Podcast Episode Summary
The podcast episode features an interview with Ben Horowitz, co-founder of Andreessen Horowitz (A16Z), discussing various topics related to venture capital, technology, and innovation. The main topic of the episode is the future of venture capital, with a focus on how A16Z has evolved to become a multi-stage firm with a focus on specific markets and industries.
Key Points:
Takeaways:
Participants:
Additional Insights:
Erik Torenberg sits down with Ben Horowitz, Cofounder of a16z, for a candid conversation on venture capital, leadership, and the future of innovation. Recorded live at a16z’s Menlo Park offices in 2023, Ben shares practical wisdom and hard-earned lessons on navigating market cycles, building resilient companies, and why culture is a lasting competitive edge.
Timecodes:
0:00 Introduction
0:49 Building a Lasting Venture Firm
1:57 Product vs. Investor-Driven Firms
5:17 Evolution of Andreessen Horowitz
8:43 Fund Sizing & Market Opportunity
11:38 Recruiting & Culture at a16z
13:58 Supporting Founders & Firm Mission
14:39 Governance & Firm Structure
17:15 The Future of Venture Capital
20:26 Riding Trends: AI, Web3, and Beyond
27:06 Regulation, Open Source, and Innovation
29:22 LPs, Macro, and Long-Term Strategy
33:25 Advice for the Next Generation
37:15 Tech Optimism & Societal Impact
42:33 Closing Thoughts & Outro
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Please note that the content here is for informational purposes only; should NOT be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security; and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. a16z and its affiliates may maintain investments in the companies discussed. For more details please see a16z.com/disclosures.
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Please note that the content here is for informational purposes only; should NOT be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security; and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. a16z and its affiliates may maintain investments in the companies discussed. For more details please see a16z.com/disclosures.
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Erik Torenberg
If you look at the firm now, what it is, is it's a collection of the original Andreessen Horowitz, where every market has a platform that's appropriate to that market, and an investing team that is focused on that market. And I think that that's the future of venture capital. We're in this phase where it's such a profound change that anything you do will work, at least for a while. And so it's kind of hard to pass on any deal in that way, so it's exciting. What we care about is, is it a real breakthrough? And how big can we help make it? Can it win the market? Like, those are the things that drive us. Today, you'll hear my 2023 conversation with Ben Horowitz, co-founder of Andreessen Horowitz. In this episode, I sat down with Ben to discuss what makes a firm last for decades, how AI is built differently, and the future of venture in an AI-driven world. Let's get into it. Ben, thank you for being the first inaugural guest on this podcast.
Ben Horowitz
Yeah, no, happy to be here. Thank you.
Erik Torenberg
Ben, we're just talking off camera. There's some firms that are great for 10 years and then struggle. There's some firms that are great for 30 years, multi-decades. What separates the firms who could do that and what enables them to be great?
Ben Horowitz
Yeah, I think it's a combination of the lasting parts, like the culture, and then the parts that change, like the leadership. So I think that if you just have a couple of smart investors but no culture to speak of, then you're probably not going to do a great generational handoff. And that's probably 10 years. 10 years is a pretty good run for investors. Maybe you stretch that out. Then if you can transition it, like Sequoia transitioned it from Don Valentine to Mike Moritz and Doug Leone and Jim Goetz, and that transition worked well, so they were able to take the original culture and build on it and grow it. 20 years for the original guys, 20 years for the successors and that kind of thing. So that goes pretty well. You guys are no spring chickens, almost 15 years.
Erik Torenberg
Yeah. How do you think about it for your firm?
Ben Horowitz
Yeah, so we're a little different in that we are organized in such a way where it's not like Mark and I can have very significant contributions without picking the investments. Because we have, I would just say, more scale and more job functions at Andreessen Horowitz because we're kind of a product first and then a team of investors second, whereas every other firm I think is the opposite. Product meaning the product to entrepreneurs. So like what are we offering is where we start. And then the team of investors is kind of goes with that as opposed to we're a team of investors and then like we'll figure out what our product is as we go.
So it's a very kind of different orientation. I've always thought of why Y Combinator is another example of a product firm in the sense that you could replace a lot of the investors they have over time and yet it still seems to work to some degree. I think that's right. Like I think they're probably, you know, the closest analog to us kind of spiritually. Yeah. So they're spiritually close to you but they're much earlier and they dominate kind of like company creation. Whereas you do a lot of seed, of course, too, but you play at all stages. Have you thought about going after that space like pretty hardcore?
