--:-- Keith Romer: Welcome to Planet Money. I'm Keith Romer. And I'm Erika Beras. $20 billion. That's a lot of money. $20 billion would pay for about half of the total budget managed by USAID last year, before the Trump administration shut it down. It would pay for a full year of the FBI, DEA, ATF, and Federal Marshal Service combined.
--:-- Erika Beras: But Scott Bessent is allowed to offer that money up to Argentina all on his own because it comes from the Treasury's private slush fund. Today on the show, we will take a look at the long history of that obscure fund Scott Bessent used to help out Argentina. And try to figure out, are we ever going to see that $20 billion again?
--:-- [Sound effects: Music fades out]
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--:-- Erika Beras: Let's start with a fun piece of trivia. This is not Brad Setzer's first time on the show. In fact, you were on the first ever Planet Money podcast. We're calling it Planet Money. A little known, little remembered fact. This right here is our first ever podcast. Dun-da-dum.
--:-- Keith Romer: All right, so today I'm going to talk to Brad Setzer. Back then, we went to Brad to ask about China purchasing U.S. debt. Today, we're talking to him about that obscure little slush fund that Scott Bessent used to help out Argentina. Can you talk a little bit about how the exchange stabilization fund even came to be?
--:-- Brad Setzer: So it one of these you know little tools pools of money available for the U government when you know when the world needs help. But its original purpose was to kind of stabilize the price of the dollar relative to gold. Yeah, back in the 1930s the U was still on the gold standard. And during the Great Depression, a lot of folks were like, who knows what's going on with the dollar? I trust gold. And they would show up at the bank and literally trade in their dollars for gold at the official rate of around $20 an ounce.
--:-- Keith Romer: But President Franklin Roosevelt did not want people burying gold in their backyards. He wanted them out spending their dollars, getting the economy going again.
--:-- Brad Setzer: After all, there is an element in the readjustment of our financial system more important than currency, more important than gold. And that is the confidence of the people themselves. So FDR suspended the gold standard for nine months. But the U.S. did eventually get back on the gold standard, at least internationally. And when they did, they lowered how much a dollar was worth kind of by a lot.
--:-- Keith Romer: In order to keep this new value of the dollar stable, Congress gave the Treasury Department this little pool of money to help influence the market for the dollar, aptly named the Exchange Stabilization Fund, you know, to stabilize exchange rates.
--:-- Brad Setzer: The gold standard, of course, is long gone, but the fund stuck around. Congress never took the money back, in part because it's useful for Treasury to have a fund that lets it act fast when it needs to. It is the pool of money the U.S. uses to intervene in foreign exchange markets. It's basically set aside for emergencies. And it is rarely used, but when it is used, its effective use is important.
--:-- Keith Romer: Yeah, you can think of the fund as like sitting over in a corner of Treasury with a sign on it that says, break glass in case of emergency.
--:-- Brad Setzer: Now, the fund sometimes gets employed in complicated ways during giant economic messes like COVID or the global financial crisis. But in currency markets, it's mostly used when some big world currency gets a little out of whack.
--:-- Keith Romer: In the 1980s, the fund was used to reset things between the dollar, the franc, the Deutsche Mark, and the yen. In 2011, the fund was used to help out the yen after a tsunami hit Japan.
--:-- Brad Setzer: Usually when the U.S. intervenes, it buys the currencies of other advanced economies, not emerging economies. Occasionally, the fund will loan money to emerging economies, but big loans to emerging economies almost always come from the IMF, the International Monetary Fund, not the Treasury Department.
--:-- Keith Romer: Which is part of why Brad kind of sat up in his chair when he heard that Besant was going to use the exchange stabilization fund for Argentina. Because of Argentina's long history of defaulting on its debts, it counts as an emerging economy, not an advanced one.
--:-- Brad Setzer: And in the Exchange Stabilization Fund's 90-year history, there's only been one other time it's been used at this scale to help out an emerging economy. A single time, just once. In 1995, the United States offered to lend $20 billion to Mexico.
--:-- Keith Romer: The Mexico story is pretty fascinating in its own right. But it's also useful as a way of understanding what Scott Besant is up to in Argentina. So we're going to spend the next little bit looking at what happened the last time the U.S. used the exchange stabilization fund in this way.
