Main Topic: The podcast episode discusses Georgism, a economic philosophy that advocates for the taxation of land value to address issues of inequality and rent-seeking. The guest, Lars Ducey, is the author of the book "Land is a Big Deal" and a game developer who has become interested in Georgism.
Key Points:
Takeaways:
Participants:
Additional Notes:
One of my best episodes ever. Lars Doucet is the author of Land is a Big Deal, a book about Georgism which has been praised by Vitalik Buterin, Scott Alexander, and Noah Smith. Sam Altman is the lead investor in his new startup, ValueBase.
Talking with Lars completely changed how I think about who creates value in the world and who leeches off it.
We go deep into the weeds on Georgism:
* Why do even the wealthiest places in the world have poverty and homelessness, and why do rents increase as fast as wages?
* Why are land-owners able to extract the profits that rightly belong to labor and capital?
* How would taxing the value of land alleviate speculation, NIMBYism, and income and sales taxes?
Watch on YouTube. Listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any other podcast platform. Read the full transcript here.
Follow Lars on Twitter. Follow me on Twitter.
Timestamps
(00:00:00) - Intro
(00:01:11) - Georgism
(00:03:16) - Metaverse Housing Crises
(00:07:10) - Tax Leisure?
(00:13:53) - Speculation & Frontiers
(00:24:33) - Social Value of Search
(00:33:13) - Will Georgism Destroy The Economy?
(00:38:51) - The Economics of San Francisco
(00:43:31) - Transfer from Landowners to Google?
(00:46:47) - Asian Tigers and Land Reform
(00:51:19) - Libertarian Georgism
(00:55:42) - Crypto
(00:57:16) - Transitioning to Georgism
(01:02:56) - Lars's Startup & Land Assessment
(01:15:12) - Big Tech
(01:20:50) - Space
(01:23:05) - Copyright
(01:25:02) - Politics of Georgism
(01:33:10) - Someone Is Always Collecting Rents
Dwarkesh Patel
Over the last century, we've had this huge conflict. All the oxygen's been sucked up by capitalism and socialism duking it out. We have this assumption that you either have to be pro-worker or pro-business, that you can't be both. I have noticed a lot of crypto people get into Georgism, not the least of which is Vitalik Buterin, who endorsed my book. If you earn $100,000 in San Francisco as a family of four, you are below the poverty line. Let's start with just taxing the things nobody has made and that people are gatekeeping access to. Let's tax essentially monopolies and rent-seeking. The income tax needs to do this full anal probe on everyone in the country and then audits the poor at a higher rate than the rich. And it's just this horrible burden we have.
Okay, today I have the pleasure of speaking with Lars Doucet, who developed the highly acclaimed Defenders Quest game and part two is coming out next year. But now he's working on a new startup. But the reason we're talking is that he wrote a review of Henry George's Progress and Poverty that won Scott Alexander's book review contest. And now it has been turned into and expanded into this book, Land is a Big Deal. So, Lars, welcome to the podcast.
Lars Doucet
Great to be here, Dwarkesh.
Dwarkesh Patel
Okay, so let's just get into it. What is Georgism?
Lars Doucet
Okay, so the book is based off of the philosophy of a 19th century American economist by the name of Henry George. And basically George's thesis is kind of the title of my book: that land is a big deal. Georgism is often reduced to its main policy prescription that we should have a land value tax, which is a tax on the unimproved value of land, but not a tax on any buildings or infrastructure on top of the land, anything humans add. But the basic insight of it is reflected in the aphorisms you hear from real estate agents when they say things like the three laws of real estate are location, location, location. And by land, it's the one thing they're not making any more of. It's basically this insight that land has this hidden role in the economy that is really underrated. But if you look at history through the right lens, control over land is the oldest struggle of human history. It goes beyond human history. Animals have been fighting over land forever. That's what they're fighting over in Ukraine and Russia right now.
And basically, the fundamental insight of Georgism is that over the last century, we've had this huge conflict, all the oxygen has been sucked up by capitalism and socialism duking it out. We have this assumption that you either have to be pro-worker or pro-business, that you can't be both. And Georgism is genuinely pro-worker and pro-business. But what it's against is land speculation. And if we can find a way to share the earth, then we can solve the paradox that is the title of George's book, Progress and Poverty. Why does poverty advance even when progress advances? Why do we have all this industrialized technology and new methods? In George's time, it was industrial technology. In our time, it's computers and everything else. We have all this good stuff. We can make more than we've ever made before. There's enough wealth for everybody. And yet we still have inequality. Where does it come from? And George answers that question in his book, and I expand on it in mine.
Dwarkesh Patel
Yep, yep. Okay, so I'm excited to get into the theory of all of it in a second. But first, I'm curious, how much of your interest in the subject has been inspired by the fact that as a game developer, you're constantly dealing with decentralized rent seekers like Steam or iOS App Store? Is that part of the inspiration behind your interest in Georgism, or is that separate?
Lars Doucet
It's interesting. I wouldn't say that's what clued me into it in the first place, but I have become very interested in all forms of rent seeking. In this general category of things we call land-like assets that come to first mover advantages in these large platform economies. I've started to think a lot about it. But the essence of land speculation is you have this entire class of people who are able to basically gatekeep access to a scarce resource that everybody needs, which is land. You can't opt out of needing it. And because of that, everyone basically has to pay them rent. And those people don't necessarily do anything. They just got there first and tell everyone else, "Well, if you want to participate in the world, you need to pay me."
Where the actual connection with game development clued me into Georgism is I'd heard about Georgism before I'd read about it. I thought it was interesting, but then I started noticing this weird phenomenon in online multiplayer games going back 30 years repeatedly of virtual housing crises, which is the most bizarre concept in the world to me. A housing crisis in the metaverse and predecessors to the metaverse, as early as Ultima Online when I was 19. This is an online game that you could play, and you could build houses in the game and put them down somewhere. What I found was that houses were actually fairly cheap. You could work long enough in the game to afford to buy blueprints for a house, which you would put somewhere, but there was no land to put it on. At the time, I thought, "Oh, I guess the server filled up." I didn't really think much about it. I was like, "This stinks. I didn't join the game early enough. I'm kind of screwed out of housing." And then I kind of forgot about it.
Then like 20 years later, I checked back in and that housing crisis is still ongoing in that game. That game is still running, a good 25 years later. And that housing crisis remains unsolved. You have this entire black market for housing. Then I noticed that that trend was repeated in other online games like Final Fantasy 14. And then recently in 2022, with all this huge wave of crypto games like Axie Infinity, Decentraland, and the Sandbox, and then Yuga Labs' Bored Ape Yacht Club, the other side had all these big land sales. At the time I was working as an analyst for a video game consulting firm called Novick.
I told my employers, "We are going to see all the same problems happen. We are going to see virtual land speculation. They're going to reproduce the conditions of housing crises in the real world, and it's going to be a disaster." I called it, and it turns out I was right. We've now seen that whole cycle kind of work itself out. It just blew my mind that we could reproduce the problems of the real world so articulately in the virtual world without anyone trying to do it. It just happened. That is the actual connection between my background in game design and getting George-pilled, as the internet kids call it these days.
Dwarkesh Patel
There's a hilarious clip. Some comedian was on Joe Rogan's podcast, I think it was Tim Dillon, and they're talking about Decentraland, where if you want to be Snoop Dogg's neighbor in the metaverse it costs a couple million dollars or something. Joe Rogan was like, "So you think you can afford to live there?" And Tim Dillon's like, "No, but I'm gonna start another metaverse and I'm gonna work hard."
Okay, so let's go into Georgism itself. Tyler Cowan had a blog post a long time ago comparing taxing land to taxing unimproved labor or unimproved capital. It's an interesting concept. I have a CS degree. Should I be taxed at the same level as an entry-level software engineer instead of a podcaster because I'm not using my time as efficiently as possible? And in other ways, the labor equivalent of having an unimproved parking lot in the middle of San Francisco or capital. If I'm just keeping my capital out of the economy and therefore making it not useful, maybe I should have that capital taxed at the rate of the capital gains on T-bill. This way you're not punishing people for having profitable investments, which you're kind of doing with a capital gains tax. What would you think of that comparison?
Lars Doucet
Before you can even answer that question, you have to go back to the ground moral principles you're operating on. Is your moral operating principle that we just want to increase efficiency, so we're going to tax everyone in a way to account for the wasted opportunity cost? That brings up a lot of other questions of who decides what that is. The Georgist argument is a little different. The tax we propose is efficient, but it actually stems from a more fundamental aspect of justice.