How have you thought about where you situate in the ecosystem?
Yeah, you know, it's funny because Paul and us started, you know, around the same time. He started a little earlier. And, you know, we talked to him quite a bit during that phase when he was running Y Combinator out of his house with Jessica. And, you know, I have to say, we never really thought about kind of being Y Combinator. And I think, look, a lot of it has to do, you know, my philosophy of business is you have to start with, okay, what can you contribute that's going to be important in the world that nobody can do better than you? And, you know, for us, a big thing that we had done is we had scaled companies built into very large size.
That wasn't really kind of Paul's experience, but he had thought super deeply about like the very initial kind of part of it. So I think that was the right thing for him to do and we did the right thing for us to do. And I think the world was better with us doing our thing and him doing his thing, but like he's got a great business. Totally. And so you're a product, you're not- Like he and his success. Yes, totally. Most venture firms are a collection of investors. You're a collection of venture firms in some ways where you have these distinct, you know, American Dynamism and bio and crypto and games, these different practices.
Should other firms think, are you guys ahead of a curve and other people, other firms will follow you or talk about the evolution to that structure and why that made so much sense?
Yeah. So it's interesting. So when we started the firm, there's a lot of conventional wisdom in venture capital. Like there are only 15 deals a year that are ever going to make it to a hundred million dollars. You know, it's a cottage industry. Done by, like, you can only learn it through apprenticeship and all the, you know, a lot of concepts, which I think were probably correct at the time, but the thing that we believed then, and Mark kind of encapsulated it at PC wrote in 2011 called Software is Eating the World, was the software industry was going to grow a hundredfold. And so 15 companies can be 150 companies, and, like, things were going to change.
And so in order to kind of be the preeminent venture capital firm, you were going to have to be a lot bigger. So we kind of saw that from the outset. And so we set ourselves up to be able to kind of organize, reorganize, evolve. And if you look at the firm now, what it is is it's, right, it's a collection of the original Andreessen Horowitz, where every market has a platform that's appropriate to that market and an investing team that is focused on that market. And I think that that's the future of venture capital. When we think about who's really an interesting competitor, it's the pure crypto firm, the pure games firm, the pure AI firm, more than the generalist firm that's trying to cover all of that with the old structure.
I think that's going to be harder for them.
Erik Torenberg
Speaking of the future of venture, will venture firms consider going public or should they consider like a YC or like you guys or firms that achieve such level of scale?
Ben Horowitz
Yeah. So there's a real interesting alignment problem with going public if you're a venture capital firm and it's as follows. So if you look at Apollo or Blackstone or any of these guys, private equity companies that have gone public, the public markets value them on their fee stream much more than on their investment returns. I think that's a safer kind of alignment between the investors and the firms in private equity than it is in venture capital. I think in venture capital, that can get super dangerous because even at 100x, what it used to be, the entire venture capital market is not that big and is, you know, like the amount of capital versus the amount of great ideas. Like we already have more capital than great ideas. And as we saw, I think, with both SoftBank and Tiger Global, if you try to change that demand supply imbalance, you just end up creating a mess. And so if you were public, you'd have a strong incentive to create a mess. So they went big and created a mess, but you guys went big in some ways, right? Your volume was very high. Your funds raised is very high. You went big in a much better way. Would you dispute that?
We didn't go $100 billion big. And then I think Tiger was raising $12 billion a year. So they were bigger than us just technically. So yeah, look, we've scaled to basically size our funds to the market opportunities. So the way we look at it is like in a two to three year timeframe, how many great deals will we see in a category and then try to size the fund to basically cover that time period is kind of roughly how we do it. And that's certainly increased fund sizes, both fund sizes and the number of funds over the years. But it's still really contained compared to what you do if you were just scaling assets. I think it's still way smaller than what Apollo or Vista or somebody would do in that kind of business. So, yeah, so I think that misalignment is pretty tricky for venture capital to overcome. Like, I haven't figured out a way where you would overcome that yet.
Erik Torenberg
Right. So a firm that stayed diligent, like a USV or diligent on fund size, you know, a benchmark or kind of stays at 500 or 250 respectively, they believe that they can get better multiples on that much smaller fund size. What do you believe that they don't believe that in terms of justify why it goes so much bigger?
