Main Topic: The discussion revolves around various aspects of cities, including their growth, decline, and resilience. The conversation covers topics such as the future of cities on Mars, the impact of terrorism on cities, the role of capital cities in empires, and the challenges faced by urban schools.
Key Points:
Participants:
Takeaways:
Edward Glaeser is the chair of the Harvard department of economics, and the author of the best books and papers about cities (including Survival of the City and Triumph of the City).
He explains why:
* Cities are resilient to terrorism, remote work, & pandemics,
* Silicon Valley may collapse but the Sunbelt will prosper,
* Opioids show UBI is not a solution to AI
* & much more!
Watch on YouTube. Listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any other podcast platform. Read the full transcript here.
Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes.
Timestamps
(0:00:00) - Mars, Terrorism, & Capitals
(0:06:32) - Decline, Population Collapse, & Young Men
(0:14:44) - Urban Education
(0:18:35) - Georgism, Robert Moses, & Too Much Democracy?
(0:25:29) - Opioids, Automation, & UBI
(0:29:57) - Remote Work, Taxation, & Metaverse
(0:42:29) - Past & Future of Silicon Valley
(0:48:56) - Housing Reform
(0:52:32) - Europe’s Stagnation, Mumbai’s Safety, & Climate Change
Host
Okay. Today, I have the pleasure of speaking with Professor Edward Glaeser, who is the chair of the Harvard Department of Economics, and he is the author of the best books and papers about cities. So, Professor Glaeser, thanks for coming on the Lunar Society.
Edward Glaeser
Oh, thank you so much for having me on, especially given the Lunar Society pays homage to one of my favorite moments in urban innovation in Birmingham in the 18th century.
Host
Oh, wow. I didn't even catch that theme, but actually, yeah, that's a great time. Yep. My first question, what advice would you give to Elon Musk about building the first cities on Mars?
Edward Glaeser
That's a great question. I think, in fact, demand for urbanism on Mars is going to be relatively limited. Cities are always shaped by the transportation costs that are dominant in the era in which they're created. That both determines the micro shape of the city and determines its macro futures. So cities on Mars are, of course, going to be limited by the likely prohibitive cost of traveling back and forth to the mother planet. But we also have to understand what cars are people going to be using on Mars. I assume these are all going to be Teslas. I assume that everyone is going to be driving around in some sort of appropriate Tesla on Mars. So it's going to be a very car-oriented living.
I think probably the best strategy is to create a fairly flexible plan, much like the 1811 grid plan in New York, that allows entrepreneurs to change land use over time, to put a few bets on what's necessary in terms of infrastructure, and then just let the city evolve organically. I think that's usually the best way: to trust more to individual initiative than to trust to central planning, at least in terms of micromanaging what goes where.
Host
Gotcha. Now, since 9/11, many terrorist groups have obviously intended to cause harm to cities. But by and large, at least in Western countries, they haven't managed to kill thousands of people like they were able to do during 9/11. What explains this? Do you think cities are just more resilient to these kinds of attacks than we would have otherwise thought, or are they just not being creative enough?
Edward Glaeser
I don't know. I mean, there's also the question as to what the objectives are. Even the 9/11 terrorists, their end game was not to kill urbanites in America. It was to affect change in Saudi Arabia or in the Middle East more generally. I think that's likely to be one major thing. We've also protected our cities better.
If you think about it, there are two things that go on simultaneously when you collect economic activity in one place in terms of defense. One is they become targets. And of course, that's what we saw in 9/11. It's hard to think of a symbol that's clearer than those twin towers. But at the same time, they're also defensible space. The origin of the urban agglomeration, the first use for cities and towns, was the fact that they could be walled settlements. Those walls bringing together people collectively for defense is the ultimate reason why these towns came about. So the walls provided protection.
I think the same thing is playing out with cities over the past 20 years. Just as New York was a target, it was also a place which, in the years after 2001, ramped up its anti-terrorist efforts. They put together a massive group, as London had previously done with the cameras everywhere in the case of London, to try and affect the cameras that would then implement congestion pricing in London with the same cameras that were used against the Irish terrorists. So both effects go on. I think we've been both fortunate and shown the strength of cities in terms of protecting themselves.
Host
Yeah, yeah. Now, if you look throughout history, in the ancient world at least, there are so many examples of empires that are basically synonymous with their capital cities. You think of something like Rome or Athens or Sparta. And today you would never think of America as the Washingtonian Empire. So what is the explanation for why the capital city has become much less salient in terms of the overall nation? Is it a sort of Coasean answer here?
Edward Glaeser
There are specific things that went on with English offshoot colonies where they, in many cases, in part because they recognized the tendency of the capital city to attract lots of excess goodies that have been taken from elsewhere in the country, located the capital city in a remote place. This was very much part of the story of the Hamilton musical, in the room where it happened. Part of the deal in the room where it happened was about moving the capital of the U.S. to a relatively remote Virginia location rather than having it be in Philadelphia or New York, although it was in Philadelphia and New York in the earlier days. Partially that was to reflect the fact that the South needed to be protected against all of the extra stuff going to New York and Philadelphia.
