Main Topic: The podcast episode is about the book "The Founders: The Story of PayPal and the Entrepreneurs Who Shaped Silicon Valley" by Jimmy Soni. The book explores the history of PayPal and the entrepreneurs who shaped Silicon Valley.
Key Points:
Participants:
Takeaways:
Jimmy Soni is the author of The Founders: The Story of Paypal and the Entrepreneurs Who Shaped Silicon Valley.
Watch on YouTube. Listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any other podcast platform.
Episode website here.
Follow Jimmy on Twitter. Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes!
Timestamps:
(0:00:00) - Bell Labs vs PayPal
(0:05:12) - Scenius in Ancient Rome and America's Founding
(0:07:02) - Girard at PayPal
(0:15:17) - Thiel almost shorts the Dot com bubble
(0:19:49) - Does Zero to One contradict PayPal's story?
(0:27:57) - Hilarious Russian hacker story
(0:29:06) - Why is Thiel so good at spotting talent?
(0:34:50) - Did PayPal make talent or discover it?
(0:40:40) - Japanese mafia invests in PayPal?!
(0:44:42) - Upcoming TV show on PayPal
(0:48:11) - Musk in ancient Rome
(0:52:12) - Why didn't Musk keep pursuing finance?
(0:56:32) - Why didn't the mafia get back together?
(1:00:06) - Jimmy's writing process
Host
I'm super excited about this one. Today, I'm interviewing Jimmy Soni. He's the author of *Rome's Last Citizen*, a biography of Cato; *A Mind at Play*, a biography of Claude Shannon; and most recently, *The Founders: The Story of PayPal and the Entrepreneurs Who Shaped Silicon Valley*. So, Jimmy, let's just jump into it.
Your previous book was about Claude Shannon, and he comes up with information theory while he's working at Bell Labs. This is a place that's famously comfortable. They have a monopoly from the government. The scientists have time and freedom. They're not pressured by competition. And on the other hand, obviously, as you talk about, six Nobel Prizes, transistor, laser, Unix, C. On the other hand, you have PayPal. They're constantly on the verge of going under, incredible pressure, long hours. And this is also a place that produces tremendous amounts of innovation. How do these different places promote innovation?
Guest
Yeah, it's a great question, and it is interesting to think about just how different they are. It's a very big question because in some ways, the right person to answer the Bell Labs question is probably John Gertner, who did the quintessential book on Bell Labs, *The Idea Factory*. I was looking at one person in that kind of stew, in that era, and that was Shannon.
Here's what I would say about Shannon's innovations. Shannon worked on information theory not because he was working at Bell Labs. He actually was working at Bell Labs and was kind of tooling with information theory as a side hustle. He started doing it on the side, which is to say it's quite possible that no matter where he worked, he would have been working on information theory in the off hours. The advantage of working at Bell Labs is, one, he's around communication networks all the time. Two, he's doing cryptography and cryptographic analysis, so he's thinking a lot about that. Three, he is around smart and intelligent people. And maybe the fourth thing is he has the *Bell Systems Technical Journal* where he can publish his findings. They're a private sector organization that has a technical journal that gets distributed pretty widely throughout academia.
But I suspect that if he were working wherever, he would have actually been working on information theory on the side anyway because this was stuff he was just interested in broadly. That level of self-starter—think about what that means. He's a self-starter who's willing to do academic research just on the side and write papers about it just for the sheer thrill of discovery. The number of people that that's true of in society is very, very small. He didn't think he was going to—you can't IPO an academic paper. He's not going to get rich. He's not seeking fame because even when he becomes famous, he actually decides he's not going to go on the lecture circuit or go on late night TV. So the population of people who are like that is very, very small.
PayPal is a different story. Profit motive is a big part of what makes places like that successful. The internet boom is going on. There's an entire generation of people who have built web companies, starting with Netscape, who are IPOing, and all of a sudden they're on the covers of magazines, and they have huge amounts of wealth. So it would be dishonest to say that's not part of the motivation there. That's combined with this pressure: they close a very big round of fundraising in March of 2000, just as the dot-com bubble starts to burst. So there's a kind of panic about surviving and about having to innovate your way to survival.
I'm not saying there aren't other Claude Shannons out there. I just think they're smaller in number than a constellation of people who are brought together by forces, are forced to survive, are forced to build a startup, and then can learn innovation that way. The other thing I would say is I think the innovations are very different. PayPal's innovations are a sequence of micro developments and creations strung end to end over the period of four years that help build the company. Shannon is writing a technical paper in 1948 that sets certain principles and establishes the field of information theory. So I'm not sure it's an apples to apples comparison, but I do like the idea of thinking characterologically and saying, okay, there are probably some Shannons in the world, but they're probably far outnumbered by the number of people who would want to create a startup and have more self-interested reasons, as opposed to public spirited reasons or academic reasons.
Host
Interesting. So, my interpretation of all your books is that in all of them, you're really writing about scenius—just a group of people who can get together and boost each other's productivity. That's obvious with Bell Labs and Claude Shannon, obviously with *The Founders* and the PayPal mafia. And I think it's even true of your book on Cato. 2000 years later, can you imagine another era where we know all the prominent politicians are household names? Pompey, Crassus, Cato, Cicero, Caesar. This book is about political scenius. I can't imagine that in 2000 years we'll know who Nancy Pelosi or Mitch McConnell or Donald Trump were. Maybe we might know who Donald Trump is in 2000 years, but another era would be the late 1700s in the United States. Jefferson, Hamilton—award-winning musicals are being made about people who wore powdered wigs and tricornered hats. If Lin-Manuel Miranda can make Hamilton a thing in 2022, that era is just one of the most studied and discussed. It strikes me that that's another scene.