Ben Horowitz
Yeah, so I think the market's just gotten bigger. So I think the way to think about it is if you believe the market was fixed at 15 companies, then that's the exact right strategy. Right. And we don't believe that. And I think that I'm not allowed to talk about our fund returns because we're an RIA. But if you look at our funds, I think our larger funds have at times like way outperformed our smaller funds. And that's just kind of a function of, look, if there were 15 companies and now there's 150, then if you had a $400 million fund, then maybe you need a $4 billion fund to do the same deals.
If you win the same percentage of them. And, you know, like that's just a simple math. And I think that there are, look, They think Benchmark believes what they believe, we believe what we believe. And again our mission isn't fun turns. We have a mission to help the best entrepreneurs in the world build the best companies that they can. And so you know we generally come at like the whole structure of what we do from that perspective. I think also, look, I could, we could all get much higher salaries if we didn't organize the firm the way we did. But, you know, like our mission isn't to maximize the number of money per partner.
Our mission is to kind kind of be the resource for building great technology companies. So it's just like a different point of view.
Erik Torenberg
And how do you recruit such amazing partners if at other firms, because they don't have these resources, maybe they can get higher salaries, or there's certain perks of being at one of those firms. How do you think about recruiting the best talent at a reason?
Ben Horowitz
Yeah, well, I think that people here, it's actually helpful that we kind of pay lower salaries to me because we get people who are on mission. Fair line. And, you know, like there's a, for example, there's this kind of thing in venture capital that a lot of venture capital say, well, spend all your time with your winners. Like we don't believe in that at all. Now, like if you look at a spreadsheet, that's the exact right thing, right? Like because the whatever three winners are going to produce all the returns. But the way we look at it is, you know, several, one, we're not so confident that we know who the winners are for a long time.
The other thing is that we kind of have the philosophy is, look, we knew the job was dangerous when we took it. If you're going to take us as your partner, we're going to be there until the bitter end. And having been very close to the bitter end myself from time to time, you really do need kind of support or at least somebody to talk to when you're in that situation. And because just from a competitive standpoint, our whole idea is that we sell on reputation. That's fundamentally important to our competitive advantage is to have the best reputation. So all those things kind of cause us to behave differently.
And if you're not into that, if you're into the spreadsheet view of venture capital, then you would hate that idea. So it actually works for us in that sense.
Erik Torenberg
And because you've spent the last decade plus building this brand reputation, there's lots of other things that you could do. You can get into things beyond venture, right? Some firms get into sort of more public investing, get into wealth management. They get into other products that serve kind of adjacent customers or serve their customers in adjacent ways. How do you think about what makes sense to get into versus what doesn't make sense to get into given that your brand enables these opportunities?
Ben Horowitz
Yeah, so the way to think about what we've done so far and what we'll do in the future is the customer is the founder for us. So we start with the founder. And the initial promise is we're going to help you raise money. We're going to help you develop into a CEO. We're going to build you a network that's as good as Bob Iger's. We're going to help you, train you into the job. And we're going to support you in every way that we can through our financial network to help you kind of build this company. And in our view, we'd like to extend that through the founder's entire life from the time they found the company to the time they become a philanthropist. And so anything in that realm we feel like is kind of things that we ought to at least consider doing. And which ones we do and which order we'll see. Depending on where the gaps in the market are and what makes sense for us.
Erik Torenberg
One thing we've talked about off camera is that one thing that enables you to take such big swings or make these changes when the market changes is your unique approach to sort of governance or control. Why don't you talk about that relative to other venture firms?
Ben Horowitz
Yeah, it's interesting. It's kind of a concept that we got from a couple of people. One was Herb Allen, who you know, I think, and then the other was Mark's father-in-law. Hey, we'll continue our interview in a moment after a word from our sponsors. Learn more at carter.com slash turpentine. That's carter.com slash turpentine. And they both kind of gave us the same idea, which, so traditionally in venture capital, I think it looks a little like a law firm or, you know, kind of a lot of these partnership structures where you have shared economics and shared control. And like from a partner standpoint, there's a lot, you know, that makes a lot of sense in a lot of ways.
We have a different structure where we're shared economics, but we've kind of centralized control. And that enables us, by not having shared control, we can change the structure of the firm very easily. And if you want to grow, like so if you want to go in an integrated way, like you could have, oh, that's the Chinese subsidiary or whatever, and that's a whole other entity, and we talk to them once every six months. That's not what I'm talking about. But if you want to grow in an integrated way with a kind of single culture, single offering, then you have to be able to change the organizational structure, you know, as you get bigger.
