Crypto’s newest threat isn’t a smart contract exploit, it’s a knock at your door. In this episode, Ryan sits down with Jameson Lopp (Casa) and Beau (former CIA, now safety at Pudgy Penguins) to map the real security landscape for crypto holders in 2026: the phishing traps you’ll see daily, the physical “wrench attacks” that terrify the community, and the practical systems that can make both dramatically less effective. If going bankless is about freedom, this is the playbook for keeping that freedom without turning into your own security team.
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TIMESTAMPS
0:00 Intro
2:45 The 2026 threat landscape: third parties, privacy, then physical
8:07 Most likely vs most dangerous: phishing vs wrench attacks
17:23 Minimize attack surface + separate your money by risk
20:27 The “3-wallet” model: daily spend, risky ops, deep cold vault
25:08 Hot vs cold: the $1k rule + don’t sign when you’re not sharp
30:01 Social engineering defense: authenticate everything, trust nothing inbound
36:22 Password managers + the 2FA ladder (passkeys/YubiKeys win)
45:05 “Dedicated signing machine” and air-gapped thinking
47:30 Wrench attacks: how targets are found + what the attacks look like
52:50 Why France stands out (and what Dubai’s data shows)
57:37 “Zero Crypto at Home”: multisig + geography + time delays
1:12:27 Duress wallets: why they don’t reliably work
1:16:38 Home hardening checklist: cameras, lights, panic buttons, doors/windows
1:30:59 Onchain privacy reality + tax software pitfalls
1:37:40 Is this a setback for the Bankless vision?
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RESOURCES
Jameson Lopp
https://x.com/lopp
https://casa.io/
Beau
https://x.com/beausecurity
https://beausecurity.substack.com/
RSA’s Article - Zero Crypto at Home
https://x.com/RyanSAdams/status/2016572587363520933
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Not financial or tax advice. See our investment disclosures here:
https://www.bankless.com/disclosures
No summary for this episode yet.
We have two security experts on the podcast today in addition to myself. This is Ryan Sean Adams, David can't be with us today. Let me tell you why I'm doing this episode. There's been an increase in physical attacks on crypto investors. It's probably happened over the last year or two in particular. I could share a dozen or more stories. This is causing anxiety in the crypto community. Perhaps as a listener, it's causing you some anxiety as you've seen some of these in the headlines. So this episode is a way to get back some control. This episode is about tactics. This is ways to harden your physical security against retro attacks and your digital security against phishing attacks.
It includes an approach that I like called zero crypto at home. At least that's what I'm calling it and it pretty much means what it says. It is about designing a system so that you can't access crypto at home using multi-sigs, time delays, third party verification when needed. I know this adds some friction in the process. I know in some ways it's not ideal, but it is something I advise and that's important in particular. If you're a doxed crypto investor, you're not pseudonymous and your name is out there. Because one thing I think you'll hear if you've listened to the bankless podcast for any amount of time is we believe the purpose of crypto is freedom.
You want to be your own bank, but you don't want to be your bank security guard. That is not freedom. So let's figure out how to go bankless in the age of wrench attacks. Before we do want to thank our friends and sponsors over at Rocket Pool. Speaking of non custodial access. Of course, Rocket Pool is a non custodial staking provider. They are now launching their Saturn upgrade. This is the biggest upgrade in Rocket Pool. That's ever shipped since its launch a few key features. It is bringing an RPL fee switch if you're waiting for that. So now staking RPL can earn even more protocol revenue.
That's all paid in ETH. Of course, liquid staking also has boosted minting capability. And on the notes node side, you can now run a node with four ETH validators and mega pulls. Those are opening in just a few days. So this lowers the barrier of entry even more. If you are looking for more than just basic staking yield on your ETH. Go check out Rocket Pool. There's a link in the show notes. You can stake your ETH and get ready for those four ETH validators. They are actually launching February 18th is probably launched by the time you listen this episode. Let's get right into that episode. Jameson Lopp and Bo on security.
Bangladesh station doing this episode because it feels very timely. And the truth is I've been delaying doing this episode for quite some time because it's somewhat anxiety inducing. But the reason that I think we need this now is because crypto natives and maybe the crypto industry is feeling some security anxiety some increased security anxiety. So I have two guests on that are going to talk about that. And my hope is we get a clear eyed picture of the problem that crypto natives face. And also we come out of this with some optimism and some solutions. So if you are a crypto native, if you've been in this industry for a while, this is one you're going to want to tune into because we dive into some topics around security and protection and wrench attacks.
Pretty deeply I have the two best guests to do this. Jameson Lopp, he is the co founder of cost of security also Bo. He is a former CIA officer. He'd now run safety at Pudge Penguins. Jameson Bo. Thanks for joining us. Glad to be here. Thanks for having me. All right. As we start 2026, I'd like your opinion on the biggest threats facing crypto natives. How would you categorize them? And what would you say, Jameson? Well, I mean, the biggest threat, I think, is the same as it's always been, which has been trusted third parties and just, you know, not taking custody of your own assets because there's just a million things that can go wrong in this space.
And at least when you're taking control of your keys, you're limiting who can make all of those mistakes beyond that privacy is a really big one. I will get into that because I basically consider privacy to be the outermost layer of security. If you can stop people at the privacy layer, then hopefully they don't ever even get to test any of your other layers of security. And then really what will probably end up spending some time talking about, but is I think the least concerning to people because it's the least frequent, but it's getting more attention is the actual physical attacks. But it is kind of novel to this space and has been getting more attention simply due to the egregious nature of them.
Okay, I just wanted to drill into that for a minute, Jameson. So you think of all of the threats facing crypto holders and crypto natives today. Some of the threats that we're going to talk about like branch attacks maybe are a much more distant than the actual threat of casting your crypto assets with some sort of third party. And by third party, you mean like an exchange, let's say, or a custodian, an FTX or a block five that you're not sure about. You still wait those threats as far higher than some of the ones we're going to talk about around going bankless with your crypto assets. Yeah, or even doing self-custody with novel smart contracts that haven't been sufficiently vetted and audit and stuff.
And the problem with any of these is that they can all lead to catastrophic loss. But in this sort of grand scale of things, if you look at the total stats of losses and types of losses that have been happening in recent years, it's still mostly trusted third party is poorly audit existence. And even the rich attacks are on the rise, relatively speaking, when you compare them to the greater ecosystem of threats, they're still very small. Okay, but what would you say to this same question, the greatest threats facing crypto natives in 2026? I would pretty much agree with Jameson's prioritization there.
Especially with keeping in mind, we may be heading into a bear market. We're in a bear market. However, you want to think about it. You know, the risks like you mentioned of an FTX or, you know, last cycle, Robin Hood had people for sell their Solana tokens, you know, near the market lows, right? When you don't control your own tokens, a lot of bad stuff can happen. Ranging from, you know, an exchange trying to do the right thing from regulatory perspective to an exchange going under Jameson alluded to this a little bit. You know, as crypto companies start to lay off their developing teams, because there's just less money in the space, those smart contracts aren't going to be audited as frequently.
Scammers are going to focus, you know, potentially on that more than individual investors, because they know there's less people guarding those types of financial assets out there. So I would, I don't have a ton to add to that. I think that's pretty much where I follow as well. And what also add that, you know, as wrench attacks become more of a topic of conversation, they sound scary. But, you know, for the average investor who's listening to this, this podcast, like you need to take care of that digital security side first, because, you know, the odds of that wrench attack happening to you compared to the hundreds of fishing attempts.
You'll see online through X or discord or telegram every day. It's, you know, you need to prepare yourself for what's most likely that you're going to encounter every day. So fully agree with Jameson there. Actually, but maybe that's a great place to start. And let's let's narrow the audience a little bit. So who you're talking about to on the bankless podcast, as you guys probably know, is as we advocate the idea of going bankless. Right. And so that has been what we advocate for day one for some of the reasons both of you mentioned third parties are the ones that often fail in a security setup.
And those are the ones that lose your assets. So how do you solve for that? The cryptocurrency way, the Bitcoin way, the Ethereum way is you go bankless. Now, I feel like there have been increasingly some chinks in the armor with respect to that. Sometimes the user experience is sort of hard to do that. We'll talk about that. But then you can get past all of that and you can learn how to to custom your crypto assets well. But then what's really thrown me for a loop has been both the fishing attacks that have gotten increasingly sophisticated and have tricked even season crypto natives out of their assets.