So whether it's Canberra or Ottawa, you see all of these English offshoot places having their capitals very much not in the big metropoles. Whereas traditionally, particularly if these places have been around for centuries, even if the capital didn't start off as the largest city, it became the largest city because centuries of French leaders thought their business was to take wealth from elsewhere in France and make Paris great. I think certainly the French empire was as synonymous with Paris as most of those ancient empires were with their capital city as well. So I think that's the main force.
I guess the question I could throw back to you is the places where this is not true. Moscow, St. Petersburg, Beijing. Do we think that Beijing is less synonymous with China than the Roman Empire is with Rome? Maybe a little, possibly just because China is so big and Beijing is a relatively small share of the overall population of China. But it's more so certainly than Washington, D.C. is with the U.S.
Host
Right. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's a really interesting answer. Suppose a city goes through a period of decline. Maybe an important industry moved out, or maybe it's had a sequence of bad governance. Are you inclined to bet that there will be some sort of renewal? Or do you think that things will continue to get worse? In other words, are you a momentum trader or a reversion to the mean trader when it comes to cities?
Edward Glaeser
I can tell you different answers for different outcomes. For housing prices, I can tell you exactly what we know statistically about this. At higher frequencies, let's say one year, housing prices show wickedly large levels of momentum. For five years or more, they show very significant levels of mean reversion. So it's a short-term cycle in housing prices followed by a decline. Population just shows enormous persistence on the downside.
What happens is you typically will have an economic shock. Detroit used to be the most productive place on the planet in 1950. A bunch of shocks to transportation technology meant it was no longer such a great place to make cars for the world. And it takes a century for the city to respond in terms of its population because the housing is sticky. The housing remains there. So between 50 and 60, population declines a little bit, prices drop. They drop sufficiently far that you're not going to build a lot of new housing, but people are still going to stay in the houses. They're not going to become vacant. The people are still there because the houses are still there. 60 to 70, population drops a little bit further. Prices kind of stay constant, but still it's not enough to build new housing. So the declines are incredibly persistent.
Growth, less so. On the boom side, if you have a boom over a 10-year period, that's likely to mean revert. That's not nearly as persistent because it doesn't have this sticky housing element to it. In terms of GDP per capita, much more of a random walk there in terms of the straight income stuff. So it's the population that's really persistent, which is, in fact, the reality of persistent decline.
Host
Interesting. Interesting. Why don't Americans move as much as they used to a century ago? You have a paper from 2018 titled "Jobs in the Heartland" where you talk about how there's increasing divergence between the unemployment rates between different parts of America. Why don't Americans just move to go to the places where there's better economic circumstances?
Edward Glaeser
I want to highlight one point here. You said unemployment rate, and I want to replace that with non-employment rate. That's partially what we're seeing now. It looks like America's labor force couldn't be better in terms of the low levels of unemployment. But what's happened over the last 50 years is a very large rise in the share of prime age men who are not in the labor force. They've stopped looking for work. And those guys are miserable. It's not that those guys are somehow productive and happy not being in the labor force. This is a very bad outcome for prime age men.
I'm separating men from women, not to say that female labor markets aren't just as important, just as fascinating, just as critical. But labor force participation means something different for many women than it does for men. There are many women who are not in the labor force who are doing things that are enormously productive socially, caring for their children, caring for their families. I wish it were symmetric across the genders. It just isn't true. There are very few men who are not in the labor force who are doing anything much other than watching television. It's just a very different thing.
So yes, there are big differences in the non-employment rate. There are some parts of America where, for much of the past decade, one in four prime age men have been jobless. It's an enormous gap. And the question is, why don't they get out? I think the answer is really twofold.
One is the nature of how housing markets have frozen up. Historically, housing in the U.S. didn't cost that much. The differences weren't that huge across places. Most parts of America had some kind of affordable housing. It was relatively easy to put up new housing. At the dawn of the 20th century, these were kit homes sold by Sears and Roebuck that sprung up by the thousand. You bought the kit from Sears and Roebuck and you just built it yourself. After World War II, it was mass-produced homes in places like Levittown. For most of the last 50 years, in places like coastal California or the East Coast, building has just gotten far more difficult. With the decline of mass-produced housing, it's become far more expensive and it becomes harder and harder for relatively low-income people to find opportunity in places that have high levels of income, high levels of opportunity.
That's partially why there's not just a general decline in mobility. There's a decline in directed mobility for the poor. Historically, poor people moved from poor areas to rich areas. That's pretty much stopped. In part, that's because rich areas just have very, very expensive housing.
The other thing is the rising importance of the informal safety net. Most particularly prime-aged men are not receiving significant handouts from the government, except if they're on disability. But they will typically have some form of income, some form of housing that's being provided for them by someone other than themselves. A third of them are living in their parents' homes. That informal safety net is usually very place-dependent. It's not like your parents, if you're living in Eastern Kentucky, were going to buy you a condo in San Francisco. You can still have your old bedroom, but you can't go anywhere else and still get that level of support. So that's, I think, another reason why we're increasingly stuck in place.
Host
You mentioned that a third of the non-employed population of young men. Is that a third of all young men?
Edward Glaeser
Non-employed. It's a third of non-employed prime age men. That's 25 to 54. There are a lot of 45-year-olds who are living on their parents' couches or in their old bedroom. It's a fairly remarkable thing.