So, like, the structure that you had at 50 people is just not going to work at 500, and that's for any organization. But in order to do that, somebody's got to be able to make that decision with no politicking, no arguing, no, you know, like, there will be tears because whoever loses power is going to, like, be upset about it. But you have to be able to make those tough decisions to get to the structure that you need to be maximally effective. And that's just really hard to do, I think. I don't know how you would do it with shared control.
Erik Torenberg
Let's get back to the future of venture. Let's say we're having this conversation 10 years from now or 15 years from now. Does venture kind of look, does the trends that are happening now continue to happen where there's just this bifurcation, multi-stage firms become even more multi-asset firms that just get bigger and bigger and bigger and this sort of solo GP or small specialists kind of this barbell? Do new models come into play, like venture studios really take off? Or do emerging technology like Web3 or AI really change how venture works? Say more about the future of venture.
Ben Horowitz
Yeah, no, like all possibilities. I mean, look, I think the kind of classical venture firm that is just like a collection of smart investors, like I think that's probably run its course. So I think you have to be like a top-end, like serious brand that can marshal resources and money and considered smart money and people want to follow. You know, I put us in that category, Sequoia. You know, there's that class of thing. And then there's people who are very specialized in a very kind of specific part of the market and know that network and have really great specific expertise and they'd probably be more early stage, I would think.
And those two things seem pretty solid, at least for the next five, 10 years. Everything else, a little more questionable. I think, you know, with the studio model, Well, to me, the big problem with that historically, and I think Bill Gross was probably the greatest practitioner of that historically, is that it's not an idea. It's an idea maze. Yeah. And so it's very hard to run through the idea maze if it's not your idea. And so I think that tends to be problematic. That's kind of, it's a little bit of a design for the head of the studio's lifestyle and kind of capabilities as opposed to what's going to make a great company.
And so I don't know that that's ever going to work. And I thought Paul's genius was the ideas weren't his. And that was the difference between an incubator and an accelerator. And that, I think, you know, just proved to be the right model. And the reason it's the right model is because whoever's building the company, it better be their idea.
Erik Torenberg
When you identify an emerging trend, whether it's Web3, whether it's AI, whether it's companies that get big and it's really big, really fast during the pandemic, let's say, and some people are more prudent about it, some people are more bullish, and I put you guys more in the bullish camp. Smart bullish, but bullish. And is the logic there that, hey, not everything's going to work out, but the things that work just work so much that it just really makes sense to be extremely bullish? I guess when you reflect on the past few years and things that you went really hard on, if you were to do versions again going forward and future, now this AI wave, of course, how do you think about riding trends and how hard to ride them?
Ben Horowitz
If you look at the history of technology, almost everything eventually worked. All the stuff, go back to 1999, 2001, and all the dot bombs. Oh, that's the dumbest. Ha, ha, ha. Pets.com. How stupid. You know, like all that stuff. You know, and then diapers.com sells for $800 million later. It was just a little ahead of its time. And I think the beauty of venture capital is you can make the bet. And if you're too early, you can make the bet again. So if a clean energy craze happened again, And if you guys were around during that time, do you think you would have bet big there and just said, hey, we're 10 years earlier?
Well, that one is a little different in that that was like a politically motivated market, which is a different kind of a thing. I mean, I think, so we're big believers in software. And if there's like a massive software breakthrough that has new applications or new models or these kinds of things, and we'd certainly be all on that. Anything like AI or crypto or, you know, or like, you know, what's going on in games, Like, we'd bet that every time. I think, you know, with the studio model, Well, to me, the big problem with that historically, and I think Bill Gross was probably the greatest practitioner of that historically, is that it's not an idea.
It's an idea maze. Yeah. And so it's very hard to run through the idea maze if it's not your idea. And so I think that tends to be problematic. That's kind of, it's a little bit of a design for the head of the studio's lifestyle and kind of capabilities as opposed to what's going to make a great company. And so I don't know that that's ever going to work. And I thought Paul's genius was the ideas weren't his. And that was the difference between an incubator and an accelerator. And that, I think, you know, just proved to be the right model. And the reason it's the right model is because whoever's building the company, it better be their idea.