So that's one dimension that has been sort of a thing in the armor of the advice to go bankless to solve this. If you want, you know, the 100% kind of security. And the other thing has been quite frankly, wrench attacks, these while rare, they're incredibly scary. And they have been happening to crypto natives in the space. So maybe these are the two things I want to focus on and bow, you just gave us some prioritization there. And you said, by far away, the biggest threat in terms of probability, you're going to face if you are doing some self custody of your assets is probably some sort of fishing type of attack.
And you said digital security, I believe, is the most important. Can you get into the types of attacks that are targeting crypto natives on the fishing side of things and then give us some scenarios maybe so that we can be thinking about this and then we'll talk about how to protect your digital security. Sure. And yeah, I think just to put it in like a little bit more of a framework, you know, I have a military and tell background. So when we're planning, we talk about the most likely course of action and the most dangerous course of action. So for people, you know, who are concerned about crypto threats, the most likely course of action right is that, you know, you're going to encounter these digital threats.
You know, we can talk about the specifics in a second, but the most dangerous course of action is that idea of someone's going to show up to your home. They're going to threaten you and your family, you know, they're going to potentially take your life, you know, in an attempt to get your crypto right. So, you know, it is important to plan for both the most likely and the most dangerous course of actions. So it's not to write off the reds attacks at all. But yeah, I think some scenarios for some of the fishing attempts we've seen, you know, really scammers were trying to do one of two things.
And that is compromise your private keys or it's to trick you into giving them permission to do something on chain. So I have an NFT background because I work with Pudgy Penguin. So using an NFT example, you know, when you're trading NFTs on a theory, you have to grant smart contract approvals for marketplaces like OpenC to take the asset from your wallet that you're selling and transfer it to the buyer. And when you grant these approvals, you know, you're giving permission for that smart contract to go in your wallet, take those assets and move it. And so scammers develop fishing sites that, you know, essentially impersonate reputable brands in the space like OpenC or like Pudgy Penguins and try and trick the user into going to that site.
So you might be scrolling your feed on X and see Pudgy Penguins is launching a new air draw, you know, come claim it now and you'll go to that site and it'll look just like our website. You'll see a connect wallet button. You'll, you know, connect your wallet and the website is going to scan your wallet to see what assets you hold. And if you hold the valuable assets that are looking for, they'll present you with a signature that makes a call on the smart contract that you've granted approvals for. So they'll use the permissions you gave to OpenC to take a Pudgy Penguin NFT from your wallet and they'll transfer it to themselves.
And they use, they can use gasless signature requests to do this. It's not very clear what you're signing. And so you can pretty easily, if you're not paying attention or tired, you know, you can give away your assets in seconds. And then another vector I mentioned right is they want to compromise your private keys. And so a major way that attackers try and do this is through seating malware onto the devices that might secure your private keys. So many people enter in the space. I'm sure just like I did, which is you download a Metamask wallet. You know, it's a hot wallet. Your keys are generated online.
They're stored locally. And so if you download malware, that can potentially take your private keys and fully compromise your wallet. And that can be distributed in a million different ways from downloading a mod to a game. If you're using a gaming PC for crypto things, we've seen fake job interviews where the scammer tries to get a victim to download a meeting software that might look like Zoom, fake versions of, you know, ledger live or other hardware wallet local software. And the whole goal right is to get that access to your device that secures those private keys. So I think at a high level, those are two examples of the fishing we see.
You know, I think we can talk about social engineering more broadly, but almost all of these attempts have elements of social engineering, which is really to try and twist someone's emotions into doing an action that they otherwise might not do. So, you know, claiming an air drop, you're going to get free money. This is an emotional, you know, response that people are going to have, you know, someone potentially offering you a job has similar, similar reactions. So I'll pause there. Galaxy operates where digital assets and next generation infrastructure come together, serving institutions and to end.
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Even the best carry trades can be within reach. Bricks brings DeFi's promise to the emerging world, and brings the emerging market yield to your wallet. Let the yield flow with Bricks. Jameson, what would you add to the digital threats? I think that's a good rundown of the landscape of threats, and then I would say the techniques for combating these are actually not that difficult. It mostly comes down to simplicity in minimizing your attack surface. If you are doing any sort of regular trading or interacting with crypto networks on a browser or on a laptop or desktop, then you should minimize how many different types of software you're installing on there.
Every time you install a new software, that's a potential threat vector. Also, you should be segregating your different types of wallets. Think of it in the same way as you have your wallet that you carry around with you with a little bit of cash and credit cards and stuff that you're spending wallet. You don't carry around tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars with you in your back pocket. You shouldn't be doing the same thing with your crypto assets. You should be having your high security vault that is completely separate and hopefully cold storage and hopefully with distributed keys if it's a life-changing amount of money that we're talking about.
Then you have your small spending account that you're taking more risks with and it's not going to ruin your life if something goes wrong. All that makes sense. I guess maybe going back to some of the things that you guys are saying is. As you were describing this, it almost felt like a paralysis sets in which is like, I want the easy button solution and maybe the easy button solution is like, I just don't do anything on chain. You're saying that smart contracts, for instance, I could be tricked into clicking the wrong link and doing a phishing smart contract. Maybe I just stop doing things on chain altogether.
Is that an answer here? I think this is part of the challenge that bank listeners will be faced with as they hear about some of these scenarios, which is just like, maybe the answer is I should stop doing things on chain. You go even more extreme. Maybe the answer is I should just put my crypto assets into custodial ETFs and just kind of let it ride. Are there ways around this because I'm worried that the attacks get more sophisticated? I won't always have my guard up. There could be a coworker's telegram account that gets hacked where they analyze our conversation history. They sound just like the person I was talking to.
I'm a little sleepy, a little groggy. I always click the zoom link and then I click the zoom link and I log on and it's deepfaked. It looks like the person I've interacted with and they somehow are able to socially engineer private keys out of me. I just don't want to click any links on the internet. I just don't want to join any zoom meetings. What are some practical safeguards we can take on the digital security side that are doable but still have us able to actually live our day-to-day lives and do things in crypto? Yeah, I think it's a great question and I'm not going to steal Jameson's thunder on the ETFs because I know he has some...
He's talked a lot about that but I don't think the answer is just not doing things on chain or I don't think the answer is I'm not going to actually hold Bitcoin. I'm going to own an ETF instead. I think especially again in the NFT world, you own these assets because they give you access to things. So to just buy them and leave them in a wallet and never do anything with them is kind of defeating the purpose. Similar to if you're interested in DeFi and you want to go open liquidity positions or lend against your money or any of those things, you're kind of leaving a whole bunch of options for yourself on the table if you just say I'm not going to participate.
And so I think practically, Jameson was talking about a little bit about wallet segregation is super important. I have what I described as like a three wallet system where I have that day-to-day wallet that I carry around with me for tiny things. I have wallets that I use that are dedicated to riskier activity. So if I wanted to sell an asset or interact with the smart contract, grant approvals that kind of thing. I'm mostly doing that on a dedicated set of wallets. And then I have wallets that I never grant approvals on and I never really do anything with except for transfer assets to and from them.
And that helps me know that my riskiest activity is far away from my most valuable assets. And really, that system is betting against myself on some level that if I end up making a mistake, I know that I'm not going to have made that mistake on a wallet that has my most valuable assets. And so I think having a simple system where you know what you're doing with each wallet, you understand what you have allowed yourself to interact with, those are really important. And the other thing I would say in general is wallet providers have gotten better wallet options have gotten better both at detecting scams at securing your private keys.
And I think Jameson's company Casa is a good example of this. There's a bunch of alternatives out there to, you know, oh, I click this zoom link and all of a sudden all my assets are gone, right. And that's not really how it works anyways. But you know, there's a bunch of alternatives to, yeah, if I download malware on my MacBook right now, like I might lose a few hundred bucks in a hot wallet. But I know for certain that the way I've stored my private keys, the way that I've kept my seed phrases offline, they're not sitting in my notes app on my iPhone or my MacBook. Like those things are not going to get compromised.
And so, you know, I don't worry so much about, you know, what happens if I download malware? Is it going to impact my crypto assets? Because the system I've set up allows me to have some confidence and not worry as much about those scams. So I think it's super important for, you know, when we onboard people to the space for the first time to help them understand the consequences of certain decisions, right. You know, so many people just use the same wallet for everything they're doing on chain and never think about, you know, the risks of keeping all their eggs in one basket. So, you know, as simple as it is, like literally just having a wallet on a separate seed phrase that's written down and, you know, using a hardware wallet or distributed signers.