Host
Yeah. Now we'll get to housing in just a second, but first I want to ask you: if the fertility trends in East Asia and many other places continue, what will the impact on cities be if the average age gets much older and there might even be some depopulation?
Edward Glaeser
That's a really interesting question. The basic age fact on cities is that for high-income or middle-income prime-aged parents, cities tend to be relatively bad for them. Once you're in the high end of the upper middle class, the distrust of our public school systems, merited or not, has meant that that group tends to leave. You have plenty of parents with kids who are lower income. And then you have groups who are part of a barbell, a demographic barbell, who like it.
This is partially about people who don't feel like they need the extra space. If they're young, they're looking to find prospective mates of various forms. Cities are good for that. Urban proximity works well in the dating market. And they've got time on their hands to enjoy the tremendous amenities, the consumption advantages that cities have. Older people, it's less about finding a mate typically, but the urban consumption amenities are still valued: the ability to go to museums, the ability to go to concerts. That continues to draw people in.
I would have thought that going forward, I would continue to expect the barbell dimension to persist until we actually get around to solving our urban schools. And the declining population levels, if anything, I would have thought that COVID skews you a bit younger because older people are more anxious. They remember that cities can also bring pandemics. They remember that it can be a nice thing to have a suburban home if you have to shelter in place. That might lead some people who would have otherwise relocated to a dense urban core to move out or stay out.
Host
You just mentioned urban schools. I'm curious, you've written about how that's one of the reasons why people who have children might not want to stay in cities. Why is it that American cities have some of the best colleges in the world, but for some reason their K-12 is significantly worse than the K-12 in other parts of the country? Why are the colleges much better in cities, but K-12 is worse?
Edward Glaeser
It's interesting. I don't think there's ever been an Englishman who felt like they had to leave London to get better schools for the kids, or a Frenchman who thought they needed to leave Paris. It's not like there's something intrinsic to cities. But I've always thought it's a reflection of the fact that instead of allowing all of the competition and entrepreneurship that thrives in cities and that makes cities great, in the case of K-12 public education, that's vanished.
Your example of colleges is exactly right. I'm in this industry. I'm a participant in this industry. And let me tell you, this industry is pretty competitive. Whether we're competing for the best students, at our level we go through an annual exercise of trying to make sure we get PhD students to come to our program instead of our competitors, whether it's hiring faculty members or attracting undergraduates. We occupy a highly competitive industry where we are constantly aware of what we need to do to make ourselves better. It doesn't mean that we're great along every dimension, but at least we're trying.
K through 12 education has a local monopoly. It's like you take the great urban food, leisure, and hospitality industries. Just take urban restaurants. Instead of having in New York City a hyper-competitive world where you constantly have entry, you say, we're going to have one publicly managed canteen and it's going to provide all the food in New York City and we're not going to allow any competitors, or the competitors are going to have to pay a totally different thing. That canteen is probably going to serve pretty crappy food. That's in some sense what happens when you have a large-scale public monopoly that replaces private competition.
Host
But isn't that also true of rural schools? So why are urban schools often worse?
Edward Glaeser
There's much more competition in suburban schools. In terms of the suburban schools, typically there are lots of suburbs, people are competing amongst them. The other thing that's actually important, and I don't want to over exaggerate this, but I think it is something that we need to think a little bit about, is the role of public sector unions, and particularly teachers unions, in these cases.
In the case of a suburban school district, the teachers union is no more empowered on the management side than they would be in the private sector. In a normal private sector, you've got a large company, you've got a union, they're arguing with each other. It's kind of a level playing field. It's all kind of reasonable. I'm not saying management has done awful things or unions have done foolish things. I'm not saying either are perfect, but it's kind of a well-matched thing. It's matched that way in the suburbs as well. You've got highly empowered parents who are highly focused on their kids and they're not dominated. It's not like the teachers union dominates elections in Westchester County.
Whereas if you go into a big city school district, you have two things going on. One is the teachers tend to be highly involved politically and quite capable of influencing management, essentially, because they are an electoral force to be reckoned with, not just by the direct votes, but also with their campaign spending. On top of this, you're talking about a larger group of disparate parents, many of whom have lots of challenges to face, and it becomes much harder for them to organize effectively on the other side. So for those reasons, our big urban schools can do great things and many individual features can be fantastic, but it's an ongoing challenge.
Host
Yeah, that makes sense. What is your opinion on Georgism? Do cities need a land value tax? Would it be better if all the other taxes are replaced by one?
Edward Glaeser
Henry George. I don't know any economist who doesn't think that a land value tax is an attractive idea. The basic idea is we're going to tax land rather than taxing real estate values. You would probably implement this in practice by evaluating the real estate and then subtracting the cost of construction, at least for anything that was built up, meaning you'd form some value of the structures and you just subtract it. The attractive thing, from most of our perspective, is it doesn't create the same disincentive to build that a real estate tax does. A real estate tax says, I might want to keep this thing as a parking lot for a couple of years so I don't have to pay taxes on it. If it were a land value tax, you're going to pay the same tax whether it's a parking lot or whether you're going to put a high rise on it. So you might as well put the high rise on it and we could use the space.