From our perspective, if you work and you produce value, your work produced that value. If you save money and accumulate capital in order to put that capital to work to receive a return, you've also provided something valuable to society. You saved money so a factory could exist. You saved money so that a shipping company could get off the ground. Those are valuable contributive things. But nobody made the earth. The earth pre-exists all of us. Someone who provides land actually does the opposite of providing land. They unprovide land and then they charge you for opening the gate. The argument for charging people on the unimproved value of land is that we want to tax unproductive rent seeking. We want to tax non-produced assets because we want to encourage people to produce assets. We want to encourage people to produce labor, to produce capital. We want more of those things. There's that aphorism that if you want less of something, you should tax it.
Maybe there is a case for some kind of galaxy brain take of taxing unrealized opportunity costs or whatever. But I'm less interested in that. My moral principles are more about: let's start with just taxing the things nobody has made and that people are gatekeeping access to. Let's tax essentially monopolies and rent seeking. Then if we still need to raise more taxes, we can talk about that later. But let's start with just taxing the worst things in society and then stop taxing things we actually want more of. We have this mentality right now where everything's a trade-off and we have to accept the downsides of income taxes, sales taxes, capital taxes because we just need the revenue and it has to come from somewhere. My argument is it can come from a much better somewhere. So let's start with that.
Dwarkesh Patel
If it was the case that we've implemented a land value tax, and we're still having a revenue shortfall, and we need another kind of tax, and we're going to have to keep income taxes or capital gains taxes, would you in that situation prefer a sort of tax where you're basically taxed on the opportunity cost of your time, rather than the actual income you generated or the returns of interest you generate under capital?
Lars Doucet
No, I think probably not. I think you would probably want to go with some other just simpler tax for the sake of it, because there's too many degrees of freedom in there. I will defend the Georgist case for property tax assessments for land value tax, but I think it gets different when you start judging what is the most valuable use of your time, because that's a much more subjective question. Are you providing more value to society as being a podcaster or being a computer science person or creating a startup? That may not be evident for some time. Think of people who were never successful during their lifetimes. The guy who invented FM radio threw himself out a window because he never got it really adopted during his lifetime, but it went on to change everything. If we were taxing him during his lifetime based off of what he was doing, being a failure, like if Van Gogh was taxed for wasting his life as an artist, which ultimately led to his suicide. A lot of these things are not necessarily realized at the time. It would need a much bigger bureaucracy to figure that all out.
I think you should go with a more modest approach. After land value tax, you should do things like severance tax on natural resources and other taxes on other monopolies and rents. The next move after land value tax is not immediately to capital and income taxes and sales taxes, but to other taxes on other rent seeking and other land-like assets that aren't literally physically land. Only after you've done all of those, if you still absolutely need more, then move on to the bad taxes.
Dwarkesh Patel
What is a severance tax?
Lars Doucet
Severance tax is a tax on the extraction of natural resources. It's what Norway does with their oil industry that has been massively successful and a key reason that Norway has avoided the resource curse. Georgist purists will say it's essentially a land value tax but of a different kind. A land value tax, you can't normally extract land like on this house you're living on, you're not using up this land. But non-renewable resources you can use up. A severance tax is basically Nestle should be charged a severance tax for the water they're using. All they're doing is enclosing a pre-existing natural resource that used to belong to the people that they've essentially enclosed, and now they're just putting it in bottles and selling it to people. They should be able to realize the value of the value add they give to that water, but not to just taking that resource away.
Dwarkesh Patel
No, that makes sense. Okay, so let's go deep into the actual theory and logic of Georgism. One thing I was confused by is why property owners who have land in places that are really desirable are not already incentivized to make the most productive use of that land. Even without a land tax, if you have some property in San Francisco, why are you not incentivized to construct it to the fullest extent possible by the law to collect rents anyways? Why are you keeping it as a parking lot?
Lars Doucet
There's a lot of reasons. There's an image in the book that this guy put together for me that shows the rate of return. What a land speculator is actually optimizing for is their rate of return. If land appreciates by 10% a year, you're actually incentivized to invest in vacant land or a teardown property, because the building of a teardown property is worth negative value. The land's cheaper because there's garbage on it. You are then less incentivized to invest in a property. Your marginal dollar is better spent on more land than it is on building up.
Dwarkesh Patel
But eventually shouldn't this be priced into the price of land so that the returns are no longer 10% or they're just like what you could get for any other asset? At that point, the rate of return is similar for building things on top of your existing land than buying new land, because the new land's return has been priced into other land?
Lars Doucet
Empirically, we just don't see that. We see rising land prices as long as productivity and population increases. Those productivity and population gains get soaked into the price of the land. It's because of this phenomenon called Ricardo's Law of Rent. It's been pretty empirically demonstrated that it has to do with the negotiation power. Some people do build and invest, but there's a lot of local laws that restrict people's ability to build. Another reason is the existing property tax regime actively incentivizes empty lots because you have a higher tax burden if you build.
There's a phenomenon called land banking and waiting for the land to ripen. Sure, I could build it now, but I might have a lot of land parcels I've got. I don't need to build it now because I think the prices might go up later. It would be better to build on it later than it is now. It's not costing me anything to keep it vacant. If I build now, I'm going to have to pay a little bit more property taxes. I know in three years that the price is going to be even better. So maybe I'll wait to incur those construction costs then. Right now I'm going to focus more on building over here. I've got a lot of things to do, so I'm just going to squat on it here.
It's the same way I'm squatting on about 30 domain names. Most of them bought before I kind of got onto Georgism. I'll pay $15 a year to just hold it. Why not? I might use that someday. I should probably release all the ones I have no intent of using. I was looking for a domain for my startup the other day and every single two-word .com is taken. It's been for like 10 years. It's a similar phenomenon. Some of it is economic, rational following of incentives. Some of it is just, "This is a good asset. I'm just going to hold onto it because why not?" I don't have any pressure to build right now. This happens on the upswing and on the downswing of cities. While the population is growing and while the population is declining, people will just buy a lot of land and hold it out of use because it's also just a great place to park money. It's an asset that, if the population ever starts growing, is going to keep its value better than almost any other hard asset you have.
Dwarkesh Patel
I guess another broader criticism of this way of thinking is that this is all a scarcity mindset. Land is limited, but why don't we just focus on the possibility of expanding the amount of usable land? There's not really a shortage of land in the US. Maybe there's a shortage of land in urban areas. But why don't we expand into the seas, into the air and space? Why are we thinking in this sort of scarce mindset?
Lars Doucet
I love this question because actually our current status quo mindset is the scarcity mindset and Georgism is the abundance mindset. We can have that abundance if we learn to share the land. Right now, why don't we expand? We've tried that. We've done it twice. It's the story of America's frontier. Right now, there's plenty of empty land in Nevada, but nobody wants it. You have to ask why. You also have to ask how we had virtual housing crises in the metaverse, where they could infinitely expand all they want. How is that even possible? The answer has to do with what we call the urban agglomeration effect.
What's really valuable is human relationships, proximity to other human beings, those dense networks of human beings. The issue is that land is not an indistinguishable, fungible commodity. Location really matters. America has a finite amount of land, but it might as well be an infinite plane. We're not going to fill up every square inch of America for probably thousands of years, if we ever do. But what is scarce is specific locations. They're non-fungible. If you don't want to live in New York, you can live in San Francisco or any other big city. But what makes New York, New York is non-fungible.
What makes San Francisco, San Francisco is non-fungible. That particular cluster of VCs in San Francisco, until or unless that city completely explodes and that moves somewhere else to Austin or whatever, at which point Austin will be non-fungible. Austin is non-fungible right now.
The way Georgism unlocks the abundance mindset, let me talk about the frontier. We have done frontier expansion. That is why immigrants came over from Europe, and then eventually the rest of the world to America, to settle the frontier. The losers of that equation were, of course, the Indians who were already here and got kicked out. That was the original idea of America. I like to say that America's tragedy, America's problem, is that America is a country that has the mindset of being a frontier state, but is in fact a state which has lost its frontier. That is why you have these conversations with people like boomers who are like, "Why can't the next generation just pull itself up by its bootstraps?" Because America has had at least two major periods of frontier expansion.
The first was the actual frontier, the West, the Oregon Trail, the covered wagons, the displacement of the Indians. That was a massive time. That was the time in which Henry George's writing was right when that frontier was closing. When all that free land was being taken, the advantages of that land was now being fully priced in. That is what it means for a frontier to close: the good productive land, the value of it is fully priced in. When the frontier is open, you can just go out there and take it and realize the gains of that.
The second frontier expansion was after Henry George's death: the invention of the automobile, the ability to have a job in the city, but not have to live in the city. The fact that you could quickly travel in. I commuted in to visit you here. That is because of the automobile frontier opening that has allowed me to live in some other city, but be able to do productive work like this podcast by driving in. But the problem is sprawl can only take you so far before that frontier as well closes. By closes, I don't mean suburban expansion stops. What I mean is that now, suburban homes fully price in the value of the benefits you're able to accrue by having that proximity to a city, but still being able to live over here, through Ricardo's law.