Like that's going to protect so much of your, you know, your stack compared to if you just keep it all on on one, you know, Metamask wallet, for example, or one hot wallet. So, I think I would just wrap it up by saying, don't keep your eggs in one basket, you know, leverage the advantages of hardware wallets that keep your keys stored offline. That's something that really anybody who's got more than $1,000 in crypto should think about, you know, go out and spend $100 on a hardware wallet. And start moving those assets from, you know, your browser extension wallet or from your iPhone app wallet over to, you know, something that's a little bit more secure.
Okay, so wallet segregation, I think we picked up our first tactical to do from this episode. Now let's flesh that out a bit more, okay. So what I want is a wallet segregation approach that the two of you would rate as like a, you know, a nine out of 10 for instance. So right now it sounds like the worst thing you could do is keep all of your crypto assets in one wallet on a browser extension Metamask. Like do not do that the worst thing you could do. But what's kind of, you know, a segregation approach that works for the vast majority of people. Is it sort of a hot wallet, cold wallet or they're kind of, you know, two, and in the cold wallet is that multi sig is that hardware backed.
And then how do you delineate what you keep in the hot wallet versus the cold wallet. And is there something in between? Is there like the idea of a warm wallet? Maybe James and you could just flush out what a fairly good wallet segmentation approach would look like for someone listening. Well, I generally say you shouldn't keep more value in a hot wallet than you would carry around in cash and in a wallet that you keep in your pocket. So, you know, for me, that would be maybe like a thousand dollars ish. You know, it's highly convenient, but it's also highly prone to a wide variety of different forms of loss.
Really, if you have more than a few thousand dollars worth of assets, it starts making logical sense to spend a hundred dollars to buy one of the well vetted and reputable cold wallet. Hardware brands, whether that's treasury, ledger, bit box, what have you, there's plenty of them out there. It doesn't take too much research to figure out which ones have been around for a long time and have good reputations. And that's good because you can carry that around with you if you need be. There's your incredibly tiny devices and just plug them in to your phone or your laptop or what have you. If you need to interact with a crypto asset network to do something and that protects you from like 95% of the bad stuff that happens out there.
The only thing that you need to understand at that point is that you should never, ever, ever type that seed phrase into anything other than the actual tiny little cold storage device itself. Because that's where the social engineering comes in. Our best practices around security have increased so much over the past decade that that's why you see a social engineering as the most common form of attack these days is because the malicious actors out there knows that they're not actually going to be able to compromise these devices that are incredibly hard and simple and difficult to get malware onto because they're designed to resist malware.
So instead, the weak point for most people these days is right here between your eyes. Is they're going to try to trick you and they're going to use very common tactics, you know, fear, doubt, urgency to try to make you think that there's some sort of emergency where you need to take action and you jump through hoops without really thinking about it too much. And I think that people mostly need to understand that as soon as you are taking custody of your assets with great power comes great responsibility. You are taking on a great power because you no longer have to ask permission to use your assets as you wish, but now you are the bank and banks put a lot of effort into their security for a reason.
There's a reason why banks exist. It's because people generally prefer to outsource all of the complexities of security. So one way I like to look at it is, you know, you know how there's a lot of drugs out there where on the label it says, you do not operate housing machinery while I take the stress. I think that you should look at it as you should never operate a crypto wallet when you're not in peak cognitive condition. If you're under the influence of anything, if you're tired, if you're sick, that can cause you to not be as aware and catch things where some attacker is trying to trick you.
So I generally interact with the crypto networks as little as possible. And when I do, I only do it in the middle of the day when I'm wide awake and I don't have any sort of issues that might cause me to miss something. So have to be very careful whenever you interact with your wallet. It is a potentially catastrophic operation because if you screw up, if you fall for a trick, there's no one out there who can undo it. So I guess maybe an instinct if you're feeling some sort of rush from some source to do this transaction now, whatever the cause of the source, you should really pause, you should take a deep breath and you should try to wait, you know, 24 hours at least for that panic to subside.
You shouldn't do anything in a rush or an panic when it comes to on chain assets on the social engineering side of things. How about sort of reducing the channels, you know, I think a lot of crypto listeners, Speckless listeners are probably getting text messages are probably getting spam calls from data leaks in the past, you know, purporting to be Google purporting to be maybe coin based support. You know, is the rule just like don't answer any of those things or on telegram, for instance, good DMs and it's just this happens all of the time. And we people say, hey, is so and so a bagless employee, they asked me to join this channel for an interview and the answer always is like, no, like that's not how we contact you.
Like, is the answer just don't a respond to a DM or a telegram message from a source that you don't trust or haven't authenticated via multiple channels? Like do you guys have general rules of thumb to prevent yourself and harden yourself from being socially engineered by an email or link something that happens online at text message. Yeah, so the key word that you used is authenticate and the short version is that almost every communication channel out there is not authenticated. There are very few maybe so basically like end-to-end encrypted channels like if you have a signal chat pre-established with someone where you've already verified it's then historically maybe what's that.
Beyond that email text message discord telegram all of these other things are not authenticated and it's very easy for people to just pretend to be someone else. So the short version is I don't trust any incoming message if you receive an incoming message that seems fishy then what you should be doing is then finding how to contact that person yourself preferably via a different communication channel and asking them, hey, is this you can you confirm or deny. Now cat and mouse games right happen with with this type of thing so some of the tax are getting more and more sophisticated so imagine a scenario where it's a loved one calls you and it sounds like their voice for instance and they're asking for funds for some sort of urgent use case and it sounds just like them maybe it looks like it's coming from their phone number even.
I've heard people talk about instituting you safe words for their close social connection which is some sort of a prompt or a way to prompt one of your loved ones your individual you agree upon the safe word you know in advance and that allows you to authenticate what are some of the best practices there Jameson. Yeah, I mean so the main reason I'm not a fan of safe words is because unless it's if you're picking something kind of unique and you're not practicing it regularly then when you get into a situation where someone's under duress you may very well forget it. I prefer to use shared insider knowledge so you know if you and a friend or you and a loved one have an extensive history together then there's going to be no shortage of like memorable events that you share that are not public.
That you can ask each other about and of course you can discuss that ahead of time but I think that that's something that's easier to keep track of and be sure that you're just you're not going to draw a blank if you get into a situation you don't want there to be some random word that you only talked about once five years ago. So if you're doing a safe word make sure you practice that on a routine basis or otherwise just you can authenticate by calling you like recalling some sort of shared memory some sort of thing only the two of you with no and I guess you know hope hope that works out but but do you have anything to add on on the social engineering front.
Yeah I think you know just on safe words real quick like that's a concept that an intel world obviously is very you know common you know when you're meeting someone in your life you want to establish bonus feed Ace you want to make sure that this is the person you actually are here to meet right. And James is exactly right that takes practice right so doing something that's more natural just you know having those shared memories is is way more effective than you know trying to force your loved one to bring up banana. In a conversation right especially especially if it's if it's like a wrench a tax area where they're under duress that kind of thing on on social engineering in general I think you know my rule of thumb is if I receive an incoming message from a crypto.
You know website or really anything crypto related at all at exchange website you know app if I feel so concerned about whatever that incoming messages I would go log in to that website directly I would not click the link in the email or the text message I would not call the phone number that the text message tells me to call. You know I can always log into my coin base account and I can check is there a suspicious login right there there's a you know there's a spot to see that in your security settings of your coin base account so you know trusting that source directly authenticating that you know the information getting from coin base is actually from Coinbase you can do that by logging into coin base right so you know of course that's dependent upon you doing that independently typing the correct you know website in your browser logging in and making sure it's the correct website right you know.
That message saying hey your coin base account has been hacked click here to reset your password like that's never going to help you. Yeah another really common thing that very few people I think appreciate is how many types of attacks a simple password manager protects you from. And the reason for this is like I was saying often these incoming messages will have links and officials will basically try to trick you into putting your credentials into their web portal which they'll then grab and use to actually log into your account and drain everything but if you're using a password manager. You should only be clicking on the password manager to have it auto fill your username and password and the reason why this is so powerful is that there are things out there like typo squatting where they'll buy these domains that to the human eye look exactly like the targets domain like a coin base common whatever.
But the password manager can tell the difference and if you end up clicking on one of these phishing links to a domain that looks the same password manager will not auto fill it and that's another major red flag okay so right another recommendation is password managers go ahead. Yeah and I think there's a very similar concept of what james jamesen is describing with two fa and multifactor authentication you know when you use a key like a you the key or even most past keys right those will not authenticate on those fake phishing websites whereas if you're using Google Authenticator and it's giving you a six digit code you are a vulnerability in that you can provide that six digit code on a phishing.