Guest
There's a great book on that actually called *Founding Brothers*. That was one of my texts that made me think a lot about the founders because it does describe the relationships. For example, the relationships between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams is super interesting. They're competitive, then they're friendly, then they're not, and there's all kinds of drama there. The relationships across the founding generation I would think is another scene. I never picked up on that common thread until you just pointed it out, which is always fun. It's the way I like doing these because I'm always learning new things. I realized, okay, there's a scenius in all three of my books.
Host
Cool. Now, I'm curious how Peter Thiel's ideas about Girard were influenced by his time at PayPal. There's the obvious memetic competition between x.com and Confinity, which was what PayPal was originally. And then x.com was Musk's company before they merged. What were the other Girardian elements to this story?
Guest
It's a great question. It's threaded throughout the book in subtle ways. In rereading it myself or in revising and editing it, there were a number of Girardian moments that came up—little moments of mimesis and anti-mimesis. I have had long conversations with a friend, Luke Burgess, who wrote a book called *Wanting*. We've talked about this a lot, where these moments are true and not true. One of the things I always tell Luke is that the actual experience of doing PayPal was not an experience of someone like Peter, as well-versed as he is, stepping back and being able to ask "What would Girard do?" I don't think it works that way. He never told me it worked that way, and I interviewed him at great length about the PayPal story. The other thing is that companies, particularly PayPal when they're built in this crucible, it's really hard for theory to match up with reality, or for your ideas about principles to match up with the exigencies of the moment.
Here's one example I would offer as a case study. Post-9/11, the company is in a really difficult position. They had been preparing to go public and had run into some hiccups with the bankers. Then 9/11 happens, the financial district is in ruins, the economy's in shock, the stock market shut down for however many days. The company leadership needs to think about what to do now. Peter, there's a great line he played back to me. This was 20 years of hindsight. He says, "Maybe because no one else is going public, paradoxically, that's actually exactly the time that you should go public, because you're running against the herd." Is there some faint echo of Girard in there? Absolutely. One of the things about studying mimetic desire is the recognition that if you oppose it, it can actually lead to very valuable decisions. Everyone zigs, you decide to zag, and that's a really smart thing.
But here's what he added to his explanation of why they decided to go public after September 11th. Reason number two: going public is a long process. You have to file so many rounds of paperwork to the SEC. You have to get so much buttoned up. You have to do a roadshow. In a startup, you can create a patchwork quilt of answers, but that's not allowed once you're a regulated public company taking public investor dollars. He said, "Because it takes a long time, one of my theses was, if we apply, even if it's after September 11th, and even if we take some flack for doing that, it's going to be six months to a year before we actually get to go public. So given that it's a long road, we should prepare now."
Reason three, and this is where it runs counter to Girard. One of Girard's big things is how emotion can screw up our decisions, obscuring clarity of thought. Peter said to me, "I'm being honest. Another reason that I insisted that we try to go public after 9/11 is I wanted to beat Wall Street." Wall Street had written off the company. It had been so dismissive, didn't understand the model because FinTech wasn't an established space. He said, "If I'm being honest, the competitive thing was a part of it." But competition is sort of not in keeping with Girard. The whole point of studying this is to avoid it. It's a welter of motives, and I don't think anyone could look at the story and say every decision was perfectly conformed to Girardian expectation and insight. I don't think of that as a deficit. I think of that as a good thing.
The way I fact-checked each of those things is I spoke to other people, particularly on the competition with the investment banks. The number of times I heard a negative word about big banks was a dozen times if it was one. People said to me, "The biggest issue we had there was because fintech was not an established sector of the economy. We didn't have a way to get these banks to understand what we were, who we were, what the business would be, what its potential was." Language like "network effects" is common for us in 2022, but it was not common back then for business models. So you have this whole industry that needs to be educated, and PayPal ran into some real difficulty educating them, which is why they were competitive. Peter described it in the book as a Silicon Valley versus Wall Street dynamic.
That's a very long answer to your question. I found moments of that Girardian intuition. If you permit me, I can share the second big bucket where I found it. 9/11 is a discrete, specific example. The other big bucket—and I'm way oversimplifying Girard—one of the things it always leads me to think about is if the entire world says X and you can think Y, or you can think the opposite of X, what if the opposite is true? You can find real power in those moments by being a contrarian. It's not a great word because it's so overused. But one of the things I found most powerfully about Peter in the PayPal story is that he did that with people.
The board would say, "Roelof can't be your CFO. He's 26 years old, fresh out of business school. He's going to get eaten alive by Wall Street. How could you do that?" Peter listens to his board and says no. He says, "Roelof is brilliant. He knows the business cold. He's built the model that's determining a bunch of the actions we're taking as a business. I believe that he will make an exceptional CFO." And he is ultimately right. Reid Hoffman, a friend of Peter's from their Stanford days—Peter says to the board, "I'm going to appoint him as COO" in January of 2000, very early in the business's life cycle. The board members are like, "Your COO is supposed to be a taskmaster, really aggressive. Reid is friendly, a community guy." Peter says, "No. One of the things we lack as a business right now is the ability to have somebody who's going to be a diplomat, a flexible diplomat who can interface with all these external bodies. We need that. He's going to be the person for that job." And he's proven right.
I heard from the employees who were in those situations about Peter's willingness to run into the teeth of what might be regarded as best hiring practices or standard opinions. I do think there is more than a faint echo of Girard in some of those moments. I also think it's hugely instructive. It really does make you think about hiring and who we count in and who we count out. I think he had an ability to see potential in people and put them into places where other people may have missed it.