Dwarkesh Patel
I feel like this is so compatible with the story of we should just focus on increasing technology in abundance, rather than trying to estimate how much rent is available now, given current status quo technologies. The car is a great example of this. Imagine if there were flying cars. There's a whole analysis in that book about if people are still commuting 20 minutes a day, a lot more land is actually in the same travel distance as it was before. Then all this land would be worth as much, even in terms of relationships that you could accommodate. So why not just build flying cars instead of focusing on land rent?
Lars Doucet
Because these things have a cost. The cost of frontier expansion was murdering all the Indians, and the cost of automobile expansion was climate change. There has to be a price for that. Eventually, when you get to the end of that frontier expansion, you wind up with the same problem we had in the first place. The first generation will make out like gangbusters if we ever invent flying cars, even better, like Star Trek matter teleporters. That'll really do it. Then you can really live in Nevada and have a job in New York. There are some people who claim that Zoom is this, but it's not. We've seen the empirical effects of that.
It's the weakest, semi-frontier we've had, and it's already closed. Because of Zoom, houses in Austin have gone up in value because there is demand for them. There's demand for people to telecommute. The increased demand for living out in the suburbs is now basically priced in because of the Zoom economy. The first people who did that, who got there really quick, the first people to log into the Ultima Online server, were able to claim that piece of the frontier and capture that value. But the next generation has to pay more in rent and more in home prices to get that.
Dwarkesh Patel
That raises another interesting criticism of Georgism. This is actually a paper from Zachary Gochenour and Brian Copeland titled "The Search Theoretic Critique of Georgism." The point they made was that one way of thinking about the improvement to land is actually identifying that this land is valuable. Maybe because you realize it has an oil well in it, maybe you realize that it's the perfect proximity to these Chinese restaurants and this mall. Just finding which land is valuable is something that takes capital and also takes you deciding to upend your life and go somewhere. That is not factored into the way you would conventionally think of the improvements to land that would not be taxed. In some sense, you getting that land is like a subsidy for you identifying that the land is valuable and can be used to produce events.
Lars Doucet
I've read that paper. First of all, the first author of that, Zachary Gochenour, I've not been able to pin him down on what exactly he meant on this, but he's made some public statements where he's revised his opinion since writing that paper and that he's much more friendly to the arguments of Georgism now than when he first wrote that paper. I'd like to pin him down and see exactly what he meant by that, because it was just a passing comment. As regards Kaplan's critique, Kaplan's critique only applies to a 100% LVT, where you fully capture all of the land value tax. The most extreme Georgists I know are only advocating for like an 85% land value tax. That would still leave some. Kaplan doesn't account at all for the negative effects of speculation. He's making a "speculation is good actually" argument. Even if we grant his argument, he still needs to grapple with all the absolutely empirically observed problems of land speculation.
If we want to make some kind of compromise between maybe speculation could have this good discovery effect, there's two really good answers to that. First, just don't do 100% LVT, which we probably can't practically do anyway because of natural limitations. You don't want to do 115% land value tax that drives people off the land. We want to make sure we have a high land value tax, but make sure not to go over. That would leave a sliver of land rent that would still presumably incentivize this sort of thing. There's no argument for why 100% of the land rent is necessary to incentivize the good things that Kaplan is talking about.
The second argument is when he talks about oil. We have the empirical evidence from the Norwegian massively successful petroleum model that shows, in the case of natural resources, how you should deal with this. What Norway does is that they have a massively huge severance tax on oil extraction. According to Kaplan's argument, this should massively destroy the incentive for companies to go out there and discover the oil. Empirically, it doesn't. What Norway does is that they figured out that the oil companies' argument is that they need the oil rents.
We need these oil rents or we will not be incentivized for the massive capital costs of offshore oil drilling. Well, Norway's like, "Well, if you just need to cover the cost of offshore oil drilling, we'll subsidize that. We'll just pay you to discover the oil. But when you find the oil, that oil belongs to the Norwegian people. You may keep some of the rents, but most of it goes to the Norwegian people. But hey, all your R&D is free. All your discovery is free." If the problem is discovery, we just subsidize discovery. And then the oil companies are like, "Okay, that sounds like a great deal."
Without that, what the oil companies do is they say, "Okay, we're taking all these risks, so I'm going to sit on all these oil wells, like people sitting on domain names, because I might use them later and the price might go up later." But now because there's a huge severance tax, you're forced to drill now. And your actual costs of discovery and R&D and all those capital costs are just taken care of.
Dwarkesh Patel
But isn't there a flip side to that? One of the economic benefits of speculation, obviously there's drawbacks, but one of the benefits is that it gets rid of the volatility in prices. A speculator will buy when it's cheap and sell when the price is high, and in doing so, they're kind of making the asset less volatile over time. If you're going to tell people who have oil on their land, "We're going to keep taxing you if you don't take it out," you're encouraging this massive glut of a finite resource to be produced immediately. That's bad if we might need that reserve in the ground 20 or 30 years from now when oil reserves are running low.
Lars Doucet
Necessarily. The problem is that speculation in the sense you're talking about—encouraging people to do arbitrage—is good for capital because we can make more capital. But we can't make more land, and we can't make more non-renewable natural resources. Empirically, the evidence just doesn't support that. If anything, land speculation causes land values to constantly increase, not to find some natural par. Especially with how easy it is to finance—two thirds of bank loans just chase real estate up.
If you look at the history of residential real estate prices in America, it's not this cyclical graph that keeps going back down. It keeps going back down, but it keeps going up and up and up on a straight line along with productivity. It underlies major issues driving our housing crisis, which then undergirds so much of inequality, pollution, and climate change.
Even if I just bite that bullet and say, "Okay, speculation is good, actually," I don't think anyone has made the case that speculators need to capture 100% of the rents to be properly incentivized to do anything good that comes out of speculation. I think it's some small, reasonable percentage—5% to 10% of the rents, maybe 15% if I'm feeling generous. But I don't think anyone has empirically made the case that it should be 100%, which is more or less the status quo.
Dwarkesh Patel
With regards to that pattern of values tending to keep going up, that implies there's nothing cyclical that the speculators are dampening.
Lars Doucet
Well, there are cycles to be sure, but it's not like it resets to zero.
Dwarkesh Patel
Yeah, but that's also true of the stock market, right? Over time that goes up, but speculators still have an economic role to play in making sure prices are...
Lars Doucet
The difference is that people are now paying an ever-increasing portion of their incomes to the land sector. That didn't used to be the case. If it keeps going, you have people paying 50% of their income just for rent. That's not sustainable in the long term. The cycle you have there is revolution. I'm serious. Look through history—you either have land reform or you have revolution. It's either a never-ending cycle of transfers of income from the unlanded to the landed, and eventually the unlanded will not put up with that.
There was a real chance at the end of the 19th century of America going full socialist or communist. The only thing that saved us—and George's argument was that it's either Georgism or communism—if you want to save capitalism and not go totalitarian, we need Georgism. What George failed to anticipate was the automobile. The automobile kicked the can down another generation, another couple generations. It came at the cost of sprawl, and that made everyone feel like we had solved the issue. But the costs of sprawl are enormous in terms of pollution and poor land use. Just look at Houston right now.
Now we've come to the end of that frontier, and we're at the same question. You see this resurgence of interest in leftism in America. That's not a coincidence. The rent is too damn high. Poor people and young people feel really shoved out of the promise and social contract that was given to their parents. They're jealous of it and wondering where it went.
Dwarkesh Patel
You mentioned that a lot of bank loans are given so you can get a mortgage and buy a house—it's towards land. There was an interesting question on Twitter about this. I can't find the name of the person who asked it, so sorry I can't give credit. But they basically asked: if that's the case, and if most bank loans are going towards helping you buy land that's artificially more expensive, but now you implement a land value tax and all these property values crash—then all these mortgages can't be paid back. Are we going to destroy the banking sector? We'll have a Great Depression.
Lars Doucet
Well, this is kind of like—I'm not trying to compare landlords to slave owners or something—but it's like the South had an entire economy based off of slavery, this thing that we now agree was bad. We shouldn't have kept slavery because it really disrupted the Southern economy when we got rid of it. But it was still the right thing to do.
There is no magic button I could push that will give us 100% land value tax everywhere in America tomorrow. The actual path towards a Georgist future is going to have to be incremental. There'll be enough time to unwind all those investments and get to a more sane banking sector. If we were to go overnight, yeah, I think there would be some shocks in the banking sector, and I can't predict what those would be. But I also don't think that's a risk that's actually going to happen because we just cannot make a radical change like that overnight.
Dwarkesh Patel
Okay, let's get back to some theoretical questions. I guess I don't fully understand the theoretical reason for thinking that you can collect arbitrarily large rents. Why doesn't the same economic principle of competition apply? I get that there's not infinite landowners, but there are multiple landowners in any region. If for the same reason that profit is competed away in any other enterprise—if one landowner is extracting $50 a month in profit and another landowner is extracting a similar amount, and they're both competing for the same tenant, one of them will decrease their rent so the tenant will come to them, and the other will do the same. The bidding process continues until all the profits are bidded away.