I think by and large, that's a perfectly sensible idea. I'd like to see more places using land value taxes or using land value taxes in exchange for property taxes. Where George got it wrong is the idea that a land value tax is going to solve all the problems of society or all the problems of cities is ludicrously not true. One can make an argument that in those places that just have a property tax, you could replace it with a land value tax with little loss. But at the national level, it's not a particularly progressive tax in lots of ways. It would be hard to figure out how to fund all the things you want to fund, especially since there are lots of things that we do that are not very land intensive. And I think George was imagining a world in which pretty much all value-creating enterprises had a lot of land engaged. So a good idea, yes. A panacea, no.
Host
No, that's a good point. I mean, Google's offices in San Francisco are probably generating more value than you would surmise just from the quantity of land they have there. Do American cities need more great builders like Robert Moses?
Edward Glaeser
Robert Caro's *The Power Broker* is one of the great biographies of the past 100 years, unquestionably. The only biography that I think is clearly better is Robert Caro's biography of Lyndon Baines Johnson. Caro is truly amazing. That being said, I would not exactly call it a fair and balanced view of Robert Moses. It is true that Robert Moses was high-handed and it is true that there are things that he did that were terrible that you never want to do again. But on the other hand, the man got stuff built.
I think of myself as a child growing up in New York City. Whether it was the public pool that I swam in or the parks that I played in or the roads that I traveled on, they were all delivered by Robert Moses. There's got to be a middle ground. No, we're not going to run roughshod over the neighborhood like Robert Moses did. But we're still going to build stuff. We're still going to deliver new infrastructure. And we're going to do it not for 10 times more than every other country in the world does it. We're actually going to have sensible procurement policies that bring in things at a reasonable cost. I think we need to balance a little bit back towards Robert Moses in order to have slightly more empowered builders who actually are able to deliver American cities the infrastructure that they need at an affordable cost.
Host
Yep, yep. Do we have too much democracy at the local level? You wrote a paper in 2017 titled "The Political Economy of Transportation Investments." One of the points you make there is that the local costs are much more salient to people for new construction than the public benefits and the benefits to newcomers would be. Does that mean we have too much federalism? Should we have far less power at the city level?
Edward Glaeser
Not universally. There are lots of good things that local control does. I do think we have too much local ability to say no to new housing projects. That's a particular case that I'm focused on. I think it's exactly right that the near neighbors to a project internalize all of the extra noise and perhaps extra traffic that they're going to have due to this project. They probably overestimate it because they are engaging in a bit of status quo bias and they think the present is great and can't imagine any change. By contrast, none of the people who would benefit from the new project are able to vote. All of the families that would love to move into this neighborhood but are being zoned out by the insiders don't get a say.
I think the goal is to make sure that we have more ability to speak for outsiders. Cities at their best are places where outsiders can find opportunity. That's part of what's so great about them. And it's a tragic thing that we make that so hard. I'm not sure exactly that I'm claiming that I want less democracy, but I do want more limitations on how much regulation localities can do. There are certainly certain limitations on local power that I think are fine.
I would prefer to call this not a limitation on local democracy, but an increase in the protection of individual rights, or the individual rights of landowners to do what they want with their land. Which in effect is a limit on democracy, but the Bill of Rights is a limit on democracy. The Bill of Rights says that they don't care if 51% of your voters want to take away your right to free assembly. They're not allowed to do that. In some sense, what I'm arguing for is more property owners' rights so that they can actually allow more housing on their building.
In terms of transportation projects, it's a little bit dicier because here the builder is the government itself. Again, I think the question is, you want everyone to have a voice. You don't want every neighborhood to have a veto over every potential housing project or potential transportation project. So you need something that is done more at the state level with representation from the locality, but without the localities getting the ultimate say.
Host
Yeah. I wonder if that paper implies that I should be shorting highly educated areas, or at least in terms of real estate? Because one of the things you mentioned in the paper was that highly educated areas have much higher opposition. They're able to foment much more opposition.
Edward Glaeser
You shouldn't short those places. Here's the real estate strategy, which I have heard that there are buyers who do this. You take an area that has historically been very pro-housing. So it's got lots of housing. It's affordable right now because supply is good, but lots of educated people have moved in. That means that going forward, they're going to build much less, which means that going forward, they're likely to become much more expensive. So in fact, you should buy that stuff or buy options on that stuff rather than shorting it. You should short, if you have a security that is related to the population level in that community, you should short that because the population growth is going to go down, but the prices are likely to go up.
Host
Yep. Yep. You wrote a paper last year on the opioid epidemic. One of the points that you made there was that the opioid epidemic can be explained just by the demand side stuff about social isolation and joblessness. I wonder how this analysis makes you think about mass scale automation in the future. Assume that might be the case. What impact do you think that would have? And assume it's paired with universal basic income or something like that. Do you think it would cause a tremendous increase in opioid abuse?
Edward Glaeser
We actually would have phrased it slightly differently. As opposed to the work of the two amazing economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton, who really emphasize the role of deaths of despair, we are much more focused on the supply side. That doesn't mean that the demand side isn't important. It means that the way we handled the distribution of large-scale pain-relieving medicines is key.
We tell a story where every 30 to 50 years, someone comes up with the same sort of idea. We know that human beings love opioids in different forms. We also know they're highly addictive and lead to a terrible cycle. All of a sudden, along comes this innovator who says, "I've got a new opioid and it's safe. You don't have to worry about getting addicted from this one. It's magical. It won't work." A hundred years ago, that thing was called heroin. 200 years ago, that thing was called morphine. 300 years ago, that thing was called laudanum.