Host
That's so interesting. There are so many memetic elements to the timing that Peter Thiel was able to execute. You talk about in the book how he saw the dot-com bust coming and he was able to use the inflated valuations to raise the CRC. I think you said a week before the bust happened, they closed their CRC. And then conversely, once the bust happened, they were able to hire all this great talent because nobody in Silicon Valley was hiring as much.
I think my favorite anecdote from the book is how Thiel, after they raise $100 million, he's like, "Alright guys, the market's gonna bust, so why don't we transfer all this $100 million into my hedge fund and I'll short the market?" And then the guy from Sequoia on the board is like, "What the fuck are you talking about?"
Guest
It's a funny moment. I can't tell it without laughing. There are sort of two renditions of that story. One rendition is the sinister version. No, it was an enthusiastic and farsighted board member who saw a market collapse coming and saw a financial opportunity. The financial opportunity is you take the funding we just raised, use it to short the market, and we'll all get filthy rich. It's a sure thing. And understandably, the board pushes back and says, "You can't do that because the funding we raised has contracts and amendments that say it's for these specific purposes." So they pour cold water on the idea.
The interesting thing is that the board members I spoke to about it had this to say. One said, "I often tell this story because I want people to appreciate that part of doing a startup in the way that this team did is being somewhat disconnected from reality. You almost have to be disconnected from reality and offer ideas that are a little outlandish in order to push the limit of what is possible." The other recollection was from John Malloy, a board member, who said, "Peter was right. The actual logic may have been what it was, the mechanics may have been what they were, but actually the NASDAQ lost 78% of its value over the next 12 months. We would have made a lot of money if we had done that. It was actually correct."
They tell it with the benefit of 20 years of hindsight, and they tell it in a humorous way. I think other writers have done characterizations that are more sinister. I didn't find that element in it. When I asked Peter about it, it was the last question in one of my interviews with him. I said, "What do you think about this?" He said, "Yeah, you suggest things when you're young." It was an idea and it didn't go anywhere. I find it to be a really interesting moment. It's characteristic of that group of people in a particular way: the willingness to engage with even the idea that you would take $100 million and short the market. I think a certain tolerance for that is required to do something like PayPal.
Host
If I was on the board, I'd be like, "No, the markets are efficient. You totally can't do that." I think you said they would have made more money by shorting the market than they did from the eBay acquisition.
Guest
I think the math is imprecise. That was a quote from John Malloy. I think he was being directionally accurate but hadn't run an Excel spreadsheet on it.
Host
One suspects that given what PayPal's burn rate was from 1999 to 2002, if someone were to do the math, that might be true because they spent in excess of $200 million in the first four years of the business, despite raising a lot of money. So it could be true, but I didn't get into the level of the math. For me, it was much more about this idea that as a board member who is very thoughtful, you would still bring to the table an idea that can seem crazy. That is actually a hallmark of what kind of Silicon Valley and of this startup environment. It's encouraging to those of us who have those sorts of thoughts.
Okay. So I re-read *Zero to One* after reading your book. I think at least you and I could be being superficial about this, but it seems like there are at least three ways in which the lessons from *Zero to One* contradict the history of PayPal. First, he says, "Don't compete. Just do something totally original." And it's like, payments, e-payments—you're competing against x.com, Billpoint, Visa, MasterCard. Second, he says one of the most important things is that you should always have a plan, always have a vision. This whole thing about startups iterating and slowly pivoting to find their niche is totally overrated.
But your original business idea of encrypting pilots didn't go anywhere. Your original business model of making money off the float didn't go anywhere. You were totally pivoting, and to your credit. Third, he talks about how startups emphasize growth statistics that they're basically getting by burning VC money over the durability of the company. They'll just look at a number. I was like, "Didn't you guys have the World Domination Index that you were constantly looking at?" I could be totally missing the deeper layer in which these lessons actually did apply to PayPal. You could also say that because he learned this from PayPal, he changed his mind.
What is your reaction to these?
Guest
It's interesting. People have said the books are pretty good companion books because a bunch of the stories from mine illustrate some of the principles from *Zero to One*. I would push back on a couple of the observations. With the competition one in particular, I actually think of the competitive dynamic as an illustration of what Peter was saying and as the kind of lesson that led him to write that. There's a gap between the PayPal story and *Zero to One*. *Zero to One* isn't just based on PayPal. It's based on his experience as an investor broadly defined and teaching courses about startups at Stanford.
Let's take a step back on the competition one. PayPal starts as the union of two companies: x.com, which is Elon Musk's company, and Confinity, which is Peter Thiel and Max Levchin, Luke Nosek, Ken Howery, and Russ Simmons' company. The two companies find themselves in competition in late 1999 and early 2000. They are burning through money using bonuses as a way of referring users to try to goose user growth. They're in an arms race with each other to give away money. There's a great line in the book: "Elon and I were going mental trying to kill each other." Another great line: "It was sort of a race to see who could run out of money the fastest."
Here's the interesting thing. Peter is one of the loudest and earliest voices in identifying that this is a competition to the death. It's really bad. It's not good for us to be spending trying to outspend each other into oblivion. He encourages and pushes his board member, John Malloy, to consider the possibility of a merger. John Malloy is actually not all that hot on the idea of a merger between x.com and Confinity. But Peter says, "No, this competition is ruinous. It's terrible to be competing at this level. We should try to merge." Peter is one of the most vocal people against the competition between x.com and Confinity. So I actually think of the PayPal story as a very clear illustration of his view of competition. He's not the only one developing PayPal, but on the competition piece, it's a clear example.