Website if you're not paying attention and you know that at that point your two fa has not done anything for you because those websites are running a script on the back end to immediately take your two fa code and go plug it into the real coin base website for example so. You know plus one on password managers and when you're thinking about two fa you know I think buying a you the key for fifty dollars is a great investment for anybody period but especially people in crypto you know that's something you can add to your coin base account that's something you can add to most other exchanges. So a big big plus one then for password managers plus two fa for all of your accounts in general and the gold standard for two fa is getting used to actually using a physical you be key at some level and storing that and protecting that and backing that up appropriately SMS for two factor.
Is it yeah we do not like SMS right the reason of course is the text message you could be Sim swapped it is incredibly insecure do not use SMS the the authenticator codes that's that's better than SMS if you have to but then the gold standard would be a you be key it sounds like that's the recommendation. Yeah so the specifics of what we require our employees to do at Casa is highest preference is you the key like spider to tap or pass key on you the key to where you the key is support past keys and as both said past keys are a great improvement upon all other types of two essay because they are bound to the domain name.
Next one below that is the t o t p the time base one time passwords which is the same digit rotating passwords many people just say Google authenticator because that's the most common software but Google authenticator itself I hate because by default it will actually upload all of your secrets to the clouds to like Google. So then if you're if your Google account gets exposed they can grab all of those the cool thing once again about you the key is that I think a lot of people don't know is that even if a if a service doesn't support the phyto you to f or pass key on you the key there's actually some software for you the key called you be co authenticator and that's like Google authenticator except it stores the secrets on the hardware device itself.
So once again you're getting all of that physical security where unless an attacker actually takes physical control on that you the key they can't do anything and then the last vestige of two f a beyond that would be like email and then potentially SMS there are still. Actually often banks only support you know the SMS to f a there's not much you can do about that personally what I do is I have I have a ton of different virtual phone numbers and you know those the virtual phone number services are segregated and they're set up behind their own. Credentials and they can't be ported away and so it's about as good as I show you can get when it comes to SMS secured.
Can we say on digital security word about email because so often as the the the the founder of proton mail came on recently he said email is not just email anymore email is actually identity. And so the talent here is if your email gets hacked and many listeners will be using Gmail and there's lots of yeah like challenges with Gmail I advocate advanced protection. You know remove for instance the recovery phone number and the recovery email address by the those defaults are are equally pernicious as kind of the Google authenticator default and then where possible I mean don't use Gmail right I mean you could use proton mail you can actually set up aliases and identities for various accounts.
James and what do you think of that advice and what would you add to the the email conversation yes so what we see most often with social engineering is that they're trying to get into your email account because often most people don't have strong to factor authentication and if you own somebody's email account you can reset their passwords and their to f a. And then get into any third party services that they want and so I would say email account for most people is the most important aspect of their digital lives and so I will once again say you the key is the answer and so you can buy multiple you the keys you don't have to just buy one because obviously if it gets lost or broken that becomes a big problem you can buy three four or five and then have.
Several that are like back up she can even you know put one of them in a bank vault for example so you know that's not going to get lost and that's just an extreme edge case recovery scenario but by. This is very very high level like everything that we're talking about all types of cyber security the strongest. Security model that you can create is when you can actually take all of these digital security issues and pull them out into meet space turn it into a physical security problem and generally the way that you do that is by some sort of physical security hardware device whether it's you know one of the like treasuring ledger they want to run the crypto side or you the keys or other digital.
Secrets managers that are used for a variety of different authentication mechanism I just want to drop a word of encouragement to listeners at this point of the conversation which is the investment that you to make in. Past keys in you be keys in securing your accounts this is kind of a frontier investment because I think I am very much of the belief that the attacks that are happening to crypto crypto is like tip of the spear the attacks that are happening sort of in crypto and the sophisticated ways they're coming to everything and. You have not everyone is going to have these types of protections and securities in the future because it'll just be basic if you don't get completely owned I guess what i'm saying is.
This investment that you're making in protecting your accounts and in you know past keys in you be keys and password managers and all the security investment. That's just going to put you ahead of everybody else but everybody else is going to have to adapt to this world as well so it's not wasted time it's not just a niche crypto thing. Everyone needs to have this type of security and and will in the future whether it takes you three to five years for the rest of the world to catch up unfortunate aspect of security in general is that you know there's always going to be attackers and so. You're never going to have perfect security all you want to do is have better security than the people because they're going to be the ones getting targeted the attacker will be serving the landscape.
A potential targets and say oh that looks too hard i'm going to go over to your neighbor instead last thing before we leave digital security I have. Seen cases where somebody did click the link let's say and download the malicious zoom software and their entire machine is completely owned like root level access to everything and of course like solution there's it don't let that happen in the first place. But it can still happen and I want to ask a question about maybe another thing i've heard some crypto folks doing this might be a bit more advanced so maybe not for everyone in addition to sort of multi six and the hardware wallets and the segregation that we talked about how about a separate machine entirely for signing.
That doesn't get connected even to your public wi-fi what do you think about that as a as a full proof method where you don't do any crypto transactions on your regular. Daily machine if you ever do them you do them on a transaction signing machine that is segregated that doesn't click zoom links at all that doesn't open emails and is just for one purpose that purpose is when you have to sign an important crypto transaction. Yeah I mean this falls under minimizing attack surface and you know before treasurer was the first. Crypto hardware device to launch and I was in 2014 and before that. Air gaps laptop was really the gold standard for doing anything.
Okay yeah so maybe we're coming full circle alright so James you just made the point that what you want to try to do is as move the some the digital into the physical realm so you have. Your hardware devices and and ubiquies and maybe separate air gap laptops and that kind of thing but let's talk more about the physical realm because. The attackers have moved to the physical realm as well let's talk about what bow you called the most dangerous type of attack we've addressed the most likely. Hopefully you have some tips on now listeners on how to navigate that how to protect yourself let's talk about a particular form of concerning attack maybe the most dangerous type of attack which are these violent in person attacks but what are you seeing with this can you give us some numbers on these types of attacks.
Of wrench attacks numbers like a profile of what typically happens who they're targeting just give us a rundown of what things look like in 2026 yeah so I think they're just over 70 attacks last year. That we know of right a lot of these attacks you know we assume go unreported or if they are reported it's possible that there's not a crypto connection identified. Heading into 2026 I think we've seen 10 or 11 so far this year maybe maybe a couple more so you know there's definitely like again when you think about the scale of humanity right there's 8 billion people on the planet like we're talking about.
100 incidents in the last 12 months that we know about right so it's it's relatively small scale but it's very targeted so. It really starts with your digital security and in your privacy right the these attackers are looking at to identify people in the real world. Who have control of these digital assets so they're looking at people's Twitter accounts they're looking at people's on chain wallets you know they're looking for people who. Flex their wealth and you can obviously see that this person has money they might be a target of interest and then from there they try and say okay can I identify with this person is right a lot of us.
Operate pseudonymously right I would not say anonymously because none of us are really anonymous but you know a lot of us use pseudonyms online to hide you know what our true name is. You know then they if they can get through that barrier right of identifying who this person might be they're going to start doing what you know we would call open source research or. Ocent research you're looking for that Intel they can get on that person online and so what this looks like is you know buying data on the dark web or you know using. Cheat or free online search engines that let you look up you know email addresses and phone numbers and you know home addresses to identify you know where this person might be physically located right you'd be surprised how many states in the United States.
You know you can find someone's home address just based off of voter registration records or based off of you know speeding ticket or court appearances. It's you know our system is not designed around privacy in the digital age and so you know really everybody has this problem if you've been online for you know 10 plus years. You know all the accounts that you've signed up for you know I was helping someone data breaches a couple weeks ago you know their home address was leaked in an airline you know data breach where they had to provide their. Data birth their home address like their residency and citizenship you know their phone number so all of these pieces of data come together for a potential attacker to you know really identify where this you know person they found online might be located in the real world.
And sometimes we're seeing this where people are doing their research themselves this is like a sophisticated you know organization that has people doing this research has people on the ground. Other times we're seeing people in the digital space sell this data to people who are willing to conduct those real world attacks. But you know the attacks look a little bit different depending upon the situation but often we're seeing them occur at home you know someone walks up to your door pretending to be a delivery driver a police officer. You know some plausible sort of reason why they would be at your home they knock on the door you open it and then they you know either try and convince themselves.