Host
We have these new drugs, which have come in and they've never been safe. But, in our case, it was OxyContin and the magic of the time release was supposed to make it safe, and it wasn't safe. There's a lot of great work that just shows that the patterns of opioid use were related to the places that had a lot of pain 30 years ago. So those places with a lot of prescribing for pain, when OxyContin came in, those were the places that got addicted most.
Edward Glaeser
Now, it's also true that there are links with these economic issues. There are links with joblessness. I basically do believe that things that create joblessness are pretty terrible and are actually much worse than income inequality. I push back against the universal basic income advocates who I think are basically engaging in a materialist fallacy of thinking that a human being's life is shaped by their take-home pay or their unearned pay. For most people, a job is much more than that. A job is a sense of purpose. A job is a sense of social connection.
When you look at human misery and opioid use, you look at the difference between high earners and mid earners—there are differences, but they are small. Then you look at the difference between low-income earners and the jobless, and unhappiness spikes enormously, misery spikes enormously, family breakups spike enormously. Things like universal basic income—the negative income tax experiments in the 1970s, which are the closest thing we have to large-scale experiments in this area—had very large effects of joblessness from just giving people money. They feel quite dangerous to me, because they feel like they're going to play into rising joblessness in America, which feels like a path towards misery.
I want to quickly deviate. Some UBI advocates have brought together UBI in the U.S. and UBI in the developing world. UBI in the developing world—giving poor farmers in sub-Saharan Africa fairly modest amounts of money—is a totally sensible strategy. These people are not about to live life permanently not working. They're darn poor. It's very efficient relative to other ways of giving. I am in no sense pushing back on UBI with modest amounts of money in the poorest parts of the world. By all means, it's been deemed to be effective. It's just a very different thing if you're saying I'm going to give $100 to a poor Congolese farmer or I'm going to give $10,000 to a long-term jobless person in eastern Kentucky.
Host
Right, right. You're not buying a PS5 with $100 in Congo.
Edward Glaeser
That's right.
Host
So I wanted to ask you about remote work. You write in *The Survival of the City* that improvements in information technology can lead to more demand for face-to-face contact because FaceTime complements time spent communicating electronically. I'm curious, what distinguishes situations where FaceTime substitutes for in-person contact and situations where it complements virtual contact?
Edward Glaeser
There's not a universal rule on this. That paper, which I wrote in the early 1990s, on whether face-to-face contact complements or substitutes for electronic contact, was really motivated by anxiety in the 1970s that the information technology of their day—the fax machine, the personal computer—was going to make face-to-face contact in cities obsolete. That discussion has reappeared in the past two and a half years because of Zoom. All of those questions still resonate.
In the short run, typically these things are substitutes. You don't necessarily need to meet a long-term contact; you can just telephone them or connect electronically. In the long run, they seem to be much more likely to be complements, in part because these technologies change our world. Over the last 40 years, yes, some face-to-face contacts were made unnecessary because of electronic interactions. But cities did well over the past 40 years, and business travel went through the roof. You'd think that would have been made unnecessary by all these electronic interactions. What happened was that these new technologies and globalization created a more interconnected world, a world in which knowledge was more important. We become smart by interacting with people face to face. As things get more complicated, it's easier for ideas to get lost in translation. We have wonderful cues for communicating comprehension or confusion that are lost when we're not in the same room.
One thing that was helpful in my earlier work was looking at the history of information technology innovations. The first one is probably the book—movable type, Gutenberg. It's hard to imagine an innovation that did more to flatten distance. Now you can read stuff people are saying hundreds of miles away. Yet there's not a shred of evidence that the book led to less urbanization in Europe or less connection. It helped create a totally different world in which people were passionate about ideas and wanted to talk to each other about their books. Flash forward 350 years and we have the telephone. Telephones started being used more in cities, mostly by people who were going to meet face-to-face. Again, no evidence that this created a decline in the demand for face-to-face contact or for cities.
I think if we look at Zoom, which unquestionably has allowed a certain amount of long-distance contact, in the short run it certainly poses a threat to urban office markets. My guess is in the long run, it's probably going to be neutral at worst for face-to-face contact in the cities that enable that contact.
Host
Yeah, yeah. My podcast has been a great example for me about this. Right now we're talking virtually, so maybe in a way it's substituted. Maybe I would have interviewed in person without the podcast. But in another way, I've met so many people that I've interviewed on the podcast or who have connected with me because of the podcast in person. The amount of in-person interactions I've had because of a virtual podcast is a great anecdote to what you're talking about.
Edward Glaeser
That makes total sense.
Host
Why do even the best software engineers in India or in Europe make so much less when they're working remotely from those locations than remote engineers working in America make? Why don't employers just pay them more until the price discrepancy goes away?