Lars Doucet
This is Ricardo's Law of Rent. There's a section in the book with illustrations. The issue is that we can't make more land. You might say, "Well, there's plenty of land in Nevada." But the point is, there's only so much land in Manhattan. The people who have land in Manhattan—why aren't they competing against each other?
What they do is, because of the scarcity of locations in Manhattan and so many people who want to live there, all the people who want to live there have to outbid each other. Let me give a simple agricultural example, and then I'll explain how it translates to a residential model.
When you are paying to live in an urban area or even a suburban area like here in Austin, what you're actually paying for is the right to have proximity to realize the productive capacity of that location. I want to live in Austin because I can have access to a good job, good schools, those amenities. You have to outbid other people who are willing to pay for those.
Ricardo's Law of Rent says that the value of the amenities and the productivity of an area, as it goes up, gets soaked into the land prices. The mechanism is: say I want to buy a watermelon. There's only one watermelon, so I'll have to outbid that guy. But the watermelon growers can say, "A lot of people want watermelon, so next season there's going to be more watermelons." But because there are only so many locations in Austin within the natural limits of our transportation network, it forces the competition on the side of the tenants. It forces us into one-sided competition with each other.
Here's a simple agricultural example. Say there is a common field that anyone can work on, and you can make 100 units of wealth if you work on it. There's another field where you can also earn 100 units of wealth, but it's owned by a landowner. Why would you go work on the landowner's field when you'd have to pay them rent? You wouldn't pay any rent at all. You'd work on the field that's free.
But if the landowner buys that field, and now your best opportunity is a free field that will produce only 10 units of wealth, now he can charge you 90 units of wealth because you have no opportunity to go anywhere else. As more land gets bought and subjected to private ownership in an area, landowners over time get to increase the rent. The limit is what's called the margin of production—you can charge up to the best free alternative. Geographically, that's the marginal land out on the edges of Austin that's available quite cheap, but might be quite far away. As that margin slowly gets privatized, landowners can charge up to that margin. The other limit is subsistence—they can't charge more than you're actually able to pay.
This is how frontier expansion works. When the entire continent's free, the first settler comes in, strikes a pick in the ground, keeps all their wealth. But as more of it gets consolidated, landowners are able to charge proportionately more until they're charging essentially up to subsistence.
Dwarkesh Patel
Does that explain property values in San Francisco? They're obviously very high, but I don't feel like they're that high where the software engineers working at Google are living at subsistence levels. Neither are they at the margin of production where it's like, "This is what it would cost to live out in the middle of California and then commute three hours to work."
Lars Doucet
It has to do with two things. First, it's over the long run. When you've had a lot of productivity booms in San Francisco, it takes some time for that to be priced in. Given a long enough time period, it'll eventually get there. Second, it's based off the average productivity. The average resident of San Francisco maybe doesn't earn as high an income as a high-income productive worker. So if you are a higher-than-average productivity person, it's worth it to live in the expensive town because you're being paid more than the average productivity that's captured in rent. But if you're lower than average productivity, you flee high productive areas. You go to more marginal areas because those are the only places you can afford to make a living.
Dwarkesh Patel
That's very interesting. That was one of the questions I was really curious about. Another one is: the idea is that land is soaking up the profits that capitalists and laborers are entitled to in the form of rent. But when I look at the wealthiest people in America, there are people who own a lot of land, but they bought that land after they became wealthy from doing things that were capital or labor—like starting a company. Bill Gates owns a lot of land in Montana, but the reason he has all that wealth to begin with is because he started a company. That's basically labor or capital, however you define it. How do you explain the fact that all the wealthy people are capitalists or laborers?
Lars Doucet
One of the big misapprehensions people have is that when they think of billionaires, they think of Bill Gates, Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos. Those are actually the minority of billionaires. Most billionaires are involved in hedge funds, banking. And what are two thirds of bank loans? Real estate.
But more to your point, I don't necessarily have a problem with a billionaire existing. If someone genuinely brings something new into the world, I don't necessarily buy the narrative that billionaires are solely responsible for everything good that comes out of their company—they like to present that image—but I don't necessarily have a problem with a billionaire existing. I have a problem with working class people not being able to feed their families. The greater issue is that the rent is too high, rather than that Jeff Bezos is obscenely rich.
Dwarkesh Patel
My point wasn't that I'm complaining your solution wouldn't fix billionaires existing. I also like that there are billionaires. What I'm pointing out is: if your theory is that all the surplus in our society is going to landowners, and yet the most wealthy people in our society are not landowners, doesn't that contradict your theory?
Lars Doucet
A lot of the wealthy people in our society are landowners. Making wealth off land is a way to make wealth without being productive. You said in your interview with Glazer that the value of the Googleplex real estate probably doesn't compare to the market cap of Google. But compare the value of all the real estate in San Francisco to the market caps of some of those companies in there. Look at the people who are charging rent to people who work for Google. That's where the money is actually going.
Investors talk about this: if you earn $100,000 in San Francisco as a family of four, you are below the poverty line. The money is going to upper middle class and upper class Americans who own tons of residential land—the old and the wealthy especially. This entire class of hidden landed gentry is extracting wealth from the most productive people in America and young people especially. It creates really weird patterns, especially with service workers who can't afford to live in the cities where their work is demanded.
Dwarkesh Patel
What do you think of this take? This might be economically efficient—I think it probably is—but the effect of a land value tax would be to shift our societal subsidy away from upper middle class people who happen to own land in urban areas and shift it to the super wealthy and super productive people who will control the half an acre that Google owns in Mountain View. It's easing the burden on super productive companies like Google so they can make even cooler products in the future. But it is in some sense a little regressive—you're going from upper middle class to tech billionaire. But it would still be economically efficient to do that.
Lars Doucet
I don't quite agree with that. Although there are a lot of upper middle class Americans who own a lot of the land wealth, it's not the case that they own where the majority of the land wealth is. The majority of the land wealth in urban areas is actually in commercial real estate—the central business district.
I work in mass appraisal, so I've seen this myself in the models we build. If you look at the transactions in cities and plot where the land value is, the graph looks like this [gestures a peak]. That's the city center, and that's not a residential district. The residential districts are sucking up a lot of land value and the rent is too damn high, but the central business district—even in the age of Zoom, it's taken a tumble but starting from a very high level—commercial real estate is orders of magnitude more valuable than a lot of the other stuff. And a lot of it is very poorly used.
In Houston especially, it's incredibly poorly used. We have all these central parking lots downtown. That is incredibly valuable real estate, and just a couple of speculators are sitting on it doing nothing with it. That could be housing, offices, amenities, a million sorts of things. When you're talking about a land value tax, those are the people who are going to get hit first. Those are people who are neither nice, friendly, upper middle class Americans nor hardworking industrialists making cool stuff. They're people doing literally nothing.
If you do a full land value tax, yeah, it's going to shift the burden on society somewhat. But I feel that most analyses of property taxes and land value taxes that conclude they are regressive are done on the basis of our current assessments. I feel our assessments could be massively improved. If we improve the assessments, we can show where most of our land value is actually concentrated, and then we can make decisions about whether we're comfortable with these tax shifts.
Dwarkesh Patel
[to audience] Hey guys, I hope you're enjoying the conversation so far. If you are, I would really appreciate it if you could share the episode with other people who you think might like it. Put the episode in the group chat with your friends, post it on Twitter, send it to somebody who you think might like it. All of those things help out a ton. Anyways, back to the conversation.
So a while back I read this book *How Asia Works* by Joe Studwell. One of the things he talks about is trying to explain why some Asian economies grew gangbusters in the last half of the 20th century. One of the things he points to is that these economies implemented land reform—they redistributed land away from the existing aristocracy and gentry towards the people who were working the land.
While I was reading the book, I was kind of confused. There's something called the Coase Theorem—the idea that regardless of who initially starts off with a resource, the incentive of that person will be to give that resource or lend it out to be worked by the person who can make the most productive use of it. Studwell was pointing out that these small peasant farmers will pay attention to detail of crop rotation and making maximum use of the land to get maximum produce, whereas if you're a big landowner, you just try to do something mechanized that's not nearly as effective. In a poor country, you have a shit ton of labor, so you want something that's labor intensive.
Backing up: I was confused while reading the book because I thought, "Wouldn't what you expect to happen in a market be that the peasants get a loan from the bank to rent out that land, and then they are able to make that land work more productively than the original landowner, therefore they are able to make a profit, and everybody benefits?" Why isn't there a Coasian solution to that?
Lars Doucet
Because any improvement that the peasants make to the land will be a signal to the landowner to increase the rent, because of Ricardo's Law of Rent.
Dwarkesh Patel
Yep, okay.