Commence you to let them into the the home or they'll force themselves into the home right by brandishing a weapon or you know physically pushing through the home. And then you know a common thing we've seen right is attackers you know detaining people right time them to a chair something like that threatening them essentially trying to get them to share where they're. You know crypto wallets are where their seed phrases are and then their goal right at that point is to find that information and. And get out as soon as possible we've also seen instances where this turns into like a kidnapped for ransom type situation where let's say you know they burst into a home and you know the keys are stored there or the wrong person is at home.
Cetera you know then they might get in contact with the person who does control the funds and say you know I have your loved one you know send me. $10 million in Bitcoin right so you know they're. Those are some of the tactics we've seen it it's a little bit different depending upon you know again the situation we've seen people grabbed off the street you know we've seen people you know kind of loved right walking in an office buildings. You know for the most part these are targeting like you know well known figures in the space influencers you know executives of crypto companies their family members.
Yeah so that's sort of you know from step A to Z how does it go and I'll let James and add anything if he has something yeah and James and while you're adding can you tell us what in the world is happening in France right now because it seems like there is a very active cluster in France and so. Yeah people in the crypto community in France are really dealing with this but it's not limited to France and these types of attacks are happening all over Europe we're certainly attacking there they're happening in the US and they have happened in 2025 in the US and just the way it was describing but there does seem to be some cluster in France what's the pattern there and why I think there's a number of things going on so I will note I did an extensive breakdown of this in a presentation I gave last year and on a per capita basis.
France was still not in the top few it was actually Dubai on a per capita basis that has the most wrench attacks and if I recall correctly all pretty much all of them were due to people engaging in high value face to face OTC trains so basically someone showing up usually to a hotel room with a briefcase full of cash and wanted to do a swap or one way or another. And but the other interesting thing is that Dubai also has the highest rate of bringing the criminals to justice one percent capture rate of the criminals probably due to their high level of surveillance throughout Dubai so what's happening in France I mean I think.
There have been several organized gangs that have been operating I know there was there was one where I think the mastermind was operating out of Morocco and I think that you got caught last year another thing that has happened is that we know that there was a corrupt tax official who was selling people's private data so people who had you know crypto related stuff on their tax returns that was getting sold to some sort of organized crime groups. In saying so essentially a government bribe to say yeah who has crypto who's likely to have this value and you know you have to report these things to the government in France and so they just bribe an official official gives up names and addresses yeah and so there was a similar problem actually in Sweden where Sweden requires you to make all of your tax information public and so there are a number of rich attacks in Sweden because you have to basically tell the entire world hey I'm declaring the crypto my taxes and I don't know I mean I haven't been to France in a long time but I certainly see a lot of feedback on these posts of people basically claiming a sort of like cultural decline occurring in France where there's sort of lack of law enforcement.
It seems like they are catching a number of people but it also seems like a number of these people who are getting caught are not getting particularly severe conditioners. And your point to Jameson like the pattern is like oftentimes there will be an external actor mastermind who might be completely remote. Trying to parse through the target data and who then kind of I don't know hires works with splits proceeds with kind of a more local group of. Fugs young thugs with nothing to lose you know maybe not does not have the capabilities to do all the operational intelligence in order to target people and that mastermind sometimes can be very tricky to.
Pinned down even if the kind of the local thugs are actually captured yeah then remember ledger is based in France I'm sure they have a lot of French customers and they've had a number of data breaches over the years though I don't think we have. Any information to directly tie the data breaches to the attacks but it seems quite plausible that that's yet another factor here you know with the the organized crime groups another. Pattern that we've seen though it's mostly been happening in Southeast Asia as we've been seeing organized crime. Gangs from one country go like find out about nationals from that country and then when those nationals go on vacation to a different country usually in Southeast Asia they'll send the people over there.
Rent you attack them and then fly back and I think this is an interesting like cross border jurisdictional arbitrage type of organized crime activity happen. Okay so this is actually go ahead bow in the EU in the EU to right where you know you can get from France to Switzerland without showing a passport or you can get from from France to Spain right. It just gets you one jurisdiction away very quickly I think one of the more recent attacks in France the attackers ended up getting caught on a train where they were going from Paris towards southern France near the Swiss border so. You know the idea of conducting the attack and then quickly moving either into another jurisdiction or far away I think that's the track this thing about your okay so the scariest version of this I think to many people maybe listening is not the version where they're meeting somebody in a parking lot or.
You know they're flashing their their assets on social media at some level I think most listeners to this are savvy enough not to do those types of things. The most scariest version if you're thinking about the kind of the most dangerous category bow is some mastermind has pinpointed your physical address and to your point is incredibly easy to do in this day and age I mean maybe we can get into if there's a way to actually protect your physical address and and have that be private but they they know your your location footprint and they also maybe they have some idea that you are crypto holder.
By virtue of data leaks maybe hardware wallet data leak maybe an exchange data leak maybe the tax software that you're using this was also a factor I think in some of the the attacks in in France you know use tax software to submit your it's automated you submit your addresses and what happens if that information is is leaked and so. All of that information is out there and then let's say you are pinpointed and an attacker knows your addresses knows how much in crypto assets that you might hold has some sort of inkling in terms of how you actually might hold these assets and comes and breaks into your house a home invasion and threatens you and your family I mean that is like nightmare fuel I think for a lot of people listening we've already.
Preface this by saying this is still extremely rare yeah just not the the vector of attack that most listeners should be most worried about however it is the most panic inducing I think and concern inducing attack so can we talk about how to mitigate that all right and I know there's nothing no such thing as a 100% security guarantees. But I am a believer and you know having done some research on this and talk to both of you that there are a number of things listeners can actually do to reduce the surface area of this type of attack and not eliminate it but harden against it and so let's talk about that Jameson how does somebody listening to this.
Sure themselves up against physical home invasion level wrench attacks well like I said they're beginning the most important or I would say easiest thing you can do is privacy is prevent yourself from becoming a target in the first place but as you have noted that can get very tricky especially depending on what jurisdiction you live and you're going to have different tools is able to you different things that you may be required to disclose. At least in America we have some excellent legal tools with like trusts and limited liability corporations where you can obfuscate the true ownership of publicly registered assets like homes vehicles and what not and I take advantage of all of those.
And then you have to get very comfortable with not putting your home residential address into any sort of foreign or database you have to assume that that is going to get leaked eventually and so you know I have a variety of mailboxes standard around that I use when actually anything is asking for a physical address. But another thing that I would note is that this wrench attack problem is not limited to self custody I see a lot of people kind of funding self custody like well you know if you weren't accustomed your assets and you don't have to worry about being a wrench attack but a number of these cases people were actually keeping their assets with custodian and you know the wrench attacker just says okay you know go authenticate into that custodian and withdraw all the assets so it doesn't really make much of the difference.
To the attack of themselves because it all comes down to single points of failure and this is where things get complicated because very few people think adversarially about their security posture and so the short version to all of this and the reason why Roach attackers are so successful I think they generally have a greater than 50% success rates and from the metrics that we're aware of on an annual basis we see them getting away with tens of millions of dollars and that's just from the attacks where they disclose the amount is taken many of these attacks in that the disclosed the amount. But think of it this way if you are able to transfer large amounts of value without leaving your house then you have a single point of failure because you basically have to look at a wrench attack scenario as one where you know your your body or your body of someone you care about is under physical dress.
And all of your normal authentication procedures can be bypassed because they will be bypassed by you because you know how to do it so the only way to truly. Present a wrench attack from being successful if they have already gotten past any privacy protections you have is to take yourself out of the equation as a single point of failure which basically means you know you should not be. Set up with at least with your like long term savings cold storage such that you can authenticate and transfer. That value without having to physically go to multiple locations and go through multiple physical authentication procedures you know this is one of the things that we help people set up at cost which is basically.
Distributed key system where you have physical hardware devices that are gene drastically distributed and are using multiple different manufacturers to prevent against things like supply chain attacks and just ensuring that you have. Drinks through diversity it's a it's a very interesting aspect of security when you can have multiple keys that have different security properties around them you get this cool additive security. Aspect to your set up which very few people I think are even aware of and the reason why I find this whole thing fascinating and why I've been doing this show over a decade.
Is because I argue that if properly architected with crypto public permissionless networks you can actually achieve security models that vastly exceed what a bank can do or even a. Fort Knox can do even Fort Knox is a single plan of failure and you can distribute your keys and your security across multiple continents if you want to like we have some extreme edge case clients that literally have to get on a plane and grow through all the physical security of TSA and airport and such like you know nobody is going to be holding you under dress and being able to go through that level of physical security in order to get to your other keys.