Erik Torenberg
You mentioned earlier that you consider your peers as the best kind of specialist firms and you compete with those firms. Do you also see your peers or competitors, other multi-asset firms that are not even in venture? As you get bigger and bigger AUM, are there firms that you see yourself as veering into their space?
Ben Horowitz
It's funny because I've spent some time with both the folks at BlackRock and at Apollo just trying to understand their structure and why they're public and these kinds of things. And I would say they are culturally, philosophically, operationally the opposite of us. So like they're very, very price focused. They're optimizers. They're, you know, efficiency experts. Like we don't care about any of that. What we care about is like, is it a real breakthrough and how big can we help make it? You know, can it win the market? Like those are the things that drive us. So there's nothing about what they do that would make them good at what we do. And there's nothing about what we do that would make us good at what they do. So I think we'll never get into that realm.
Erik Torenberg
Yeah. And when people focus so much on returns, it's important to think about just the LP product. My understanding of the SoftBank thesis was that this is a place that LP could plow a ton of capital and get some consistent return. And there's not that many places where you could just plow all that capital into one place and get that kind of diversification. How do you think about the LP product that you're offering?
Ben Horowitz
We think about LPs differently. So we think about LPs, or the way we like to think about them is the same way a company would think about its VC. So we're not building a product for them. We're building a product for founders. And they can invest in that product. And then there's a couple of things we think about there. One is we want to have the kind of investors that we want to be in business with for a very long time. So we choose them very carefully. And two, we want to treat them like investors. And I think sometimes venture capitalists make the mistake of not doing that, which, what does that mean? And it means, well, like you shouldn't have them invest if you don't respect their opinion, aren't interested in what they have to say, don't want to keep them up to date on what you're doing. Like then you're not treating them like investors if you don't do that. And I think what we're going to find out in this kind of particular interest rate change environment is that like the VCs who didn't treat their LPs like investors are going to be in for what that means in bad times.
Erik Torenberg
Does macro inform your firm's strategy?
Ben Horowitz
No. I think we've got to be very careful about that, in fact. So one, macro, in our view, is highly unpredictable. Right. So that's the first thing. And so we don't try to predict it. Yep. And then secondly, we have a 10-year horizon on exits. So if we invest in a company today, we're expecting it to come out in the environment in 2033. And so in 2033, the idea that we could predict that macroeconomic environment is like pretty absurd to me. Like even to talk about it sounds weird. Hey, we'll continue our interview in a moment after a word from our sponsors. Turpentine VC is proudly sponsored by Synaptic.
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And so you get into that kind of situation. It's like, that's not even smart for you. Like, you know, it's kind of like you're a bad person for not calling back somebody you invested in. But like, that's not even smart for you. Like, what are you doing? Like, you don't know what's going to happen in 2033. Right. Makes sense.
Erik Torenberg
When you started the firm, people like Michael Ovitz and others gave you advice on how to think about the firm in a different way based on the market at the time. I'm curious for the next Ben Horowitz and Mark Andreessen out there who are 20 years or 30 years younger, whatever, just starting out, but want to build the next A16Z. But they're looking at the market at 2023. Let's say they're coming to you guys for advice and you wanted to give them advice. How would you think about creating the next A16Z starting in 2023, given where the market is today?
Ben Horowitz
There already is A16Z. The Uberflex is Uber. No, if they wanted to create a Hollywood talent agency, then I would have plenty of advice for them, maybe. Fair enough.
Erik Torenberg
You've coined the term wartime CEO, peacetime CEO. I'm curious if we could think about wartime VC. Because right now it's a tough time in markets, tough time to get a firm off the ground. People are more skeptical about venture. People are skeptical about tech more broadly. It's an anti-time of anti-tech. What it's like to be a wartime VC or to be techno-optimist in a world that is increasingly pessimistic.
Ben Horowitz
Yeah, so I think the biggest kind of war kind of issue that we have is actually probably with the regulatory environment and some of the ideas of the kind of current administration where they have become anti-innovation. And look, we've already seen like a pretty large percentage of the crypto venture capital go overseas. So the idea that the United States would forfeit the internet of property rights and money at such an early stage in its life, it just feels so absurd. It doesn't even feel like America in that way. And the literally fake things that they're blaming it on, like, oh, crypto's funding fentanyl.