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--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Well, I had been kind of deeply involved with Mexico from the time I arrived. I was the assistant secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs when the Mexican debt problems arose.
--:-- Keith Romer: I was the assistant secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs when the Mexican debt problems arose. Jeffrey had worked on the NAFTA free trade deal, and he'd been paying a lot of attention to what was going on with Mexico's currency, the peso.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: How would you explain what the problem was in Mexico?
--:-- Keith Romer: Well, the fundamental problem was, I think, an unrealistic commitment to an exchange rate that got more and more out of line with reality.
--:-- Erika Beras: Erica, are you ready to do a little exchange rate explaining?
--:-- Keith Romer: So ready. Yes, yes. Okay, so towards the end of 1994, one Mexican peso was worth about 29 cents. Like, you can think of that as the price of the peso. But like anything else, the price of the peso would move up or down depending on how much people wanted it following the law of supply and demand.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: The Mexican government had committed itself to keeping the price of the peso high, which was great for Mexican consumers. The peso was worth more. So essentially anything that was imported into Mexico was cheaper. Also, it helped keep inflation down.
--:-- Keith Romer: But the way the Mexican government was keeping the price of the peso high was by buying the peso themselves. You can buy it with gold or you can buy it with foreign currency and most cases dollars.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Yeah. Like most countries, the Mexican government had billions of U.S. dollars in its reserves. Think of it like a government bank account filled with foreign currency. And whenever it seemed like the price of the peso was dipping a little, they would jump into the currency market and spend those dollars to buy pesos and keep the price up.
--:-- Keith Romer: Which is fine if you have an infinite number of dollars to buy pesos with. But the Mexican government did not have infinite dollars. And it had taken out these complicated loans that it was essentially going to have to repay with dollars, not pesos.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: We were watching the situation and knew that the problems were building up. I can remember sitting over coffee at the senior Mexican officials saying they really needed to do something and outlining the kinds of things they needed to do.
--:-- Keith Romer: To Jeffrey, the solution was obvious. Mexico needed to stop propping up the peso. They needed to let the market determine the price to float the peso.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: But the Mexican government didn't want to. But then at the end of 1994, a new president, Ernesto Zedillo, took over in Mexico. And he was open to a change in strategy. He knew that Mexico needed to stop propping up the peso. And he tried to let its value go down, gradually, in a controlled way.
--:-- Keith Romer: But by then, it was too late. The old team just passed him off this untenable situation, and so it immediately blew up.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: I got a phone call from my counterpart at the Mexican Hacienda, which is what they call the Treasury, saying that they had run out of money. The exchange rate was falling. They were going to have to let it go the next day.
--:-- Keith Romer: So they had reached a point where they decided, we're going to let this currency just float. We're not going to try to keep it.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Well, they were at a point where they had no choice. They had no resources left to try to maintain it.
--:-- Keith Romer: Now, Jeffrey understood that there is a big difference between intentionally letting your currency devalue little by little and what was about to go down in Mexico.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Markets seemed to figure out that the Mexican government had already spent most of its dollars, which meant that there would be nobody left to prop up the peso. The price of the peso would fall like a rock and investors would start pulling all of their money out of the country.
--:-- Keith Romer: It would be like a bank run, but on an entire country. And this wouldn't just be bad for Mexico. If Mexico's economy self-destructed, it would be bad for the U.S. economy, too. The two countries are very economically intertwined.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Plus, illegal immigration from Mexico, which was also a hot-button issue back then, would have surged.
--:-- Keith Romer: On top of all that, there was a risk of contagion to other emerging markets. Investors could get skittish and pull their money out of those economies, too.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Which country's next? Is it Argentina? Is it Brazil? Is it Peru?
--:-- Keith Romer: Back in the U.S., Jeffrey and his boss were trying to figure out what to do about all of this.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Meanwhile, there actually wasn't a permanent secretary of the Treasury. Bob Rubin had been nominated, but not yet confirmed.
--:-- Keith Romer: And where is Bob Rubin during these conversations?
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: He's fishing somewhere in the Caribbean. Why was he fishing in the Caribbean?