Let's zoom in on that because I actually wrote an article about this and and publish this on X and on on bankless and it was basically the idea of zero crypto at home and this is kind of the revelation after listening to security folks for some period of time that. The gold standard for defense against a successful wrench attack is actually Jameson as you say you have almost zero zero crypto at home so the way I define this might you like in a mimetic format is no hot wallet at home with funds over $1,000 all right you just you didn't carry that in home at home or on your person. No cold wallet at home period okay and I know exchange this is key that allows moving funds without verification and delays so zero crypto at home you know you have it when you don't have the ability to access your funds without a time delay without multiple locations without possibly some sort of third party authentication say safe deposit box or some sort of other location where you access one of the pieces of your multi sig and you make that a thing you make that your posture you could still go bankless of course but you just don't have access to any of your crypto assets and to me as I was uncovering this I mean maybe we'll dive into that a little bit deeper actually Jameson so if somebody wants to implement what you're saying and what I wrote about which is zero crypto at home what sort of tools do they need in order to implement that I feel like the.
The core of this is kind of some sort of multi sick wallet potentially with time delays and a way to and also if they keep any crypto assets on exchanges also setting it up such that you know something is required before they can access those funds maybe a time delay before adding a wallet or something like that can you break down what a zero crypto at home. Strategy might be for the average listener who's who's trying to do things a little more bagglessly yeah like I said our primary goal a casa is eliminating single points of failure that includes casa itself as a company if casa blows up we're.
Still going to be able to sleep at night knowing that our clients can route around us and still be able to access their funds but the first like the foundational part of it is using these air gaps devices you know the ledgers and treasures and what not to take those keys off the internet because as I said that's that protects you from like 95% of attacks. As soon as you do anything on an internet connected device you basically have a door open to eight billion people to knock on and try to get through. Beyond that once you've gotten those keys offline and in the self custody the biggest problems that you are actually going to run into.
tends to be foot guns where you make a mistake something goes wrong or some sort of maybe environmental failure you know house fires are staying. You shouldn't be storing everything at home because that is a single point of failure and so it becomes less of an issue of like hackers and attackers and more of an issue of having enough you know don't see and resiliency so that. When something goes wrong because something will go wrong eventually but when something goes wrong it's not a catastrophic failure. And that once again is where multi said really comes into play it's great because you have the flexibility to set up a digital vault that has many different keys perhaps has three keys five keys 10 keys really as many as you want.
And then you can have enough flexibility in there that if you lose one or two or three keys you're most likely going to have other keys available but of course this is where it's not panacea it the devil really is in the details if you have if you set up a five key vault and keep all those five keys at home and we have seen people do this. You still have a single point of failure it's the important part is to distribute those keys so that they have a variety of different attributes you know you put the keys on different hardware devices by different manufacturers in different geographic locations and and all of these things come with decisions and that's where I think people can get very paralyzed and that's why services like costs I think are very helpful because we're essentially a security consulting service.
We help you understand what all the trade-offs of these decisions are and usually each of these decisions is going to be you trying to figure out convenience versus security so simple example is how far apart are you going to put those keys you can put them one house down and as really convenient but perhaps not incredibly secure the extreme example I already gave you can put them on different continents that require you to take flights which is the extreme level of security. Even are at the point there are jurisdictional arbitrage is there's some sort of government level action against crypto but of course it's incredibly inconvenient so it really comes down to robustness and and having the ability to recover from failure and you do that by distributing the keys across as many different sectors as possible.
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skin in the game when they make public top or bottom calls the D5 report is one of them the week before the October 10th flash crash Michael from the D5 report emailed his entire newsletter saying he's going aggressively risk off and sold the majority of his book from crypto into cash this is when ethos about $4,000 and Bitcoin was 110 Michael runs the D5 report an industry leading research platform built on data cycle awareness risk management transparency and most importantly skin in the game we like Michael at bankless we like his analysis and that's why you hear him on the bankless podcast about once a month and the D5 report is giving bankless listeners one free month of access to the D5 report so if you're looking for some sharp data driven analysis to make better informed decisions around your portfolio you can learn why and how Michael called the top and what he's doing next all in the D5 report pro check it out there is a link in the show notes let's just run that by the attack scenario we're talking about which is let's say some you you're targeted it in some way you have a multi-six set up whether it's you know cost and cost I believe supports Bitcoin supports Ethereum supports stable coins in those crypto assets there's other multi-sig technologies as well there's you know safe for instance I've heard about people using Bitcoin vaults like Zengo anyway you have your multi-six set up so what happens in a wrench attack type of scenario so someone bust down into your house and then what you say I've got zero crypto at home I mean obviously they're not able to get the crypto assets or you know I mean could they drive to a second location to try to pick up your other multi-six like what happens how does this in your scenario planning Jameson actually prevent a successful wrench attack yeah so I mean obviously the next question that they're going to have is okay what is actually needed order to access these keys and that's where the details really become important where if you're just putting the keys out of friends or neighbors house that's you know only a few minutes away that's probably not great and you should assume that you will be coerced into telling the truth because you're going to be on your dress it's going to be a very bad situation and lying and getting caught in a lie is only going to make it worse for you so that's where having keys behind physical safe guards where they are only accessible perhaps during certain times of day business hours where there are other layers of physical authentication to make sure that it's actually you that is going through them becomes very important and then a bank safe deposit box is like a classic example of this right yeah and and so this is also why multi-sign is important because I would not advocate taking a single key to a single signature while putting it in a bank safe deposit box right that's still a single point of failure the bank could have an employee that goes corrupt or we've even seen times when law enforcement has come in and completely swipes entire safety deposit box is happening California there's a lot of states that you have done this yeah but if you only have one key to a multi-sign once again you could lose access to that it could be taken or destroyed and it's fine you can recover from it with your other keys okay so if you're if you're doing that correctly then the attacker basically can't get anything I mean like will they be frustrated that they can't do anything will they believe you like I you know what the matter it doesn't matter if they believe you and now of course the next question is what are they going to do as a result of being frustrated and the natural logical question those people ask as well should I have a dress wallet to to try to pay them off and make them go away and unfortunately we don't really have any data that shows that dress wallets work we've actually seen the opposite where people have immediately handed over everything that they had and the attacker believed that they had been trying to dupe them with a dress wallet and they kept torturing them for a long time before they finally got frustrated and ran away the one thing that I will say I think works in the favor of victims here is that there's a very incredibly low rate of homicide from these attacks if you think about it that these are robbers they they are willing to use intimidation and some level of violence in order to get a very very large payday but they generally are not willing to actually murder someone and have have law enforcement come after them for murder because any any criminal who is at least seasoned understands the way that law enforcement and the justice system prioritize going after attackers is that homicide has the highest clearance rate and gets the highest level of resources put behind it so you don't want to be on law enforcement's radar for homicide yeah okay so this is also what I added when I was thinking through my article about zero crypto at home so first first step is implement zero crypto at home actually don't have it don't have access to it and using using some of the mechanisms that Jameson just described one other idea I had is writing a note actually or having some sort of thing that you prepare in advance that says I'm zero crypto at home I keep no crypto at home on my phone just pocket change I have the pocket change the less than a thousand dollars go take that I'm nothing else and then I do think if you're public there are ways to sort of signal this or talk about this Vitalik buterin has actually done a pretty good job in places and tweet replies for instance he's talked about his multi six set up and he he describes it as as an M of N some keys held by you but not enough to block recovery and the rest held by people you trust who's got kind of a social recovery mechanism don't reveal who those other people are even to each other and so Vitalik has publicly said this that he is kind of zero crypto at home so if an attacker gets access to him it's at some level there's nothing he can really do and I think to your point Jameson earlier that a large number of these attacks so far have actually been successful and that's why they that's why they keep happening that's why they propagate if that 50% number drops down to like 2% to 1% it becomes very much negative ROI for attackers actually do home invasions and do rent attacks and they will stop happening that's not going to happen overnight but this is how we as an industry can get control now of course the ideal scenario is that your house doesn't get invaded in the first place and maybe bow you could talk about that at some level so how do you be vigilant against an invader maybe it's a delivery person for instance or you know in the middle of the night somebody breaking down your doors what what are some of the nuts and bolts that somebody can do to actually harden their location let's assume that privacy is not an option right now they'd have to maybe move homes and do some of the things that the Jason born things that Jameson is putting in place to protect their address let's say that's not an option so they know their address is out there are there ways to harden their house or put protocols in place to actually protect themselves as well and go back to what Jameson said earlier about sometimes you don't need