What was your second little divergence?
Host
Iteration versus having a strong initial vision.
Guest
On this one, once PayPal establishes itself as a payment system, as a master merchant between eBay buyers and sellers, once that fundamental business model is established, Peter is actually pretty committed to that vision going forward. You have a period where they are figuring themselves out, from very late 1998 through to 1999. Once that cement dries to some degree, and particularly Confinity is like, "We're going to be an email payment system that is a credit card master merchant and get the economics of the business right," once that happens, they actually have a pretty clear roadmap for how things are going to go. The way I know that is I was seeing decks. It was really neat to go back and look at the pitch decks as they evolved. The pitch deck as of late 1999 and 2000 is pretty well locked. It's not like they're using a payment system to pivot to something else. There's actually consistency for three quarters of the early years of the business. I wish I could get things that right and be that prescient all the time.
The last piece on burn rate and startups using exaggerated or inflated growth metrics to burn VC cash—there's a little bit of truth to that. The criticism in *Zero to One* runs counter to the PayPal experience because PayPal did have to burn through a lot of money. The difference in PayPal's case, and the reason I don't think it's inconsistent, is there's burn rate that you could forecast based on bonus payments. You sign up for PayPal, you get $10. I can reasonably guess at growth rates what I'm going to spend on that. What PayPal didn't anticipate and couldn't have anticipated is the degree to which fraud would be the biggest cost center for them.
Had they known that, they probably wouldn't have gone into the business. I had multiple people at the founding say, "If we had known how bad fraud was, it's quite possible we wouldn't have done this to begin with." It makes me think that the plan was never to just get a bunch of easy money, light it on fire, and use those numbers to sell a bigger vision. Very quickly, they encounter something that's lighting their funds on fire that they didn't anticipate. They have to solve that problem, which becomes one of the company's signature achievements. So I'm not sure I would argue it was just a VC cash grab.
The other reason it's not quite that way is because in 2000, late 2000 and 2001, when the company institutes fees and builds a business around this viral product, they are actually very thoughtfully creating a real enterprise. Originally the idea was to make money on the float—just have a bunch of money and get a few basis points on that because of interest. But in the year 2000, they start to build a fee structure for their users in a very careful way that would run against the criticism that you're just getting a bunch of user growth and that's it.
Host
No, the second half of that for PayPal was we're going to build an incremental plan to essentially take a free, to build a freemium model for our users so that we can bring revenue in. And then at some point when they had run these elaborate spreadsheets, there was a point at which they hit profitability. So it was not quite as helter-skelter as I had to describe the part of it that was, which was like 1999, where they're figuring all of this stuff out.
Guest
Yeah, yeah. The fraud piece is so interesting. There's my favorite anecdote from the book, and this is so good that I almost don't believe it. I mean, I do believe it, but it's like if I saw it in a TV show that was about a startup, like in *Silicon Valley*, I would be like, "Oh, come on, you're pushing it." It was the Russian hackers who were committing fraud against PayPal. One of them emails Max Levchin, the CTO, and this guy had an email exchange. I can't do a Russian accent, but the guy is like, "You know, I'm from a poor Russian family. We can't feed my family. I need to do this in order to feed my family. You're going to affect America, and who doesn't understand about..." And then they implement CAPTCHA, and the guy responds, "Fuck you." It was an epic cat-and-mouse game. One of the things I found most interesting about it is you never picture a CTO of a company communicating with the people who are trying to defraud his company. It's almost not a stretch to say your fraudsters are like a part of your product team, weirdly—unpaid members of your product team.
Host
Yeah. Okay, so why was Peter Thiel so good at spotting talent, and how has he consistently been that way with his VC investments?
Guest
It's a great question. If there's one thing that emerges in the book, I don't have a grand unifying theory of this talent spotting. Let me take a step back and talk through some of the stories from the book. One thing I think he's very good at is not holding a lack of social graces against people.
There's a moment I interviewed Reid Hoffman about. Reid is considering joining the board of Confinity, the company co-founded by Peter and Max. Peter says, "My co-founder is Max, but you've never met him. You guys should go have breakfast. You can't join the board without Max agreeing to it." They meet at Hobee's. The way Reid Hoffman described this to me, endearingly, because he likes Max a lot, he said, "For 45 minutes, all I could think was, 'Look the fuck up,'" because Max was looking down at the ground while explaining what Confinity's products were and what the company was going to be. Today, Max Levchin is as comfortable on a TechCrunch stage as he is with his companies, but there was a time when that wasn't true. The thing he wanted most in the world was to write code and build technological products.
It takes a certain ability to suspend disbelief about somebody, to take a chance on someone and say, "This CTO may not be able to look me in the eye, but he's brilliant. I want to support him with my money and become CEO of his company." That willingness to look the other way on certain social graces is actually a skill. Think about how many McKinsey interviewees would be turned down if they weren't able to look their interviewers in the eye, but they might actually be the smartest people interviewing. How many times do we write people off because of the way they look, the way they talk, the color of their hair, some random quirk of personality? He more than anyone in the story was drawn to that—drawn to the person who might be a misfit or at the margins, and said, "You have real talent. You're going to be brought into this fold."
A great example: there were high school dropouts on the roster at Confinity. This is before dropping out became cool, before the Thiel Fellowship, before Mark Zuckerberg. There were two people I interviewed who were high school dropouts. One of them, his literal reason was, "I just thought high school was stupid, and I was going to make more money writing code." He leaves and does his thing. So there's a roster of people like that who might not find effectiveness in other parts of American economic life, but where he sees real potential.