Lars Doucet
That's exactly what happened in Ireland. George talks about this in *Progress and Poverty*. A lot of people were like, "Why was there famine in Ireland? It's because the Irish are bad people. Why didn't they improve?" And it's because if you improve the land, all that happens is you are still forced into one-sided competition and the rent goes up.
Dwarkesh Patel
Is the goal that the taxes you would collect from the land value tax are meant to replace existing taxes, or are they meant to give us more services like UBI? Because they probably can't do both, right? You either have to choose getting rid of existing taxes or...
Lars Doucet
Well, it depends how much UBI you want. It's a sliding scale. How many taxes do you want to replace versus how much spending? You can have a budget. I show in the book the exact figures of how much I think land value tax could raise. I forget the exact figures, but you can pull up a graph. Whether you're talking about the federal level or federal, local, and state, there's $44 trillion of land value in America. I believe we can raise about $4 trillion in land rents annually with 100% land value tax. We'd probably do less than that in practice.
Even on the low end—I forget what figure I quote for the low end—you could fully pay for any one of Social Security, Medicare plus Medicaid together, or defense entirely with the lowest estimate of what I think land rents could raise. I think you can actually raise more than that. I give an argument in the book for why I think it's closer to $4 trillion, and that could pay for all three and have room over for a little bit extra.
It's up to you—a policy decision of whether you want to spend it on spending, offsetting taxes, or UBI. I think the best political solution, because if I bite the bullet that there might be some regressivity issues left over, you want to do what was called in George's time a "citizen dividend." That will smooth over any remaining regressivity issues.
I am very much in favor of getting rid of some of these worse taxes, not just because they have deadweight loss and land value tax doesn't, but also because there's this tantalizing theory called "All taxes come out of rent." This suggests that if you reduce other taxes, it increases land values. If it's true in the strongest sense, it means the single tax—land value tax replacing all taxes—would always work. I'm not sure if I buy that. I want to see some empirical evidence. But I think at least some weak form of it holds, so that when you offset other worse taxes, not only do you get rid of the deadweight loss from those, but you also wind up raising at least a little bit more in land value tax revenue.
Dwarkesh Patel
As a libertarian, or somebody who has libertarian tendencies, my concern would be that this obviously seems better than our current regime of taxing things that are good—capital and income. But my concern is that the way something like this would be implemented is it would be added on top of rather than repealing those taxes. So we would want to get this one right.
Lars Doucet
I've been a libertarian in my past, and I have a soft spot for libertarianism. I used to be a Ron Paul guy back in the day for a hot minute. The thing to assuage your concerns is: what is land value tax? It's property tax without a tax on buildings. The natural path to actually getting land value tax comes from reforming existing property tax regimes by reducing an entire category of taxation—the tax on buildings.
That's what I think is the most plausible way to get a land value tax. In Texas here, if we were to start by just capturing the same—what I actually proposed for a first step is not 100% land value tax federally. I don't even know how you get to there. I think what you actually do is start in places like Texas. Legalize split rate property tax—tax buildings and land at separate rates, set the rate on buildings to zero, collect the same dollar amount of taxes. Let's start there.
There are proposals to do this in various cities around the nation right now. I think there's one in Virginia, a proposal to do it in Detroit, some talk of it in Pennsylvania and some places. I'd like to see those experiments run and observe what happens. I think we should do it in Texas. That would be very friendly to the libertarian mindset because clearly we're no new revenue. We're exempting an entire category of taxation. Most people are going to see a savings on their tax bill. The people who own those parking lots downtown in Houston are going to be paying most of the bill.
Dwarkesh Patel
By the way, what do you make of a Georgist critique of government itself? In the sense that government is basically the original land squatter, and it's charging the rest of us rents. It's neither productively improving as much as it's getting rents from us. Even your landlord usually isn't charging you 40%, which is what the income tax rate is in America. You can almost view the American government as the landlord of America.
Lars Doucet
If you're asking if Georgism is compatible with full anarcho-capitalist libertarianism, probably not 100%. I think we can have a little government as a treat. But I think it's not a coincidence that throughout America's founding, originally only white landowning men could vote. It was a government by the landowners, for the landowners, of the landowners.
And that's very much kind of the traditional English system of government, just neo-feudalism. And so I think Georgism certainly has a critique of that, that government is often instituted to protect the interests of landowners. But what's interesting is if you look throughout history. I'm very much a fan of democracy, rule of the people. I kind of sympathize with Milton Friedman here, where he might want to have less government than we have now, but he doesn't believe we can have no government. And then he goes on to endorse the land value tax as the least worst tax because income tax, especially, I feel like is a gateway drug to the surveillance state.
One of the advantages of land value tax is you don't even care necessarily who owns the land. You're just like, "Hey, 4732 Apple Street, make sure the check shows up in the mail." I don't care how many shell companies in the Bahamas you've obscured your identity with, just put the check in the mail, Mr. Address. Whereas the income tax needs to do this full anal probe on everyone in the country, and then audits the poor at a higher rate than the rich. It's this horrible burden we have. And then it gives the government this presumed right to know what you're doing about everything, this massive invasion of privacy.
Dwarkesh Patel
That's fascinating. Speaking of shell companies, the Bahamas, by the way, there's this interesting speculation about what would happen if crypto really managed to divorce and make private your ledger transactions. The idea is the only legible thing left to the government is land. So it would force the government to institute a land value tax because you can't tax income or capital gains anymore, that's all on the blockchain and obscured in some way.
Lars Doucet
Right, right. So it's like crypto is the gateway drug to Georgism because it'll just move income and capital to the other realm. It's so weird. I've gone on record as being a pretty big crypto skeptic, but I have noticed a lot of crypto people get into Georgism. Not the least of which is Vitalik Buterin, who endorsed my book and is a huge fan of George's. I'll take fans from anywhere, even from people I've had sparring contests with. I'm generally pretty skeptical that crypto can fulfill all its promises. I am excited by those promises, and if they can prove me wrong, that would be great. I think there's some logic to what you're saying, that if we literally couldn't track transactions, then I guess we don't have much to tax except land. I don't think that'll actually come to pass just based off of recent events. But I have noticed a lot of crypto people are some of the easiest people to convince about Georgism, which was completely surprising to me. I've learned a lot by talking to them. It's very interesting and weird.
Dwarkesh Patel
So there were some other interesting questions from Twitter. Ramon Dario Iglesias asks, how do you transition from a world today where many Americans have homes, or at least are aspiring to have homes, to a world where it would be a different regime? They might still have homes, but their property would be thought of in a completely different way. How do you transition to that? What would that transition look like?
Lars Doucet
Right, so there's this issue I have to grapple with called Gordon Tullock's transitional gains trap. If you think about taxi medallions in New York City, it's an artificially scarce asset that allows you to operate a taxi. The first generation that got their taxi medallions got in cheap and then made out like gangbusters. But the second generation had to buy those taxi medallions at the fully priced-in value. Now when you come in and say, "We're going to abolish taxi medallions," you would screw over that entire second generation who bought in in good faith after the value of the asset had been fully priced in. Even if you admit the system is now unfair, removing that unfairness screws over the people who played by the unfair rules. How do you grapple with that?
I think it's something Georgists need to grapple with because we can't just imagine a future utopia without accounting for being fair to people who play by the rules, including people like myself. I'm a homeowner. Am I intending to screw over myself and everyone like me? I think it's really important to do the math of knowing exactly who's going to be a winner, who's going to be a loser, who's going to pay more, who's going to pay less.
It's really salient that a lot of the value of land is commercial downtown real estate. A revenue-neutral property tax shift to land, where we exempt the taxation of all buildings but collect the same amount in property taxes as we're doing now just from the land, and then a modest citizen's dividend, is a really good first step. Then over the years, you can raise the land value rate as you also decrease things like income tax and sales tax. That's a transition that gets us there without really screwing anyone over. For any edge case, like a poor sympathetic widow who has no income but has a high-value home, you just make it so she doesn't have to pay the land value tax until she dies or sells the estate.
Dwarkesh Patel
Even in that case, the worst case scenario is the status quo where they don't have to pay land value taxes, which is already the case now. Nobody cares about the people who are being evicted and displaced by the status quo. One snafu in terms of figuring out how to price the land is that by the time a land value tax is passed, it will have been years after this political talk of having a land value tax. That talk will in turn affect the prices of homes that are sold in that time. Then you'll look at the land selling value and be like, "Oh wow, this house on the outskirts of San Francisco only sold for $200,000. Does that mean the unimproved land there is only worth $100,000?" Wouldn't that really conflate the data when you go about implementing this, of what the actual unimproved land is worth?