--:-- Keith Romer: The last vacation before he takes over as the secretary of the Treasury.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Eventually Rubin gets back from the Caribbean. And then on January 10th 1995 he gets confirmed and then sworn in at the White House the very same night President Bill Clinton is there.
--:-- Keith Romer: Bob Rubin's wife is there. And as soon as the swearing in was over, his wife left, and we went into a meeting with the president.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: So the swearing in happens, and then Rubin is like, OK, bye, honey, I'll see you at home.
--:-- Keith Romer: They explained to President Clinton that they think the U.S. needs to bail out Mexico. And the president very quickly agreed.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: He said this is going to be politically awful, but it's what we have to do.
--:-- Keith Romer: Congress did agree that it was going to be politically awful. Why do you want to intervene in Mexico at all? Are we trying to prop up the Mexican government?
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: That would be wrong. Should I, as a congressman, vote to put American taxpayers at risk again and again?
--:-- Keith Romer: Well, so then you start thinking, well, what is plan B? Plan B is the Treasury Department's little private pool of money we were talking about before, the Exchange Stabilization Fund.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: The fund had started with $2 billion, but because of interest it earned on loans from the fund and gains on currency held in the fund, it now had about $25 billion in usable funds.
--:-- Keith Romer: How certain was everybody that this was a lever you could pull?
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Well, I think there was certainty that it was a lever we could pull. The question was, was it a lever that we wanted to pull?
--:-- Keith Romer: For President Clinton, going it alone without the backing of Congress and lending Mexico all that money was a huge political risk.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: If we succeeded, if it came out right, it would not be, by re-election time, a liability. And if you failed and it didn't come out right, it would be a liability by election time.
--:-- Keith Romer: Like it could cost him the presidency.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: For the folks at the Treasury, there was a second risk. I saw somebody somewhere referred to the stabilization fund as a weapon you can only use once.
--:-- Keith Romer: Well, our view was we could only use it once if we didn't get it back. I mean, if we got it back, it showed it worked, and those resources would be available to use in them.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: The same situation arose again. But in fact, you couldn't. You could only bail once. Treasury did have the money to bail out Mexico. But if Mexico couldn't pay back the loan, that was pretty much the end of the exchange stabilization fund.
--:-- Keith Romer: So if there was another currency crisis somewhere, Treasury wouldn't be able to help.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: But if they didn't use the fund, Mexico could melt down. So they decided they had to pull the lever. They were going to offer to loan Mexico $20 billion.
--:-- Keith Romer: Now, if you were going to lend another country $20 billion, you do want to think through how you were going to lend that money.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Jeffrey said he took as a guide something known as Badgett's Dictum. Walter Badgett, 19th century writer, early editor of The Economist.
--:-- Keith Romer: And Badgett said, assuming that whoever you are lending to is solvent, a lender of last resort should follow three rules.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Lend freely at a penalty rate against good collateral.
--:-- Keith Romer: So, lend freely? That means lending more money than you think they're going to need.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: That is so that the market, which is in some sense acting in a kind of panic, is reassured. It's reassured and it's willing to begin to come back in.
--:-- Keith Romer: On top of the U.S.'s $20 billion, contributions from the IMF and others brought the number to over $50 billion, way more than Mexico needed.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: So that's lending freely.
--:-- Keith Romer: Explain at a penalty rate, like what's the reason to charge a little bit more than you would be charging normally?
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Well, one is to keep them from coming to you when they didn't need to. But the other was to incentivize them to go back to the market as soon as they were able to go back and repay us as soon as possible.
--:-- Keith Romer: The interest rate on the bailout was a lot better than Mexico could have gotten from banks and investors in the midst of this crisis. But it was still pretty high.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: And then finally, against good collateral, what's that?
--:-- Keith Romer: That means to have an assurance that you are going to be repaid.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Yeah, one part of the deal Jeffrey worked out with his Mexican counterparts was about collateral. If Mexico did not make their payments on time, the U.S. could claim the revenue the Mexican national oil company got from its exports.
--:-- Keith Romer: It took weeks for the team at Treasury to settle on all the terms with the Mexican government. Finally, they got the money flowing from the exchange stabilization fund to Mexico.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: And then they waited for their bailout to show any signs of working. And waited. And waited.