The second thing is, he is ridiculously smart himself. He's a kind of grandmaster chess player, very widely read, very well educated. He has a high bar for people he wants to hang out with. If you're going to be in the group around him, you have to have a certain level of intelligence. That's table stakes.
The last thing I would say is he had this ability, played back to me by other people, to forecast what someone could be—to look into a crystal ball and see their future, and then outline that for them. There's a really good podcast Max Levchin does where he describes this, way after PayPal. He said that one of Peter's talents is this ability to see what your future could be, play it back to you, and then help you get there. He said he's done this over and over again. I saw that play out powerfully. I would interview people who felt like they weren't good enough to be at PayPal, and they would say Peter would outline the vision of what I could do, and I totally bought it. I was like, "I'm in. I can do that." He gave people a lot of rope.
All of that—I think you're going to have a hard time, and maybe Tyler Cowen's book on talent does this because there's a whole section about Peter. But I think those features are actually very powerful things that are not specific to Peter Thiel. All of us could do more of that. We could become more intelligent. We could embrace misfits more. We could help the people around us outline the biggest and best versions of their lives. So I don't think it's just this specific Peter Thiel thing. I think these are things all of us could probably do more of.
Host
Yeah, interesting. And speaking of talent, did PayPal discover talent or did it make it? Obviously the PayPal Mafia goes on to found LinkedIn, YouTube, Yelp, Tesla, SpaceX, maybe not Twitter. Is it just that Max and Peter were able to identify these people who were going to end up doing great things? Or did the experience at PayPal make them the kind of people who could form half of Silicon Valley?
Guest
It's the great nature-nurture question. Were they going to be the dream team, or did they become the dream team? Was it Michael Jordan or Phil Jackson? Was it the triangle offense or not? I think the only honest answer is both. It is the case that the talent drawn to work at PayPal, many of them were a cut above in whatever thing they were a cut above at—whether it was the ability to see the product vision the way David Sacks could, or the ability to fight fraud, or the ability to write really great code and release products quickly. There's a certain kind of person that got through the door.
That said, the experience of building a startup under duress in the middle of a dot-com bust, facing clash of the titans at the executive level, merging two companies, dealing with eBay and all the rest—it was like 25 years of experience compressed into four years. It was a graduate education times three for some of these people. You could not separate that from the things they have done later. Sometimes that's in very direct ways. YouTube's strategy of making itself ridiculously good at being embeddable in various sites has a direct tie to PayPal's strategy of making itself ridiculously good at being embeddable on various sites. Full stop. I heard story after story about YouTube as an early company getting users who were frustrated by other platforms to complain if a YouTube player was shut down. PayPal did exactly the same thing. There's no way to divorce the later successes from PayPal.
There's another obvious reason: they had a financial exit in early and late 2002. You have a group of people who don't have world-historic sums of money, but they have enough to provide seed capital to other startups, including Yelp, YouTube, Facebook, and all the rest. They have the ability to write a check without the discomfort that might come from writing it in 1998.
Reason three: they had delivered returns for investors. It wasn't just the PayPal group, but Sequoia, BlueRun, Nokia Ventures, John Malloy—all these groups that invested in them had gotten a healthy return. That built a track record and credibility so they could go out and get venture backing, not just from Peter Thiel or Max Levchin, but from big venture capital firms that would look at these people and say, "You've been down this road before. You have a template."
The last thing I would say, and this is crucially important but often missed in the retelling, is that people think the narrative goes: the PayPal people made some money, then went off and turned it into more money, and then even more money. It's not that tidy. You're talking about several hundred people, and not everybody had that experience. Part of what happened is that there was a focus on product distribution at PayPal that was very serious and rigorous. One of the big lessons learned is it's not good enough to just make something. You have to figure out how people are going to find it, use it, and then part ways with their money to pay you for it. That's a very different challenge. David Sacks and his team took that lesson away and have gone on to very senior product roles in other companies. Thinking rigorously about product distribution becomes a very big part of what the people on the product team do.
So the answer has to be both. As unsatisfying as it is, it's not just that you can pluck talent, bring them into your company, and later you'll all go on to host *Saturday Night Live* and own Twitter. You have this group of talented people, and they go through a shared experience together that's really intense. Cards on the table, it's the reason I wrote the book. The book would be uninteresting if it were just a random group of people who went through this experience, and it would be uninteresting if it were just, "Oh, we hired a team of five Michael Jordans and won 20 NBA championships in a row." Of course that happened. It would be uninteresting if it were either or.
Host
Yeah, that's so true. There's a really great talk that Max Levchin gave at a Startup School a few years after PayPal. One of the things he mentions is that they apparently got a multi-million dollar check from the Yakuza, the Japanese mafia. I don't think that was in the book, but what was that about? What happened?
Guest
Yeah, there was an entity attached to the Japanese mafia. These stories have become conflated in the retelling, and there's a little nod to it in the book. Basically, there was a private company attached to the Japanese mafia. The reason Max and Peter have both told this story over and over again is not to illustrate their connections to the mob—they don't have them. The reason is because the money was... this is sort of funny. There was so much hype about Silicon Valley and so much interest in investing in late 1999 and early 2000 that one of the companies basically wanted to send them the money without any contracts. They just asked for the wire instructions and said, "We just want to give you the cash."