Lars Doucet
It's important to remember that land selling value is derived from land rental value, not the other way around. Land selling value is the net present value of the future flow of income that can be generated from the property. The property's inherent productivity is inherent to it. The selling price is based off the capitalization of that value minus the expectation of any taxes. A 100% land value tax will theoretically reduce the selling price to zero, but the land will still be as productive as it always was. The flow of those rents is just being redirected. In mass appraisal, one of the things you do is decapitalize the effect of the tax.
Dwarkesh Patel
But how do you figure out what the property owner or seller thinks the probability of a tax is? Since you don't know that, it's hard to estimate what the actual capitalization value is. Are you concerned about the societal effects of the depreciation of land prices, or are you more concerned about the calculation issue?
Lars Doucet
The calculation issue. Empirically, if the land selling price has dropped to zero, then you are fully capturing all of the land rents. If it's above zero, you have not captured all of the land rents. In the first few years you implement this, you would be trying to mess with the rate. If there are any vacant lots in the area and they're selling for anything, there's still land rent in that property.
Dwarkesh Patel
Gotcha. So this is not something you would be able to figure out day one. You would have to fudge the numbers over a course of years.
Lars Doucet
We're doing property tax assessments right now. We're doing mass appraisal all the time right now. If you just keep it updated every year, you could do it every six months if you had the right technology, which is something I'm pushing for. You can see the prices change in real time as transactions come in. You can use multiple regression and geographic weighted regression to work out the difference between the improvements and the land prices. If you had a rental registry and knew what everyone was paying in rents, you'd be able to keep even better track on what's going on.
Dwarkesh Patel
This might be a good point to talk about your new startup. This is actually something I don't know about either. What is the idea? What are you up to?
Lars Doucet
I'm transitioning out of video games and into municipal property tax assessment, mass appraisal. My new startup is called Geoland Solutions for now. We'll probably have a new name by the time this podcast airs. The idea is that I think the best criticism to Georgism is, "How are you actually going to separate land value from improvement value, from building value? We can't do a land value tax till we put a price on every parcel of land. So how are you going to do that?" I thought that was the best, most good faith criticism remaining. It seemed like we got to get good at that.
I looked into it and realized there's a lot of research papers posted in the last 15 years about how to practically do this. I started interviewing a bunch of assessors and realized the state of the practice is pretty far behind. Only 15% of most property tax assessment offices even use multiple regression. A lot of them are using the cost approach, which is what Ed Glaeser talked about in your interview with him, where you estimate the cost of building, apply depreciation, and subtract it from the observed selling price to get the assumed land price. That works okay, but a lot of assessment is using essentially only that method. Another issue is that a lot of those cost tables are very out of date. Assessments themselves are not always done every year. It's not unheard of to find places that haven't done reassessments in more than 10 years. Most places it's one to five. Even that, I think we should be doing everything we can to get all the latest mass appraisal technology and research.
We've hired some people. One of our first hires was one of the guys who was just first author on all these papers we were reading. We're here to update municipal property tax assessors on the latest methods so that we can accurately know what all the land in America is worth. This will solve a lot of regressivity issues too. We know that a lot of landlords are actually under-assessed relative to homeowners, believe it or not, because they're more likely to protest their property taxes. Minorities tend to be over-assessed and poor people tend to be over-assessed. That's why property taxes are sometimes called regressive, because the assessments need to be fixed.
Dwarkesh Patel
I see. Because if you have more property, getting your rate change from 1% to 0.8% is worth thousands of dollars rather than hundreds of dollars.
Lars Doucet
There are a lot of other issues too. Often from no malintent whatsoever, but just out of date assessments can cause all sorts of issues.
Dwarkesh Patel
One worry people might have is that income taxing is obviously very inefficient. In the book, you talk about the percentage of taxed income that is literally just spent on figuring out how much income tax to collect and whether people are paid. I get that. But at least it has this nice property of there being a hard figure that ought to exist. I made this much income this year. Whereas figuring out how much land is worth, the rent value, that's the value of the land. But it just feels much more murky. It might enable corruption where whoever is doing the assessment uses fancy algorithms to nudge it one way or another that benefits big corporations or whoever they want.
Lars Doucet
That's a good argument, but the reply is that we need to move towards more transparency. Land value follows certain rules that should logically make sense. We know some things that drive locational value. First of all, we should move towards open source models, which is something we want to do, and open data whenever possible. A lot of these cities will post open data portals. My mission in life is to advance the state of the art of this technology and make it so anyone can check on stuff. You should be able to, in any city in America, look up your property tax assessment on a map and compare it to your neighbor. What you shouldn't see is a Christmas tree effect where your neighborhood looks like Christmas tree lights of green and red of people whose property tax assessments massively differ. That's the case in a lot of cities.
If the land values have been correctly assessed in this neighborhood, most of these parcels should be about the same. The cul-de-sac is worth a little bit more, but your neighbor's land shouldn't be worth 20% more than yours. If it is, it'll stick out on a map like a sore thumb. If the data and the algorithms are all open source and open data, you should be able to check anyone's math and use that to protest your taxes if they seem off. That's the argument for land value taxes. You can hide all kinds of stuff in income taxes and capital taxes. That's what the Caymans and the Bahamas are for. But if you want to, it's very easy to find people who are getting a break on their property taxes. I'm not saying corruption won't happen, but it'll be very easy to see because you'll be able to see a mansion that suddenly has this discontinuity on the land value map. It's like, "Well, someone gave this person a break. Maybe we should write an article in the local newspaper about this." It'll be way better than how income taxes work, where none of it is open to potentially even the government itself.
Dwarkesh Patel
That's fine for things that are above ground and legible. But what about if you find out through surveying that this land has a lot of oil under it and you buy it? You're not going to tell the government you just found oil. You're still being a speculator, but you're incentivized even more to be a speculator because as soon as you declare there's oil underneath this ground, the government is going to start taxing you for it. So you just want to hang on to that forever.
Lars Doucet
We need to talk about mineral policy in America. Especially in the state of Texas, mineral rights and land rights are totally different. Usually when you buy land in Texas, you actually don't have the mineral rights. Those are very severable. A lot of people are very interested in getting those mineral rights. Usually if you're not paying attention, you're not getting the mineral rights when you're buying land, and if you are, you're paying more for them.
I think with the case of minerals, you can't just have a full capture. As an acknowledgement of Kaplan's search theoretic thing, you need something more like the Norwegian model, where you need to give some incentive to someone to produce or to not withhold that resource. A good example would be the treasure law in England. England has all this ancient Anglo-Saxon treasure and Roman treasure. Before, someone would find it and hide it or melt it down because they didn't want the government to tax them. They passed this treasure law where they said, "This is our heritage. We want that in a museum. Here's the deal: if you find treasure, you're going to get paid, and the landowner's going to get paid." There's an incentive for people to go out with metal detectors and for a landowner to let people do that. The government puts it in a museum. You're rewarded for the discovery, but that thing's value is captured because it's the heritage of the British people.
The opposite of this is the Spanish government. Whenever someone finds a ship full of gold doubloons on the bottom of the ocean, if you invest the capital to bring it up and you're in Spanish waters, a Spanish admiralty court is going to try to get its claws on that gold. In the view of the Spanish government, the incentives they're producing are to make sure nobody ever recovers a ship. Or if they do, it just ends up in a foundry in another country.
Dwarkesh Patel
A general critique of Georgism or implementing it would be that the reason America is wealthy and other developed countries are wealthy is because they are very strong in terms of honoring contracts, especially honoring people with property rights. If we get to a scenario where the government is saying, "In this case, we're going to..." I guess it depends on how you think about the contract of property, but in some sense it's a contract we have with the government that "I have this property." Once you don't honor that, people will get too concerned to want to invest in America or in American assets. That will have all kinds of economic repercussions where people are like, "Oh, I guess my property is not mine. Maybe other things I thought I was investing in, like my stocks, are not mine. So why should I buy these stocks in America?"
Lars Doucet
This is a fully general argument against change. I don't agree with all the assumptions. If America doesn't honor its agreements, what are they worth? We've violated all kinds of treaties, not just with the Indians but also international treaties. We've made all kinds of times where we've changed rules on things and changed asset classes. We had an entire period where we just banned all sales of alcohol, and then we had a time where we completely undid that and brought it all back. There have been times where we've made major changes to the rules of what kind of asset classes we have. This is brought up with labor protections and things: "We have these rules and therefore we can never change them."
The best answer to this is that you need to acknowledge Gordon Tullock's transitional gains trap. If someone is going to be put out, then you make sure there's some compensation in the system to smooth over the transition. The rule of law doesn't imply that any change to the status quo is going to undermine trust in it. It's important to remember that George is not interested in seizing land. That's a very big distinction from the Maoist position, which is murder the landlords, or the more modest Asian reforms. In Asia, they took the land away from the big landowners, gave it to the peasants, and it made those countries way more productive. I don't think anyone would look at those Asian countries now and compare them to where they were and say the rule of law is weaker now than it used to be. George isn't even advocating for that. He's just advocating for raising taxes on land and exempting all of the building taxes. I don't think it amounts to seizure of land. Even if it did, sometimes it's worth biting some bullets.
