being, the way that things are currently designed, there are these potential points of centralization there.
And what I see Suavez is a platform for decentralizing all that off-chain MEV infrastructure. I think for decentralizing some of what builders do, but also, you know, if you're like, want to run a protocol right now for matching, for doing like a batch-oction off-chain, right now probably the best way to do that would be to, would be, you know, have some semi-trusted party, like you run it, right? Like you run a server, and I say, I just promise I'm going to run a batch-oction and I won't look at your bids and I won't bid myself. But if you wanted to do this in a trustless way, there's actually just no platform on which to build that, to build a, for example, like a decentralized batcher.
And so what I'm most excited about Suavez is I see it as a place where you can build, I can just like write some code, right? Like maybe even just like some solidity and they will run it for me off-chain really efficiently. But in a way where I know that it's actually going to be executed, I can depend on untrusted hardware or on consensus or on some decentralized guarantees that it's actually going to be run in a private way. I think that just as an application designer would be an incredibly powerful thing to rely on. It's, in my view, almost as big as just moving from like Bitcoin to Ethereum, to moving toward turning complete on-chain contracts, as imagine we had turned complete off-chain contracts.
Beautiful. Dan, this has been a fantastic exploration to a bunch of new knowledge. And I thank you for coming back onto bankless and spreading all of this cool stuff that you've been researching on over at paradigm. Yeah, thanks for having back. And just before I go around to remember, I'm paradigm, we're in a crypto asset investment firm. We do investments in a lot of the projects that we mentioned today. And generally, I'm here speaking on my own behalf and nothing that I said here was financially good advice. Of course, thanks Dan. I'll give our own disclaimers as well. Over at bankless crypto is risky banklessation.
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