Edward Glaeser
That's interesting. I don't fully know the answer. I suspect some of it has to do with the nature of supply and demand. Some things are just very hard to do remotely. Either because you have very precise informational needs that are easier to communicate to people who are nearby, or the person who's nearby has evolved in ways that they know exactly what you want and have exactly the product you need. Even though the remote call center worker and the local one may be totally equivalent on raw programming talent, you may still end up in equilibrium willing to pay a lot more to the local one because there's a slightly differentiated skill that the local one has. There's a lot of competition for the remote ones, so the price is going to be pretty low. There's not that much supply of the one guy who's down the hall who knows exactly what you're looking for. That guy gets much higher wages because he can offer you something no one else can exactly reproduce.
Host
Let me clarify my question. Even remote engineers in America will make more than remote engineers in Europe or in India. If somebody is working remotely but just happens to live in the US, is that just because they can communicate in English in the same way? What explains that?
Edward Glaeser
I would take the same stance. They're likely to have skills that are somewhat idiosyncratic and valued in the US context.
Host
Are you optimistic about the ability of the metaverse and VR to be able to better puncture whatever makes in-person contact so valuable?
Edward Glaeser
No, I do not think the metaverse is going to change very much. I do think there will be a lot of hours spent on various forms of gaming over the next 20 years, but I don't think it ultimately poses much of a threat to real-world interactions. We saw this with the teenage world over the last three years. A lot of 15, 16, 17-year-olds spent an awful lot of time gaming and connecting entirely virtually during the pandemic lockdowns. Every single person from that cohort, when you allowed them to interact with real members of their group live, leapt at the opportunity. They leapt at the opportunity of meeting, of actually hanging out with real people until three o'clock in the morning and arguing over whatever it is—whether it's football or Kant. Particularly for the young, living life live just beats the alternative.
Host
That sounds like a very Harvard scenario, having to argue over football or Kant, those two topics. Are you predicting lower taxes over the coming decades in places like California and New York, specifically because remote work sets a sort of maximum bar of how much you can tax highly productive people before they will just leave?
Edward Glaeser
This is a central issue of our day. It's part of why I wrote my recent book, *Survival of the City*, because I was so worried about this. Two things have happened simultaneously. One, as you correctly say, Zoom has made it easier to connect from anywhere. I don't think Zoom is going to cause a tech startup in Silicon Valley to say, "We're just going to go home to our Orange County suburban homes and never meet live again." That's a low probability event. But what seems like a perfectly high probability event is to say, "We can Zoom with our VCs. We can Zoom with our lawyers. Why don't we just relocate to Austin, Texas, not pay taxes, or relocate to Boulder, Colorado, for beautiful scenery, or relocate to Honolulu so we can surf?" We've made the ability for smart people to relocate much easier, even if they're going to keep seeing each other in the office three or four days a week.
That collides with a very fervent desire to deal with festering social inequities at the local level—limited upward mobility for poor people, high housing costs, the rise of mass incarceration and police brutality towards minority groups. There's this progressive urge, which runs up against the fact that the rich guys can run away. If your model says local governments will realize the rich guys can run away and seamlessly lower tax rates to attract those people, that's running up against the fact that there's a whole lot of energy on the progressive side which says, "No, we want to—Massachusetts just passed a millionaire's tax." For the first time ever, we have the possibility to have a progressive tax, which feels extraordinarily dangerous given this time period. We may need to see a bunch of errors in this area before we start getting things right. We went through a lot of pain in the 1970s as cities first tried to deal with their progressive goals and rich people and companies ran away. It wasn't until the 1980s that people started realizing this was the path to local bankruptcy and that we had real city limits on what the locality could do.
Host
You cited research in *Survival of the City* which said that firms like Microsoft were much less willing to hire new people once they went online because of the pandemic. What do you make of the theory that this is similar to when industrialization first hit and we hadn't figured out exactly how to make most use of it to be most productive, but over the long run, somebody will do for remote work what Henry Ford did to the factory floor, and make it so much more effective and efficient than in-person contact, just because we'll have better ways of interacting with people through remote work?
Edward Glaeser
It's entirely possible. I never like betting against the ingenuity of humanity. On the other hand, you need a lot of technology to override 5 million years of evolution. We have evolved to be an in-person species, not just because we're productive and learn a lot face-to-face, but also because we just like it. A world of hyper-efficient remote work, where you're puttering around your apartment doing things very quickly and getting things done, doesn't sound particularly joyful to me. Workplaces are not just places of productivity; they're also places of pleasure, particularly at the high end. In 2019 and earlier, Google, Yahoo—the companies that should have had the biggest capacity to do remote stuff—weren't sending their workers home. They were building these paradises for high-skilled workers, stuffed with foosball tables and free snacks in these giant campuses in the Googleplex. They were certainly betting on the power of face-to-face and creativity rather than on the ability of remote work to make everything work.
I think the most reasonable view, let's say that of Nick Bloom of Stanford, is that for those types of workers, 20% of your week being hybrid, maybe 40%, seems quite possible. That seems like a thing, particularly for workers with families who really value that degree of flexibility. But fully remote is a pretty niche thing. There are some jobs like call center workers where you could imagine it being the norm, but in part because it's just hard to learn the same amount remotely that you do face-to-face. This came out both in the earlier Bloom study on remote call center workers in China and in more recent work by Natalia Emanuel and Emma Harrington. Both studies found the same thing: in these call centers, workers are plenty productive when they're remote, but the probability of being promoted drops by 50%. The entrepreneur may make it very efficient to do things in the short run remotely, but they're going to turn off this tendency we have to be able to learn things from people around us, which is just much harder to duplicate remotely.