Dwarkesh Patel
Let's move on to some more fun interpretations and applications of Georgism.
Lars Doucet
Sure.
Dwarkesh Patel
Bernd Hobart had this blog post. He's a great finance writer. He was talking about how if you have a Facebook account or a YouTube channel with millions of subscribers, you were very early to YouTube or Facebook and now you have this land. Facebook punishes you if you have a big account but aren't posting frequently or getting enough engagement. In the future, you'll have a harder time reaching people. Bernd had this Georgist interpretation where you have this productive asset of people to attend to, this initial profile you were able to build in the early days of Facebook. If you're not posting on it, they're not going to give you the advantage of having millions of eyes. There are all kinds of ways you can apply Georgism. You can think of the App Store as rent-seeking from Apple where they charge you 30%. There are all kinds of other places in the digital world where you can think of this. How do you think about Georgism in the context of those kinds of things?
Lars Doucet
I've actually written a policy paper on how to apply the theories of land value tax to virtual worlds. The question is, virtual real estate, when does something actually operate like a land-like asset? To what extent do George's principles apply? That doesn't necessarily mean just do LVT. Let me define what I mean by a land-like asset. A land-like asset has three properties. It is scarce in supply, it is necessary for production, and it obtains locational value by virtue of its position in some kind of graph.
As an example, I create a fictional MMO and I give the example of a unicorn, a permit, and a plot of land. The unicorn is scarce, but it's not necessary for production. Any value you could get from the unicorn, you could get some other way. It's just really nice to have, and there's only 10,000 on the server. A permit is a permit to brew potions. You're part of the witch's guild, you can brew potions. My apprentice witch has to pay rent to me to gain access to my permit to be allowed to brew potions, but all permits are fungible so there's no locational value. Then a plot of land, like we've talked about, becomes a real speculative asset.
Domain names are probably the closest thing to this. Vitalik Buterin has actually written a post about how to apply George's theory to domain names and all the wrinkles involved. We did this on your blog as a guest post. Well, Progress and Poverty.substack.com is not technically my blog, it's a group blog where a lot of us Georgists post. He cross-posted it on his own blog too. There are other considerations when we go away from literal land. In domain names, especially with the Ethereum Name System, you have issues of identity that don't apply. If someone buys this house from you, people aren't going to think that they're you. But if I buy vitalik.eth, there might be some confusion. I might be able to get some transactions that were meant for him. He deals with all of that.
I wrote a policy paper about how to apply LVT in virtual worlds and stuff. That was more in these literal simulacra of the real world in these virtual worlds, then the things you're talking about of YouTube accounts and charts in app stores and user-generated content platforms. I haven't fully analyzed user-generated content platforms, but I do think chart positions are a sort of virtual land. They do essentially charge rent for that. Not just to the platform in their flat 30% fee across everything, but also in the kind of advertising Red Queen's race you have to do to stay on those charts. You essentially have to buy that position and then keep it. There's this huge first mover advantage that turns into rent seeking. I haven't fully analyzed exactly how you apply George's theory there, but I do think there's something to it.
I also think there's something to extremely long-lived copyrights and patents. It's a little undercooked at the moment. I don't have a fully-fledged theory of it. But certainly cases like other monopoly assets like orbital real estate, radio spectrum, any kind of being able to capture the right to the possibility space. John Carmack had a lot of algorithms, some of which were patented, and he wasn't even allowed to use them in his own games because someone else had speculatively patented them.
Dwarkesh Patel
Oh really? That sucks.
Lars Doucet
Yeah. Carmack Reverse was this particular algorithm that they weren't allowed to use in Quake 3 or something because someone had speculatively patented it. There was no other way to do that thing, so Quake 3 had to be 25% slower because someone had patented essentially the Pythagorean theorem. That kind of nonsense, you can just rent seek off that for 20 years.
Dwarkesh Patel
Jesus. Anyway, let's move on to another juicy implication you were just talking about, which is space. Eventually, hopefully, humanity will conquer space and the rest of the galaxy. This is where Georgism will be really interesting and applicable. We obviously want to encourage and incentivize people to go to new worlds and make use of stars and planets. But we obviously don't want it to be the case that if you got to Mars a year earlier, if Musk gets to Mars a year before Bezos, he has forever rights to everything on Mars and all the resources. Georgism in space would be a place that makes a lot of sense. Have you put much thought into interstellar Georgism?
Interstellar Georgism is actually current international law, through the Outer Space Treaty. I think the Outer Space Treaty will last for about five minutes once the interplanetary space race gets going in earnest. But the current law basically says that nobody's allowed to claim interstellar bodies like the moon or Mars for China or the US. Like we have a flag there, but it's not American territory. It's basically international waters, so to speak.
Lars Doucet
Right.
Dwarkesh Patel
Once the actual possibility of having permanent bases shows up, we will have to hash that out. I think we should take that and run with it. If you are going to take possession of interstellar bodies, it becomes a question of who exactly becomes the government in that scenario. Is it some international coalition? Is it the UN? I'm not a huge fan of the UN. Or does whatever sovereign government gets there first just get to claim it? But can you have Georgism within those confines? I think we certainly should. Because otherwise, you're going to get under investment. The first people to get there are going to basically charge rent to all the people who come next.
Lars Doucet
Yeah.
Dwarkesh Patel
I just remembered the other question I wanted to ask about copyright. That's a really interesting and complicated area because it's hard to think of what is the intrinsic value of the land of the idea and what is the improvement you've made. What do you call the improvement on the song you discovered? The melody would have existed anyways, but the specific lyrics he came up with, I don't know.
Lars Doucet
Well, with copyright, it's not clear to me exactly what the implication of Georgism is. Georgism, if you zoom out, it's not exactly just about land. That's where people ask, "Why are you so obsessed about land?" It's mostly about the enclosure of natural monopolies. An economy based entirely around rent seeking is clear we have this with eternal copyright. If we had the copyright laws we had today when Disney was first getting started, the Brothers Grimm would still be under copyright, and Disney would not have been able to get off the ground with a lot of their early properties. Then they pulled the ladder up right behind them. It's clear they're rent seeking in a lot of ways and refusing to give back to the commons from which they first enriched themselves.
The question becomes, can you easily parse copyright as land? It's a very undercooked theory, but there's something there. It probably cashes out to just copyright terms should be shorter. At some point when an idea has become part of the cultural consciousness for so long, it should become part of the background collective commons. All ideas are essentially remixed and built on top of other ideas. But we want to incentivize people to create new ideas in the first place. It's not a perfect analogy to land, but there is something there about rent seeking that needs to be addressed. It probably just cashes out to reducing copyright terms.
Dwarkesh Patel
Yep. Let's talk about the political feasibility of this idea. I mean, land value tax in general. Do you think it'll be something that will get passed in a democracy? A lot of people have homes or want to have homes. But on the other hand, if you just redistribute, if you don't have many acres in the middle of San Francisco, you would maybe still come out net ahead. But could you be able to explain that to people? Obviously there's tenants who would definitely benefit from this. What is your thought on how politically feasible this is now, or would be in the future?
Lars Doucet
I think it's more politically feasible than we think. It just right now has low salience. If more people start talking about it, I think it's going to make a lot of sense, especially if it's pitched as property tax reform. Right now in Texas, you have people like Huffines who are trying to abolish property tax, which will turn the state into California like that.
Dwarkesh Patel
Why? How come? Why does he want to abolish property tax? Why would it turn it into California?
Lars Doucet
Because California has some of the lowest property taxes in the nation, thanks to Proposition 13. It creates an entire layer of landed gentry and really, really expensive housing. Housing's already getting expensive in Austin, and property taxes have an effect of lowering property prices. Property taxes are an imperfect land value tax. Abolishing them would just reproduce the economic conditions that empirically exist in California.
There's this funny saying that the Texas Constitution is not a government document, but rather an anti-government document. One of the positive byproducts, if you're a Georgist, is since it makes taxing income so hard, governments are forced to tax property and hopefully eventually land. I have a bone to pick with the Texas Constitution because Houston had a single tax mayor in 1911 and had an active Georgist land value tax. It would have still had it today if it wasn't for a state judge who basically shut them down.
Dwarkesh Patel
Why? What was the reason?
Lars Doucet
Because there's a clause in the state constitution of Texas that says all property taxation has to be uniform. That's interpreted as uniform across both the buildings and the land. You can't tax them at separate rates.
Dwarkesh Patel
So does that mean that constitutionally you just couldn't do it in Texas?
Lars Doucet
It's up to interpretation. Some people interpret that clause to mean you can't tax this guy at a higher rate than that guy. You have to tax them based on the value of their property. You could claim that it's still being uniform, we're just taxing land, and we have all these exemptions and categorizations already. This is just another one of those. We tax agricultural land at a different rate. If you put a bunch of cows on a property, suddenly it's magically less valuable. So why can't we target just the land? If you had the right judge, maybe you could get away with that.