to be the most secure person in the world you just need to be more secure than you know the next guy on the list and you know becoming a hard target is is really like thinking or I guess thinking of your home as a hard target versus a soft target is is what's really important so you know adding some cameras to the front of your home that are visible but also effective in identifying you know who's coming up to your door I like the idea of flood lights at night right that are motion sensor and someone walks you know climbs over your backyard fence and walks up to your house and all the sudden boom they're hitting the face with you know a light I'm a big fan of the concept of you know using a home security system or there's even some fairly cheap options for like panic buttons that you could set near you know like your front door or put it in your office where you know they're probably going to take you if they were coming into your house here you know obviously I think there's some common sense what you're alluding to of you know don't let people inside your house who are strangers right and San Francisco we saw an example of an attack where you know the fake delivery driver was asking for a signature and he pretended to not have a pen to hand the customer to sign their signature so we asked if he could come inside to get a pen for the customer to sign the delivery notice on the package and that was his lie that he used to talk himself into the house so being aware of like you know people might give you an excuse that sounds somewhat legitimate and not letting them inside a couple other things I like to recommend to people is you know you should identify you know some sort of you should have a conversation with anyone you live with at home about these these concepts right whether that's your spouse or your roommate or whatever so that they understand that same type of risk and you know really importantly in that moment that you have a plan right so you know maybe your safe room that you designate is your bedroom which has another lock on that door you know where maybe has a phone that you know you're going to be able to alert the police or maybe that's where you put a panic button to you know alert the police at that time you know I think it boils down to you know make sure that if someone's like scoping out your house because we know they do this right they're going to case your property before they go and conduct an attack like if they see cameras out front if they see you know motion sensor lights they might be discouraged from conducting you know that sort of attack and then once something happens like don't just be blindsided by what's happening right in front of you have a conversation with yourself and the people you live with ahead of time of you know what do we do if we think someone's trying to break into the home right you the first time you think of that shouldn't be when it's happening to you and it can be as simple as I have a panic button in this location I'm going to go press it it's going to alert a security company they're going to call my cell phone I'm not going to pick up and so I know the security company's going to know call the police I personally I'm going to have to get of self-defense I think you know I'm not going to recommend that to people on the call because I think it's you know it really is a very personal decision whether you choose to fight off an attacker whether that's grabbing a baseball bat or whether that's you know using firearms or something else like you know you may be making things worse if that's you know what you choose to do if you if you're not trained you don't know what you're doing but like that's a part of my personal security plan right if someone breaks into my home like I am prepared to respond to them with with force right so I think there's a bunch of different options there the basics should be you know how do you make your home itself a hard and unattractive target through the use of cameras to the use of lights through you know having strong locks under doors I mean windows people can break through right a security system that will alert people if someone does try and break into your home so in the United States this is like your classic ADT security system those panic buttons I mentioned and then the last thing I'll mention is a lot of people don't live in homes right they live in apartment buildings they live in you know in these kind of shared spaces and that can be to your advantage or disadvantage as well right if you live in an apartment building that requires key fobs to scan up to the elevator that requires you know that has a or that has a 24-7 you know desk person or security guard outside your door those factors might discourage people of versus you know if anyone can you know like I remember in college you know when we were sneaking into our buddies apartment buildings to go you know to the the pregame right like you would just tailgate someone to the building and there was very low security so when you're choosing where to live especially when you're moving you know those are some factors you should think about is how secure is this location I'm actually moving myself into does it deter an attacker because there's a camera up front or there's a security guard sitting at the desk could someone scan up you know just walk to the elevator press a floor and get off right or do they need us a key fob to actually get up there so there's some factors you can think about too if it's not an actual like standalone home I think that's a fantastic list of factors I can tell Jameson wants to add a few things all out a few other things to I think on that point of somebody coming to your door that's not scheduled that you don't know don't open the door talk to them through a camera that if you want make that a policy in your house it feels at first a little socially awkward but you once you adopt it into your security process I mean you're like why not the other thing I would say is in addition to like self-defense as you talked about though and I think Jameson you've thrown out some stats that unfortunately only if something like six percent of all of these crypto wrench attacks have been defended against by self-defense so if you do that then make sure you're good I would say some of that self-defense not to say you could outsource it but you can outsource that to a big dog honestly I mean I think that is a probably underrated protector of the household is is having a dog that will alert maybe will respond in these types of attacks I do have one question for you bow and then we'll we'll add Jameson or either you can answer this is like when it comes to we talked about cameras we talked about alarm systems are there things you can do to actually harden your entrance points your doors and your windows I think you've written blog posts about this Jameson so talk about that and share anything else that you think would be helpful yeah well it really depends on your home construction but at least in America the vast majority of home construction is really cheap and all we use is like three quarter inch screws and for 20 bucks you can get double-linked screws with hard and striker plates that that massively improves the robustness of the door hinges and locking mechanisms in the frame and then if you want to go a little bit further and I've actually done some testing around this there are a number of security films out there I would go with like a 3M film and get it professionally installed on the windows and those won't make them completely impervious but they will give you probably at least 30 seconds to a minute of additional time where someone has to try to to break through them before they can actually ingress into that and that's kind of what you're looking for with those types of solutions even with kind of the reinforced doors with longer screws it turns something that can be kicked down in like five seconds into something that's just you know you got to give 30 seconds and you got to give some some good and that obviously is something that's very alert of it buys you time that that definitely strengthens things yeah and you actually hit one of what I was going to mention with the dog is is a really easily overlooked thing and it doesn't even have to be a big dog and in fact in most cases smaller dogs are better at alerting them when they hear stuff and and and and and it really knows the the the yappy dog that just will not shut up yeah you don't want to find out the hard way whether or not it's an attack dog or just an an interesting dog now if you really want to go hardcore you can get Germany Shepherd or indulgent melon law pay around $20,000 get them like shoots on level defense training and they will be an attack dog but once again you know this is this is time and resources and investment and whatnot and the one other thing I would just recently mentioned because we can I can spend a whole hour talking about it and I have a lengthy article called like fire arms for home defense on my blog fire going down the rabbit hole of fire arms does involve a lot of decisions and once again resources time training and I mainly I tell people look just by one gun and like throwing it in one safe is not good enough because depending upon the layout of your home what happens if the attacker is in between you and the gun and so you have to think about every possible situation and you know I have like a decentralized system of safe where every room within like 10 or 15 feet has a safe and it's not just any safe it's a quick access safe that takes less than three seconds to open it has a simplex mechanical lock not a biometric not electronic it's going to work every time even if I wonder you know dress and it's the same weapon in every safe so that I know that I don't have to think about how I'm going to be operating it there's all these little things and then there's a lot of decisions that win and do like what weapon what caliber thinking about over penetration what is the construction of your house and the layout you don't want to sheet an attacker and accidentally hit someone that you care about and that of course once again as Bo said you know whether you're in a single family or maybe you're in some sort of complex you have to worry about the neighbors as well there's many many factors and there's no simple answer to these things so for listeners that feel overwhelmed just just recognize I do too when I listen to Jameson talk I hear kind of he is a level 99 warlock of security okay and so most listeners are not at that level but I think the important thing is you can take this list of recommendations that that you've heard from both Bo and Jameson today and you can implement them slowly over time this doesn't have to happen in a week or a month I think the the main thing is that you're making progress on this on a year to year basis and so when you look at 2027 February 2027 the question you you want to ask yourself is am I more secure am I in a better posture than I was last year do I have an ongoing project to tackle some of the highest return on investment things one by one do I have an active plan to do this and if you were a better a year from now than you are today that's the path that you should be on so don't feel like all these recommendations you need to implement them overnight Bo I want to ask you about another thing because we were talking about some of these attacks being targeted right and so one of the parts that I think we don't like about blockchain right now is that there is not good native on-chain privacy techniques to ob uscate addresses and so this does give some sort of mastermind the ability potentially if you're not careful or even sometimes if you are careful the ability to identify your wallets and your assets on-chain are there ways to prevent that type of thing to be careful in my article I throw out some obvious ones which is just like hey don't link an ENS name or an NFT that uses your PFP to some of your main accounts holding crypto assets like don't do that that's a bad idea right and realize that when you transfer assets from one address to another that can obviously by be linked to anyone that that's kind of looking on-chain but then I think when people are looking deeper in terms of privacy they're like well how do I how do I keep some of my addresses private right do you have any solutions to that or what would you