It struck Peter in particular as an example of the worst kind of memetic problem. If everyone thinks every company in Silicon Valley is going to be successful, something is wrong. Something's gone cuckoo if someone is saying, "Just give me your bank account number and routing number. I'll wire the money right now. We'll work the paperwork out later." That money ended up being a little more ethically complicated because of its connections. They used the story as an illustration of how aggressive the environment was to get money to an American company whose principal accomplishment at the time was building an email payments infrastructure and giving away bonus funding. The burn rate was ridiculous, but you have this company halfway across the world that's so excited it's just going to send cash, and then they find out later it has unsavory ties.
There were story after story like that. It's a big part of Elon's experience as well. I asked him how difficult it was to fundraise in early 2000. He said, "It's really not that difficult." His line is, "When everyone's pounding on your door and trying to fire hose you with cash, it's not exactly what I would call fundraising." That was their experience. And this gets back to the first question you asked. In spite of that, Peter was pretty insistent during March of 2000 that they close their fundraising quickly, because his view was, "This might be true now—some random company might be trying to wire transfer us money without any strings attached—but that will change as soon as the market starts to slide."
People want to talk about the genius of this group, and there is some truth to that. But you also have to recognize that closing the fundraising in March of 2000 is a fortuitous event. It's a timing event. Even when I interviewed mid-level and junior employees, they would talk about it as a quasi-religious watershed. They managed to secure this round, and then just a little bit after, things completely took a dive. I went for substance over exploring Yakuza connections. I also didn't want to be calling up random phone numbers to ask who's affiliated with the Japanese mafia. I don't think that's a good look for somebody like me.
Host
I hear that apparently there will be a TV show made of this book. This would be a great, at least five-minute edition.
Guest
I think so. It's fun.
Host
By the way, is that happening? The TV show?
Guest
Yeah, it's in the works. There's a producer named Mark Goffman who got his start on one of my favorite shows, *The West Wing*, and recently did *Umbrella Academy*. He was on *Limitless* on CBS. Mark is really great. He and I have been in touch for a long while about the project. I think what he recognizes in it is what I saw: if you have a room of very smart people facing very big challenges, and they don't entirely agree on how to fix everything, that makes for a really interesting narrative. It makes for thought-provoking back and forth, contests of ideas, contests of ambition and ego. What comes out of that is very energetic. He sensed that energy a few years back and reached out to me. He and a few others have been championing this project. I hope it goes. You never know—Hollywood's always a little unpredictable.
Host
I really hope so. One of the things that makes this story so incredible is it's like watching an Avengers movie or a superhero movie where you know Spider-Man is going to win. They're not going to kill off Spider-Man. It's Elon Musk—come on, it's Elon Musk. They're not going to go bust. But then you read this book and it's like, "Oh, people almost went bust here. They lost their backups here. They were at the edge of their funding here." But it's like, "Oh, come on, it's Peter Thiel, it's Elon Musk. How could that happen?"
Guest
It's a really important point, and no one has really brought that up. I'm glad you did. The problem with seeing them as invincible is that it makes other people think they can't do these things, even when they fail. The reason my version of the PayPal story has so much failure in it is because if we pretend they're not superheroes for a minute, if we bring them back down to earth, if we tell the stories of accidentally hot-swapping hard drives and almost losing the company's entire source code, it makes it okay for many other people to do the kinds of work they do and be okay with some odds and ends and wrong turns. I had a friend who's a startup founder who said, "It's really comforting to know that Elon and Peter and David experienced anxiety. To know they were nervous actually makes me feel good." He told me, "Your book is like therapy. If they lived through this and were successful, maybe there's hope for me." I didn't intend to do that. The purpose of my book was just to tell the story, but I do think of it as really important.
Host
Yeah, and there's a strong memetic element to the fact that you published the book in a very positive way. You have this really moving epilogue—I won't spoil it for people who want to read the book—but even like, I'm 21 and I'm a programmer reading this book, and I'm like, "Fuck yeah, I want to do this shit." Which is a totally memetic desire, but that's definitely one you want to spread.
Guest
Yeah.
Host
Okay, so one question I've always had when reading this kind of stuff is, what does somebody like Elon Musk or Peter Thiel do in a pre-capitalist society? Imagine the era of Cato. Are they going to conquer Gaul like Caesar? What is somebody super competent, ambitious, clever, and intelligent doing in those eras? Conversely, you can ask, what does somebody like Napoleon or Churchill do when there's not a total war going on? Are they startup founders? Or do they just open a restaurant?
Guest
Let's go back to what we were talking about at the beginning. If you look at the late 1700s era generation in the United States with the American Revolution, you have Ben Franklin and Thomas Jefferson. Those are two really interesting figures to have in this context. I have a sneaking suspicion that Ben Franklin was an entrepreneur. His start was in printing. He was a printer, made books and things, but he was an entrepreneur and broadly scientifically interested. Jefferson too had all these random interests and writings. He built and designed Monticello, the layout for the University of Virginia bears his signature, in addition to writing the Declaration of Independence. You have people who are polymaths. If they were alive today, would they be involved in business and government? Probably in some capacity. Would they be entrepreneurs? Almost certainly. Some of the hallmarks of their ability—to read widely, to commit themselves to self-education—I wonder what Ben Franklin would have been like if he had YouTube. You've got to believe the guy would have wanted to learn everything, because he displays that quality in his books and in the way he lived his life.
Host
He might spend some time on other video streaming websites.
Guest
That's right. You'd watch Ben Franklin on Vimeo. He'd be a Vimeo guy, not a YouTube guy. I don't know. But it seems to me that there are certain hallmarks of places that are very potent in society where there's a lot of change happening or a lot of possibility of affecting big numbers of people. Those places attract smart, ambitious, and energetic people. In the late 1700s, if you were smart, energetic, and ambitious in the United States during the colonial era, the hottest party in town was the American Revolution. You'd find your way to that. The group that helped create and nurture PayPal has gone on not just to accomplishments in business, but in politics, art, film, books, literature, and nonprofits.