Host
Right. Yeah, yeah. I'm curious why Silicon Valley became the hub of technology. You wrote a paper in 2018 about where pioneer and non-pioneer firms locate. Was it Stanford? Is it where Fairchild Semiconductor is located, and the offshoots of that? What is the explanation?
Edward Glaeser
We trace it as being earlier than Stanford. In *Triumph of the City*, I traced it through a company called Federal Telegraph Company, founded by a guy named Cyril Frank Elwell, who was a radio pioneer. He was tapped by his teacher to head this radio company. There had been a local genius in San Francisco who attracted all these investors to do a wireless telegraphy company, and he died in a freak carriage accident. His investors wanted to find someone else. They went to Stanford's faculty and asked who they should hire. It was Elwell, who founded Federal Telegraph. Federal Telegraph then licensed Danish technology—originally the Poulsen Telegraph Company. They hired some fairly bright people like Lee DeForest. They did incredibly well in World War I off of Navy contracts. They then provided jobs for people like the young Fred Terman, whose father was a Stanford scientist.
Fred Terman then plays an outsized role. He goes to MIT, studies engineering, then comes back to become dean of Stanford's engineering program. He plays an outsized role in setting up the Stanford Industrial Park and attracting Fairchild Semiconductor. Then there's this random thing: Fairchild Semiconductor attracts these people and then repels them because you have this brilliant guy, Shockley. He's both brilliant and personally abhorrent. He manages to attract brilliant people and then repel all of them. They all end up dispersing into different companies and create this incredibly creative ecosystem that is the heart of Silicon Valley. In its day, it had this combination of really smart people and a really entrepreneurial ethos, which made it very healthy.
The thing many of us worry about with Silicon Valley more recently is that it feels much more like a one-industry town, which is dangerous. It feels more like a bunch of industrial behemoths rather than a bunch of smart and scrappy startups. That's a recipe that feels much more like Detroit in the 1950s than Silicon Valley in the 1960s.
Host
[to audience] Hey guys, I hope you're enjoying the conversation so far. If you are, I would really, really appreciate it if you could share the episode with other people who you think might like it. This is still a pretty small podcast, so it's basically impossible for me to exaggerate how much it helps out when one of you shares the podcast. Put the episode in the group chat you have with your friends, post it on Twitter, send it to somebody who you think might like it. All of those things help out a ton. Anyways, back to the conversation.
Speaking of startups, what does your study of cities imply about where tech startups should locate and what kind of organization—in person or otherwise—they should have?
Edward Glaeser
There's a lot to like about in-person, certainly. Relying too much on remote feels quite dangerous if you're a scrappy startup. But I like a lot the Sunbelt smart cities. I like the places that combine what I call a two-factor model of economic growth: education and having governments that are pro-business. In the U.S., there's a lot of heterogeneity. The U.S. has historically been better on being pro-business than, say, northern European social democracies, but those social democracies are great on the education front. Places like Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany are very successful because they have enough education to counter the fact that they may not be as pro-business as the U.S.
Within the U.S., you have this balance. Places like Massachusetts and California are certainly much less pro-business, but they're pretty well educated. Other parts of the country may be more pro-business but less so. The real secret sauce is finding those places that are both highly educated and pro-business. Those are places like Charlotte, Austin, and even Atlanta—places in the Sun Belt that have attracted lots of skilled people. They've done very, very well during COVID. Austin, by most dimensions, is the superstar of the COVID era in terms of attracting people. You have to wait for the real estate prices to come down a bit in Austin, but those are the places I would be looking at.
Host
Yeah, I don't know if you know, but I live in Austin, actually.
Edward Glaeser
I did not know that. You're exactly right.
Host
Yeah, yeah. Actually, I'm surprised you said that about education, because you write in the paper that general knowledge measured as average years of schooling is not a strong determinant of the survival of a pioneer firm, but that the relatedness of knowledge between past and present activities is. So I'm surprised that you think for pioneer firms, education is a strong characteristic.
Edward Glaeser
No, I'm a big human capital determinist. I tend to believe that individuals, cities, and nations rise and fall based on their skill levels. If you look over the last 40 or 50 years, skills are very predictive of which cities, particularly colder cities, manage to do well versus poorly. If you ask yourself why Detroit and Seattle look different, more than 50% of Seattle's adults have college degrees, maybe 14 or 15% of Detroit's adults do. That's a huge gap. When you're thinking about your punitive startup, you're going to be looking for talent. Having lots of educated people around you is going to be helpful for that.
Host
Yep. Let's talk about housing. Houston has basically very little to no zoning. Why is it not more of an interesting city? Nobody goes to Houston for tourism.
Edward Glaeser
I have, in fact, gone to Houston for tourism, although part of it, I admit, was to look at the housing and to go to The Woodlands. Interesting has a lot to do with age in this country. The more a city has—Boston is good for tourism just because it's been around for a long time and hasn't changed all that much, so it has this historic thing. Houston is a new place, not just in chronological age, but in the sense that it's grown so much it's dominated by new stuff. That new stuff tends to be more homogenous and has less history. Those are things which make new cities typically less interesting than older cities. Rome, Jerusalem, London—these are great tourist capitals because they've accreted all this interesting stuff over the millennia. I'm not sure that if we look at more highly zoned new cities, we're so confident they're all that more interesting. I don't want to be particularly disparaging any one city. There's actually a bunch that's pretty interesting in Houston, and I'm not sure it's any less interesting than any comparably aged city in the country.