recommend on the on-chain address privacy side yeah I mean I think the simple man's answer right is if you want to set up a new set you know new wallets that are private from old ones you know fund them from a different exchange that then the one you use to fund your first wallets you know that's not true privacy because you're not you know hiding who you are from the exchanges right but from attacker perspective you know I have wallets that I've set up through a different centralized exchange that don't talk to each other each other on-chain I don't share NFTs I don't use you know bo security as a ENS name you know for me that was that's something I did a while ago and I've just stuck with that system I think there's a lot of tools that have come out recently or been developed more recently like Zcash with with near intense as a privacy option there are privacy tools out there like rail gun obviously there's you know infamous tornado cash right I mean I think if you start playing around with those things you have the potential to like cause yourselves more compliance trouble with the exchanges you do use that kind of thing it kind of depends on what your risk tolerance is for that but for the average person like you know as best I think the average person right doesn't necessarily have this Twitter account profile that is you know attached to their on-chain wallet and so you know that may not be as much of an issue but for people who want to you know take their on-chain cluster of wallets and separate them from you know any activity they're doing in the future the the like simplest way to do that from what the general public can observe is to just set up new wallets through a different exchange and transfer funds that way Jameson may have a far more advanced answer than me on this but you know I think like there's so many compliance risks and other things you can get into with using a lot of the mixing tools and and other things that like I don't have my thesis on this fully fleshed out I think of what's the best thing to do it's you know the depth is stacked against you on most of these networks public permissionless networks that operate completely transparently trying to be private on a completely open network is difficult to say the least you know I don't even really use mixers myself as you said they can actually cause problems because you might get associated with other activity that you don't want and really if you if you need strong privacy this is where I tell people to like use the narrow use the cache use using network for strong privacy is built in at the protocol layer and you aren't having to like jump through a bunch of hoops and figure out these complex technical machinations to try to create privacy and on a transparent network so I mostly don't I don't try to to tell people what to do from a privacy perspective because you're just so many foot guns out there and it's very easy to screw up you know even if you are doing a lot of things privately you only have to make one mistake and blow a hole in everything you've done I think that captures the current state of privacy for sure and unfortunately that's really where we are as an industry there aren't a lot of great solutions for Bitcoin or for Ethereum right now although new solutions are coming together like every day and I think this is a big area of investment we see protocols like Zama has been pretty cool that's new on the scene or things like Aztec there are things that are in development it's just it still feels like the status quo the best you can do is like move funds through an exchange and create a new wallet but then of course that is that is a vector too because what if the exchange leaks data you know how invisible really is that it's just like definitely it's not great right now like privacy is not great right now in crypto and that's just a realization what one other thing I'll add is just a emphasis on be careful of the tax tracking app that you use there are some local versions that keep all tax information local on your machine that you can switch to will include some links maybe in the show notes to that but I mean that that seems like a that's a vector I worry about a lot I mean these are entities that are not necessarily putting in exchange level security practices in places they're not cussing assets and their cloud-based solutions they can be hacked if somebody can tie your on-chain profile and your your address to that hacked information identify who you are then they know where your wallets are so that that is something that might be actionable as we was we wrap this up a so now so also I would say do not fall for the convenient path of putting exchange API keys into your tax yes it makes it easy for them to get the data but there have actually been hacks related to that where the attackers get the API keys and use it to take over your exchange account so yeah I think steps like rock key I think for example which is like a version of them is the best idea I'm fortunately we're in a position where the attackers are getting more sophisticated the tools that they're using now the ability to leverage AI to put all of this data set together into kind of mastermind what targets to to attack that's getting more sophisticated but I think the goal that but both you emphasize is you're we're not looking for perfection here we just have to be better like more hardened than everyone else and I think some of the the tactics we talked about will help listeners do that today I guess I'm I'm kind of met with this as as I've been thinking about this increasingly in 2026 as I mentioned I wrote that zero crypto at home article which is kind of a uncovering some of my thoughts on best practices to prevent wrench attacks with a lot of input from the crypto security community which is fantastic of which both of you have contributed so much but it does feel like a bit of a setback for the bankless vision that's kind of what I'm left with I'm just like it's not the full story here like we're not done yet and certainly there are even more challenges with the custodial solutions that we see in the traditional world of course but it is a heavy responsibility to take on private keys and to be your own bank and so if you are taking on that responsibility make sure you are not signing up for 24 seven security guard of your own house your own private keys you have to be smarter than this but even so I do feel like it's somewhat of a setback some people might be listening to this episode just be like oh my god guys that is a lot I can just go by crypto assets in my brokerage account and there's this thing and it's called ibit and I just like purchase that I don't have to worry about any of this shit what do you think I mean I'm still optimistic I feel like we are maybe at it kind of a a local a tranche in terms of custing keys in particular the sentiment around some of these these crypto attacks these wrench attacks in person has made me feel that way but will we get out of that will self custodial crypto be the end game will we have billions doing the types of things that you know bankless listeners are doing and controlling their own keys or is this a is this kind of a setback for the vision go ahead James let me oh sorry if I can jump in go ahead the let me throw a wrench pun intended in your ibit plan there right you know let's say you're you're holding your ibit on robin hood and you know you get rich attacked because you're talking about dick coin all the time but you you think you're safe because you're holding it you know in an ETF and the attacker shows up you know it's your house between 9 a.
m. and 4 p.m. trading hours and says hey go sell all your ibit by dick coin on robin hood and transfer it to me right yeah like you know that I'm sure robin hood has some measures in place to prevent some of those things but like that's a theoretical thing that could happen right so I think you know if you want to be in crypto self custody is still the way to go because you're taking use of the assets you know the advantage of being your own bank of not being reliant on a government to you know approve the form of currency that you're using like coming from a fed background right like I just see the advantages of this system so so strongly and to jayvson's point earlier today you know by taking the right steps you can actually get stronger than bank security while having the advantages of you know making your own decisions around your money you know how many times do we see you know someone posts an article about I was trying to withdraw 20 grand for my bank account and two hours later I'm still answering questions about why I'm using the money you know I think the the advantages of that system will overcome the security challenges especially as new tools get introduced as well it's get better you know as police become aware of these trends and start cracking down more on the crime right as more wrench attacks fail as more scams fail you know I think there's no reason why we can't get to a very similar place in terms of safety of of crypto as you know sort of the web to environment is today well said Mojia jayvson yeah I mean look the reason why I've spent the past decade building self custody systems is because I felt like we are fighting against human nature and human nature is to generally choose convenience at the expense of almost all else and also human society and civilization has developed over millennia via specialization of tasks so we as humans are used to outsourcing very large swaths of our lives even our own food production you know these these things are incredibly important to our day-to-day and long-term living and so you know outsourcing financial stuff is also second nature and so it's really going against the grain to tell people to completely split that model on their head and take responsibility for a very important aspect of their lives and their finances and and so that's why I felt like we need to keep working to make self-customer more convenient and more bulletproof because if the average person isn't confident in themselves to be able to do this securely and safely they're not going to be able to sleep at night and they're going to throw up their hands and say okay I'm just going to outsource it to someone who really knows what they're doing and of course as we all know that means they're throwing out really the most valuable premise of these systems in the first place which is not having to trust a third party and ask permission to use your money the way that you want and so I think I'll close out by by there's this one quote that comes back to me all of the time which I think is pretty fitting in this situation because we've spent the past hour and half talking about how complicated this is and how many different things you are having to worry about if you want to manage crypto securely and that is this quote if you wish to build a ship do not divide men into teams and send them to the forest to cut wood instead teach them to long for the vast and endless sea and this is why I preach the gospel of sovereignty the gospel of empowering yourself as he had these public permissionless protocols so that you don't have to rely upon the whims of bankers and regulators and governments and whatnot and so you know that in a sense that will get us to written off as the paranoid crypto anarchists by the Michael sailors of the world and I'm okay with that I just want to see as many people as possible understand that this is an option and if you're willing to put into the effort you can greatly empower yourself and your family for many generations to come well said and I don't think we're paranoid I think we're just ahead of the curve and the end goal as you said summed it up well is sovereignty is another word for that is freedom and so I think one way that bankless listeners can lose their freedom as if they become a bank security guard and they they feel that pressure all of the time but some of the tools that we talked about multi-sig is so key for this once you have a good multi-sig setup that you'll feel much better about your position you implement this and you will be able to take back your freedom let's end it there gotta let you know of course crypto is risky you could lose what you put in but we are headed west this is the frontier it's not for everyone but we're glad you're with us on the bankless journey thanks a lot