--:-- Keith Romer: The market just didn't look good. The Mexicans, in terms of compliance with the program, that was fine. But the interest rates were getting very high and the pesos continued to weaken and it looked like it might not come together.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: For months, the peso stayed in crisis and kind of so did Jeffrey. Bob Rubin called me into his office and I was clearly very visibly showing the stress in my face and he said, Jeff, we're doing the right thing. We've done the right calculations but that doesn't guarantee it's all going to work out.
--:-- Keith Romer: And you have to be prepared to accept the fact that it doesn't work.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: But it did start to work out. Gradually, the market changed its mind. Investors started to get it into their heads that the United States wasn't going anywhere.
--:-- Keith Romer: I think it was a matter of, in the end, of staying the course and the market would see we're still there and we're still putting the money out.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Mexico was ultimately able to come out the other side of its crisis. And by October of 1995, they started paying the U.S. back.
--:-- Keith Romer: In the end, because of the interest Treasury was charging, the U.S. made a profit on the loan of around a half billion dollars.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: Jeffrey actually brought a photo into our interview from the day Mexico made its final payment. And the president's shaking my hand, Bob Rubin standing in the background.
--:-- Keith Romer: It's rare, I feel like, to get one's life achievements captured this precisely.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: I hadn't realized there was a photographer in the room. And then he got just the perfect moment. Like this is the moment when the president of the United States said, thank you for helping solve this crisis.
--:-- Keith Romer: Jeffrey says he had been planning to leave government for the private sector for a while. And this was kind of mission accomplished for him.
--:-- Jeffrey Schaefer: He left his job at the Treasury the next day.
--:-- Keith Romer: So that's what it looks like when you lend $20 billion from the exchange stabilization fund. And it works.
--:-- Erika Beras: Next, we turn our attention back to our current $20 billion experiment in Argentina. That's after the break.
--:-- [Sound effects: Music fades out]
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--:-- Keith Romer: Okay. As of last month, the Exchange Stabilization Fund has now been used twice to extend a $20 billion credit line to a troubled Latin American economy. In the 1990s with Mexico and now in 2025 with Argentina.
--:-- Erika Beras: And there are plenty of similarities between what was happening in Mexico back then and what is happening in Argentina today.
--:-- Keith Romer: Argentina, like Mexico in the 90s, has been propping up the value of its peso by using its dollar reserves to buy pesos on the open market.
--:-- Erika Beras: Argentina, like Mexico in the 90s, owes billions of dollars, coming due within the next year that it doesn't have the dollars to pay for.
--:-- Keith Romer: And as if that wasn't enough, Argentina is running a current account deficit. In other words, there is more money going out of the country than coming in, like billions of dollars more.
--:-- Erika Beras: Right. There is no question that Argentina can use an extra $20 billion. But does that mean it's a good idea for the U.S. to lend it to them?
--:-- Keith Romer: We should say there are significantly more assets in the exchange stabilization fund than there were back in the 90s. The vast majority of that is this weird kind of IMF not-quite-money called special drawing rights.
--:-- Erika Beras: And it does look like the U.S. has sent almost a billion dollars worth of special drawing rights to Argentina, which presumably Argentina uses to pay back a little bit of its IMF loans.
--:-- Keith Romer: But for all kinds of reasons, what you can do with special drawing rights is just a lot more limited than what you can do with regular old currency.
--:-- Erika Beras: And there's only about $40 billion in regular old currency and easily convertible assets in the fund.
--:-- Keith Romer: So a $20 billion loan to Argentina would take a big chunk out of that.
--:-- Erika Beras: We asked our financial flows expert, Brad Setzer, to help us evaluate the credit line for Argentina using Walter Badgett's three main conditions for a lender of last resort. Lending freely at a penalty rate against good collateral.
--:-- Brad Setzer: So lending freely, essentially, like, if our goal was to stave off a liquidity crisis for Argentina, did we lend enough, do you think? Probably not.
--:-- Keith Romer: $20 billion is enough to get you through the end of this year, take you probably through half of next year. If you were lending something closer to $40 billion, I would say, yeah, that's probably enough.
--:-- Brad Setzer: So close, but not quite.
--:-- Erika Beras: So it sounds like lending freely, it sounds like you're giving maybe a B or so?
--:-- Brad Setzer: Yeah, B+. Okay. It's a big sum of money.