To go towards political feasibility, I think it could be more feasible than we think, especially pitched as property tax reform. People are like, "Property taxes are too high. Hey everyone, let's exempt all your buildings." I think you could build a coalition that's excited about that. Especially if you do the math and show what the change in your taxable rate is going to be. A revenue neutral property tax shift to land can be quite popular.
There's a lot of cities around the US right now where this is being floated. Organizations like Strong Towns, the Center for Property Tax Reform, and the Lincoln Land Institute are working on it. Detroit is talking about it right now, and they could desperately use it. I think it could pass.
In terms of Henry George's salience coming back, especially in Norway, the ruling center party coalition just passed a very successful resource management policy with oil. They also have one from the early 1900s in hydropower, which was set up by Norwegian Georgists. The ruling center party coalition just put one in for salmon farming, aquaculture locations, a new severance tax on that. They name-checked Henry George when they implemented it in the speech. If they are willing to stand up to the landowners in Oslo and pass a land value tax, that would be the next step. I'm not sure if they're brave enough to do that, but we're starting to see this kind of bubble up.
I think a revenue neutral property tax shift to land is the politically popular way to do it. It can be done on the local level without having to change a whole bunch of laws. It's a little complicated in Texas because of that stupid state constitutional provision, but in other states, any municipality could do it right now if they wanted.
Dwarkesh Patel
One of the things you talked about in the book is that in some sense, the value of your land is caused by the other people around you, other properties, amenities, companies, whatever. It's kind of a publicly contributed value. If you think about it that way, doesn't it make sense that your land taxes should go to that community which is creating all this value, rather than being distributed federally? Maybe we should have land value taxes on local levels that go to pay towards local amenities. If you live right next to the subway and the reason your property is so valuable is because you're right next to the subway, then that goes towards making the New York subway better, not towards city hall in Kentucky.
Lars Doucet
Right. If you wanted to create a model for bottom-up decentralized America, I would take that bargain. We still got to fund the federal government somehow. I would like to repeal the federal income tax and have that funded by land value tax. But if that's as far as I could ever get, I'd shake your hand and take that deal.
Dwarkesh Patel
Fair enough. One more question, this one actually from Twitter from Craig Fratrick. The question is, one of the reasons we think of land as being a public thing is because your land value is contributed by people around you. But what if you own so much land that you are the one contributing to the value of all your land? If you're thinking of something like Disney World, they basically own like half of Orlando. They're the ones creating nearby amenities which are making the rest of Disney World valuable. In that case, aren't they entitled to all the proceeds?
Lars Doucet
What's funny is, in a way, yes. This is often posed as a gotcha question for Georgists. We internally call this the Disneyland or the Disney World question. It's a really interesting case. The thing you have to realize is, who is Disney World in this situation? Disney World is the government in that case. Disney World is the community. Disney World is the city. It's a private city. There are all these questions of who is a citizen of Disney World and is it an inequitable democracy, which we'll leave aside for the moment.
The point is that Disney World has fully internalized the positive externalities of their own building. The incentive structure has changed. We fully acknowledge that, we just bite that bullet. The question becomes, what do you do about it? It's essentially a private city. There can be issues with company towns, especially when they enforce local monopolies, like you have to buy from the company store. That's mostly an issue of governance. But in terms of land use, if an entire landowner owns a large enough area to internalize all of their positive building externalities, that does change the situation. You need to see them less as the private owner of a parcel and more as a private operator of a city. That changes the governance question and it becomes a completely different category of problem.
Then there are questions of what is the right mix of taxes and subsidies, and do you even want to have these sorts of entities in the first place? But the important thing to realize is that you are no longer dealing with a private landowner, you are dealing with a private city.
Dwarkesh Patel
Is one way to think about Georgism that somebody has to be collecting the rents, and what Georgians are saying is we want the rents collected by the government and not by a private landowner? Presumably because the government will do more public facing things with it. Rents have to be collected, we're just trying to decide who will collect them. If we leave it to the status quo, private actors free riding off their neighbors will collect them and make everything worse. They will cause less investment, they will hold the best land out of use, there'll be less building than there should be, and the rent will be too damn high. The rent has to be collected one way or another, so it might as well be collected on behalf of the community.
Lars Doucet
Yeah. Because not only will this fix the incentives, but it also shares the wealth with the people who actually produce the wealth. If the community is itself this giant private city, then that changes the equation a bit. I have not fully delved into the Disney World issue. That's a little separate academically from actually existing Disney World and how anyone feels about that institution in particular. But the important thing is that we're now dealing with a different domain. Who is a citizen of Disneyland? Who is a tenant of Disneyland? What is the governance of Disneyland? You realize that Disneyland essentially is the government. I think that's actually kind of literally true in actually existing Disney World, because they have their own special district that operates essentially as a private government. That's its own kind of question.
But the point is very much yes, the rents have to be collected one way or the other, so they might as well be collected on behalf of the community. One way to implement that is through a government, because we have this nice little democracy we can use. There's also the charter cities movement, and a movement I like even better called starter cities. That's less about finding a third world country and hoping your sovereignty doesn't get revoked in five years, but building cities somewhere in America where zoning is pretty loose. You could have everyone who lives there basically be a shareholder of a private entity and share out the land rents that way. Another way to implement it would be ground leases rather than land value tax within a private city. Everyone who lives there is de facto a shareholder of the city. Some people are trying to build stuff like that, which I'm very much interested in.
Dwarkesh Patel
Awesome. Final question. What is next for you?
Lars Doucet
I'm still a game developer. Nights and weekends, I'm overseeing a project that'll release next year, Defenders Quest 2, after a good decade of development. I'm happy for that to be finished.
Additionally, I am working on a startup called Geoland Solutions for now. The name will almost certainly have changed by the time this podcast airs. If you go to geolandsolutions.com, it'll redirect to whatever our new website is. That is a municipal mass appraisal company. We're going to partner with local municipalities. We've already got a couple of customers who are interested. We're going to massively update the state of the practice of municipal mass appraisal in America to be more accurate, more efficient, more up to date with the latest models, and more transparent, leaning into open source and open data solutions wherever possible.
I think that can be the practical step towards Georgism, not just to implement it, but even to advocate for it. In the Edward Glaeser interview, I'm super happy to have Glaeser's endorsement, even if he thinks Georgism isn't a panacea. One of the things about his critique is that I think he's under the impression that land isn't a big deal. How important you think Georgism is depends on how much the land is worth. To do that, we have to measure it. We're not super good at measuring it right now. I think we need to get super good at measuring it.
When I was talking about this originally, someone challenged me. They said, "If you really think you can do this, then people would give you millions of dollars to go do it." Well, we just closed a round led by Sam Altman, and that's exactly what happened. Now we're going to do it. I'm really grateful to that commenter for challenging me. I really see my life's work as making Georgism possible and practical. I think the way to do that is to measure the value of the land and to put those tools out there for anybody to be able to pick up.
Dwarkesh Patel
The book is Land is a Big Deal. Where else can people find you?
Lars Doucet
You can find me at a couple of places. One, the website landisabigdeal.com. You can find me on Twitter at @Larsiusprime. The book is based on a series of articles that you can find at gameofrent.com. And geolandsolutions.com, which will redirect you to whatever the new name is. That's everything I do.
Dwarkesh Patel
This is one of those books where you read it and think, "Oh, that's interesting, I guess I shifted my prior slightly." And there's books where you think, "Oh fuck, why did I not think about it that way?" That changes everything about how I think about economics. The metaphor in the book about observing the cat in a picture, seeing the cat. I do highly recommend the book. It's one of those books you'll read where you'll just have a completely new perspective on an entire field.
Lars Doucet
Awesome.
Dwarkesh Patel
Thanks Lars. Thanks for coming on today and thanks for making your way all the way here to do this interview live.
Lars Doucet
Thanks for grilling me. Thanks for all the hard questions. I really like to be challenged in that way and really engage with the best faith, hard-hitting critiques to make sure we really understand what we're talking about. None of this matters unless it works. I'm not here to defend Henry George's honor. I'm here to really explore whether this can actually be a solution to our problems.
Dwarkesh Patel
Yep. Hey, thanks for listening. If you enjoyed that episode, I would really appreciate it if you could share it. This is still a pretty small podcast, so it is a huge help when any one of you shares an episode that you like. Post it on Twitter, send it to friends who you think might like it, put it in your group chats. It helps out a ton. Many thanks to my amazing editor, Graham Bessalou, for producing this podcast, and to Mia Ayana for creating the amazing transcripts that accompany each episode, which have helpful links. You can find them at the link in the description below. Remember to subscribe on YouTube and your favorite podcast platforms. Cheers. See you next time. Thank you.