--:-- Host: Hello, and welcome to the Lunar Society. Sorry it's been so long since the Tyler Cowen interview. I want to thank all of you for joining this podcast so early on. I especially want to thank those of you who have been sharing these episodes on Twitter and other platforms. Since this is a new podcast, almost all of the views and listens I get here are because of your retweets and endorsements, so please continue sharing this podcast if you enjoy it.
--:-- I also want to thank those of you who have bought me books and equipment off my Amazon wishlist. Scott Hamilton bought me the very microphone I'm recording with. John Beattie donated Nassim Taleb's new book, someone else donated Charles Murray's new book, and someone gifted me a $120 Raspberry Pi kit for embedded systems programming. If you're one of the people who anonymously donated, please DM or email me so I have a chance to thank you personally. And to Scott and John, I'm really grateful for your gifts.
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--:-- Okay, today I have the pleasure of speaking with Machos Leonardis. Machos has co-written a paper with David Deutsch about the Palmer-Miller theorem, and we get into that, as well as the dangers of the scientific identity, the nature of scientific progress, and advice to young people who want to be polymaths. Machos is one such, as you will see. He's a fascinating person that I've had the pleasure of getting to know. He has a broad range of interesting ideas, which we get into. So without further ado, here's Machaz Leonardo.
--:-- Machos Leonardis: Okay, Machaz, you have co-written a paper with David Deutsch about Bayes' theorem. But before we get into that, let's talk about the big picture questions. Science, what is it? And is it somewhat of a confusion to even talk about it distinctly from other disciplines?
--:-- Machos Leonardis: Well, my view on that subject is that often a lot of talk about science ends up being quite counterproductive. I'm not saying that there is no such thing as science, but I definitely think that people identify with science too much. They wonder whether what they are doing is science. They think they are scientists and wonder what it is that they should do in their capacity as scientists, and I think that often has a counterproductive effect on what they do.
--:-- One interesting thing to note is that the name "scientist" is actually an early 19th-century invention. It was traced back to two professors at Trinity College in Cambridge. People were able to do science before that quite well. So one of the problems I see is that people perhaps think about what is a scientist and who is a scientist and what is science a bit too much.
--:-- People have always tried to understand the natural world without becoming conscious of the idea that they were doing anything special or playing a special role. They were able to do it just fine. At some point, the idea developed that one is engaged in a special activity when trying to understand nature, and there being a special social role for that. But it is unclear if that identity is useful.
--:-- If the identity of a scientist is not that useful, then why do we have universities that are considered special places? They are supported both institutionally and culturally. It is useful to have institutions that keep relevant books in one place, organize events, and allow people to meet. I'm not disputing that there is an activity worthy of being supported. But whether that particular way of looking at the activity is the right one is less clear.
--:-- Host: So you identify there's a special role for universities and they're doing a distinctive activity. If it's not science they're doing, how would you describe what they're doing?
--:-- Machos Leonardis: Perhaps we shouldn't think of this activity in a unified way. Imagine an institution where someone is interested in liquid helium, another in star formation, and so on. You can have an institution supporting all these people, but it's not possible to say they're all engaged in a unified activity called science.
--:-- The idea of science often comes with the idea of a specific method. This can stop people from doing sensible things. The current conception of science allows criticism about whether someone is really doing science, which wouldn't happen if people just focused on specific issues.
--:-- Host: But there is a specific method, or at least a family of methods. We have Popper, falsifiability, testability, and we privilege these over other methods like myth-making. What's wrong with someone understanding their position in an institution as using a specific family of methods?
--:-- Machos Leonardis: I would dispute that premise. Popper himself said he was a professor of a subject that he thought didn't exist. His student, Feyerabend, wrote "Against Method," arguing against that idea. There are patterns of thought more conducive to understanding the natural world, but it's unclear what those patterns are.
--:-- Host: So you're saying scientists should consider certain methods better than others but shouldn't identify themselves with them?
--:-- Machos Leonardis: It's unclear if one is ever using a method. Thoughts arise without being conscious of a method. People have been thinking about the natural world without being method-conscious. The idea that all thoughts arise from a method is a stretch.
--:-- Host: But people have been very productive in understanding the natural world in the past 500 years, seemingly because of a family of methods. Doesn't the success of the Enlightenment lend credence to the idea that certain methods are privileged?
--:-- Machos Leonardis: I don't have a strong view on that. The narrative about the Enlightenment's importance isn't obviously true or false. It's unclear if it was due to a change in method or something else, like economic progress.
--:-- Host: Speaking of induction, let's get into the paper you co-wrote with David Deutsch about the Popper-Miller theorem. Can you describe it?
--:-- Machos Leonardis: The Popper-Miller theorem aimed to show that probabilistic support isn't inductive. They argued that evidence doesn't confer support on general theories in the way people think. They identified two parts of a theory: the deductive part and the inductive part. The evidence always decreases the probability of the inductive part.
--:-- Host: Did this theorem fit a broader theme in Popper's work?
--:-- Machos Leonardis: Yes. Popper was interested in the logical content of a theory. He argued that theories with more content are less likely but more valuable. People seek explanatory, less likely theories, not tautological ones. This relates to the conjunction fallacy, where people prefer more specific, less likely explanations.
--:-- Host: Can you explain why explanatory theories should be preferred?
--:-- Machos Leonardis: Popper argued that people have a psychological need for regularity. Without it, they invent it. Explanatory theories allow for progress by creating universal theories that can be tested and replaced. They accumulate knowledge beyond mere experience.
--:-- Host: Where might you disagree with Popper?
--:-- Machos Leonardis: I'm unsure if the need for regularity exists or how it works. It's plausible but not fully understood.
--:-- Host: Speaking of polymathic pursuits, what advice do you have for a young person who wants to be a polymath?
--:-- Machos Leonardis: People are naturally interested in everything. The most important thing is to pursue what you're interested in without fear. Don't think you need to study fundamentals systematically. These ideas were developed to solve problems, not for learning. History often helps because it shows how ideas were created to solve specific problems.
--:-- Host: Should a young person just focus on learning what they find interesting or identify problem situations in existing knowledge?
--:-- Machos Leonardis: Connect with people or groups solving problems. Find something you can contribute to. It's challenging but not impossible. People are sympathetic to young contributors. The main challenge is awareness and experimentation.
--:-- Host: On that hopeful note, Machos, thank you for being on the show.
--:-- Machos Leonardis: Thanks for having me. It's been a pleasure.