--:-- Keith Romer: Brad says he gave Besant higher marks because of this extra move Besant made. To prop up the peso, Besant used the fund to buy pesos on the open market. It's estimated the Treasury bought more than a billion dollars worth of pesos this way.
--:-- Erika Beras: Oh, and that's pretty extraordinary. A little risky, Brad says, but yes, also extraordinary.
--:-- Brad Setzer: And then the second piece, at a penalty rate, you know, to avoid moral hazard, to encourage them to get out of this loan as quickly as they can and get back into the markets, what grade do we give there?
--:-- Keith Romer: Incomplete. I mean, the financial terms of this loan have not been disclosed. Might be at a penalty rate. Might be at the U.S. Treasury's cost of funds. We just don't know.
--:-- Brad Setzer: Brad says it is very unusual for a deal like this to get signed without some official statement laying out the terms of the deal or without requiring Argentina, in this case, to change its approach.
--:-- Erika Beras: I mean, the U.S. never gives people unconditional support. That's very, very unique.
--:-- Keith Romer: The IMF did have some conditions attached to its most recent $20 billion loan to Argentina. But so far, Besant hasn't indicated the U.S. is adding anything to those conditions.
--:-- Brad Setzer: We reached out to Treasury several times asking for the specific terms of the U.S. deal, but we didn't get a response.
--:-- Keith Romer: And then against good collateral? C. Gentlemancy. Gentlemancy.
--:-- Erika Beras: Gentlemancy. That's, I mean, in my memory from college, a gentlemancy was, you didn't do that well on the paper.
--:-- Brad Setzer: Look, as far as we know, there's no collateral and no policy conditions beyond the IMF program.
--:-- Keith Romer: And this is where I think perceptions differ. I mean, a lot of people think you don't need to have conditions on a government like that of Javier Malay, which is really committed to running a balanced budget, to slashing public spending.
--:-- Erika Beras: Slashing public spending is kind of Malay's entire brand. His chainsaw's real.
--:-- Brad Setzer: So the argument would be you don't need conditions when the government wants to do this anyway.
--:-- Keith Romer: But President Millay and his economic team didn't actually meet what I think is an important component of the IMF program.
--:-- Brad Setzer: They didn't meet the target to rebuild Argentina's foreign exchange reserves ahead of the election.
--:-- Keith Romer: And so to me, the missing bit of conditionality is really making sure that Argentina rebuilds its foreign exchange reserves.
--:-- Brad Setzer: Because if it doesn't, Argentina could end up in an even worse spot than it's in right now sometime next year.
--:-- Keith Romer: Brad thinks there is a path out of this trouble for Argentina, so long as Malay is willing to stop propping up the peso.
--:-- Brad Setzer: He's done the hard work on balancing the budget. Important, significant, real financial accomplishment. He has to complete the job.
--:-- Keith Romer: And yes, you know, you kind of got to take a chainsaw to some of Argentina's import spending. It seems like a sort of second chapter of austerity.
--:-- Brad Setzer: First was cutting the social services, cutting back the budget, and then now it is cutting the value of the currency that buys everything.
--:-- Keith Romer: You know, look, they've done half of what they need to do. That's a big step. They just need to do the other half.
--:-- Brad Setzer: But in an interview with the Financial Times last week, Malay made it clear he was not open to any significant weakening in the peso, and that he was plenty willing to draw on the $20 billion from the exchange stabilization fund if and when he needs to.
--:-- Keith Romer: If that happens, most of the fund's cash would be committed to Argentina, potentially for years, no matter what other crisis might come along.
--:-- Erika Beras: If you liked today's show, we would like to ask you a favor. Please rate and review the show in whatever podcast app you happen to be listening to us on.
--:-- Keith Romer: It really helps other people find the show.
--:-- Erika Beras: Today's show was produced by Luis Gallo. It was edited by Eric Mennel and fact-checked by Sierra Juarez.
--:-- Keith Romer: It was engineered by Sina Loffredo.
--:-- Erika Beras: Alex Goldmark is Planet Money's executive producer.
--:-- Keith Romer: I'm Erica Beras. And I'm Keith Romer. This is NPR.
--:-- Erika Beras: Thanks for listening.
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