Even today, one of the companies with a bunch of PayPal alumni associated with it is trying to reforest 3 billion acres of forest ecosystems. Some of these characteristics operate at the level of character, and that's malleable. We can improve. We can get better. It's cool to play the game of wondering what so-and-so would be doing. I suspect Ben Franklin today would probably make his way to Austin, Texas, or Miami. I bet he'd be all in on crypto. This is a person who thought about everything from firefighting to daylight savings time. You don't think he'd be totally down to have a long discussion about cryptocurrency?
Of course he would.
Host
Okay, so one question I had is, once Musk got kicked out of PayPal because he had this super ambitious vision of redoing the banking industry and the brokerage services industry and making them cheaper and faster, why didn't he just say, "All right, if PayPal doesn't want to do it, I'll just make a new company to do it"? Why did he decide to finance SpaceX and pivot to Mars and electric vehicles?
Guest
It's a great question. In my discussions with him, he still speaks openly about feeling like PayPal was a vision unfulfilled, and that this is the sort of thing he would want to do at some point. I think the honest answer is that he became oversubscribed. The passions he had in college around electrical energy, sustainable energy, and space travel re-engaged him post-PayPal. He went on to found SpaceX very quickly after his ousting at PayPal. Those are the businesses that obviously occupy his time today, among others. I don't think the passion has ever left. In my discussions with him, he could still become very impassioned about the necessary improvements to financial services that he believes are overdue. But he has understandably made advancements in other fields. I think he still thinks finance is stuck in the 1980s and 1990s in terms of its infrastructures and ecosystems. But the other things he's doing are places where he could uniquely make a mark. It was a matter of timing and circumstance. Leaving X.com—what he called X.com, which became PayPal—allowed him to shift into his Tesla and SpaceX years.
I did have a couple lines from other people. Reid Hoffman mentioned that at one point Elon was like, "We should get the band back together. There's still so much to do in financial services. There's so much that needs upgrading. All these fees are so stupid." Reid Hoffman sort of gently said, "Oh man, just let it go. You have so much other stuff going on." The more interesting thing to emphasize is that in each case, what he is doing is what's commonly known as first principles thinking. The idea of going back to a first principles approach on finance: would you have to pay a wire transfer fee if we're just passing ones and zeros through a database?
If all we're doing is taking one line on a spreadsheet and moving it to another line, and we can do that digitally at almost no cost, why am I paying $25 for an inbound wire? Those sorts of questions animate SpaceX just as well as they animated PayPal and X.com. Let's break things down to what it actually costs to launch a rocket into space. Thinking about those questions is easier than doing something about them. In the original conception of X.com, the idea was to unite financial services. The reason you want to unite financial services is it's better for consumers. It makes things faster and cheaper.
If my mortgage, savings account, and brokerage account are all managed by the same place, I won't be paying hefty fees when I need to move money around, and there won't be a three-day delay before a deposit comes in.
That's as true today as it ever was. And so I think in each case, what he is really thinking about is let's begin from a place of first principles and work backwards to what the best solution is for customers. It doesn't always work out perfectly, but I would argue that some of his criticisms are still true. I mean, I've paid a fee in my life that I would want back from my bank, and damn it, someone should fix that. So I think the short answer to your question is time and his attention shifted to other things. But the longer answer is those problems still exist.
Host
Yeah, yeah. I'm glad you brought up the thing about the band getting back together because that is actually one question I had. This is such an effective team. And as far as I can tell, the only people who actually teamed up as founder and founder, not just investor and founder, were the YouTube founders. So I'm curious, why didn't these people say, "Oh my gosh, PayPal, look at that huge success. Why don't we put this entire team together and do one thing together?" Why did they go off and do their different things? Was it just that these people all needed to be the big guy, given how talented they were?
Guest
No, I don't think it's that. Remember, we're talking about a whole bunch of people. PayPal pre-IPO in Palo Alto was around 200 people, give or take, and Omaha was several hundred people. So it's not like a dozen people. There's actually a whole range of folks, and many of them have worked together on other things. Jeremy Stoppelman and Russ Simmons, early PayPal, co-founded Yelp. Chad Hurley, Jawed Karim — there's YouTube. There are employees that are early at PayPal who go on to work at LinkedIn. There are PayPal employees that go on to work at SpaceX, Tesla. So they do end up working together. The band isn't like a five-piece. It's not the Beatles. It's like 100 Beatles. It's like 500 people. So it's hard to argue that they could bring it back together for one thing.
It's also the case that there were people there who went on to build things that maybe other people wouldn't want to participate in, or build things that couldn't scale. My favorite example is the person who left PayPal after a very short tenure and became a very prominent professional magician. Daniel Chan was one of my favorite interviews because he did magic on Zoom while I was interviewing him. He did tricks with me. But he's not building a venture-backed business to go make some big thing. His business is fundamentally about perfecting his craft and doing it very, very well. Would that blend with some of the things that Peter Thiel is doing? Maybe, but I doubt it.
I don't think of it as a bad thing that the team went off into all these other directions, because them going off into all these other directions is the reason we have YouTube and Yelp and LinkedIn and SpaceX and all the rest. In some ways, I'm comforted that they didn't all stay together and do the next venture and the next venture.