Host
Yeah, yeah. I'm visiting Houston later this month and I asked my friend there, "Should I stay here longer? Is there anything interesting to do here?" He responds, "Well, it's the fourth biggest city in the country." And he goes, "So no."
Many people, including many economists, have said that we should drastically increase U.S. population through immigration to a figure like one billion. Do you think our cities could accommodate that? Do we have the infrastructure? Let's say reformed housing over a decade or so. Could we accommodate such a large influx of people?
Edward Glaeser
A billion people in a decade. I love the vision. I'm certainly among those who, in my heart, am an open borders person. It's a moral thing. I don't really like the idea that I get to enjoy the privileges of being an American and think that I'm going to deny that opportunity to anyone else. I love this vision. A billion people over 10 years is an unimaginably large amount of people over a relatively short period of time. I'd love to give it a shot. It's certainly not as if there's any long-term reason why you couldn't do it. Goodness knows we've got more than enough space in this country. It would be exciting to try to see if we could build enough infrastructure and structures to do that. But it would require a lot of reform in the housing space and a fair amount of reform in the infrastructure space to be able to do this at some kind of large-scale affordability.
Host
What does the evidence show about public libraries? Do they matter?
Edward Glaeser
My friend Eric Klinenberg has written a great book called *Palaces for the People* about all the different functions that libraries have played. I've never seen anything systematic statistically about this, but you're not going to get a scholar to speak against books. It's not a possible thing.
Host
Why do European cities seem so much more similar to what they looked like decades or even centuries ago than American cities, even American cities that are old—obviously not as old as European cities—but they seem to change much more over time?
Edward Glaeser
Lower population growth, much tougher zoning, much tougher historic preservation. All three of these things are going on. It's very difficult to build in European cities. There's a lot of attention to caring about history; it's often part of the nationalist narrative. You often have huge amounts of national dollars going to preserve local stuff and relatively lower levels of population growth. An extreme example is Warsaw, where central Warsaw was completely destroyed during World War Two, and they built it up to look exactly like it looked before the bombing. This is a national choice, unlikely that we would necessarily make here in the U.S.
Host
I was in Mumbai earlier this year and I visited Dharavi, which is the biggest slum in Asia. It's a pretty safe place for a slum. Why do slums in different countries often have different levels of how safe they are? What is the reason?
Edward Glaeser
I, too, have been in Dharavi and felt perfectly safe. It's like walking around Belgravia in London. My model of Dharavi is the same model as Jane Jacobs' model of Greenwich Village in 1960: this is just a well-functioning community. People have eyes on the street. If you're a stranger in these areas, they're going to be looking at you. It's a community that just functions. There are lots of low-income communities throughout the world that have this. It requires a certain amount of permanence. If the community is too much in flux, it becomes hard to enforce these norms. It's really helpful if there aren't either a massive number of guns floating around or an unbelievably lucrative narcotics trade in the area. Those are both things that make things incredibly hard. Partially, U.S. drug policy has been responsible for creating violence in some of the poor parts of Latin American cities.
Host
Yeah, yeah. Now, maybe you don't play video games enough to know the answer to this question, but I'm curious: is there any video game, any strategic video game like Civilization or Europa Universalis, that you feel does a good job representing the economics of cities?
Edward Glaeser
No. I will just say that when I was in graduate school, I spent a few hours playing something called SimCity, and I did think that was very fun. I'm not going to play it, but I think it got it right. That was probably my largest engagement with city-building video games.
Host
What would you say we understand least about how cities work?
I'm going to say the largest unsolved problem in cities is what the heck we're going to do about climate change and the cities of the developing world. This is the thing I do not feel like I have any answer for. In terms of how we're going to stop Manila or Mumbai from being leveled by some water-related climate event that we haven't yet foreseen.
Edward Glaeser
Right. We sort of think that we're going to spend tens of billions of dollars to protect New York and Miami, and that's going to happen. But the thing I don't understand, the thing that I think we really need to invest in in terms of knowledge creation, is what are we going to do with the low-lying cities of the developing world to make them safe?
Host
Yep, yep. Okay, well, your most recent book is *Survival of the City*, and before that, *Triumph of the City*. Both of those I highly recommend to readers. Professor Glaeser, thank you so much for coming on the podcast. This was very interesting. I enjoyed this a lot.
Edward Glaeser
Thank you so much for having me on. I had a great deal of fun.
Host
Hey, thanks for listening. If you enjoyed that episode, I would really, really appreciate it if you could share it. This is still a pretty small podcast, so it is a huge help when any one of you shares an episode that you like. Post it on Twitter, send it to friends who you think might like it, put it in your group chats. Just let the word go forth. It helps out a ton. Many thanks to my amazing editor, Gram Besalu, for producing this podcast, and to Mia Ayana for creating the amazing transcripts that accompany each episode, which have helpful links. You can find them at the link in the description below. Remember to subscribe on YouTube and your favorite podcast platforms. Cheers, see you next time.