I read that today. I was like, what the hell are you talking about? It's like literally the most transparent form of payment that there is in the world, like more than Visa, more than dollars, more than anything. And like for somebody, you know, a senator to come out and say some just completely something that she no doubt knows isn't true, you know, to kind of push innovation overseas is like that's a real wartime kind of situation for us in innovation land. And I think we're seeing the same thing in AI. We certainly have struggles for a different reason in bio and that kind of technology. But like, so I'll just give you an idea.
On bio, though, the FTC recently sued to break up a deal between a bio startup and a kind of big pharma company. Like, it's pretty impossible to do drug, to fund drug development if there's no M&A market. So to literally outlaw new science for health, new financial technology, new kind of property rights in the virtual world is a really hard stance for us to understand. So we are working with policymakers and trying to understand, OK, because it's not all like bananas. Some of it certainly makes sense. But to kind of shape that for like a future that's prosperous for America is like a big effort from the firm, and we're working hard on that.
But that feels like wartime. That feels like, okay, now we have an actual threat, existential threat to innovation in America. You know, in terms of being a tech optimist, I always like to go back to a quote from Andy Grove, which I absolutely love, which he said in the 90s. And somebody asked him, they said, Andy, is the microprocessor good or bad? And he said, well, that's not even the right question. That's like asking, is steel good or bad? It is. And so it's our job to make it good. And that's a lot how I feel about kind of all these technologies is they are going to exist. Like you cannot, you can't get rid of the wheel now.
Like it's over, like it's here. You can't get rid of AI now. It's over, it's here. Like, you can't outlaw math. You can't, like, that paper's already out there. Like, you're not going to stop it. Like, the whole idea that you're going to stop people from doing it is just so crazy. So then the real question is, like, okay, what do we have to do to make it good and positive for society and so forth? And by the way, without new technologies, like, how are we going to deal with pandemics or climate change or any of the real, you know, issues facing the world? Like it's not even possible without technology.
Like lockdowns didn't work. None of the policy stuff worked. You know what works? Paxlovid. That works. You have COVID, you take that, like you're good. That works. So we need technological solutions to these very, very daunting problems that we have with more and more populous earth and all these kinds of things. So, you know, that's how we remained optimistic.
Erik Torenberg
Yeah. And maybe gearing towards closing here, So as I mentioned to you, you guys have been very helpful to us. You know, we're seeking to create this new kind of tech media company. It's more driven by insiders. It has more of a pro-tech approach. What advice would you have for us? Or when you look at the kind of media ecosystem, what more do you want to see?
Ben Horowitz
Yeah, well, I think you're on like a really good track, which is, you know, what I want to see is, okay, I'm a young person and I want to understand where the world is going and what's happening and how I can get involved. And make my contribution, what do I need to know? And I think that's, you know, like, how does AI work? What is this new computational model of the universe? How can I learn about it? How can I kind of push things forward? Which is, like, largely absent, I would say. I mean, I think you're walking into a vacuum is the good news. But, you know, when I was a kid, there used to be, like, Dr.
Dobbs, you know, and Wired Magazine was that way for a long time. But now it's just like these weird politically charged whatever criticisms of how things are run or how things are built or what they're going to do or every negative consequence of everything. The internet had so many negative consequences. But I don't think if we got rid of it, then if you're in Bangladesh, you now have no access to any of the information that people in the rich world have. It's done amazingly great things. But like, yes, there's cybercrime. Yes, there's porn. Yes, there's a lot of things that, you know, probably are not a general positive for society.
I think people over-abstracted from the Elizabeth Holmes or Theranos situation. Yeah. Identified, hey, I could make a career. There's, you know, finding more of these, and there's got to be more of these. Thinking that over-abstraction and then other over, you know, abstraction was around sort of defending democracy, you know, you know, because Facebook somehow, people's minds contributed to Trump. Well, the funny thing was, like, if you go back to 2008, all the stories on how Obama got elected were Facebook. Like, he mastered Facebook. He got elected on Facebook. Facebook's the greatest thing.
It's making the world more democratic. Arab Spring. Wow, this is so awesome. And then Trump gets elected, and it's like, this is a threat to democracy. We're all screwed. Gotta shut down the social network. So, you know, like, it's interesting, you know, when things get political, they get very weird very fast, I think. And what's funny now, and we'll get it too close, is AI is, it's now coming from within the house in terms of some of the people who are most active are, like, are within tech in terms