The other thing is, the venture they did together — financial services — is very specific and very difficult. While some of them have done that again in the future, it's not the field that everybody wanted to participate in. Intellectually, we have to remember that if you're building financial services, you're interacting with regulatory bodies all the time, battling big banks and Visa and MasterCard. There are a lot of people for whom that was just a lot of noise, a lot of drama, a lot of diplomacy, a lot of very sensitive interactions about people's money. I think there was a bit of burnout. Somebody could call it PayPal PTSD.
People live their lives. I think it would be hard for some of these people who have been CEOs to be subordinate to others. But I don't think that's the primary reason. I think they just went off and pursued their own interests and passions.
Host
Yeah, yeah. Okay. I want to be respectful of your time, so I'll ask you one last question. You were the managing director at Huffington Post, and I'm sure that involved being up to date minute to minute on getting featured articles out and managing social media. Things are happening constantly. And now you write these books that take five years to compose and publish, with this Robert Caro-like research and writing process where you're reading everything and watching all the interviews. What was that transition like for you? And can you talk a little bit more about your writing process?
Guest
Calling my process Robert Caro-like is the nicest thing anybody's ever said to me. He's a beast and he's the OG of my field. He's the best, and everybody is kind of in his shadow because of the level of diligence he brings.
I like books because they take a long time. I spent five and a half, six years on this PayPal project. That's a long time to devote to one project. I didn't do it full time, but it's still a long time. I like that because every new discovery yielded some other discovery, and every new interview prompted some new insight. I found details that were left underexplored or unexplored for so long. I got a lot of joy out of the endurance of it, out of slogging through it and really going for broke, trying to interview as many people as I could.
I left digital media a long, long time ago, and I'm sort of glad I did. The foremost reason is that with books, you have the ability to patiently work your way through a topic for a very, very long time. In my dream, I get to do what Robert Caro does. My dream is 10 years on a book. If the economics of that could work out, that's exactly what I would do. I would wake up every day and do homework for 10 years until I had a book, because it's so exciting and thrilling to me. I think I was wired that way.
You asked about process. I have specific things I do, but broadly, I treat all of these books with a level of — I think about Caro and I often ask myself, "What would he do?" Or what would Stacy Schiff do? Or what would Barbara Tuchman have done? I think about the people I admire and how they would have approached a project like this. That leads me to seven days a week, watch every interview, contact everybody, try to do as much historical spade work as I can. I don't know why it works. It works for me. I think it's a personality thing too. You have to be willing to be bored a lot. You actually have to be willing to wake up and be bored a lot of the time, because it's only on the 17th press release for X.com that you discover this little nugget about something, or a little name that is different.
I remember when I was looking at Elon's early company, Zip2, I printed out all the Zip2 press releases I could find. I would read them end to end, trying to understand how Zip2 evolved as a company and then divine how that might have affected Elon's development. There's this really great moment in one of the press releases that I ended up putting in the book. JavaScript debuts. This is a big event in computer science. JavaScript is real now. Dr. Lou Tucker, who was the director of development or research at JavaScript, has a line in this press release. I noticed that from the time Java launched to the time Zip2 incorporated Java was a very short window. It confirmed something Elon had said, which is that one of the things he was proudest of with Zip2 was that it was always technologically trying to move very fast and stay ahead of the curve. To me, he made that point, and I thought, "Okay, everyone says that." But then I saw the Java thing and I went and did the timeline on when Java launched and when Zip2 included it, and I thought, "Oh, there's real meat to that statement. There's real substance there."
I can imagine that for a lot of people listening, reading 17 Zip2 press releases is their idea of torture. But for me, having these big stacks of paper around my house that I'm making my way through is actually so thrilling. You feel like you are on an exciting adventure if you're me. I say that a lot. I'm like, "This sounds ridiculous." But you really do feel that way. That's the cool part. The cool part is actually not interviewing. Interviewing them was fun, and I learned a lot from my interviews with these people. But the bigger thing was discovering these tiny discoveries about how these things fit together. An email from a user where they're really angry, and I think, "Oh, this is gold." Or some customer service spreadsheet where you can see the number of customer service calls, and I think, "Oh my God, I have the number of customer service calls. That's insane." I get a thrill out of that. I can't do it on Twitter. I can do it over years on a specific kind of project. I just love it. I love the heck out of it.
Host
Yeah, I loved it too. Like you said with the Java thing, one of the things I really liked about the book was that as a computer nerd, it was so fun to read how people were thinking in the 90s about the trade-off between using Unix and Windows. You did a great job covering that, because these kinds of trade-offs exist even today. People have to make decisions about whether to use this new technology or one that has all these APIs built into it. You go into great detail on this, and it was such an interesting part of the book.
So anyway, the book is *The Founders: The Story of PayPal and the Entrepreneurs Who Shaped Silicon Valley*. I highly, highly recommend it. It's definitely been one of the best books I've read in a long while. Jimmy, anything else you want to say? Anywhere else people can find you?
Guest
Thank you. Thank you for taking the time to do these interviews and to share some of these things. I think the challenge of the kind of work I do is that sometimes you have to neglect, by definition, some of the engagement with an audience, because I need to keep myself walled off in order to do historical work. Then you sort of emerge and the world has totally changed. So I appreciate when enthusiastic people read the book and reach out and can engage on it. What's also nice is you've read the other books in this space, so you're a super informed reader, which makes these conversations and dialogues really fun. I just appreciate all the time and energy you take to do this, because it's not easy, I know. As an author, I appreciate the Robert Caro-like approach to your interviews.
Host
Well, it's extremely nice of you to say, given the rigor in your own preparation process. That compliment means a lot to me. Thank you very much.